Imagine a large-format photograph with a prison looming in the foreground. The print renders the building in impeccable detail. Sunlight glints off the razor wire. You can count the bars on the windows and make out the piercing eyes of guards in the towers. What’s more, you can see a new wing of the building, now under construction, which will transform the site into a Justice Complex, integrating corrections, courts, and police. A state-of-the-art training facility for police officers will be built next door. You spy the helmeted welders and bricklayers. Off to the side are the elected officials planning the ceremonial ribbon-cutting. They will congratulate themselves on fulfilling campaign promises to be tough on crime. Prison officials, police chiefs, and criminology experts will be in the audience, satisfied that their own advocacy of “law and order” has paid off. This picture also illustrates the most important aspect of the prison: people peering from behind those barred windows, locked up. They are parents stolen from children, children stolen from parents. Their lives have been shortened and depleted.

Look closer and you realize that this photograph is not the work of a single artist. It is a collage of different moments, and it is the work of activists, journalists, and scholars who have transformed a movement for racial justice into a new way of understanding the history of the United States. This collage puts the prison at the center of the social and political history of the past four decades, if not the past fifteen. And the prison is really a broader agglomeration of punitive policies that depend on aggressive policing, extravagant sentences, and court-mandated surveillance and pecuniary penalties.

The effects are far-reaching. Almost 2.3 million people in the United States are locked in jail or prison on any given day, with another 4.5 million on parole or probation. Jails and prisons are unhealthy places, and these levels
of incarceration are among the reasons why the United States has lagged behind other wealthy countries in growth of its average life expectancy in recent decades. Black men overall lose 3.09 years of life expectancy to prison or jail, Latino men 1.06 years, and white men 0.50 years. For women, these subtractions from life expectancy average 0.23, 0.09, and 0.05 years, respectively. Around nineteen million Americans have a felony conviction record, and many more a record of arrest, making them ineligible for multiple types of employment and civic benefits, including voting rights in some states. Interactions with this system start at age twelve on average among Black youth. These interactions almost invariably begin with police.²

Yet this detailed illustration of the prison complex and its effects in the photograph’s foreground sits against a background that remains hazy. Its structures and shapes are indistinct. From the existing rendering, it is unclear how pathways that disappear into the horizon connect with the police and guards in the foreground. This background is an imperial project. It is the US effort to assure its national security by assuring the internal security of countries across the globe. To look at that background is to grasp that although the history of policing and prisons within the United States appears grotesque, the true extent is worse. This US apparatus has encircled, and encaged, the globe.

This book re-imagines the collage, clarifying its nebulous background. *Badges Without Borders* shifts figure and ground, bringing into focus that imperial project.³ This simple movement reveals that the growth and empowerment of cops and cages beginning in the 1960s was not independent of that imperial background, but has been intimately tied to it. The ideas and people essential to the background were ideas and people essential to the foreground. They were one and the same. To look at these policymakers and their maneuvers to bolster law enforcement around the globe after World War II is to understand who the builders of the carceral state were, how they crafted this policy, and why they did it. Racially invidious policing and incarceration within the United States, which many have worked so hard to bring to public consciousness, do not represent the sum of state-building in the name of law and order. A close look at the collage’s background reveals that many of the law-enforcement leaders who stewarded the rise of this new penal apparatus had already been engaged in a program of deterritorialized state-building. They crafted policy designs and rationales overseas. They deployed technical expertise to any country that would have them, helping endow these states with up-to-date repressive capacities and bolstering authoritarianism. And they then policed American streets like “foreign territory.”⁴
Black radicals at the time understood, named, and condemned the inter-relationship this book excavates, sometimes calling it “internal colonialism.” Although some have questioned the concept’s utility for analyzing political economy, its undisputed strength was its focus on policing. As the objects of countersubversive policing, Black radicals mounted critiques of US policy overseas by refracting it through their experiences back home, situating the United States in the world and the world in the United States. Bobby Seale of the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense, for example, declared in a prescient 1967 article: “The racist military police force occupies our community just like the foreign American troops in Vietnam.” An occupying military was unaccountable and vicious; residents could not reason with it. Police in Black neighborhoods were the same. Seale predicted the “long hot summer” that began with small uprisings against police in Tampa and Cincinnati, followed by massive ones in Newark and Detroit. Police then redoubled efforts to upgrade their own technologies, training, and techniques. New Left radicals with organizations like the North American Congress on Latin America and the Institute for Policy Studies who studied these projects confirmed the links between war overseas and repression at home using every government document they could obtain. Before it became a topic of scholarly inquiry, Black radical intellectuals like Seale highlighted the centrality of policing and prisons to American political development, while also connecting repression of freedom movements at home to repression of anticolonial efforts overseas. Personal experience with police taught them counterinsurgency’s first principle: it is not only insurgents or criminals who must be pacified, but entire populations. This book’s inquiry into the development of the carceral state as racialized social control stands on the foundation these thinkers built, taking their political analyses seriously and matching them with extensive new archival research, using records unavailable at the time. This research shows that the relationship that made the policing of Seale’s Oakland neighborhood feel like colonial occupation depended on long-standing personal and institutional connections across borders.

