I

Language Conflict and National Development

The high incidence of group conflict generated by segmental social divisions in some transitional political systems has given rise to a deep sense of despair in many quarters. These conflicts are usually related to the competing demands made on the national political authority on the basis of ethnic, religious, and linguistic loyalties. The tendency to treat these loyalties as inherently antinational is widespread. The stubborn persistence of these particularist loyalties has even persuaded many perceptive observers to point out that the destructive impact of such loyalties may drive the drama of development toward a tragic end.[1] Such an ominous overtone is especially noticeable in the scholarly works and popular commentaries devoted to the analysis of the Indian scene.

The implications of such trends of thought need some elaboration. Political development requires a rational ordering of goals and a conscious direction of the instruments fashioned for their achievement. A properly constituted national political authority is essential for the ordering, promotion, and achievement of such goals. The stronger the foundation of the national political

[1] For example, see Gunnar Myrdal, *Asian Drama*, vol. 1, chap. 3, esp. pp. 83–122 (paperback). Myrdal refers to the general uncertainty of outcome but his particular study is tilted in the dismal direction.

community the greater will be the effectiveness of the directing authority. The strength of the nation, according to this way of thinking, is supposed to vary inversely with the degree of conflict generated by subnational loyalties. If the strength of the nation is to be assured, the subnational loyalties must be dispensed with. The process of elimination may involve authoritarian suppression or democratic persuasion. The nature of the subnational loyalties is such that democratic methods and measures are likely to encourage them. Only strong-handed authoritarian measures seem to be capable of discouraging them. To that extent, a democratic system, according to this kind of reasoning, is inconsistent with national integration and orderly political development.

The generality of these implications and their particular applicability to the concrete Indian situation raises grave doubts about the prospects of achieving national and political development through democratic institutions and processes. It is surprising that many of the Western observers who believe in democratic principles have, nevertheless, readily conceded the futility of democratic operations for political development in transitional societies. They have been saying in effect that it is not possible to derive a valid theory of development from democratic principles and practice. In other words, according to this logic of despair, democracy does not admit of a theory of development.

The burden of this study is that the type of reasoning noted above is neither logically warranted nor empirically justified. In the first place, there is no reason to assume that subnational loyalties are necessarily inconsistent with national loyalty. Social divisions are not automatically translated into political cleavages. Even when some of them are politically translated, there may be a wide variation in their direction, momentum, and consequences. Not all political cleavages are translated into open conflicts, and when they are, such conflicts may promote integration rather than disintegration. The extent to which political groups and group conflicts may be channeled into integrative behavior

will depend on, among other things, the nature of the general decision-system in which they are made to operate. For example, if the political system in which they operate is based on a pluralist decision-system rather than an authoritarian decision-system, the probability of political integration will be higher. Integrative consequences of group conflict are likely to be greater in a political system where the distribution of cleavages is crosscutting and mutually offsetting, and where plural divisions are likely to be accommodated in aggregative social and political organizations. Finally, certain positive factors of cohesion may achieve an overarching dimension such that the scale of damaging conflict may not substantially disturb the foundations of the national community.

These points will be elaborated later. At this stage, it should be added that the empirical material required for the discussion of these points is derived from a study of language politics in India. The focus of this particular study is on the evolution of language loyalty in India and its political expression through voluntary associations devoted to the promotion of the interests of the respective language groups. The role of such language associations in the formulation and implementation of national language policy is described in detail for the purpose of analyzing a concrete decision-area and the nature of the decision-system involved. The linkage points between the language groups and other groups, their mutual interaction and selective aggregation in the pluralist framework, are described and analyzed. An attempt is made to trace the actual political consequences of such behavior on the national political community. Finally, an effort is made to relate the findings of the empirical investigation to the wider questions of democratic political development.

Before we discuss the substantive details of our investigation, we should explain some of the basic concepts and conceptual arrangements in particular theoretical contexts which we have utilized in the course of our study. This will enable us to define our terms precisely and to place them in the context of the particular framework of analysis which we propose to use.

