Since the dawn of the new millennium, the world has been witnessing a rapid rise in the numbers of migrants in a wide array of categories—voluntary and involuntary, internal and international, authorized and unauthorized, and environmental—as well as victims of human trafficking. All continents are involved in the massive movement of people as areas of immigration, emigration, or transit—and often as all three at once. Yet migration is as old as mankind. As a human adaptation, migration is written in our genome and encoded in our bodies: in our bipedalism, in our stereo-oscopnic vision, in our neocortex. Modern humans are the children of migrations. Migrations are complex, multidetermined, and not easily reduced to deterministic algorithms. Migrations elude simple mechanistic models of causality because they unfold in complex ecologies involving demographic factors, economic variables, political processes, cultural models, social practices, historical relationships, the environment itself, and multiple combinations thereof (McLeman 2014; Forman and Ramanathan, chapter 1, this volume). In the twenty-first century, mass migration is the human face of globalization—the sounds, colors, and aromas of a miniaturized, interconnected, and ever-fragile world. Today “migration is a shared condition of all humanity” (Pontifical Academy of Sciences 2017, 1).

According to the United Nations, in 2015 there were approximately 244 million international migrants—3.3 percent of the world’s population (UNICEF 2016, 92)—and upward of 760 million internal migrants (see Bell and Charles-Edwards 2013). Millions more were kith and kin left behind. The largest international corridors of human migration today are in Asia, Europe, and the Americas. The largest chains of internal migration occur in Asia: by 2015, China had an estimated 280 million internal migrant workers (China Labor Bulletin 2017), and in India well
over 320 million people—more than a quarter of the country's population—were internal migrants between 2007 and 2008 (UNICEF 2016). While in terms of sheer numbers more people are now on the move than ever before, the rate of international migration has remained stable over the last fifty years, with roughly 2.5 to 3.3 percent of the world’s population living outside their country of birth.

In the aftermath of World War II, well-worn migration corridors came to connect historically linked countries of origin with specific destinations in new societies. That is the story of Latin American migrations to the United States; Mediterranean, African, and Middle Eastern migrations into Northern Europe; Ukrainian and Uzbek migrations to Russia; and Indian, Bangladeshi, and Filipino migrations into East Asia and the Middle East. As the number of international migrants increased, a new research agenda was drawn. It endeavored to define, measure, theorize, and interpret the myriad of push-and-pull factors behind mass migration—above all the labor markets, demographics, wage differentials, social networks, and cultural models structuring and giving momentum to human movement. In recent decades, researchers have come to depict in broad terms how labor migrations begat family reunification, which in turn begat the rise of the second generation now transforming Europe, North America, and Australia.

While there are as many motivations and pathways for migration as there are migrant families, large-scale migration is not random. It is ignited and then gathers momentum along predictable corridors. At the proximate level, migration is a strategy of the household (Foner 2009; Massey and España 1987). Distinct patterns of kinship, household, and social organization carve the pathways for worldwide migratory journeys. The fundamental unit of migration is the family—variously defined and structured by distinct, culturally coded legislative, economic, reproductive, and symbolic forms. At the distal level, immigration is multiply determined by labor markets, wage differentials, demographic imbalances, technological change, and environmental factors. However, up close it is the family that makes migration work. Immigration typically starts with the family, and family bonds sustain it. Immigration profoundly changes families (Foner 2009; C. Suárez-Orozco and M. Suárez-Orozco 2012). “Love and work,” Freud’s eternal words on the well-lived life, are useful to think about migration as an adaptation both of and for the family.

But migration for “love and work” tells only part of the story. Historically, the clash of powerful nation-states has been the main driver of the sudden, involuntary, and massive displacement of populations. Two world wars, the wars of colonial liberation, and the Cold War pushed millions to seek shelter in safer lands. During World War I, millions of Russians, Germans, Serbians, Armenians, Belgians, Poles, Latvians, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, Jews, and others were forced from home:
In August 1914 the Russian occupation of East Prussia caused around one million Germans to flee their homes. Before long, Germany’s occupation of Belgium and northern France, Poland and Lithuania provoked a mass movement of refugees. Austria’s invasion of Serbia resulted in a humanitarian catastrophe as soldiers and civilians sought to escape the occupation regime. In the Russian Empire, non-Russian minorities such as Poles, Latvians, Lithuanians, Ukrainians and Jews were disproportionately concentrated in the western borderlands and thus particularly vulnerable when Germany and Austria invaded. In addition, Tsarist military commanders accused these minorities—falsely—of aiding and abetting the enemy and deported them to the Russian interior.

In the Ottoman Empire, meanwhile, Turkish troops uprooted Armenians who had lived side by side with their Turkish and Kurdish neighbors for generations but who were now regarded as the enemy within. As Talat Pasha, a leading official, put it in a coded telegram in April 1915: “The objective that the government expects to achieve by the expelling of the Armenians from the areas in which they live and their transportation to other appointed areas is to ensure that this community will no longer be able to undertake initiatives and actions against the government, and that they will be brought to a state in which they will be unable to pursue their national aspirations related to advocating a government of Armenia.” (Gatrell 2014a, 1)

By the war’s end, perhaps more than ten million people had been displaced internally or internationally. The refugee crisis was deep and lasting. According to British historian Peter Gatrell, “during the First World War the refugee emerged as a liminal figure who threatened social stability partly by virtue of the sheer number of displaced persons, but also because the refugee was difficult to accommodate within conventional classification such as assigned people to a specific social class. Other kinds of disorder were also at stake. The crisis caught everyone by surprise and limited possibilities for political action that might contribute to further upheaval. The social upheaval did not end with the cessation of hostilities” (2014b, 2).

At the end of World War II, there were more than forty million refugees—then the largest number in recorded history. World War II had other significant indirect, long-term effects on migration’s new cartography. The United States’ entrance into the war led to the creation of a guest worker program to recruit temporary Mexican braceros to labor in US fields. For more than half a century, that temporary program led to the largest flow of immigrants into the United States in history (Massey et al. 1987). Likewise, the various temporary guest worker programs in Europe immediately following World War II ended up delivering permanent immigrant communities now visible in Berlin, Brussels, Rotterdam, and elsewhere.

Decolonization and the wars of national liberation generated their own routes of massive movement, sending Congolese to Belgium, Pied Noirs to France, and Indonesians to the Netherlands. The end of British India, the partition of the British Raj, and the subsequent independence of India and Pakistan (and then Bangladesh) resulted in the largest population exchange in recorded history. Approximately
seven million Hindus and Sikhs from Bangladesh and Pakistan moved to India, and approximately seven million Muslims from India migrated to Pakistan.

The United States–Soviet Cold War and the proxy wars it engendered in Africa, the Americas, and Asia created massive displacements. In Angola (1975–2002), four million were displaced internally, and another half million fled as refugees. At the height of the Cold War, the best predictor of who would arrive as a refugee in the West was someone escaping a Communist regime: from 1975 until 1995 more than two million Southeast Asians fleeing Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia were settled in the West, the majority in the United States but also some in the European Union, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Those fleeing the Soviet Union followed Southeast Asians as the second largest number of refugees arriving in the West, including more than a million in the United States and almost two million in Israel. Likewise, more than a million Cubans fleeing the Castro regime in various waves were favored refugees in the United States. Least favored were the casualties of the proxy wars in Central America. Escaping barbaric but, alas, anticommunist regimes in Guatemala, Nicaragua, and El Salvador, millions of folks arrived in North America in search of refuge. Few became formal refugees, yet over time they came to give birth to the new “recombinant migrations” of the recent era (see Suro, chapter 2, this volume).

After holding for three quarters of a century, the map tracing the great global migration corridors of the post–World War II era has become increasingly blurred. Three disparate formations laid the foundations for an emerging new cartography. First, the dismemberment of the Soviet Union (early 1990s) and the end of the Cold War significantly impacted the acceleration of human migrations. Second, the worldwide economic crisis of 2008 and the antigovernment uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East beginning in 2010—the so-called “Arab spring”—signaled yet another turn. Third, President Trump’s moves to make good on his campaign promises that elected him—rapidly stepping up deportations of unauthorized immigrants in the United States, building a two-thousand-mile wall along the Mexican border, halting Syrian and other refugees from entering the United States, and forcibly separating thousands of mostly Central American children from their parents at the Southern border—marked a brusque turning point in the global migration landscape. In the same vein, the concurrent rise of nativist, anti-immigrant movements in the European Union and elsewhere marks the beginning of an entirely new cartography of mass migration.

A NEW MAP

Migration is increasingly defined by the slow-motion disintegration of failing states with feeble institutions, war and terror, demographic imbalances, unchecked
climate change, and cataclysmic environmental disruptions. Symbiotically, these forces are the drivers of what I will call the catastrophic migrations of the twenty-first century.

Catastrophic migrations are placing millions of human beings at grave risk. In the first quarter of the twenty-first century, the world witnessed the largest number of forcibly displaced human beings in history: while precise numbers are both elusive and changing, UN data report that more than sixty-five million people—the equivalent of every man, woman, and child in Lagos, Sao Paulo, Seoul, London, Lima, New York, and Guadalajara—are escaping home into the unknown (UNHCR 2016). The majority of those seeking shelter are internally displaced persons (IDPs), not formal refugees across international borders. In addition, approximately nine in ten international asylum seekers remain in a neighboring country—Asians stay in Asia, Africans in Africa, Americans in the Americas. While migration is a normal condition of humanity, it is increasingly catastrophic: “The majority of new displacements in 2016 took place in environments characterized by a high exposure to natural and human-made hazards, high levels of socioeconomic vulnerability, and low coping capacity of both institutions and infrastructure” (IDMC 2017, 9). By the end of 2016, there were 31.1 million new internal displacements due to conflict and violence (6.9 million) and disasters (24.1 million) (see fig. I.1), “the equivalent of one person forced to flee every second” (IDMC 2017, 9).