The Black Panther Party attempted to forge a new liberation politics adequate to the challenge of the intertwinement of the military-industrial complex and the prison-industrial complex. *Badges Without Borders* wagers that to realize these elusive politics today will require reckoning with the extensive connections US security agencies built across borders after World War II—and continue to intensify now. Racial formation, and racial oppression, took shape locally, through histories of slavery, settlerism, and
segregation. But these also took shape globally, through histories of colonial occupation, dispossession, and extraction. At the center of both these efforts was police power, and this book demonstrates the vigorous global transit of police ideas and personnel.

Following domestic political unrest in the 1960s, officials in Washington, DC, as well as state capitals and city halls, decided that the way to prevent future outbreaks was to upgrade policing. This allocation of resources was not inevitable. Proposals that confronted the problem but did not put police at the center also came from establishment sources, like the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (NACCD), better known as the Kerner Commission, after its chair, Illinois governor Otto Kerner. President Lyndon B. Johnson appointed the NACCD in July 1967 to investigate the causes of unrest in twenty-three US cities—and to devise prophylaxis against future unrest. In its bestselling Report, issued on February 29, 1968, the commission offered recommendations to alleviate racial and economic inequality, urging a vast federal spending program on jobs, education, and housing to address the socioeconomic conditions underlying the political unrest.

President Johnson spurned this proposal, but most of the subsidiary recommendations the Kerner Report delivered on how to transform policing were adopted. Security came first. And the way to assure security was to reform its technical apparatus. Police chiefs, national security officials, and social scientists concurred. This coalition helped produce some federal legislation in 1965 and a huge bill in 1968 that put federal money in cops’ hands. Elected officials offered this “war against crime” to concerned voters as a way to control political unrest. What it actually did was offer resources to police and prisons to enhance their capacities and repertoires, laying the stony foundations of the carceral state: aggressive policing, mass incarceration, and the engulfing of the state’s welfare capacities by penal demands.

Accounts of the rise of the carceral state have emphasized conservative ire, liberal frustration, and shifting voting blocs, but this commitment to reforming law enforcement won popular support because it had police support. The War on Crime was not only the result of white electoral backlash against the gains of the civil rights movement, or concerted organizing among elites to prevent those gains. By the late 1960s, attempting to ensure social peace by means of police reform was already the US approach in dozens of countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The carceral state had bipartisan origins. Its proximate catalyst was the demand to reform policing. And this demand was consonant with the prerogatives of the national security state, the most
bipartisan aspect of US politics in the post-1945 period. The expansion of incarceration and policing that began at home in the late 1960s grew out of an expansion of policing capacities around the globe that the United States stewarded to prevent communist revolution. New endowments for police training and equipment were the product of US imperial governance, which during the Cold War conferred purpose, coherence, and political acumen on law-enforcement actors to expand their power and prestige back home. Racism, movements to counter it, and their repression have, of course, existed throughout US history. The War on Crime, however, emerged specifically in the context of an effort to use police to manage global decolonization.12

Examining how recommendations on revamping policing practices reached the Kerner Commission opens a window on a set of actors surprisingly excluded from the history of the growth of prisons and policing, namely, those who would themselves be tasked with waging war on crime. It turns out that many police leaders at the time already saw themselves as global actors. One stands out among them: Byron Engle, who testified to a globe-spanning career’s worth of law-enforcement expertise in his appearance before the Kerner Commission on September 20, 1967. The NACCD copied several of the ideas in Engle’s brief statement nearly verbatim into its Report.13

Engle recommended the use at home of lessons learned overseas: “The Communists have had long experience in utilizing disturbances, riots, terrorism, as political action tools. As a consequence, we . . . have put a lot of emphasis on nonlethal riot control. We have found there are many principles and concepts which apply, whether it is [in] Asia, Africa, or South America. Perhaps those same principles would apply in the United States.”14

He was an obscure figure, except to subscribers to The Police Chief, the monthly magazine of the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), and staff of the National Security Council (NSC). Few of the millions who read the paperback NACCD Report would have noted Engle’s name among those of more famous witnesses who testified. But he was one of the most consistent and influential voices in professional circles of law enforcement around the globe. His testimony demands the perspectival shift from the foreground of the domestic development of aggressive penal policy to the background of its international development.