Political Modernization

Most definitions of modernization are essentially enumerative. They indicate a selective list of conditions derived from model societies as the basic components of modernization. Usually included in such lists are literacy, urbanization, per capita income, areal mobility, exposure to communication, industrialization, political participation, and so forth.[2] In many studies, the dimensions of modernization specifically related to the social, economic, and political areas are delineated separately. For our purpose such a separation is important to the extent that it enables us to stress the impact of political factors on the general processes of modernization. The importance of the role of a general, directive authority in designing and guiding the processes of modernization is commonly acknowledged—especially in the newly modernizing societies, where the forces of modernization are more externally induced than internally generated. Compared to these, there was less drama in the classical cases of modernization in the advanced Western societies, since the pace of change was slow, gradual, relatively unplanned, and generally free from high-pressure tensions.[3] Being pioneers, these societies were able to program the innovations in such a way that the strain generated by the sequence of changes could be adequately handled by the respective national authorities in society and politics. The evolutionary transition was also aided by the fact that the political consciousness and the institutional representation of the masses in such societies were substantially limited.

Modernization in new nations, while attempting to emulate the patterns of modern societies, is not historically favored by the possibility of following the sequences mentioned above. Contemporary modernization processes have their roots in exogen-

[2] See, for instance, Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow, *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 6–7, and Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of Developing Areas*, pp. 52 ff.

[3] A good comparative account is presented in C. E. Black, *The Dynamics of Modernization* (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), chap. 4.

ous influences. These processes involve comprehensive attacks on traditional structures and follow a program of rapid transition, with sudden thrusts and dramatic reconstructions. Several dimensions of modernization are attempted simultaneously and rapid results are sought by cutting short a number of stages. At the same time the contemporary modernizers have to take into account the pressures of mass politics on the decisions of the national authorities. This implies that the production of values can no longer be separated from the pattern of distribution preferred by the politicized masses. Contemporary modernization, therefore, is much more complex and confronts problems of far greater magnitude than its counterpart processes of the classical European and American cases.[4]

The distinguishing feature of contemporary modernization is its attempt to achieve too many things in a short span of time. Such an enterprise can succeed only when there is adequate planning to coordinate all sectors of modernization into an integrated program. Planning at this level can be successfully undertaken only by the authority attending to the general needs of the society. This indicates the critical role that the national political authority is expected to play in assuring the success of modernization in our time. However, the existence of a competent national political authority cannot be taken for granted. Most new nations are based on fragile political communities, which in their turn cannot be expected to sustain strong political authorities. This raises the crucial question of how the task of building the nation can be synchronized with the task of using the national authority to accomplish modernization.

But how does one build a nation? The idea of nation-building as an architectural enterprise appears to overemphasize the role of deliberate design and the freedom of the political architects in impressing this design on social materials. It neglects the contributions of organismic evolution to the formation and growth of nations. The development of nations invariably depends on

[4] For details, see Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, pp. 93 ff.

various combinations of the architectural and the organismic processes.[5] A proper concept of national development, therefore, should emphasize the interaction between the act of deliberate building and the evolutionary growth of the social units leading to the successive stages of the integration of a nation. Such a concept of national development puts a premium on the treatment of the nation as a dynamic process of integrating a plurality of social groups into a common framework of identity and loyalty structured in a political community.

Cohesion and Community

The use of the concept of community in the analysis of national development is not free from semantic ambiguities. Historically, it has been used to refer to a wide range of cohesive arrangements, including, for example, the classical notions of polis and cosmopolis, the Hebrew and the Christian notions of the community of believers, and a variety of idealistic, utopian, romantic, totalitarian, and pluralistic variations on this theme.[6] Such wide variations in the range of referents have made it difficult to use this term in contemporary discussions without specifying the particular meaning intended. In modern political science, the concept of the political community has been used in some cases as a "practical concept," and in others as an "analytical concept."[7] As a practical concept, its primary function is to guide action, to direct attitudes, and to state commitments. As an analytical concept, it is used to describe various possible cohesive arrangements. One popular analysis tends to identify the concept of political community with that of political system.[8] A care-

[5] This is elaborated by Karl Deutsch in *Nation-Building*, ed. Karl W. Deutsch and William J. Foltz, p. 3.

[6] For a discussion of the evolution of the notions of community, see Sheldon S. Wolin, *Politics and Vision*, and Robert A. Nisbet, *Community and Power* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962).

[7] See J. Ladd, "The Concept of Community: A Logical Analysis," in *Community*, ed. Carl J. Friedrich (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1959), p. 270. See also G. W. Blackwell, "Community Analysis," in *Approaches to the Study of Politics*, ed. R. Young (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1958), pp. 305–317.