Indeed, by then “there were 40.3 million people internally displaced by conflict and violence across the world. An unknown number remain displaced as a result of disasters that occurred in and prior to 2016” (IDMC 2017, 10). Internal displacement associated with war and terror continues to grow at a staggering pace: “The
number of new internal displacements associated with conflict and violence almost doubled, from 6.8 million in 2016 to 11.8 million in 2017. Syria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Iraq accounted for more than half of the figure.” (IDMC 2018, v). The number of persons internally displaced by war and terror (see fig. I.2) is more than double the number of refugees—today there are 22.5 million refugees under UNHCR terms in the world (UNHCR 2017c, 1).

Environmental Dystopia
Forman and Ramanathan (chapter 1, this volume) argue that unchecked climate change and geophysical hazards increase morbidity and mortality, disrupt production, decrease agricultural yields, decimate livestock, and forcibly displace millions the world over (see also McLeman 2014). In 2017, extreme weather patterns and weather-related hazards—floods and high-intensity cyclones, rising sea levels, but also droughts, hurricanes, heat waves, and forest fires—displaced 18.8 million people in 135 countries. “Of these,” the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre reports, “8.6 million displacements were triggered by floods, and 7.5 million by storms, especially tropical cyclones. The worst-affected countries were China with 4.5 million, the Philippines with 2.5 million, Cuba and the US each with 1.7 million, and India with 1.3 million displacements. In 2017, cyclones displaced millions of people around the world, including Mora which struck Bangladesh in May and hurricane Irma that wreaked havoc in the Atlantic in August” (IDMC 2018, v).
From 2008 to 2016, the IDMC reported 203.4 million displacements, an annual average of 25.4 million (IDMC 2016, 8). By 2017, the majority of new displacements had occurred in “low- and lower-middle-income countries and as a result of large-scale weather events, and predominantly in South and East Asia. While China, the Philippines and India have the highest absolute numbers, small island states suffer disproportionately once population size is taken into account. Slow-onset disasters, existing vulnerabilities and conflict also continue to converge into explosive tipping points for displacement” (IDMC 2017, 10).

Documented displacements due to environmental and weather-related factors took place in 135 countries across all regions of the world. Floods, storms, cyclones, monsoons, hurricanes, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, wildfires, landslides, and extreme temperatures displaced millions of people in 2017 (see Ramanathan and Forman, chapter 1, this volume). The data over the last couple of years reveal an alarming trend. In 2015 India,15 China,16 and Nepal17 accounted for the largest numbers of people displaced, “with totals of 3.7 million, 3.6 million, and 2.6 million respectively” (IDMC 2016, 15). The Philippines experienced three massive storms, which together displaced two million people.18 In Myanmar, Cyclone Komen “displaced more than 1.6 million people . . . the fifth highest figure worldwide in absolute terms. . . . Twelve of the country’s fourteen states and regions suffered widespread destruction” (15). By 2016, weather-related hazards triggered 24.2 million new displacements . . . [and] 4.5 million displacements were brought on by large-scale geophysical hazards. . . . Over the past eight years, 203.4 million displacements have been recorded, an average of 25.4 million each year” (IDMC 2016, 8—see also Forman and Ramanathan, chapter 1, this volume; McLeman 2014).

Beyond Asia, in 2017 millions were displaced in the Caribbean and in North and Central America by environmental factors.19 Indeed, the UNHCR predicted that climate change would perhaps become the biggest driver of population displacements, both inside and across national borders. Though there is general consensus that quantitative estimates are presently unreliable, Forman and Ramanathan (chapter 1, this volume) make a plea for an ethical global policy response to the world’s emerging climate migration crisis. They argue that we simply cannot await reliable metrics. International cooperation on climate mitigation is more urgent than ever as the United States under President Trump’s leadership is moving toward an ever more retrograde agenda on climate issues. Establishing international protocols that outline the rights of climate refugees and the responsibilities of industrialized nations toward them cannot wait.

Jeffrey Sachs (2017) argues that in addition to the physical environment, demography itself is a main driver of today’s mass migrations. Africa and the Middle East are a case in point. In the 1950s, Europe had twice the combined populations of the Middle East and all of Africa. So migration to Europe was not a problématique of significance—with labor shortages and the need to rebuild after the war,
immigration was a solution, not a problem. In an epic reversal, the Middle East and Africa now have twice the population of Europe. Europe now has about 740 million people. The Middle East and Africa combined have about 1.4 billion people. Furthermore, according to UN forecasts, Europe’s population will be level because of aging and low fertility rates, whereas the population of the Middle East and Africa combined is on its way to 4 billion people by 2100 (Sachs 2017, 5).

War and Terror

War and terror are pushing millions of human beings from home. Millions of people linger in perpetual limbo in camps far away from the wealthy cities of Asia, Europe, North America, and Australia. The world is experiencing what Sánchez Terán (2017) calls the “forced confinement crisis” of the twenty-first century. Millions have been internally displaced, millions are awaiting asylum, and millions more are living in the shadow of the law as irregular or unauthorized immigrants. The United States, the country with the largest number of immigrants in the world, has an estimated 11.3 million undocumented immigrants and some five million children with at least one undocumented immigrant parent.

In the aftermath of antigovernment uprisings beginning in 2010, the Middle East and North Africa had the largest number of war-and-terror-displaced human beings. Yet by the end of 2016, sub-Saharan Africa led the way with the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) having the greatest number of “new displacements by conflict and violence” (IDMC 2017, 13). Ongoing conflict “in North and South Kivu and an increase in intercommunal clashes in southern and central regions such as Tanganyika, Kasai, Kasai-Oriental, Ituri and Uele caused more than 922,000 new displacements in total during the year. Some people were forced to flee more than once” (13). In Iraq, almost 680,000 new displacements occurred as a result of nine military campaigns. In Yemen, at least 478,000 new displacements took place against the backdrop of a persistently dynamic and volatile security situation (10).

In Syria an estimated 12 million people have fled their homes since 2011 (UNHCR 2017c, 3). In 2017 more than 2.9 million new displacements were recorded in Syria – by far the highest figure in the world (IDMC 2018, 24). By then, more than half of the Syrian population had lived in displacement, either across borders or within their own country. “Now, in the sixth year of war, 13.5 million are in need of humanitarian assistance within the country. Among those escaping the conflict, the majority has sought refuge in neighboring countries or within Syria itself. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 4.8 million have fled to Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, and Iraq, and 6.6 million are internally displaced within Syria. Meanwhile, about one million have requested asylum in Europe. Germany, with more than 300,000 accumulated applications, and Sweden with 100,000 are the EU’s top receiving countries” (UNHCR 2017c, 1).
In 2017, just three countries—Syria, Iraq, and Yemen—accounted for more than half of all internally displaced persons. Likewise, in 2017, more than half of all international refugees under UNHCR mandate originated in four states: Syria (approximately 5.5 million), Afghanistan (2.5 million), South Sudan (1.4 million), and Somalia (900,000). The conflicts in these countries are disparate and incommensurable in nature. Yet they share a chronic, protracted quality. Syria’s descent into a Dantesque inferno has been seven years in the making and there is no end in sight; the Afghanistan conflict has gone on for twice as long. In Somalia, “more than two million Somalis are currently displaced by a conflict that has lasted over two decades. An estimated 1.5 million people are internally displaced in Somalia and nearly 900,000 are refugees in the near region, including some 308,700 in Kenya, 255,600 in Yemen and 246,700 in Ethiopia” (UNHCR 2017b, 7). These conflicts have endured longer than World War I and World War II combined. In each case, environmental dystopia and extreme weather patterns antecedes and accentuate the catastrophic movement of people.

Syria continues to represent “the world’s largest refugee crisis” (Dunmore 2017, and see fig. 1.3). While Syrians are escaping interminable war and terror, in its collapse, Syria also embodies the noxious synergies among the environment, war and...
terror, and mass human displacement. According to NASA data, Syria’s current drought is “the driest on record.” NASA scientists found that by “estimating uncertainties using a resampling approach [they could] conclude that there is an 89 percent likelihood that this drought is drier than any comparable period of the last 900 years and a 98 percent likelihood that it is drier than the last 500 years” (Cook et al. 2016, 1). According to UN data, the drought caused “75 percent of Syria’s farms to fail and 85 percent of livestock to die between 2006 and 2011. The collapse in crop yields forced as many as 1.5 million Syrians to migrate to urban centers like Homs and Damascus” (Stokes 2016, 2).25

The great exodus of the Rohingya from Myanmar into Bangladesh in 2017 gained unprecedented kinetic movement when two-thirds of all Rohingya Muslims, approximately 650,000 human beings, were forcibly displaced in the process of escaping terror at the hands of Myanmar soldiers. “Even in the chaos, it was clear the soldiers were bent on inflicting the most horror and fear possible, boasting that the Rohingya would never see their land again. Hillsides were wrecked; livestock was killed; and entire villages were systematically razed” (New York Times 2017).

Long-term conflicts, unchecked climate change, extreme weather patterns, and environmental degradation in Africa are generating massive forced migrations. “Four countries in Africa—Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic, and South Sudan—were among the top ten globally for new violence-induced internal displacements in 2015. . . . In total, more than 12 million people have been internally displaced by conflict and violence within Africa—more than twice the number of African refugees” (UNICEF 2016, 58).