Although Engle’s testimony came in a setting of heightened political attention, it signaled a process that had actually been ongoing since the 1940s, with Engle at its center. When he said perhaps the principles used overseas might apply at home, he was being coy. In fact, his entire career, and
those of his influential collaborators, who constituted the leadership of law-enforcement modernization, had been dedicated to mounting a single border-crossing war on crime and left-wing radicalism that utilized the same practical techniques and technologies and similar policies overseas and at home. Not simply individual police officers, but rather the milieu of professional policing as a whole envisioned itself as situated on an unruly globe that inexorably posed dangers requiring police intervention, from chaotic roadway congestion in extensively and intensively urbanizing regions to armed anticolonial insurgencies and narcotics trafficking. For law-enforcement modernizers like Engle, the professionalization schema they applied to Third World police forces applied just as readily to many police forces across the United States. By the 1960s, professional policing did not possess two repertoires, one for deployment at home and one for deployment abroad. Rather, it possessed a single repertoire, which experts vigorously attempted to institute wherever they could.

Over the previous six years, Engle had developed a close personal and professional relationship with the NACCD’s associate director of public safety, Arnold Sagalyn, who invited him to testify. In a wink to the Office of Public Safety (OPS) that Engle directed in the Agency for International Development (AID), Sagalyn named his section of the Kerner Commission, charged with investigating all aspects of the control of disorders, the Office of Public Safety. OPS was a small outfit with a large impact.15 For the purpose of counter-insurgency, it assisted police forces in at least fifty-two countries, and officers from seventy-seven countries attended its training academy, funded either by AID, the countries themselves, or the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).16 The goal of this police assistance effort was to prevent communist revolution and crime. Public safety advisors, as OPS technicians were called, reckoned that these were never distinct from each other. OPS would create the “first line of defense” against subversion, its advocates often remarked. During two decades, US public safety assistance reached over a million police officers around the globe in some way.

Engle’s testimony constituted cutting-edge security expertise. Sagalyn ensured that the ideas of their cohort—a transnationally mobile ensemble of reformist law-enforcement experts—carried the day. To police the tide of revolution, this vanguard would revolutionize policing. The Departments of Justice and Defense reconfigured crowd-control guidance based on the NACCD recommendations, affecting nearly every police officer, soldier, and National Guardsman in the United States over the coming decade. This
Fig. 1. Fifty-two countries receiving public safety assistance, 1962–74. Programs were counted if they consisted of at least one resident advisor who stayed beyond an initial survey period. In the 1950s and 1960s, advisors conducted program surveys in other countries, like Argentina and Cambodia, that never received long-term technical assistance, and countries like Barbados, Gambia, India, Iraq, Malaysia, Paraguay, and Zambia sent trainees to the United States in the absence of an advisory program.
upgrading of “riot control” was a single phase of a far broader effort to transform law enforcement in response to crisis. These reforms recognized how integral policing practices were to state legitimacy. The technical refinement experts shepherded across borders aimed to shed any institutional confirmation of slapstick stereotypes of oafish, corrupt cops. To protect police power and insulate it from external control, reform was crucial. The key argument for the reforming of law enforcement that these experts led from the 1950s into the 1970s was that what was needed to fight communist subversion was simply routine police work.

The public safety advisors under Engle’s direction were woven into a powerful organized constituency of law-enforcement voices that was able to push President Johnson and Congress to act. This vanguard aimed to renew and redeem policing after years of Southern cops’ complicity in lynchings of African American people and brutal crackdowns on civil rights protest, apparent nationwide inability to stanch rising crime rates, and, most recently, violent responses to Northern urban protest that transformed it into destructive unrest. The resulting federal War on Crime funneled federal money to the states to enhance, upgrade, and strengthen police, prisons, and courts. Self-interested, this constituency cohered institutionally and attained prominence through the Cold War battle against communism, which it waged at home and abroad.