[8] In Karl Deutsch's works the central focus is on the way in which groups

ful attempt to separate these two concepts can be seen in the works of David Easton, who reserves the concept of political community "for the special purpose of identifying one particular aspect of a political system, as one of a number of basic political objects toward which support may be extended, or from which it may be withdrawn."[9] In Easton's use of the term political community, the focus is on a group of persons who, for one reason or another, are joined together in a common enterprise. Easton implies that the way in which a common enterprise is conducted may vary with regard to the degree and the kind of cohesion that is brought to bear on the working of the community. The political community is bound by the primary tie of a political division of labor. Apart from this primary tie there is always the possibility of various degrees of affective solidarity sustaining the political community. But the degree of the affective ties "will only be a possible characteristic of a political community, not an essential part of the meaning of the term."[10]

Though Easton's usage does not tie the concept of political community exclusively to national political communities, his analysis has an important bearing on the understanding of national development in heterogeneous societies.[11] It is worth noting that his usage is based on a clear distinction between the sociological concept of the social community and the political concept of political community. The sociological idea of community is based on a paired set of ideal types introduced by Ferdinand Tonnies.[12] These types refer to two fundamental

of people gradually form units for the peaceful solution of their problems. See his *Political Community at the International Level* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1954), p. 16. In E. B. Haas the focus is on the loyalty of the specific groups and individuals to their central political institutions. See *The Uniting of Europe* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), p. 5.

[9] David Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*, p. 176.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 177.

[11] Easton identifies political systems at different levels of inclusiveness from parapolitical systems to international systems. See his *A Framework for Political Analysis*, pp. 23–58.

[12] See his *Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft*, translated by C. P. Loomis under the title *Community and Society* (East Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 1957). For a critical discussion, see Marion J. Levy, Jr.'s

forms of human will that underlie two forms of social relationship. These types of wills are characterized as natural and as rational wills. A social collectivity is characterized as a community insofar as its members think of the grouping as a gift of nature. This natural community is distinguished from the social collectivity that is based on rational will, in the sense that the individuals involved wish to attain through it a definite end and are willing to join hands for this purpose. Such a social collectivity is referred to as a society, in the special sense of the term envisaged by Tonnies. In fact, the paired terms community and society refer to two forms of social relationship which in reality are often found to coexist in various proportions.[13] Their analytical separation is intended to bring out sharply the instrumental and the affective ties governing social relations.

By separating the concept of political community from the sociological sense of community, we can keep the question of the character of cohesion relatively open. In this way we can conceive of a political community independent of the question of natural solidarity of the members of the common political enterprise. This is especially important in analyzing national development in the new states based on various kinds of segmentary diversity. Moreover, by postulating this conceptual framework, it is possible to arrive at a better understanding of the sequential development of various kinds of cohesion. Thus it is important to remember Easton's suggestion that "it is quite possible, . . . that in the formation of new societies and associated political systems, a sense of belonging together politically may normally follow rather than precede the emergence of a political community. If this is so, there could be little doubt that a political community is phenomenally independent, at least in its initiation, from the

analysis in H. Eckstein, ed., *Internal War* (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 233–266.

[13] The use of paired concepts to comprehend "natural" and "rational" forms of social relationship is not limited to the pair suggested by Tonnies. Witness, for example, the dualistic constructions suggested by Henry Maine in the form of status and contract societies, Durkheim's mechanical and organic solidarities, Howard Becker's sacred and secular societies, and Robert Redfield's folk and urban societies.

feelings of solidarity that are usually considered to be a major pre-condition."[14]

This implies that the political integration of a nation can be considered separately from social, cultural, and other forms of integration that are subsumed under the general category of national integration. This is not to deny that these questions are related, but rather to suggest that an analytical separation of these dimensions of integration may yield a better insight into their mutual relations.