In South Sudan, “some 1.9 million people [have been] displaced internally, while outside the country there are now 1.6 million South Sudanese refugees [who have been] uprooted, mainly in Ethiopia, Sudan, and Uganda” UNHCR 2017a, 7). Again the environment looms large: “Drought and environmental degradation, and a food crisis that became a famine because of government neglect and changing regional demographics” were behind the collapse in the Sudan (IDMC 2016, 4). According to the UN, “a famine produced by the vicious combination of fighting and drought is now driving the world’s fastest growing refugee crisis. . . . The rate of new displacement is alarming, representing an impossible burden on a region that is significantly poorer [than other African regions] and which is fast running short of resources to cope. Refugees from South Sudan are crossing the borders to the neighboring countries. The majority of them go to Uganda where new arrivals spiked from 2,000 per day to 6,000 per day in February [2017], and currently average more than 2,800 people per day” (UNHCR News Centre 2017a, 8). The UN World Food Program estimates that by 2017, 4.9 million people (40 percent of South Sudan’s population) were facing famine (UNHCR News Centre 2017b, 1).

Famine lurks as a macabre specter:
In all, more than 20 million people in Nigeria, South Sudan, Somalia and Yemen are experiencing famine or are at risk. The regions in which these countries sit, including the Lake Chad basin, Great Lakes, East, Horn of Africa and Yemen together host well over 4 million refugees and asylum seekers. Consecutive harvests have failed, conflict in South Sudan coupled with drought is leading to famine and outflows of refugees, insecurity in Somalia is leading to rising internal displacement, and rates of malnutrition are high, especially among children and lactating mothers. In the Dollo Ado area of southeast Ethiopia for example, acute malnutrition rates among newly arriving Somali refugee children aged between six months and five years are now running at 50–79 percent. (UNHCR News Centre 2017b, 1)

By large margins, African refugees stay on the continent: “Some 86 percent . . . find asylum in other African countries. Five of the largest refugee populations in the world are hosted in Africa, led by Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda. The protracted nature of crises in sending countries means that some of these host countries have shouldered responsibilities for more than two decades (see fig. I.4). Generations of displaced children have been born in some of the longest standing camps” (see Dryden-Peterson, chapter 10, this volume).

Only small numbers of refugees make it to the high- and middle-income countries (see fig. I.5). Europe is a case in point. By the end of 2015, Europe had approximately one in nine of all refugees under UNHCR’s mandate, a total of 1.8 million people. Of these, most were “divided in nearly equal measure among Germany,
the Russian Federation and France (17, 17 and 15 percent of refugees in Europe, respectively). In 2015, more than one-third of the refugees living in Germany were from the Syrian Arab Republic, with smaller proportions from Iraq and Afghanistan (38, 17 and 10 percent, respectively). Nearly all of the 315,000 refugees hosted in the Russian Federation by the end of 2015 were from Ukraine. By the end of 2015, Germany had become the world’s largest recipient of new individual applications for asylum—receiving more than twice as many as the next closest country” (UNICEF 2016, 92).
In the Americas, a new migration map is also taking form. First, by 2015, Mexican migration to the United States, the largest flow of international migration in U.S. history, was at its lowest in over a quarter of a century. Second, for the first time in recent history, more Mexicans were returning (voluntarily and involuntarily) to their country than were migrating to the United States. According to data analyzed by the Pew Hispanic Center,

more Mexican immigrants have returned to Mexico from the U.S. than have migrated here since the end of the Great Recession. . . . The same data sources also show the overall flow of Mexican immigrants between the two countries is at its smallest since the 1990s, mostly due to a drop in the number of Mexican immigrants coming to the U.S.

From 2009 to 2014, one million Mexicans and their families (including US–born children) left the U.S. for Mexico, according to data from the 2014 Mexican National Survey of Demographic Dynamics. (ENADID 2014)

Third, as Mexican migration decreases (Gonzalez-Barrera 2015), uncontrolled criminality (Suro, chapter 2, this volume), terror, climate change, and environmental dystopia put Central Americans at the center of the new map. Indeed, the Americas gave the new immigration map a new contour: mass unauthorized immigration, unaccompanied minors, children forcibly separated from their parents at the border, and mass deportations.

The sources of the forced movements of people in Central America have disparate and complex histories, finding their distal origins in the Cold War, inequality, and uncontrolled criminality. The Cold War drastically destabilized Latin America and the Caribbean, setting the stage for multiple cycles of mass forced migrations. Armed with the “doctrine of national security,” state terrorism was installed throughout the region. Guatemala came first, with the fall of democratically elected President Jacobo Arbenz in 1954 (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1982). In El Salvador, a key date for the terror and the beginning of the exodus is 1979 and the First Revolutionary Government Board (M. Suárez-Orozco 1989; LaFeber 1993). Protracted conflicts in Nicaragua, the country with a record of US military interventions (LaFeber 1993; M. Suárez-Orozco 1989), likewise sent millions of migrants in search of safe haven. From 1976 to 1996, the Cold War in Central America would leave more than 250,000 dead, more than one million internally displaced, and more than two million seeking shelter, the vast majority in the United States (García 2006).

Honduras and Guatemala are also the countries with the highest levels of inequality in North, Central, and South America. In Honduras the Gini coefficient ratio was 55.7, making it the tenth most unequal country in the world. Guatemala’s index (52.35) placed it as the fourteenth most unequal country.

Honduras has a chilling rate of violence of 90.4 murder deaths per 100,000 inhabitants—the highest per capita in the world. By 2013, more than one thousand
children and youth under the age of twenty-three had been murdered in that country. The logic of terror qua migration is not surprising: the vast majority of Honduran children detained at the US southern border originate in San Pedro Sula, first in the ranking of the fifty most violent cities in the world, with a rate of 159 murders per 100,000 inhabitants (“San Pedro Sula” 2014).

According to the Global Report on Internal Displacement (IDMC 2016, 45), organized criminal violence associated with drug trafficking, gangs, and extortion has reached “epidemic proportions in Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras.” Indeed, the report notes:

As a result, there were at least a million IDPs in the region as of the end of 2015, up from 848,000 at the end of 2014, many of them driven from cities suffering the highest homicide rates in the world and levels of violence comparable with a war zone. . . .

There were more than 289,000 IDPs in El Salvador, a country described as the world’s most deadly outside a war zone, as of the end of 2015. . . . [In Honduras] a total of 2,138 households were surveyed across 20 municipalities identified as having the highest concentrations of displaced people. Based on an extrapolation of the findings it is estimated that they are home to around 174,000 IDPs, including children born in displacement. Of those surveyed, 67.9 percent said their decision to move was influenced only by violence and insecurity, and without consideration of other factors that usually determine migration, such as employment or living conditions. (IDMC 2016, 45)

In the twenty-first century, catastrophic migrations flow from regions plagued by war and terror, rachitic states, unchecked climate change, extreme weather patterns, environmental dystopia, and rampant criminality. Catastrophic migrations are a subcategory of mass migrations but differ in terms of origins, corridors, and the responses they generate (see Suro, chapter 2, this volume). Catastrophic migrations are putting millions of human beings at grave risk the world over. The failure to respond to the magnitude of suffering is marked by world’s largest crisis of confinement in history, leaving millions lingering in interminable limbo, leaving them de facto and de jure with diminishing rights. Syria best embodies the world’s crisis of confinement. Syrians can “only move so far. The country’s international borders were effectively closed in 2015–2016, leaving hundreds of thousands internally displaced near crossing points into neighboring countries” (IDMC 2017, 4).

Catastrophic migrants seeking shelter outside their countries of birth often face ambivalence, xenophobia, and push-back. Catastrophic migrations are the existential crisis of the twenty-first century.

**“CHILDREN ARE A SIGN”**

“(Children) are a sign of hope, a sign of life, but also a ‘diagnostic’ sign, a marker indicating the health of families, society and the entire world. Wherever children
are accepted, loved, cared for and protected, the family is healthy, society is more healthy and the world is more human” (Pope Francis 2014). Crying children are the face of the catastrophic migrations of the twenty-first century. Worldwide, one in every two hundred children is a refugee, almost twice the number of a decade ago (UNICEF 2017a, 11). According to UN data, in 2016 there were twenty-eight million children forcibly displaced. Another twenty million children were international migrants. Their total number is now larger than the populations of Canada and Sweden combined. Millions of children are internal migrants. In China alone there were an estimated thirty-five million migrant children in 2010 and a staggering sixty-one million children who were left behind in the countryside as their parents migrated to the coastal cities.

Few of the forcibly displaced children ever make it to the high-income countries. The vast majority of children seeking refuge will remain internally displaced or will settle in a neighboring country. UNICEF (2016) reports that 900,000 children have been forcibly displaced within South Sudan, and more than 13,000 have been reported as “missing” or separated from their families. Jacqueline Bhabha (chapter 3, this volume) notes that of the more than 600,000 South Sudanese refugees currently sheltered in Uganda, some 300,000 are under age 18, and the majority are girls and women.

By 2015, the world had witnessed a record number of unaccompanied or separated children, with 98,400 formal asylum applicants—mainly Afghans, Eritreans, Syrians, and Somalis—lodged in 78 countries. “This was the highest number on record since UNHCR started collecting such data in 2006” (UNHCR 2016, 8). By the end of 2016, a new record had been set, with at least “300,000 unaccompanied and separated children moving across borders . . . registered in 80 countries in 2015–16—a near fivefold increase from 66,000 in 2010–11. The total number of unaccompanied and separated children on the move worldwide is likely much higher” (UNICEF 2017a, 6).