Elites pushed, but law-enforcement professionals also made demands. Elite approval of cops’ demands in turn shaped cops’ own capacities to respond to legislators. Constituencies created doctrinal programs, and programs hailed constituencies. The field of law enforcement was contested and changing, but the vocabulary of “law and order” originated with law-enforcement figures themselves. They were the ones who advocated a War on Crime, and they would wage it. Their easy assent to the use of the metaphor of “war” for their objectives shows that the territorial borders of the United States did not enclose their work. These historical actors developed the political resources and institutional coherence to transform policing at home through their work on behalf of the national security state. As the War on Crime took shape, law-enforcement experts were already working hand in hand with liberal elites under the sign of counterinsurgency. At the close of the Johnson administration, an internal assessment declared that OPS’s program across the globe contributed “the international dimension to the Administration’s War on Crime by assisting police institutions to carry out their role as the first line of defense against those influences which seek to destroy free societies through the erosion of public order.”
Civilian policing met the demand for security against internal threats, or exogenous threats that manifested as subversion, both at home and overseas. The personnel, technologies, ideas, and repertoires that enabled the extension of policing overseas were the very same ones that reformed it at home. The elevation in prominence of a professionalized form of policing in both domains led to the domestic creation of new bureaucratic infrastructures, police training regimens, police technologies, and intellectual frameworks that transformed the state’s coercive capacities. Engle, Sagalyn, IACP director Quinn Tamm, and other security experts discussed in this book participated in a multiyear effort to transform a key instrument of US foreign policy, the counterinsurgency program of police assistance to Third World countries, into a key instrument of domestic policy. Through a relentlessly comparative framework, the experts who developed the protocols and techniques of assuring order sanctified the foreign-domestic divide in assessing the seriousness of threats. Yet their practical recommendations obliterated it. US policing’s leaders were insistently transnational in their orientation, outlook, and formation. Not incidental, occasional, or fleeting, overseas experiences shaped the marrow of US policing practices and institutions.

The centerpiece of the anticrime efforts of the Johnson and Richard M. Nixon presidencies was the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), created in 1968 by the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act. It was a loose domestic analog of OPS. Thanks to Sagalyn, the overseas model of police assistance became the blueprint for the War on Crime. From April 1961, his primary responsibility was to oversee training and coordination for the Treasury Department’s law-enforcement officers, and in this capacity he collaborated with OPS. This global perspective inspired him when he contacted Lyndon Johnson’s aides to present a novel idea for resolving the apparent crisis of policing signaled by urban unrest in the summer of 1964. Sagalyn argued for the creation of federal grants to local law enforcement to upgrade capabilities for crime and disorder control, separate from funds for poverty alleviation. The goal was to empower law-enforcement agencies at the smallest scales, while not infringing on their autonomy. He invoked OPS efforts abroad as the model. Counterinsurgency bequeathed a skeletal bureaucratic form to achieve social order amid protests against racist social structures. Devolutionary assistance at arm’s length would upgrade local law enforcement, funded by a centralized purse. The Frankenstein of fiscal federalism would be zapped to life. With expensive reform efforts proliferating, many police executives hankered after federal dollars, though they
were reluctant to risk diminishing their local discretion. Organized by the nationwide IACP and in many individual statewide professional associations, they lined up to support a federal declaration of war against crime. A vocabulary honed through inflation of the communist threat would be unleashed on the crime threat. Legislators listened. This cohort perceived modern policing expertise not only as the cutting edge of state power, but also as a means of transforming it. Cold War national security policy was the acme of this approach, but its lineaments were already apparent in the Red Scare of 1919–1920, Prohibition, and the New Deal.20

National security had no essence, only motility. By the end of the 1940s, given the alarming possibility that the globe’s loyalties might sway toward the communist camp, national security considerations transcended the practice seen in the two world wars. In those, after congressional consultation, the country had gravely declared war, with a concerted mobilization of science and industry. Now, waging the Cold War would entail the creation of the multifaceted national security state, shaped by executive-branch prerogative. It relied on a steady business outlook cemented by tentative compromises between capital and labor, underwriting national and international prosperity, “military Keynesianism” or “the warfare-welfare state.”21 Upon this foundation, the president and the NSC, guided by the CIA, made discretionary decisions to use coercive force. Not like the two big wars, those outliers of US history, the United States now returned to a pattern of war-making that preceded the country’s founding and also characterized its relations with the world across its shifting borders in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The United States once again became a fighter of small wars. This approach amounted to the adoption of a police posture in foreign relations, the creation of a discretionary empire. To foster the welfare of a globally integrated system of states and ward off threats to capital accumulation, the United States’ discretionary police power at the interstate level took the form of policing at the intrastate level.

