Introduction

For countries as for people, there can be few surer prescriptions for disaster than commitment to an undertaking that is inadequately understood and from which there seems to be no turning back. Because it takes two to make peace, but only one to make war, and because pride inhibits the admission of gross error, wars are undertakings from which extrication is peculiarly difficult. There is widespread understanding of conventional wars as they have been fought among the modern powers, and there is enough knowledge of nuclear war—if something so apocalyptic can be called war—to tell us that it must be prevented. There are, however, wars of another, or third, kind, neither nuclear nor conventional, to which a major power may become almost inadvertently committed. Because of the reliance of one side on hit-and-run operations, these conflicts are usually called *guerrilla wars*. The term, however, is incompletely descriptive: the reliance of the one side on guerrilla operations may be only partial; it may over time gain the capacity to wage battles of position and maneuver; and its opponent may attempt throughout the conflict to fight a conventional war. Accordingly, a more appropriate designation for such conflicts might be *wars of the third kind*.

The disparities in strength between great powers and less developed lands, and between regular armies and guerrilla bands,

have commonly led civilian and military leaders to predict that wars of the third kind upon which they embark will be short and easily won. But the reverse has almost invariably been the case. In 1774 George III, having decided that the American colonies should be reduced to obedience, predicted that "once these rebels have felt a smart blow, they will submit." Seven years of exchanging blows provided the measure of his miscalculation. In 1808 Napoleon invaded economically backward Spain in what was intended to be a war of quick decision. It too lasted seven years; it cost Napoleon half a million men he could ill afford to lose; and it introduced into English the Spanish word *guerrilla*. In the latter part of 1899 General Elwell S. Otis was telling American correspondents in Manila that the conflict we call the Philippine Insurrection was over; actually, its guerrilla phase had just begun and would last for upward of five years. In December 1946 Chiang Kai-shek expressed to General George C. Marshall his confidence that he could exterminate the forces of the Chinese Communists in a matter of months; less than three years later, all mainland China was in their hands. The list of such cases might be extended indefinitely, and it would be hard to find the exception that is supposed to confirm the rule.

In 1962, with his eyes on the growing American involvement in Vietnam, President Kennedy declared that guerrilla wars required "a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore a new and wholly different kind of military training."[1] (In this view he was contradicted by the Army chief of staff, who asserted that "any good soldier can handle guerrillas.")[2] Six years later, after the United States had decided to hold peace talks with North Vietnam, Henry Kissinger in effect declared that no such strategy had been found. The strategies we had brought to the Vietnam conflict had been failures, he said, and if we were to avoid similar disasters, which might look quite different but would embody the same essentials, we would have to reassess the ideas that got us involved there.[3]

It cannot be expected that a conceptual study relevant to such wars—wars that in essence are the same, however much they may differ in their particulars—will be made by a high govern-

ment official. In general, the higher the official, the wider the range of matters with which he or she is concerned, and breadth implies a sacrifice of depth. During my own government service, spent below those echelons, I had unusual opportunities to observe and consider conflicts in which guerrilla operations played a substantial role. Because that service provided the foundation for my further study of the subject, leading to the writing of this book, it is owing to the reader to provide a brief account of it.

I spent the eight years between the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937 and the end of World War II in 1945 in China as a Foreign Service officer with Chinese language and area training. During the first half of that period, I was stationed successively in three cities when they were taken over by Japanese forces—Peking, Canton, and Foochow—and experienced a fourth occupation when the Japanese evacuated Foochow and it was retaken by the Chinese. Accordingly, what I first witnessed were conventional military operations viewed chiefly from the vantage point of urban centers, and when I first heard claims being made for the effectiveness of the guerrilla warfare being conducted by the Chinese Communists behind the Japanese lines I received them with disbelief.