Bhabha (chapter 3, this volume) notes that Europe has witnessed a dramatic increase in the numbers of children and youth, including unaccompanied children, arriving from the Middle East, North and sub-Saharan Africa, and South Asia. More than 30 percent of sea arrivals in Europe since October 2015 have been children; for some nationalities, including Afghans and Eritreans, children constitute the majority of asylum applicants. By 2017, even greater numbers of unaccompanied and separated minors were arriving in Europe via the unforgiving Central Mediterranean Sea passage from North Africa. “Ninety-two percent of children who arrived in Italy in 2016 and the first two months of 2017 were unaccompanied, up from 75 percent in 2015” (UNICEF 2017a, 6).

In 2014, the United States experienced a significant spike in unaccompanied children fleeing Central America (see www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/usbp-sw-border-apprehensions), and between 2015 and 2016, in North America 100,000
unaccompanied and separated children were apprehended at the Mexico–US border (UNICEF 2017a, 12).

Thousands of children, the majority of them Central American, were incarcerated with their parents in harsh and punitive US facilities, according to Bhabha, "simply because they [could not] demonstrate a regular immigration status, despite a broad international consensus opposing detention of children for immigration reasons. In Mexico, the United States’ de facto immigration buffer zone, detention of child migrants is even more oppressive and pervasive" (chapter 3, Bhabha, this volume). The number of forcibly displaced children and youth arriving in Europe and the United States is but a small proportion of the global total. These children, Bhabha argues, face a “protection deficit.”

In the aftermath of World War II, Europe, the United States, and their allies developed policies for refugees based on the assumption that whatever caused them to flee their homes would be resolved eventually. "Civilized nations could promise ‘non-refoulement,’ the right not to be returned to a place of violence or persecution, because the promise was only temporary (M. Suarez-Orozco and Suro 2017, 1). These architectures now are misaligned with the new conditions. Devastated environments in states with weak institutional capacities hold little promise for safe return. Millions are also fleeing existential threats but may not meet the anachronistic standards required for formal refugee status. The twenty-first-century map suggests new forms of migration that do not fit existing policy frameworks. The architectures in place to protect the forcibly displaced, refugees, and asylum seekers are now out of date and out of touch with the current catastrophic kinetics of forced migration. First, most forcibly displaced migrants today linger as internally displaced in their own countries or in camps in neighboring states with weak institutions, often in subhuman conditions with few protections. Indeed, millions of human beings now are “lost in transit” (Crul et al., chapter 13, this volume). Second, protracted conflicts are sending millions fleeing with no expectation of returning. In 2014, in thirty-three conflicts globally, the average length of exile was twenty-five years (Dryden-Peterson, chapter 10, this volume; IDMC 2016). The conflicts in the countries generating the greatest numbers of the forcibly displaced, such as war and terror in Syria, Afghanistan, and Somalia, have endured longer than World War I and World War II.

Third, the architectures in place are generally blind to the developmental needs of children—a topic of grave urgency (C. Suárez-Orozco, chapter 4; Sanchez Sorondo, epilogue; Bhabha, chapter 3, all this volume). Even when temporary protection is possible or desirable, children in flight need more than a safe haven. They need a place to grow up. They need the safety of home. Fourth, the architectures are not aligned with the best evidence and current thinking on physical health, mental health, and trauma (Mollica, chapter 5; Betancourt et al., chapter 6; Yoshikawa et al., chapter 8, all this volume); legal protections (Bhabha, chapter 3,
this volume); or education (Noguera, chapter 14; Bokova, chapter 9; Banks, chapter 11; Dryden-Peterson, chapter 10; Lena, chapter 12, all this volume).

In his inaugural address at the conference upon which this volume is based, Jeffrey Sachs articulated a plea for seven action items in urgent need of implementation now:

First, the faster we have widespread economic development so that people can safely and prosperously stay in their own homes and homelands, then [the faster] the pressures of forced mass migration [will be], of course, eliminated.

Second, I believe that it is in Africa’s enormous self-interest and in the world’s interest to help make sure that every child in Africa, especially the girls right now, have the health and the education they need. . . .

Third, we have to stop the wars. Syria was a war of choice largely by the United States, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. It led to [over] 10 million people being dislocated. That has had terrible spillover effects on European politics. But it was a war of choice, a so-called regime-change operation, which failed. Similarly, Libya was a war of choice. Iraq was a war of choice. This is one of the great dangers in our world and one of the reasons why we have so many dislocated people.

Fourth, I would emphasize [that] if we do not achieve the Paris Climate Agreement, if we do not successfully stay below 2 degrees Centigrade [in further warming, the planet] will face many disasters, but one of them will be mass forced migration.

Fifth is that even with the tendencies that we have right now, almost all parts of the world, including New York City, need to achieve climate resiliency [that is] built into their regular policymaking. In New York we are still recovering from Storm Sandy in some of the coastal areas of Long Island, for example. So we have to get serious with climate resilience.

And, finally, I would emphasize again that we need to turn the concept of, quote, “Losses and Damages” into a concept of environmental justice and compensation by the rich countries for the damages to the poor countries. Now we have a president [Trump] who wants to blame the poor for America’s problems. Of course this is horrendously ignorant and dangerous. We need quite a different approach, which is to say, “Sorry for a lot of the ills we’ve caused in the world. We’re ready to help you to meet those challenges,” and that’s the approach of justice and the approach that we need to build into any framework for migration as well. (Sachs 2017, 14)

**PLAN OF THE BOOK**

In the following chapters, we endeavor to identify needs as well as new models to best address the physical and mental health, legal protections, education, and well-being of asylum seekers, refugees, and irregular migrants in varied destinations.

In part 1, “The New Cartography of Mass Migration,” we examine the demographic, economic, and environmental processes shaping the new catastrophic migrations. In chapter 1, “Unchecked Climate Change, Mass Migration, and
Sustainability: A Probabilistic Case for Urgent Action,” Fonna Forman and Veerabhadran Ramanathan of the University of California–San Diego argue that unchecked climate change is creating massive disruptions the world over. A new planetary fever, they contend, is resulting in major climate disruptions such as heat waves, severe storms, floods, and droughts. With unchecked emissions, the warming is likely to exceed 1.5°C by 2030, 2°C by 2050, and perhaps a devastating 4°C by 2100.

Forman and Ramanathan caution social scientists and policy makers that such warming magnitudes and speed of warming are unprecedented when compared with the measured climate changes over the last several thousand years. Any attempts to extrapolate causal links between climate change and migration based on past records to predict future trends are likely to yield unreliable results and may severely underestimate the threats we will face in the coming decades. The authors insist that in the face of uncertainty, an ethical global policy response cannot await reliable metrics. International cooperation on climate mitigation is urgently needed. Establishing international protocols that outline the rights of climate refugees and the responsibilities of industrialized nations toward them cannot wait. We must build a culture of climate resilience.

In 2017, the world witnessed ferocious hurricanes in the Atlantic that devastated entire regions of the Caribbean, including Antigua and Barbuda. According to Prime Minister Gaston Alphonso Browne, after the largest storm ever in the Atlantic Ocean in September 2017, “the island of Barbuda [was] decimated, its entire population left homeless, and its buildings reduced to empty shells” (UN News Centre 2017a). The entire island of Puerto Rico was left without power for months. A month earlier (August 2017), devastating monsoons in South Asia killed more than 1,200 people, forced millions from their homes in India, Nepal, and Bangladesh, and shut 1.8 million children out of school.

Climate justice for the global poor, Forman and Ramanathan claim, is as much a battle against what Pope Francis calls “the culture of indifference” as it is about redistributing responsibilities, protections, and reparations.

In chapter 2, “A Migration Becomes an Emergency: The Flight of Women and Children from the Northern Triangle and Its Antecedents,” Roberto Suro examines the particulars of the recent catastrophic exodus out of Central America. He identifies a “transmutation” of flows from the same region to the same destinations but sees them as responding to different drivers. Over two generations, Suro traces the Central American flows to the United States that began escaping state terror in earnest in the 1970s and early 1980s to a pattern best characterized as economic and labor migration (during the 1990s and early 2000s), and sees them finally being transformed into a new variant of forced migration, responding to unchecked criminality and inequality in states with rachitic institutional capacities.

In March 2014, more than 5,000 minors and mothers were apprehended at the southern border of the United States. In April the number “went over 6,000. That
was just the front edge. In May the number was 12,722 before creasing with 16,330 in June. The great bulk of the increase was made up of Northern Triangle migrants, and the number travelling in family units was almost matched by the number of children apprehended alone. The flow of unaccompanied minors—migrants aged 0 to 17—followed a pattern similar to that of the family units, reaching 10,620 in June, five times what it had been two years earlier. Apprehensions of family members and unaccompanied minors totaled 136,986 in fiscal 2014, accounting for 29 percent of all apprehensions that year.” In an act of Herod-like brutality, in 2018 the Trump administration announced that it would forcibly separate children from their parents apprehended in the Southern Border.

While earlier waves of migrants from Central America had been escaping state terrorism and then seeking economic opportunity, the newest arrivals were responding to an entirely different set of circumstances. Even with the same origins and destinations, the corridors of mass migration “recombine” in complex and unpredictable ways. The implications of Suro’s conceptual work for other well-worn corridors such as the North Africa to Europe route are many and worth considering in careful detail.

In Part II, “Frames on Children and Youth on the Move,” we examine mass migrations in light of the experiences of children and youth. Children are on the move in numbers never seen before. UN data suggest that in 2015 there were twenty-eight million children and youth forcibly displaced; another twenty million children were international migrants. Millions more are internal migrants—often encountering the same hardships and threats that international migrant children face.