Political Integration

In discussing the concrete processes of political integration, most studies have concentrated on the problems of reducing cleavage, discord, and parochial loyalties facing the new states. The burden of these studies is that the way to integration lies through forcible subordination of the parochial groups under authoritarian rule. For example, Rupert Emerson suggests that the achievement of ordered societies in the West "was in good part the product of the firm authoritarian rule which bridged the transition from the Middle Ages to the contemporary world."[15] Accordingly, he states that the prime requirement of the new states is not for more freedoms, but for discipline; not for opposition, but for a national consolidation; and in countries with tribal, racial, or religious hostilities, he claims, "the essential need is strong and unified management."[16] For further evidence of this mood among social scientists, one can turn to the analysis of David Apter, who singles out the effect of cultural strain as one of the most important determinants of the future of new nations.[17] According to him, this creates a problem for the leadership groups of the new nations. Their political leaders are rebels against tradition. Their goals of progress require social mobilization, which in turn requires an organizational revolution that offends the natural conservatism of the public. He con-

[14] David Easton, *Systems Analysis*, p. 188.

[15] Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation*, p. 289.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 290.

[17] See David E. Apter in *Comparative Politics*, ed. Harry Eckstein and David E. Apter, p. 649.

cludes that "autocracy is thus intrinsic to a development situation in which political entrepreneurship is the source of change and government its director."[18] Similarly, turning more specifically to national development in India, commentators, both Indian and Western, have stated that the cost of the survival of the nation may very well result in a succession of stresses and strains, leading to a situation which is "certain to overwhelm free institutions."[19]

What is the basic source of these stresses and strains besetting national development in the new states? This source has usually been identified as the natural ties of the segmental groups to their own given order of existence. One study draws a sharp distinction between the natural ties and the civil ties, or as they have been called, the primordial order and the civil order,[20] partially reminiscent of the distinction made by some in political theory between the public realm and the realm of private and parochial attachments.[21] Specifically, primordial attachment has been described as

> one that stems from the "givens"—or more precisely . . . the assumed "givens"—of social existence; immediate contiguity and kin connection mainly, but beyond them the givenness that stems from being born into a particular religious community, speaking a particular language, or even a particular dialect of a language, and following particular social practices. These congruities of blood, speech, custom and so on are seen to have an ineffable and, at times, overpowering cohesiveness in and of themselves.[22]

In contrast, the civil loyalties are revealed in classes, parties, and

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 654.

[19] Selig S. Harrison, *India: The Most Dangerous Decades*, p. 338.

[20] See, for example, Edward Shils, "Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties," *British Journal of Sociology*, June 1957, pp. 130–145.

[21] For a discussion of the distinction between the private, the social, and the public realms, see Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1958), p. 24 ff. (paper). Also S. S. Wolin, *Politics and Vision*, p. 429.

[22] Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution, Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States," in *Old Societies and New States*, ed. Clifford Geertz, p. 109.

so forth. The range and intensity of the threats posed by the civil loyalties are supposed to be considerably less than their primordial counterparts. As Geertz puts it, civil loyalties rarely threaten to undermine the nation itself, though they may challenge existing forms of government, whereas the primordial loyalties threaten partition, irredentism, or merger, and hence pose a new definition of the national domain.[23] This, as we shall see later, is a tenuous assumption.

Like all paired concepts, the primordial-civil dualism is only partially useful. It does not sensitize us to the complexity of these factors in reality. By looking at the origin of the social cleavage rather than examining it in the dynamic context of the social and political transformation, such a dualistic notion often tends to oversimplify the primordial in national development. So far as national development is concerned, the static distribution of the multiplicity of primordial groups is of less consequence than the dynamic processes of the political transformation of these groups through the existing political channels of negotiation, adjustment, and resolution of conflict.[24] Given this perspective of dynamic interaction, it may be more useful to assume that the political role of the multiple social groups cannot be automatically derived from their given bases of social existence.

In the transitional politics of national development of the new states, the social bases of the primordial groups themselves tend to change in significant ways. The source of such changes may be found in the political factors. The political impact of a primordial group depends to a large extent on how a hitherto unpoliticized group has transformed itself into a significant politicized group. In other words, social segmentation by itself does not tell us much about the patterning of the social groups' participation in politics and its consequences on political integration. The mode of participation depends on the definition of political interest of such groups, the style of their leadership, the nature of the political system in which the leaders act, and the methods of

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 111.