I was at that time serving in Chungking, the wartime capital, but in 1943 I began a two-year assignment as a reporting officer on detached service in a region just south of the communist area centered at Yenan and immediately west of the Japanese lines. While on this assignment I learned that the Communists' armed formations and political cadres had indeed gained control—at the expense of both stay-behind nationalist forces, which were no match for them, and the invading Japanese—over wide areas of North China. During those years I was able to gauge the performance of both Chinese communist and nationalist forces against the Japanese, and also against each other. I had for some time believed that the end of World War II would be followed by the resumption of China's nationalist-communist civil war, and I now became convinced the Nationalists would not win it. I also began to fear that the Chinese Nationalists, who had done little fighting against the Japanese since our entry into the war in 1941, would continue to look

to us for help against their communist enemies, and that we might become disastrously involved. I could not, however, foresee how many years would pass before we put that possibility behind us.

In August 1945, with the surrender of Japan, I was ordered to proceed to Washington on transfer to the Department of State, and the first leg of my journey took me back to Chungking. While there I paid a call on Major General Patrick J. Hurley, who had been appointed ambassador to China late the previous year. I had heard little about him except that he cut a most handsome figure, dominated conversations with practiced facility, and liked when elated to let out war whoops, a practice perhaps related to his having grown up in Oklahoma when it was Indian territory. General Hurley had been sent to China with the missions of harmonizing relations between Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and General Joseph W. Stilwell, commander of the U.S. forces in China, and of bringing about the unification of the military forces of China in the interests of the war against Japan. The Chinese quickly convinced Hurley that Stilwell had to go, and he was replaced by General Albert C. Wedemeyer, whom Chiang found much more amenable. Nominally, Chinese communist forces had been a part of the government's military establishment since 1937—they had been given government unit designations and their commander in chief had accepted a government appointment. But a truly unified command could only be established as part of a political settlement. General Hurley had tried to bring about such a settlement and it had thus far eluded him, but he was continuing his efforts because without a settlement there would be a renewal of civil war.

While discussing his problems during my call, General Hurley expressed the belief that the Chinese Communists were not truly Communists—a view with which I was prepared to dissent, had he given me the opportunity. The main difference between them and his fellow Republicans back in Oklahoma, he declared, was that the Chinese Communists were armed. Hurley nevertheless made it clear that he conceived it to be U.S. policy to support the Nationalists against the Communists. The Communists were at that point attempting to assert

the right to participate in taking the Japanese surrender, and Hurley declared with evident satisfaction that any Japanese troops who surrendered their weapons to communist units would be required to go get them back. As he rose from his chair and began to accompany me to the door, he related—perhaps to convince me of his determination—an account of an engagement during World War I in which a large proportion of his command had become casualties, but that had ended with him still holding his ground.

At that point there were about sixty thousand American servicemen in China, many of them carrying out a U.S. commitment to train and equip thirty-nine divisions of Chinese troops and an air force of eight and one third groups. U.S. forces also were beginning the task of assisting the Chinese government to reoccupy Japanese-held areas of China by providing airlift and sealift to East and North China for some half a million nationalist troops. In addition, about fifty thousand U.S. marines were landed in North China, where they took responsibility for keeping rail lines in operation and repatriating Japanese troops and civilians. The instructions under which they operated called for their avoiding involvement in Chinese civil strife, but with clashes occurring as a result of nationalist troops being transported into communist-held areas of North China and Manchuria, such involvement was sometimes unavoidable.

Such was the situation in China in the autumn of 1945 when I began what was to be a three-year assignment in the State Department's Division of Chinese Affairs. General Hurley had come to Washington on consultation in September, and toward the end of November, instead of returning to China, he abruptly sent President Truman a letter of resignation. The president then appointed General George C. Marshall to serve as his special representative in China entrusted with promoting the peaceful settlement between the two Chinese sides that had eluded General Hurley. I thought Marshall's mission was doomed from the start, inasmuch as I was convinced that the differences between the Nationalists and the Communists were irreconcilable. Like oil and water shaken together, it seemed for a time that they might be successfully combined, but a cease-fire agreement reached in January 1946 was never really kept. Ne-

gotiations broke down, and after a year's effort Marshall came home to assume the position of secretary of state. Viewed solely in the context of its announced purpose, Marshall's mission had been a failure, but seen from a broader standpoint, it was not without important accomplishments. It had gained the time needed for the bulk of U.S. military personnel in China to complete their tasks and come home, without becoming seriously involved in that country's civil war.