In chapter 3, “Children on the Move in the Twenty-First Century: Developing a Rights-Based Plan of Action,” Jacqueline Bhabha suggests that although children have always migrated, “the protection deficit that accompanies this multifaceted phenomenon, now widely referred to as ‘children on the move,’ only emerged as a concerted focus of concern relatively recently.” Bhabha frames the phenomenon “beyond the current preoccupation with child vulnerability, dependence, and related protection imperatives, critical though that perspective is. A more dynamic and ambitious agenda to complement the focus of current work is needed, one that acknowledges youthful agency and ambition and that places the right to safe and legal child and adolescent mobility at its core.” She articulates a coherent set of principles, starting with the “unconditional insistence that all children should be considered as children first and foremost, whatever their migration or nationality status.” She reviews policies and principles qua physical health, mental health, and education, among other fields, to ameliorate risk and foster the flourishing of children on the move. As important, she argues that considering the experiences of children and youth on the move should be seen as an opportunity with enormous positive rewards, if well managed, moving forward.
Chapter 4, “A Compassionate Perspective on Immigrant Children and Youth,” by Carola Suárez-Orozco, endeavors to “make sense of the experiences of immigrant and refugee children” as they settle in new societies. She introduces conceptual tools to bring clarity to the complexities facing youngsters on the move. First, she proposes an ecological model of immigrant adaptation, anchored in Bronfenbrenner’s perspective, “whereby the interrelated contexts of development within which children and youth are embedded shape their opportunities and have important implications for both educational and well-being outcomes.” Second, she develops a systematic model of risk and resilience in immigrant and refugee life. Echoing Bhabha’s concern, Carola Suárez-Orozco argues that immigrant and refugee children and youth are remarkably resilient, and their agency and assets are a sine qua non to their thriving in new contexts. She reviews the contexts into which immigrants and refugees settle—inter alia, the policy frameworks, economic realities, and xenophobic responses they encounter—and concludes with a plea for “bridging the compassion gap.”

In Part III, “Catastrophic Migrant Lives at the Margins,” we turn to the triaging of catastrophic migrations. Such migrations in the twenty-first century are delivering millions of human beings into no exit/no entry zones. A “province of liminality” is now the fastest growing region in the new cartography of mass migrations. Millions of internally displaced people are unable to return home and unable to reach a safe country. For them, life is betwixt and between. They linger at the threshold.

There are now almost twice as many internally displaced people as there are international refugees with UNHCR protections. Those who do make it across international borders in nine out of ten cases will remain in a neighboring country. The largest “neighboring hosts” include Turkey (hosting 2.9 million forcibly displaced people, including 1.9 million from neighboring Syria); Pakistan (hosting 1.4 million people from neighboring Afghanistan); and Lebanon (hosting 1 million people from neighboring Syria). In addition, there are also “10 million stateless people who have been denied a nationality and access to basic rights such as education, health care, employment, and freedom of movement” (UNHCR 2018a).

In chapter 6, “The New H5 Model: Trauma and Recovery,” Richard Mollica of Harvard Medical School argues that “the model of guaranteeing safety and security to refugees used by the United Nations and nongovernmental organizations is outdated. It is obvious to all humanitarian relief players that the current humanitarian assistance model is badly broken and inadequate.”

Refugees, as Drosh Marie DeVoe (1981, 88) has long noted, evoke the lasting impression of a needy and helpless victim: “a client in need of assistance. The refugee problem is typically viewed in terms of filling only the immediate requirements of a needy people.” Yet refugees are competent agents with the drive, creativity, and inherent capacity to self-heal. They need to be the architects of their healing—indeed, their agency is the sine qua non to healing, according to Mollica.
Theresa Betancourt and her team of collaborators elaborate on the theme of refugee agency in chapter 6, “Addressing Mental Health Disparities in Refugee Children through Family and Community-Based Prevention.” They present a culturally relevant intervention in the form of a community-based participatory research (CBPR) process to develop, implement, and evaluate a family intervention aimed at promoting positive caregiver–child relationships, family functioning, and child mental health among refugees resettling in the United States. Their work describes the value of CBPR in such efforts. “Examples are drawn from a process used to develop and evaluate the feasibility and acceptability of a family home visiting intervention . . . among Somali Bantu and Lhotshampa Bhutanese refugees who have resettled in the United States.” The tentative results are promising.

In chapter 7, “Surveying the Hard-to-Survey: Refugees and Unaccompanied Minors in Greece,” Theoni Stathopoulou, director of the National Centre for Social Research, Athens, turns to the humanitarian crisis that was unfolding in Greece in 2015 with the sudden arrival of more than 850,000 refugees in search of shelter (IOM 2016). Greece, a country badly battered by an enormous economic and social crisis, responded with an extraordinary effort, bringing civil society, state actors, and the international community to relieve and accommodate the new arrivals. The chapter presents the results of REHEAL, the first survey conducted by the National Centre for Social Research in refugee camps all over Greece between July and September 2016 with the use of self-completed questionnaires. In addition, Stathopoulou presents the results from a pilot study on unaccompanied minors in Greece conducted in collaboration with the Harvard Program on Refugee Trauma. The chilling findings of this study are central for any understanding of safety and protections needed for the most vulnerable group in this refugee population.

Millions of forcibly displaced children are out of school, and millions more are being schooled on the move. According to a Save the Children 2016 report, “Refugee children are five times less likely to attend school than other children. Currently, 50 percent of primary school-aged refugee children and 75 percent of secondary school-aged children are completely left out of the education system, with none of the safeguards that school environments provide. In 2015 alone, the education of 80 million children was disrupted by humanitarian crises” (Save the Children 2016). Less than one percent of refugees the world over are receiving a college education.

In addition, millions of children and youth are exposed to catastrophic contexts that endanger their safety, health, and well-being. Well-documented risks include both exposure to and direct experiences of violence, including rape, torture, and severe beatings; the loss of loved ones; and violent and protracted family separations. In a recent International Organization for Migration survey, ”over three-quarters of 1,600 children aged 14–17 who arrived in Italy via the Central Mediterranean route reported experiences such as being held against their will or being forced to work
without pay at some point during their journeys—indications that they may have been trafficked or otherwise exploited. Traffickers and other exploiters thrive especially where state institutions are weak, where organized crime abounds, and also where migrants become stuck and desperate” (UNICEF 2017a, 6).

In chapter 8, “Mitigating the Impact of Forced Displacement and Refugee and Unauthorized Migration on Youth: Integrating Developmental Processes with Intervention Research,” Hirokazu Yoshikawa, Alice Wuermli, and J. Lawrence Aber of New York University argue that the rights of youth on the move around the world are being violated, with severe consequences for their psychological health and well-being. The authors present a “developmental process-oriented framework for informing the development and evaluation of interventions to mitigate the risks posed by major social and political upheavals, displacement, and refugee and unauthorized status on child and youth development.” They examine the best “evidence on the overall risk to child and youth development and learning posed by exposure to these contexts, the emerging evidence on contextual and psychological factors that may exacerbate or mitigate these risks, and the evidence base of rigorous evaluations of interventions from the dyadic to the policy levels that have successfully targeted these factors and mitigated the risks and promoted resilience and healthy development despite adversity.”

In Part IV, “The Work of Education in the Transitions of Immigrant and Refugee Youth,” we turn to the role of education in migrant and refugee children’s transition into new societies. The majority of children in need of refuge today are living lives in limbo within the boundaries of their conflict-ridden nations or settling into precarious conditions in neighboring countries (Dryden-Peterson, chapter 10, this volume). The research by Jacqueline Bhabha and Sarah Dryden-Peterson addresses the “crisis of confinement” (Sánchez Terán 2017, 1), and the near-permanent marginality facing millions of children at the margins.

The children and youth who make it to middle- and high-income countries face other realities, challenges, and marginalities. In the United States, Canada, Australia, and most of Europe, the children of refugees and migrants are now the fastest growing sector of the child population. Their education, well-being, and prosperity are imperatives as fundamental conditions of civilization. There are also pragmatic imperatives: Syrian children will be tomorrow’s nurses in Germany, police in Sweden, and engineers in Holland. The same is true for Central American children in the United States. Harnessing the resilience, hardiness, and ethic of care in these children is as much a smart policy for a healthy society moving forward as it is a humanitarian imperative.

Education is the Camino Real to socioeconomic mobility, health, citizenship, and engagement. But those growing up in “fragile or conflict-affected countries—migrants, refugees, and displaced persons—are hit hardest.” Immigrants and refugees are falling behind: “At a time when educational achievement is a marker of
future opportunity, the world remains far off mark, with over 263 million children and adolescents still out of primary and secondary school and close to the same number failing to acquire basic skills after four years in school. Adolescent girls and young women are most vulnerable to exclusion as well as to early marriage, sexual violence, and exploitation (Bokova, chapter 9, this volume).

Wide-ranging chapter 9, “Empowering Global Citizens for a Just and Peaceful World,” by UNESCO’s former Director General Irina Bokova, makes a plea for education as a human right and a fundamental instrument for empowerment. She maintains that education “provides women and men with the tools to build resilience and make the most of change. This is especially important in conflict situations, in which learning and going to school can bring a sense of normality and restore hope in the future. Learning provides young minds with confidence when horizons are bleak, making education the best long-term way to break cycles of violence and set communities on the path to peace.”

Today’s humanitarian crisis is generating intolerance and xenophobia and increasing the risk of immigrant youth’s radicalization and gravitation to fundamentalist ideologies. Education’s preventive and preemptive role—in particular through the promoting of global citizenship, dialogue, youth engagement in democratic life, intercultural competencies, and digital literacy—is more important today than ever.

In chapter 10, “Inclusion and Membership through Refugee Education? Tensions between Policy and Practice,” Sarah Dryden-Peterson of Harvard Graduate School of Education turns to the matter of educating the children of refugees. As she notes, those who do make it into schools are often headed for separate facilities for refugees. Such schools have been the norm in so-called “neighboring host countries,” where almost 90 percent of all global refugees are settled. The idea of separate schools is aligned with the notion that refugees are temporary guests soon to return to their countries of origin. Such schools are thus preparing children for their return home.