[24] See Karl W. Deutsch in *Nation-Building*, ed. Karl W. Deutsch and William J. Foltz, p. 6.

action which have been found in practice to gratify the demands of the conflict groups. There is no reason to assume in advance that primordial groups, because of their natural origin, would stick to naturally defined rigid interests. On the contrary, it is conceivable that political prudence of the leaders of the primordial groups may very well make their definition of group interest flexible and amenable to adjustment. This is more likely to be the case when in the distribution of segmental groups no single group can overwhelm others and many of the groups may cut across each other.[25]

In general, it may be said that social divisions are of consequence to the study of national development to the extent that they are manifested as political divisions.[26] It is possible to distinguish among various kinds and characteristics of political divisions.[27] Thus, political divisions may mean simply concrete policy disagreements. Or, political divisions may be related to cultural divergence of the social groups in a political community. A third type of political division may be related to segmental cleavage. In this case the divisions are not merely due to the different cultural orientations of the actors involved; they are in addition related to the actors' attachments to their segmental groups. In studying the political divisions of a country one has to know the extensiveness of the salient divisions. It is not enough to know how many types of divisions exist in a country. One has to find out the nature of the divisive issues and the target of divisive politics. For example, a simple disagreement on a specific governmental policy reflects a less extensive division than does an uncompromising political division, which may in certain

[25] For a specific account of the complexity of conflict arising from segmented group structure, see Richard D. Lambert, "Some Consequences of Segmentation in India," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 12, no. 4 (July 1964): 416–424.

[26] It is important to note here that not all social divisions attain the form of political divisions.

[27] The following distinction of political divisions is treated in detail in Harry Eckstein, *Division and Cohesion in Democracy: a study of Norway*, pp. 33–36.

cases threaten the existence of the political community itself. The intensity of political division must also be taken into account. Political division in a country may be extensive, but it may not develop great intensity, owing to less affective involvement of the actors, to lesser degree of organization, or to many other factors. But in certain cases, the extensiveness and the intensity of division may coincide, and this cumulative effect when reinforced by violence may pose a greater threat to political community.

Thus it is important to recognize the complex variety of divisions, their variable characteristics, and the alternative possibilities of alignment of conflict-groups in order to assess their impact on political integration. Moreover, the divisions themselves have to be balanced against the factors of cohesion. Political cohesion is often thought to be the result of a relative lack of political divisions. Or it is sometimes suggested that political cohesion can exist despite divisions, if not because of political divisions.[28] In order to study contemporary problems of political integration the first of the possibilities of cohesion suggested above may not be very important, especially because of the nature of divisive materials involved in heterogeneous new states. But the two other possibilities of cohesion will be of great importance because of our assumption that political divisions do not necessarily hinder political integration. We are also assuming that even when these divisions take the form of concrete political conflicts, these conflicts may prove to be a factor of positive sociation leading to a possibility of integration.[29] But even if the conflicts are not moderated by their mutually crosscutting nature and even if they are not mutually balanced, there may be parallel

[28] See *ibid.*, p. 69.

[29] For a detailed treatment of conflict as a process of sociation, see Georg Simmel, *Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations*, part 1, chap. 1 (paperback); Lewis Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict*, esp. chap. 7 and 8 (paperback). See also Ralf Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society* (paperback), and Robert C. Angell, "The Sociology of Human Conflict," in *The Nature of Human Conflict*, ed. Elton B. McNeil, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), pp. 91–115.

cohesive norms and institutions which may contribute to political integration.[30] It is in this context that the positive role of the political institutions of the community and a normative legitimation of certain overarching values may be important for political integration.[31]

At this stage, it is necessary to clarify what we mean by political integration. We have already pointed out that for us the concepts of political integration and national integration refer to two analytically separable categories. Political integration, for the purpose of this work, will be defined as the minimal cohesion necessary for the coordination of the political groups through the institutionalized procedures of the political community.[32] This minimal cohesion does not simply mean a lack of violence in the resolution of group conflict.[33] The institutionalization of group coordination through a pluralist decision-making system is of primary importance to the process of political integration that we will study.

Language and National Development

The impact that social divisions based on language have on political integration in multilingual new states may be appreciated better in the context noted above. Patterns of language division in multilingual societies vary widely. In order to comprehend a specific pattern, it is important to consider, among other things, the number of language groups, their relative size,

[30] See Lewis A. Coser, *Functions of Social Conflict*, pp. 72–80, and E. A. Ross, *Principles of Sociology* (New York: Century, 1920), pp. 164–165. See also S. M. Lipset, *Political Man*, pp. 76–82 (paperback).

[31] For one view concerning this point, see Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture*, pp. 490–493.