In the Department of State, the officers of the Division of Chinese Affairs did not learn of the decision to send General Marshall to China until it was announced by the White House. This struck me at the time as extraordinary, but I was later to realize that at the highest level in Washington, where the most important decisions are reached, the number of those participating is likely to be the smallest. Moreover, had I been consulted, I would not have been able to demonstrate that the Marshall Mission would be unable to achieve its announced purpose, for I reached that conclusion through an intuition born of numerous inputs, many of which would have been beyond conscious recall. (I subsequently was interested to learn, in this general connection, that Dean Acheson, while secretary of state, had great difficulty in accepting some of the recommendations of such eminent Foreign Service officers as George Kennan and Charles Bohlen because they had not been reached through a consciously formulated series of steps. What Acheson needed in his dealings with the president was communicable wisdom, rather than mere conclusions, however soundly based in experience or intuition.[4] This, I suspect, is a problem that will often characterize relations between career Foreign Service officers and the politically appointed officials under whom they serve.)

General Marshall assumed his new responsibilities early in 1947, and during the first six months of his incumbency, the tide of battle in the Chinese civil war turned against the Nationalists. The Chinese government had begun the civil war with an estimated five-to-one superiority in combat troops and rifles, a virtual monopoly of heavy equipment and transport, and an unopposed air arm.[5] It had been provided with the assistance of a joint U.S. military advisory group; large quantities of arms and ammunition, much of it gratis; Lend-Lease aid; and

Export-Import Bank credits, in large part still unused.[6] Nevertheless, the Truman administration was coming under powerful pressure from elements in the country and in the Congress that charged it with not having done enough on behalf of the Chinese government and that seemed to want the United States to involve itself inextricably in what many of us saw as a hopeless cause.

In July 1947, on the recommendation of General Marshall, President Truman directed General Wedemeyer, known to be a firm friend of the nationalist government, to proceed to China on a fact-finding mission. While in China, in accordance with a suggestion by Chiang Kai-shek, Wedemeyer addressed an assemblage of high officials of the Chinese government. He declared that the government could not defeat the Communists by force, but only by winning the support of the people through political and economic reforms. Chiang was offended, and in effect rejected this prescription: in discussions with Wedemeyer he said that when the problem of the Communists had been solved—presumably by military means—he would be able to concentrate on political and economic reforms.[7] Shortly after Wedemeyer's departure, Chiang asserted in a speech to Kuomintang leaders that China would never again depend on the United States for assistance, and that, while remaining friendly with the United States, China would have to strengthen its relations with the Soviet Union.[8]

In his report to the president, General Wedemeyer at one point expressed the opinion that a U.S. policy conducted "without regard to the continued existence of an unpopular repressive government would render any aid ineffective." General Marshall would certainly have agreed. Marshall's year's effort in China would surely have taught him that Chiang, as he made explicit to Wedemeyer, was intent on dealing with the Communists first, and would leave the matter of reforms for later. Why, then, did he advise the president to send Wedemeyer on this mission? I was told at the time by Arthur Ringwalt, chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs and my immediate superior, that its purpose was to relieve the pressure for a deeper U.S. commitment, and thus to gain time.

Having completed his mission and submitted his report,

Wedemeyer was admonished by Marshall to scrupulously avoid discussing its contents with anyone. When a copy was supplied to us in the Division of Chinese Affairs, it was with a similar warning. In justifying his suppression of the report, Marshall subsequently described it as motivated by the belief that one of Wedemeyer's recommendations—that Manchuria, then being overrun by Chinese communist forces, should be placed under a five-power or U.N. trusteeship—would be resented by the Chinese as an attempt to alienate Chinese territory. In addition, I suspect, Marshall found another of Wedemeyer's recommendations even more objectionable. In an annex to his report, despite what he had said about the unsuitability of aid not accompanied by reforms, Wedemeyer recommended that U.S. military advice and supervision be extended in scope to include Chinese forces in the field.[9] He estimated that extending such assistance down to the regimental level would require about ten thousand commissioned and noncommissioned officers.[10] This would have been a long step toward full military intervention, and in discussing the matter with Walton W. Butterworth, director of the State Department's Office of Far Eastern Affairs, Marshall declared that if he were to intervene militarily, he would need half a million men just to start with. And how, he asked, would he ever be able to extricate them?[11] It will be appreciated that we in the Division of Chinese Affairs abided gladly, as well as scrupulously, by General Marshall's injunction not to disclose the contents of the Wedemeyer Report.