Yet extended conflicts make the “myth of the return” an ever-distant mirage for millions. As Dryden-Peterson notes, since 2012, global policy has shifted to a new normative ideal to integrate refugees into national education systems. She maintains, “The policy of integration reflects the reality that displacement is protracted, and return to a country of origin is elusive. The practice of integration of refugees reflects a different reality, one often filled with isolation and exclusion.” Dryden-Peterson explores the tension between the lofty ideals encoded in the model of integration of refugees into national education systems and the ambiguous belonging enacted in the daily experiences of refugee students in classrooms—a practice that places refugee children “outside of current membership in society.”

Mass migrations are generating push-back, nativist anxieties, and anti-immigrant fervor. These reactions are occurring in the United States and in much of
Western Europe, but also in China and throughout Africa and the Middle East. The eminent scholar of education and multiculturalism James A. Banks argues in chapter 11, “Civic Education for Noncitizen and Citizen Students: A Conceptual Framework,” that conflicts over diversity and citizenship persist in many forms in many societies marked by ethnic, racial, and religious differences. Banks claims that racial, ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious groups are often denied structural inclusion in the nation-state. The children of immigrants and refugees both register and are affected by the increasingly radioactive ethos of reception—how they are viewed in their new societies and the structural barriers that they face (C. Suárez-Orozco 2001; see also chapter 4, this volume). The anomic withdrawal and the cultures of antagonism of the children of stigmatized populations are but an instance of what Banks has called “failed citizenship.” The children of refugees, immigrants, and other marked minorities may not make the values and symbols of the nation-state their own. The United States, Western Europe, and other advanced postindustrial societies, as Banks documents, are manufacturing high levels of disconnection, anomie, and social malaise: “Failed citizenship exists when individuals or groups who are born within a nation or migrate to it and live within it for an extended period of time do not internalize the values and ethos of the nation-state, feel structurally excluded within it, and have highly ambivalent feelings toward it. Individuals who experience failed citizenship focus primarily on their own needs for political efficacy, group identity, and structural inclusion rather than on the overarching and shared goals of the nation-state. Their allegiance and commitment to the nation-state is eclectic and complex.”

Formal education must reclaim its eudemonic, civic, and emancipatory roots if we are to interrupt the life-thwarting momentum threatening millions of youth in marginalized communities. Banks’s thoughtful blueprint for an education promoting transformative citizenship should be useful to all educators and policy makers working with immigrant and refugee children.

Pierre Léna of the Académie des Sciences, Paris, notes in chapter 12, “Refugees in Education: What Can Science Education Contribute?,” that massive displacements are “putting millions of students in a variety of situations: no schooling for years, poor schooling in precarious environments, and immersion in [new] cultures without the language and necessary bridges with the family culture.” Education, he reminds us, thrives with curiosity. Curiosity is the sine qua non for cognitive engagement (C. Suárez-Orozco, M. Suárez-Orozco, and Todorova 2008) and lifelong learning. For Léna, science education, teaching for reasoning and for modeling a rational mind, is the cure for ignorance and the antidote to fundamentalisms and xenophobic intolerance. He argues that with unchecked climate change as a driver of mass migration, climate-change education, with its high science content, is needed on a large scale to implement the difficult objectives of the Paris Agreement. He presents examples from La main à la pate (“hands on”), a highly regarded
inquiry-based science education program in primary and lower secondary schools implemented throughout the world. This program now reaches children—including those of immigrants and refugees—in fifty countries. He argues that "natural sciences have a character of universality, fostering cognitive development of students, which makes them a precious tool for these displaced children."

In "Lost in Transit: Education for Refugee Children in Sweden, Germany, and Turkey," chapter 13, Maurice Crul and his colleagues compare the ways in which three countries that have received large numbers of refugees are endeavoring to incorporate children into their disparate educational systems. The authors examine in detail the institutional arrangements most likely to shape the school trajectories of refugee children: 1) preschool; 2) entrance into compulsory schooling; 3) the so-called "welcome, submersion, or introduction classes"; 4) second-language instruction; 5) supports for teachers working with refugee students; 6) tracking; and 7) schooling after compulsory school. The programs vary greatly, and the results are varied. While both Germany and Sweden are struggling to provide equitable quality education to new arrivals, the situation in Turkey is bleak. Although Turkish law mandates the schooling of all minors regardless of nationality, about half of all refugee children in Turkey are not being educated in schools. Those who are enrolled in school “are in temporary education centers.” The authors suggest which educational institutional arrangements need to be in place to provide equal opportunities for refugee children to succeed in school.

In chapter 14, “From the Crisis of Connection to the Pursuit of Our Common Humanity: The Role of Schools in Responding to the Needs of Immigrant and Refugee Children,” Pedro Noguera develops the concept of the crisis of connection and reflects upon the flight from humanism and the ethic of care. He maintains:

Signs of the crisis of connection are particularly evident in the international response to the global refugee crisis. As millions of people are displaced from their homes and forced in many cases to risk their lives as they attempt to flee war, hunger, and violence, a yawning empathy gap acts as a formidable obstruction to the development of humane and creative responses to suffering. . . . The tepid, ineffectual response to the global refugee crisis is reinforced and exacerbated by our acceptance of grotesque inequalities in wealth and access to resources, an imbalance that drives at least some of the refugee crisis and often threatens the quality of life in places where the displaced wait to be settled.

Noguera argues that schools in the United States and elsewhere are unequipped and unprepared to respond adequately to the needs of the new wave of refugees and unaccompanied minors. Although US public schools are mandated to serve all children, including the undocumented and the children of refugees, too many schools and communities are reacting with hostility and resentment. Others are responding with humanity and care. Yet more often than not, these schools
respond without guidance, basic supports, training, and resources. Noguera notes the “growing hostility toward immigrants expressed by politicians, civic groups, and the media that erodes public willingness to assist schools in serving the new arrivals. Without a major cultural undertaking to bridge the empathy gap,” he observes, “it will be difficult to gather the human and material resources required for the task of educating the largest and most diverse cohort of immigrant and refugee-origin students now making its way through schools the world over.”

Chapter 15, “Children of Immigrants in the United States: Barriers and Paths to Integration and Well-Being,” by Harvard sociologist of immigration Mary Waters, and chapter 16, “Improving the Education and Social Integration of Immigrants,” by Francesca Borgonovi, Mario Piacentini, and Andreas Schleicher of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), examine the lives and transitions of immigrant children and youth in the United States and the OECD countries.

In the United States immigration is both history (how the country came to be what it is today) and destiny (the children of immigrants are the fastest-growing sector of the US population). The proportion of today’s immigrants is slightly below what it was a century ago. Waters maintains, “First and second generations account for one out of four members of the US population. . . . The successful integration of these immigrants and their children is necessary for the overall success of our society. The well-being of a quarter of our population ought to be one of our highest public policy priorities. As a society that has successfully integrated generations of immigrants and their children throughout its history, the United States ought to be a model for societies around the world who face similar challenges in the age of unprecedented human migration.”

Waters examines the integration and well-being among the children of immigrants in the areas of education, socioeconomic outcomes, and mental and physical health. She asks: What policies “facilitate or impede that integration? How does integration affect the well-being of the second generation?” The answers tell a mixed story. She concludes by articulating a new semiotics and ethics of engagement to address the protracted issue of unauthorized immigration in the United States. Waters suggests “that the Catholic Church and other religious organizations have the potential to contribute greatly to the moral underpinnings of the movement that is needed to keep immigrant families together and to strengthen the next generation. The Catholic Church, along with other faith-based organizations, has long been a leader in nongovernmental action in immigrant integration. Faith-based institutions have great potential to also be moral leaders in the kinds of policy changes that are urgently needed in the United States going forward” (Waters, chapter 15, this volume).

In chapter 16, “Improving the Education and Social Integration of Immigrants,” Francesca Borgonovi, Mario Piacentini, and Andreas Schleicher of the OECD note that an estimated five million permanent migrants arrived in OECD coun-
tries in 2015. The recent wave continues an upward trend in the share of new immigrants in these countries. Since 2000, the immigrant population has grown by more than 30 percent and represents ever more diverse origins. The children of immigrants and refugees are a growing presence in classrooms throughout OECD countries. Education is critical as an end in and of itself, but it also shapes public perception of a country’s ability to manage migration well. Schooling shapes the identities and sense of belonging of immigrant children and youth. As important, education will drive their transition to the labor market and to citizenship in new societies.

By 2015, data from the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) found that, on average, in OECD countries 12.5 percent of fifteen-year-old students were immigrant-origin (up from 9.4 percent in 2006). The data suggest that children of immigrants have lower levels of academic achievement than other students. However, the authors conclude that the average difference in science performance between immigrant and nonimmigrant students with similar socioeconomic status and familiarity with the test language narrowed between 2006 and 2015.

The lower levels of academic achievement are not surprising. First, testing relies heavily on the academic language of the new country. Language acquisition and academic trajectories are bound together (M. Suárez-Orozco 1989, 1991; C. Suárez-Orozco, M. Suárez-Orozco, and Todorova 2008; Gandara and Contreras 2009). Research in the United States, Canada, Europe, and elsewhere suggests that it takes years for immigrant-origin students to reach academic language parity with native speakers, even under the best teaching and learning conditions. One recurring finding (see Collier 1995; Cummins 2000; Hakuta, Butler, and Witt 2000; National Research Council 1997) is that it takes approximately five to seven years for immigrant language-learners to develop the academic language proficiency required to compete fairly with native speakers in standardized assessment regimes at the center of worldwide education reforms. Another consistent finding suggests that “balanced bilinguals”—that is, youth who continuously develop their home language as they acquire a second academic language—tend to have better educational trajectories over time (Callahan and Gándara 2014).