[32] For a detailed discussion of cohesion, see P. E. Jacob and H. Teune, in *The Integration of Political Communities*, ed. P. E. Jacob and J. V. Toscano (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1964), p. 4 (paperback).

[33] For a positive evaluation of the role of nonviolence in this respect, see K. W. Deutsch et al., *Political Community in the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 5; and E. B. Haas, *Uniting of Europe* (n. 8 above), p. xv. For a negative view, see Herbert J. Spiro, "Comparative Politics: A Comprehensive Approach," *American Political Science Review* 56, no. 3 (September 1962): 589.

the degree of relatedness and distinction among them, variation in the standard languages and dialects, the differential literary tradition of the languages, the relation of language division to other social divisions, and the importance attributed to the language factor by the speech communities concerned.[34]

Language has been defined as the totality of utterances that can be made in a speech community.[35] In Bloomfield's analysis, language as a complex of communicative symbols is inextricably related to social activity. Of the media of communication, language is the most versatile. In analyzing linguistic phenomena within the wider context of politics and society, the role of language in the speech communities and the relationships among these communities in the social and political environments are usually emphasized. By a speech community we mean "any human aggregate characterized by regular and frequent interaction, by means of a shared body of verbal signs and set off from similar aggregates by significant differences in language use."[36] For social and political analysis, it may be convenient to distinguish the different elements that are subsumed under the category of language. Thus, one may speak of different standard *codes* (e.g., English, Chinese), *regional variants* within a single code (e.g., the casual conversational English of Boston), *social class variants* of a particular regional variant, *stylistic variants* related to levels of formality and so forth.[37] Most major languages have such internal variations revealed in the standard form and the dialectal divisions, and stratifying as well as stylistic variants. It is there-

[34] For an attempt to construct typologies of multilingual societies, see Heinz Kloss, "Types of Multilingual Communities: A Discussion of Ten Variables," *Sociological Inquiry* 36, no. 2 (Spring 1966): 135–145.

[35] See Leonard Bloomfield, "A Set of Postulates for the Science of Language," in *Language* 2 (1926): 153–156; this definition stresses the point that the sounds and grammatical patterns are always abstracted from social activity.

[36] John J. Gumperz, "The Speech Community," in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: Macmillan, 1968), 9:381. See also Leonard Bloomfield, *Language* (New York: Holt, 1933), for an early discussion of some of these points.

[37] See Introduction to *Readings in the Sociology of Language*, ed. J. A. Fishman, (The Hague: Mouton, 1968), p. 5.

fore important to locate the language centers and the leading groups which set the standard language and act as leading agents in relating the linguistic factors with the political community.[38]

People's love for their own language is as old as recorded history. But the political affirmation of language loyalty and the political manifestation of language rivalry have assumed salience in a relatively recent period of history. The invention of printing, the spread of education to the middle and lower classes, Humanism and the Reformation, and the increasing participation of the general population in national politics have been some of the decisive factors in the placing of a premium on language loyalty and its expression in the politics of nationalism.[39] These developments in the European scene gradually persuaded some Romantic thinkers to believe that language is the most important identifying characteristic of peoples and therefore it should be the obvious criterion of national political boundaries.[40] Modern scholars prefer to discount such simplistic notions, and they take into account the vast complexities in the relationship between language and political community.

Language is not a static factor. Although language loyalty has often been characterized as a primordial loyalty, when the dynamic development of language is considered, it will be found that language loyalty is a variable, dependent at times on important political factors. One author has aptly pointed out:

> The linguistic divisions among the Romance languages today reflect the dynastic boundaries of the tenth to eighteenth centuries. The revival of Gaelic was the consequence, not the cause of Irish discontent with British rule. The Landsmaal movement in Norway emphasized the non-Danish elements of the vernacular to reinforce the earlier political separation from Denmark, and the attempt to "purify" Turkish from Arabic elements became official policy after military defeat had severed the Arab parts from the Turkish state.[41]

[38] See K. W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication*, p. 43 (paperback).

[39] See Frederick Hertz, *Nationality in History and Politics* (London: Routledge, 1951), pp. 81–85.

[40] See *ibid.*, pp. 86–87, 353–361.

[41] D. A. Rustow, *Leadership in the Emerging Nations* (Washington, D.C.; Brookings Institution, 1964), pp. 20–21 (mimeo). For a detailed treatment,