In March 1949 I was transferred to Manila, where I served for two years as chief of the U.S. Embassy's political section. It was the time of the rebellion of the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (HMB), successors of the wartime Hukbalahap guerrillas. The HMB was under the direction of the Philippine Communist Party, which was hoping to succeed through the strategy by which the Chinese Communists were defeating the Nationalists on the adjacent Asian mainland. It was my responsibility in Manila to learn all I could about the Huks, to follow both their operations and the efforts of the government to suppress them closely, and to prepare analytical reports on the rebellion for transmission to Washington. It also fell to my lot on occasion to recommend measures the United States might

undertake, and one such occasion came just after a number of spectacularly successful Huk raids, conducted simultaneously on the 29 March 1950 anniversary of the founding of the Hukbalahap.

As was made evident in a report I drafted on behalf of the embassy at that time, the Philippine armed forces were in urgent need of better and stronger military leadership. Our report stated: "So long as the Constabulary seize foodstuffs without paying for them, become drunk and disorderly, extract information by inhumane methods, abuse women, shoot up country towns and mistreat the populace, just so long will they continue to lose the Philippines to the HMB." In that same message we recommended that the United States assign to Manila, in an advisory role, military personnel with knowledge of and experience with political subversion and guerrilla warfare such as the Philippine government was facing.[12]

Somewhat later Ambassador Myron M. Cowen invited a number of us, including Major General Jonathan W. Anderson, chief of the joint U.S. military advisory group, to accompany him on a trip aboard the embassy air attaché's plane. During our flight, General Anderson told me that President Elpidio Quirino was going to appoint a new secretary of national defense and had asked for his recommendations. Anderson then produced a list of a number of possible choices, which we discussed. It contained the name of Ramon Magsaysay, and because I knew him to have had wartime guerrilla experience, I said he was the one I would recommend—as did Ambassador Cowen. Magsaysay undoubtedly was the first choice of General Anderson, who knew him well in his capacity as chairman of the armed forces committee of the Philippine lower house. In any event, on 1 September 1950, President Quirino appointed Magsaysay secretary of national defense, and while I was one of those who took satisfaction in the appointment, I would never have imagined how successful he would prove to be. Nor, for that matter, did I know Colonel, later Major General, Edward G. Lansdale, sent to the Philippines in an advisory role such as I had envisaged, whose relationship with Magsaysay was to prove so fruitful.

Not long after Magsaysay assumed office, he is said to have

played an important role in the discovery in a downtown Manila office building of the headquarters of the Philippine Communist Party and in the arrest of a number of its leaders. A night raid on that headquarters yielded a great quantity of documents. The embassy was able to obtain photocopies of these, and their contents contributed greatly to our knowledge of both the Huks and the Philippine Communist Party.

In 1951—the same year, incidentally, in which the Huk rebellion was reaching and passing its peak—I had the good fortune to be chosen to spend a year as a student at the National War College, followed by a tour of duty at Stuttgart as consul general and land commissioner for Baden-Württemberg under the U.S. High Commission for Germany. Baden-Württemberg contained the headquarters of the U.S. Army, Europe, at Heidelberg, as well as those of the U.S. Eighth Army and its Fifth Corps, both in Stuttgart itself. The Fifth Corps was commanded by Lieutenant General James M. Gavin: already the author of *Airborne Warfare,* he was well read in the field of unconventional military operations and made available to me a number of works on the subject that might otherwise never have come to my attention.