Second, research suggests that parental socioeconomic status (SES)—including maternal education and paternal occupation—is a powerful predictor of testing outcomes. Children of lower SES immigrant parents are thus at a disadvantage. Research indicates that immigrants are more likely than their native counterparts to encounter poverty in their new societies (Kazemipur and Halli 2001). Poverty is created in part by unique disadvantages that are often associated with immigrant status, such as “language barriers, incompatibility of educational credentials, limited transferability of job skills, unfamiliarity with the market demands, and lack of access to job and educational networks” (Kazemipur and Halli 2001, 1132; see also de Haan and Yaqub 2009).
Third, concentrated disadvantage in immigrant neighborhoods, segregated and inferior immigrant schools, unauthorized immigrant status, and the stresses and trauma of immigration have been empirically linked to lower testing outcomes and academic trajectories. Children raised in disadvantage are also vulnerable to instability of residence as well as to an array of distressors, including difficulty with concentrating and sleeping, anxiety, and depression as well as heightened exposure to delinquency and violence. Concentrated disadvantage has long been recognized as a significant risk factor for poor educational outcomes (Luthar 1999; Weissbourd 1996).

Immigrant poverty and segregation are often compounded by unauthorized status (the United Nations estimates that there are between 30 and 40 million unauthorized migrants worldwide; Papademetriou 2005). The United States has a very large concentration of undocumented immigrants—approximately 11.1 million people (or just about 3.5 percent of the nation’s population) were unauthorized, and about 3.9 million kindergarten through twelfth-grade students in US public and private schools in 2014—73 percent of the total—were children of unauthorized immigrants, according to Pew Research Center estimates (Passel and Cohn 2016). The number of children who are themselves unauthorized has declined from a peak of 1.6 million in 2005 to about 750,000 a decade later. Research suggests that undocumented youth often arrive after multiple family separations and traumatic border crossings (C. Suárez-Orozco, Yoshikawa, and Tseng 2015). They may continue to experience fear and anxiety about being apprehended, separated again from their parents, and deported (C. Suárez-Orozco and Marks 2016; see also Chaudry et al. 2010; C. Suárez-Orozco, M. Suárez-Orozco, and Todorova 2008). An overview of key research published in the Harvard Education Review in 2011 concluded: “The evidence reveals a consistent pattern: the effects of unauthorized status on development across the life span are uniformly negative, with millions of US children and youth at risk of lower educational performance, economic stagnation, blocked mobility and ambiguous belonging. In all, the data suggest an alarming psychological formation” (C. Suárez-Orozco et al. 2011, 461).

Given this powerful undertow, immigrant- and refugee-origin children may be doing better academically than expected. Yet the great influx of refugee-origin children into European OECD countries during the last twelve months is very likely to alter the generally positive picture reported in the PISA data.

**CONCLUSIONS**

Mass migration and demographic change are, under the best of circumstances, destabilizing and generate disequilibrium. Catastrophic migrations produce multiple additional layers of distress. The forcibly displaced undergo violent separations and carry the wounds of trauma. Millions of human beings are caught in
permanent limbo, living in zones of confinement—Stathopoulou’s “no-man zones.” In these zones “humiliation is re-created in the camp environment when individuals are not allowed to work, grow food, or make money” (Mollica, chapter 5, this volume). Catastrophic migrations assault the structure and coherence of families in their legislative, social, and symbolic functions (Lacan 2006).

The outright rejection of unwanted refugees, asylum seekers, and unauthorized immigrants compounds the trauma they suffer (see C. Suárez-Orozco 2004). In many receiving countries, too, we have identified zones of confinement where de facto and de jure policies are forcing millions of immigrant and refugee families to live in the shadow of the law. In the United States, the country with the largest number of immigrants, millions are separated, millions are deported, millions are incarcerated, and millions more inhabit a subterranean world of illegality (C. Suárez-Orozco, chapter 4, this volume).

Catastrophic migrations and violent family separations disrupt the essential developmental functions necessary for children to establish basic trust, feel secure (Erickson 1950), and have a healthy orientation toward the world and the future. Catastrophic migrations tear children from their families and communities. Furthermore, physical, sexual, and psychological abuse are normative features of forced migrations, especially when they involve human trafficking and the subhuman conditions that prevail in many migrant camps. The camps in Bangladesh are but the most recent example. They were hastily set up for the 650,000 Rohingya refugees, mostly women and children, escaping massacres in Myanmar in late 2017. Once in Bangladesh, the Rohingya, encountered rickety camps and “a miasma of untreated trauma, fresh exploitation and apprehension about the future” (New York Times 2017, p. 13, see also Stathopoulou, chapter 7, and Mollica, chapter 5, both this volume).

Catastrophic migrations remove children and youth from the proscribed pathways that enable them to reach and master culturally determined developmental milestones in the biological, socioemotional, cognitive, and moral realms required to make the transition to adulthood successfully. Catastrophic migrations are life-thwarting, harming children’s physical, psychological, moral, and social well-being by placing them in contexts that are inherently dangerous.

When immigrants and refugees manage to settle in new societies, they bring new kinship systems, cultural sensibilities (including racial, linguistic, and religious), and identities to the forefront. These may misalign with (and even contravene) taken-for-granted cultural schemas and social practices in receiving societies. The world over, immigrants and refugees are arousing suspicion, fear, and xenophobia. Immigration is the frontier pushing against the limits of cosmopolitan tolerance. Immigration intensifies the general crisis of connection and flight from the pursuit of our inherent humanitarian obligations concerning the welfare of others (Noguera, chapter 14, this volume). Reimagining the narrative of belonging,
reclaiming the humanitarian call, and recalibrating the institutions of the nation-state are a sine qua non to move beyond the current immigration malaise the world over. In the long term, we must retrain hearts and minds, especially younger ones, for democracy in the context of demographic change and superdiversity. We need to convert a dread of the unfamiliar “Other” into empathy, solidarity, and a democratizing desire for cultural difference. In this book we endeavor to cultivate the humanistic ideal to find oneself “in Another” (Ricoeur 1995) in the refugee, in the asylum seeker, and in the forcibly displaced.

NOTES
Throughout this volume we use the terms migrants, immigrants, emigrants, asylum seekers, refugees, internally displaced persons, forcibly displaced persons, and environmental refugees. Each term denotes distinct and often disparate circumstances, seriatim, context of exit, context of reception, motivations and phenomenology of experience. We find the general definitions of these terms suggested by the International Migration Organization quite useful (www.iom.int/key-migration-terms). The general focus of the volume is on the “catastrophic migrations” of the 21st century. A catastrophe can be defined as a sudden change or upheaval in the order of things, whether physical or social, that affects living beings dramatically and adversely. Beings, in this case, are human beings forced to flee. Terror and uncontrolled criminality are now major drivers but, as Pope Francis wisely noted in the encyclical Laudato Si, there is also “a tragic rise in the number of migrants seeking to flee from the growing poverty caused by environmental degradation. They are not recognized by international conventions as refugees; they bear the loss of the lives they have left behind, without enjoying any legal protection whatsoever. Sadly, there is widespread indifference to such suffering, which is even now taking place throughout our world. Our lack of response to these tragedies involving our brothers and sisters points to the loss of that sense of responsibility for our fellow men and women upon which all civil society is founded” (Pope Francis 2015).

1. Human trafficking is not the topic of the current work. It will suffice to say that an estimated thirty million humans are being trafficked, representing “all continents and races [and] the world’s religions and languages.” “Almost every country in the world is affected by trafficking, whether as a country of origin, transit or destination for victims” (UNODC 2012). “Victims of forced labor have been found in nearly every job setting or industry imaginable, including private homes, factories, restaurants, elder care and medical facilities, hotels, housekeeping, child rearing, agriculture, construction and landscaping, food processing, meat-packing, and cleaning services” (US Dept. of State 2013, 30). Many of those trafficked are immigrants.

2. “When humans first ventured out of Africa . . . they left genetic footprints still visible today . . . . According to the genetic and paleontological record, we only started to leave Africa between 60,000 and 70,000 years ago. What set this [migration] in motion is uncertain, but we think it has something to do with major climatic shifts that were happening around that time—a sudden cooling in the Earth’s climate driven by the onset of one of the worst parts of the last Ice Age” (National Geographic, Genographic Project n.d.).
3. “Diverse species have emerged over the course of human evolution, and a suite of adaptations have accumulated over time, including upright walking, the capacity to make tools, enlargement of the brain, prolonged maturation, the emergence of complex mental and social behavior, and dependence on technology to alter the surroundings” (“Climate Effects on Human Evolution” 2016). Indeed, migration is a precursor of modern humans, “the open-country suite of features inferred for Homo erectus had evolved together and provided the adaptations for dispersal beyond Africa. These features foreshadowed those of more recent Homo sapiens and included large linear bodies, elongated legs, large brain sizes, reduced sexual dimorphism, increased carnivory, and unique life history traits (e.g., extended ontogeny and longevity) as well as toolmaking and increased social cooperation” (Antón, Potts, and Aiello 2014).

4. “These numbers can be problematic because the most widely cited UN figures are cumulative” (Butler 2017).

5. The well-worn migration corridors of the post–World War II era have much older origins—in the age of European exploration, wars of conquest and of empire that began in 1492. War and conquest created the unstable foundations of what would be called the “New World.” They destroyed civilizations, induced demographic collapse, and caused massive displacement of indigenous populations and their livelihoods. The expanding European powers systematically linked the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans, creating the largest trading systems ever seen in history. The trade routes became the great corridors for global migration during the last five centuries.