In the autumn of 1959 I became a member of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, soon thereafter redesignated the Policy Planning Council, and in the files left behind by a predecessor I found a voluminous study of irregular warfare in Colombia and an instructive report on what was called the Emergency in Malaya. This led me to begin working on what was intended to be a paper on the subject of wars of the kind through which the Chinese Communists had come to power, and that I had followed in the Philippines, but also based on the materials I had found in the files. However, I soon was assigned instead to other work on the grounds that guerrilla warfare was a military subject.

John F. Kennedy held the quite different view that guerrilla warfare, in which he had a lively interest, was political as well as military in nature, and after his inauguration in January 1961 all parts of the foreign affairs apparatus of the government were called upon to concern themselves with counterinsurgency. In the early 1960s President Sukarno seemed to be allying himself

with the Communist Party of Indonesia; he talked much of a Djakarta–Phnom Penh–Peking–Pyongyang axis; and one was bound to surmise that he was being encouraged in Peking, where he was a welcome visitor, in his paramilitary attacks on Malaysia. And the Middle Eastern oil on which Japan was vitally dependent had to pass by tanker through the Strait of Malacca, flanked by Indonesia and Malaysia—a circumstance that suggested that the assumed collaboration between China and Indonesia represented a threat that was not limited to Malaysia. Moreover, communist China was giving political, economic, and military assistance to North Vietnam, contributing to the impression that it was thrusting outward. We could not then foresee that Sukarno would be overthrown in an anticommunist coup in the latter part of 1965, or that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the People's Republic of China would in 1979 fight a border war.

Against the background of the world view that then prevailed in Washington, and in the atmosphere of compulsive activism that characterized the new administration, I drafted a paper for the Policy Planning Council proposing that U.S. embassies in countries deemed vulnerable to communist insurgency be instructed to prepare appraisals of the situation in their host nations, including a statement of what each country's government needed to do for the purpose of improving its administration and attracting the support of its people and an estimate of its ability to take the requisite measures. The governments in question were to be encouraged to carry those measures out, with the United States standing ready to supply the difference between what needed to be done and what they could do for themselves. This had about it an element of accepting imperial responsibilities without having imperial authority, which troubled me at the time, though I was less dubious then than I have since become about the utility of interventions in the affairs of other lands. In any case, though my paper underwent much change at other hands, the approach I had suggested was incorporated in relevant National Security Action memorandums and led to the formulation by U.S. embassies in a number of countries of so-called Country Internal Defense Plans.[13]

It was not the intention, in my own mind at least, that U.S.

commitments to foreign governments should be open-ended, and it was particularly in the sphere of military involvement that I believed limits needed to be observed. Thus, on 11 May 1961, I prepared on behalf of the Policy Planning Council a memorandum commenting on a National Security Council paper and dissenting with some courses of action proposed to be taken by the United States with respect to the deteriorating situation in South Vietnam. In that memorandum, an expurgated copy of which has been released to me under the Freedom of Information Act, I wrote: "We are skeptical of the utility of employing US flag forces in a counter-guerrilla capacity in Vietnam. If the measures outlined in this plan prove insufficient, we doubt the situation will be remediable through the use of foreign troops." I realized, I added, that this ran counter to the expressed opinions of Lieutenant General Lionel C. McGarr, chief of the U.S. Military Mission in Saigon, who was being quoted as saying that he could clean up the Viet Cong in a few months with two or three regiments of the sort of troops he commanded in World War II.

In that same memorandum I suggested the desirability of better preparing the forces of the government of South Vietnam (GVN) for coordinated small-unit operations rather than accepting proposals, contained in an annex to the NSC paper, for the "prompt organization of two new GVN divisions" and for putting "the entire GVN army through a greatly intensified divisional training program," a program that would have better prepared South Vietnam to meet a conventional invasion, but not to conduct counterinsurgency operations.

I made points similar to those contained in that memorandum in a paper I prepared that same year, which was among the study materials adopted for use by the Counter Guerrilla Department of the Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg. However, I doubt that either memorandum had any effect on subsequent decisions. In any case, the army chief of staff professed to believe that any good soldier could handle guerrillas, and army Special Forces were never given more than a limited role in Vietnam.[14] The United States agreed, in response to a letter from President Diem, to underwrite the creation of the two new divisions.[15] The entire army of South Vietnam could not

have been put through an intensified divisional training program in any case, given the problems it was having in coping with increasing numbers of Viet Cong guerrillas. And it was on the basis of his own judgment that the president resisted the early deployment of U.S. ground troops in Vietnam, a measure recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as early as 10 May 1961.[16]

Late in 1961 Averell Harriman was appointed assistant secretary of state for far eastern affairs and chose me to serve under him as deputy assistant secretary. He had been entrusted by President Kennedy with responsibility for negotiations being conducted in Geneva intended to lead to the neutralization of Laos; in consequence there were periods when he was away from Washington; and when he was absent I served as acting assistant secretary. The president's policy on Laos had many opponents, and while Harriman was away I sometimes found myself fending off efforts by Secretary of State Dean Rusk to have me take steps that in my opinion would have tended to undermine it.

Here I should recall that both Chinese regimes, Mao Zedong's People's Republic of China, governing the mainland, and Chiang Kai-shek's Republic of China, occupying Taiwan and a number of smaller islands, were then—as they still are—within artillery range of each other at the point where the heavily fortified nationalist-held island of Quemoy faces the mainland port of Amoy. Because the United States was committed under a treaty of alliance concluded in 1955 to the defense of Taiwan, any attempt by either side to test the defenses of the other in the Quemoy-Amoy area would threaten to involve the United States—as, indeed, it had in 1958.

In the early months of 1962 it became evident that in consequence of the failure of Mao's economic policies, the people of China were suffering from widespread hunger. In this situation Chiang professed to believe that it would take little—perhaps only the landing of a division of nationalist troops—to trigger a mass uprising and enable him to return to power on the mainland. Meanwhile, his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, attempted through the CIA station chief in Taipei to gain the backing of the United States for this venture.

In June it became apparent that the Communists had begun an enormous troop buildup along the coast opposite Taiwan. Because the preparations did not include the gathering of the craft that would have been needed for an invasion of Quemoy, much less of Taiwan, it appeared that the buildup was defensive in nature, but the situation nevertheless seemed potentially explosive. At the juncture President Kennedy, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara were united in determination that force should not be used in the vicinity of the Taiwan Strait by either side. Near the end of June, Harriman prepared a message to be transmitted to the Chinese Communists, through ambassadorial contacts maintained with them at Warsaw, making it clear that any nationalist attempt to invade the mainland would have no U.S. support. The Communists recognized that a nationalist invasion not supported by the United States would be a suicidal venture and, despite further nationalist probes, the crisis soon passed.[17]

That same year Harriman took steps designed to discourage Chiang Kai-shek from resorting to further ventures of the same kind. He had Everett F. Drumright, who had by then served as ambassador in Taipei for four years, replaced by Admiral Alan G. Kirk. In China, as is well known, age carries with it the right to receive a certain deference; Admiral Kirk was of about the same age as Chiang Kai-shek, whereas Ambassador Drumright was decades younger. As a former ambassador to the Soviet Union, Kirk was an experienced diplomat. Most to the point of all, he had commanded the U.S. task forces for the invasions of Sicily and Normandy during World War II, and was in position to enlighten Chiang on what was required for conducting a major amphibious landing.

In the spring of 1963, Harriman was promoted to the post of undersecretary of state for political affairs. In discussing with me the question of who was to succeed him in the position he was relinquishing, Harriman paid me the compliment of saying that things had gone as well in his absences as when he was present. However, while I appreciated that expression of his confidence, I had no expectation of being offered the post. It was not only that I had undoubtedly irked Secretary Rusk during the periods in which I had been in charge of the Bureau of

Far Eastern Affairs. When on the Policy Planning Council, I had been informed that the secretary disapproved of my approach to China policy. I at no time recommended U.S. recognition of the Peking government, but I had concluded that the Chinese government on Taiwan could not be kept in the United Nations much longer by trying to keep the Peking government out. In any case, I was told that the secretary did not want me to testify on the subject of U.S. policy toward China before committees of the Congress, and I knew he would not accept a proposal for my promotion.