6. Latin Americans are the largest immigrant group in the United States. The nation now has approximately four times more immigrants than the second-largest country of immigration (the Russian Federation) does.

7. I subsume under labor migration the categories “sojourners,” “target earners,” and so-called “guest workers.”

8. The colonial struggles of independence in the Americas (in Haiti in 1791), Africa (from the Maghreb to South Africa), and Asia, including the end of the British Raj in India and the subsequent partition of the subcontinent (in 1947), would be punctuated by cycles of “hot wars” such as those in Indochina (1947–54), Algeria (1954–62), and Vietnam (1959–75); “cold wars” such as those in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Cuba; and “dirty wars” such as those in Guatemala and El Salvador, resulting in massive movements of people.

9. At the end of the Obama administration (in early 2017), US policy qua Cuban arrivals finally became aligned with the reception of other asylum seekers.

10. The collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 and the ensuing global recession began a significant downturn in patterns of migration—especially irregular, unauthorized migration.

11. According to the Global Report on Internal Displacement (IDMC 2016, 8), while there are no figures for the total number of people permanently displaced by disasters, “among a sample of 34 ongoing cases documented in 2015, there were hundreds of thousands of people identified as living in protracted displacement for periods ranging between one and 26 years.” For an overview of climate and migration, see also McLeman (2014).

12. Alexander Betts (2010) argues that catastrophic migrations are populated by what he calls “survival migrants” and what Roberto Suro calls “recombinant migrants” (chapter 2, this volume).

14. Human beings have always migrated. Migrations have shaped and reshaped the world. Modern humans are the children of immigration. *Homo sapiens sapiens* is the child of *Homo sapiens mobilis*—migration made us human.

15. “In India, the impact of two major flood and storm events were responsible for 81 percent of the displacement, forcing three million people to flee their homes. Heavy rains and flash floods associated with a weak tropical cyclone that tracked across the Bay of Bengal in November displaced 1.8 million in the states of Tamil Nadu and southern Andhra Pradesh. Monsoon flooding associated with Cyclone Komen, which struck neighboring Bangladesh in late July, displaced 1.2 million, mostly in the northern and central states of West Bengal, Odisha, Manipur, Rajasthan and Gujarat” (IDMC 2016, 15).

16. “Three large-scale typhoons and a flood disaster together triggered 75 percent of the displacement in China. Three typhoons, Chan-Hom, Soudelor, and Dujan, struck four eastern provinces between July and September, destroying homes, causing landslides and flooding and, [among] them, displacing more than 2.2 million people. Earlier in the year, heavy rains and flooding in nine southern and eastern provinces forced another 518,000 people to flee their homes in May” (IDMC 2016, 15).

17. “The earthquakes in Nepal in April and May, the thousands of aftershocks that followed and the landslides they triggered left 712,000 homes and much infrastructure damaged or destroyed. The disaster took a heavy toll on the developing nation, affecting almost a third of the population and killing 8,700 people. Many of the 2.6 million who were displaced have been unable to return to their homes, and recovery and reconstruction will take many years to complete” (IDMC 2016, 15).

18. “Typhoon Koppu (local name Lando) was the most severe. It made landfall on Luzon, the country’s largest and most populous island, in October, killing 54 people, displacing around 938,000 and causing severe crop damage. Typhoon Melor (local name Nona) forced 743,000 people to flee their homes in the central regions of Bicol Peninsula and Romblon Islands in December, and Typhoon Goni (local name Ineng) displaced more than 318,000 in the north of the country in August” (IDMC 2016, 15).

19. Inequality and unchecked criminality are compounded by manmade environmental malfeasance. The 1969 Honduras–El Salvador war (known in Latin America as the “Soccer War”) erupted when approximately 300,000 Salvadorans ran out of cultivable land, spilling over into neighboring Honduras. The enormous concentration of lands in the hands of a few families and the resulting land scarcity for the vast majority of peasants led to the brief war. Durham (1979, 1) argues that “land scarcity, a principal cause of the war, was largely a product of the concentration of landholdings.” Deforestation for rare hardwoods and beef production has left an ecological scar as more and more forests are destroyed for export commodities. Between 1990 and 2005, 37.1 percent of the forests of Honduras were consumed. “Worse, since the close of the 1990s, Honduras’s rate of forest loss has increased by 9 percent,” leaving the country especially vulnerable during hurricane season. Hurricane Mitch hit Central America in 1998, leaving more than 11,000 dead and 8,000 missing and displacing more than 2.5 million Hondurans. Many Hondurans began a massive exodus to a country to which they had not migrated before: the United States. The hurricane left a catastrophic environmental and psychosocial sequel.
Data from the Brown University School of Medicine estimate that out of a total of 3.3 million adults (age fifteen or older) living in Honduras, more than 492,000 have experienced posttraumatic stress disorder due to Hurricane Mitch (Kohn et al. 2005). More recently, as Suro (chapter 2, this volume) notes, “To make a horrific situation worse, Central America experienced the most severe drought in decades during this period with relief agencies counting 3.5 million people in the region as food insecure at mid-decade” (Chishti and Hipsman 2016).

Sachs writes, “I believe that it is in Africa’s enormous self-interest and in the world’s interest to help make sure that every child in Africa, especially the girls right now, have the health and the education they need. That would be followed by a faster voluntary fertility reduction, a demographic transition. . . . If Africa were to reach 5 billion in population or 4 billion in population by 2100, the pressures on survival, well-being, and mass migration would be phenomenally large, indeed tragic” (Sachs 2017, 6).

The vast majority of these children, some 4.5 million, are US-born citizens. These children are living in the shadow of the law, in constant fear of deportation and forced family separations. During the term of his presidency, Barack Obama deported more than 2.5 million immigrants. Moving forward, President Trump is making good on his promises to increase deportations and call for the building of a two-thousand-mile wall along the Mexican border.

“Of those the Syrian conflict has uprooted, around 6.6 million people have been displaced internally. Away from the media glare and out of reach of humanitarian agencies, many struggle to survive in subhuman conditions” (IDMC 2016, 4).

In 2015, Iraq had 3.3 million and Yemen had 2.5 million internally displaced people (IDMC 2016, 4).

By 2017, South Sudan had 2.4 million refugees, surpassing Somalia in the number of refugees under UNHRC protection (UNHCR 2018a, 2018b).

“The drought ‘had displaced Syrians long before the conflict began,’ said Francesco Femia, president of the Center for Climate Security. ‘And what is frightening is that analysts who study the region completely missed it’” (Stokes 2016).

Approximately a quarter of all the 1.8 million refugees in Europe originated in Europe (UNICEF 2016, 92).


The top nine countries for deportations from the United States are all Latin American nations, led by Mexico. Jamaica is tenth. See “Top 10 Countries of Deportations” (2013).

The Gini coefficient is a standard economic measure of income inequality whereby 0 represents perfect equality while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality.

St Louis, Missouri, the most violent city in the United States, has a homicide rate of 59.2 deaths per 100,000 people (Gramlich 2008; see also http://www.city-data.com/crime/crime-St.-Louis-Missouri.html).
32. In 2015, “there were 40.8 million IDPs worldwide as a result of conflict and violence—an increase of 2.8 million on 2014.” Internal displacement associated with conflict and violence has been growing since the beginning of the millennium, and the 2015 data represent “the highest figure ever recorded” (IDMC 2016, 5). Today there are 21.3 million refugees under the UNHCR.

33. In affluent countries worldwide, poverty among children of immigrants has increased steadily in recent years, with gaps between the native-born and immigrants ranging from 7 percent in Australia and Germany, to 12 percent in the United States, to between 26 and 28 percent in England and France (Hernandez et al. 2010). In the United States, children of immigrants are more likely than native-born children to live in crowded housing conditions (7 percent versus 2 percent, respectively) and to experience inadequate nutrition (25 percent versus 21 percent, respectively) (Chaudry and Fortuny 2010).

Poverty coexists with a variety of other factors that augment risks, such as single parenthood, residence in violence-ridden neighborhoods, gang activity, and drug trade as well as school environments that are segregated, overcrowded, understaffed, and poorly funded (C. Suárez-Orozco, Yoshikawa, and Tseng 2015). It is also associated with high rates of housing mobility and concurrent school transitions that can be highly disruptive to educational performance (Gándara and Contreras 2009). Segregation matters in immigrant integration. In the United States, immigrant-origin Latino children are the most segregated students in the schools, particularly in the West (Orfield et al. 2014; Orfield and Lee 2005). Immigrants who settle in predominantly minority neighborhoods may have little if any direct, continuous, and intimate contact with peers from the nonimmigrant mainstream population. A pattern of triple segregation—by race, language, and poverty—shapes the lives of many new immigrants in the various countries.

34. “Almost every country in the world is affected by trafficking, whether as a country of origin, transit or destination for victims” (UNODC 2012). Although no precise figures exist, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) (2013) estimated that “980,000 to 1,225,000 children—both boys and girls—are in a forced labor situation as a result of trafficking.”

The trafficking in children—internally in countries, across national borders, and across continents—is closely interlinked with the demand for cheap, malleable, and docile labor in sectors and among employment settings where the working conditions and treatment grossly violate the human rights of the children. These are characterized by environments that are unacceptable (the unconditional worst forms) as well as dangerous to the health and the development of the child (hazardous worst forms). These forms range from bonded labor, camel jockeying, child domestic labour, commercial sexual exploitation and prostitution, drug couriering, and child soldiering to exploitative or slavery-like practices in the informal industrial sector” (ILO 2004, 16).

According to the ILO, “the occupations in which most children are working as forced or slave labourers are in agriculture, drug trafficking, commercial sexual exploitation and as child soldiers [in paramilitary combat units]” (ILO 2013).

REFERENCES