Harriman was succeeded by Assistant Secretary of State Roger Hilsman, with whom I had collaborated in his immediately prior position as the department's director of intelligence and research. Hilsman, under whom I served until the end of 1963, was a West Point graduate who had led Burmese guerrillas against the Japanese during World War II, and he brought this experience to bear on the problems of Southeast Asia in general and Vietnam in particular throughout his period in the Department of State.

On 22 November Hilsman was host at a luncheon held on the eighth floor of the State Department honoring Senator Raul S. Manglapus of the Philippines at which Undersecretary Harriman, Senator Frank Church, and others besides myself were among the guests. Halfway through the meal, Senator Church was called to the phone. He suddenly appeared stricken, and returned to give us the news that President Kennedy had been shot. Kennedy had to the last resisted the introduction of U.S. troops in Vietnam in combat roles, but with his death a chapter was closed.

I had by the end of 1963 served in the Department of State for five years and was glad to be sent to Hong Kong as consul general, a post I was to hold until the latter part of 1967. We did not have diplomatic relations with Peking at the time, and Hong Kong served as our principal listening post for mainland China. I became deeply preoccupied with its affairs in consequence of the active military and economic support it was giving North Vietnam and of the outbreak in China itself of the so-called Cultural Revolution. A short time after I left the department, William P. Bundy succeeded Hilsman as assistant

secretary. Bundy made it his practice to solicit the views regarding Vietnam of all the chiefs of mission in his geographic area of responsibility, usually by telegram, but also at periodic chiefs-of-mission conferences. Bundy welcomed dissenting views, and I was often ready to oblige.

While I was in Hong Kong and after the Cultural Revolution had begun, the secret files of the Chinese Communist Party were in large part opened up to the rampaging Red Guards, the news sheets they set up operated free of censorship, and travel controls between mainland China and Hong Kong were loosened. In consequence, quantities of highly informative Red Guard newspapers reached Hong Kong. A substantial portion was translated by various organizations, including the press monitoring service of our own consulate general, and made available to the public. During that same period Chinese Communists, using methods of agitation and terrorism, tried unsuccessfully to take over Hong Kong from within.

At the end of my tour in Hong Kong, I was given a final assignment as diplomat-in-residence at the University of California in Berkeley, where I was attached to the Center for Chinese Studies. Among the materials in its library were copies of the translations from the Red Guard press made in Hong Kong, and this enabled me to begin writing my book *Mao's Way,* a study of the Chinese Revolution, which after its completion some years later was published by the University of California Press. In turn, work on that book led me to reconsider the Chinese revolution as a model Communists elsewhere—notably in Vietnam and in the Philippines—had sought to adapt to their own purposes.

Meanwhile I was coming to realize that while conclusions I had reached about wars of the third kind on the basis of my own observations were themselves communicable, my convictions concerning their general validity perhaps were not. This tended to negate their value in deciding questions of war and peace, not only for government officials but also for the populace, which needs to keep watch over the latter's performance.

The solution to this problem was suggested to me by an interchange between two eminent political scientists on the implications of the Vietnam conflict for future U.S. foreign policy. One

of them, Samuel P. Huntington, declared: "It is conceivable that our policy-makers may best meet future crises and dilemmas if they simply blot out of their minds any recollection of this one." In support of this assertion, he made the points that the situational characteristics of our Vietnamese entanglements were in many respects unique, and that any lessons learned from it might be the wrong ones. In reply to these assertions, Hans Morgenthau, the other noted political scientist, observed that it was no new discovery that historical phenomena are unique in one sense, but that it also is obvious that they are in another sense typical.[18] The problem, then, is to identify those aspects of historical phenomena that are typical, and to draw from them the lessons they contain.

Accordingly, I decided to examine a convincingly large number of wars of the third kind, occurring in a variety of countries and in different historical periods. I would need to distinguish between the particularities of each such war and the respects in which it was typical, establish the strategic principles underlying these wars, and draw any other generalizations my study might reveal—a time-consuming task, but one I found rich in interest.

The chapters that follow set forth the results of this inquiry.