Overseas, technical police assistance encapsulated President John F. Kennedy’s New Frontier posture, a foreign policy no longer restricted to mutually assured destruction in the form of massive atomic retaliation. It was a policy newly attentive to the birth of new nations, within which differing approaches to socioeconomic development vied for adherents. Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev had pledged support for “wars of national liberation” a mere fortnight before Kennedy’s inauguration, which the new president interpreted as an incendiary taunt.22 Kennedy’s administration immediately set to work on the problem of insurgency. In this changing world situation,
prevention of communist subversion was paramount. Modern, well-equipped, disciplined, and fair police forces were to be a tool of democracy, not tyranny. Police professionalization was the surest way for the United States to guarantee that the first line of defense against subversion would be strong, resolute, unafraid, honest, and innovative. The result, however, would be more efficient, individually structured, and molecular tyrannies.

Liberal politicians placed great faith in police assistance as a cheap, flexible, small-footprint instrument of US geopolitical power and suasion. President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s preferred combination of strategic air–atomic defense and covert action steadily lost its appeal between the CIA-sponsored coups in Iran in 1953 and Guatemala in 1954 and the disaster of the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961—plus the concomitant unraveling of the French colonial empire, first in Indochina and then in Algeria. The story of overseas police assistance in its classic form, and therefore the story of this book, runs from 1954, when the NSC created the predecessor to OPS, to 1974, when Congress shut down OPS, a decade on either side of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It was the two-decade period after Brown v. Board of Education and approximately between the Asian-African conference in Bandung and the proposal for a New International Economic Order. These decades saw the intertwining and enthronement of Keynesianism at home and developmentalism abroad. In a new global situation of decolonization and self-determination, up-to-date policing techniques would be the means to contain revolution; the same would be true of a domestic situation of implacable Black freedom demands met with attempts at legislative containment.

The professionalized form of policing became dominant both at home and abroad by the mid-1960s. Its hegemony derived from the laboratory of professionalization Third World countries offered, with lessons transmitted across national borders and across scales of government through institutions like the IACP and the LEAA, and later the Police Foundation and Police Executive Research Forum. These lessons appeared in professional periodicals and textbooks and would be taught in growing numbers of criminology schools. Professionalization of policing entailed specific recruitment standards, formal training, remuneration that allowed full-time and career-long service, and supervision according to a ranked system. Professionalizers often additionally aspired to introduce “functional specialization of personnel, use of modern technology, neutrality in law enforcement, responsible use of discretion, and a measure of autonomous self-regulation.”23 At a more basic level, professionalization meant new uniforms and new technologies, the routinization of
everyday tasks as guided by data collection and research, the eradication of the
graft that had long made up for cops’ low pay, and the expectation that police
be accorded the autonomy and respect expected by any other skilled profes-
sionals. Professionalization also created complex bureaucracies, with differing
structures of accountability, which promoted street-level discretion while
insulating command officers from responsibility for the situational despotism
that resulted. Lessons learned confronting foreign subversive forces were not
just repatriated to the United States as up-to-date domestic policing tech-
niques, they had been developed all along in a comparative framework, con-
stantly alert to the imminence of the appearance of new foreign threats at
home and domestic alliances with foreign subversive forces.

At the apex of the machinery of US statecraft, invested in the practical and
intellectual management of a new global dispensation after World War II—of
the management of the contradiction between newly won political sovereign-
ties and the unshakeable necessity of their rejection of communism—stood a
cohort of security practitioners, educators, and theorists who made no strong
distinction between how this management should proceed overseas or at
home. The narrative nucleus of this book is the OPS public safety program,
but this cohort’s institutional and professional reach extended well beyond it.
OPS was one key node in the global movement to professionalize policing.
Before voters latched onto the phrase “war on crime,” the public safety advi-
sors who staffed OPS readily adopted it, an effort AID would international-
ize.24 For advocates of police modernization, security was equally unfinished
at home and abroad. Security’s assurance demanded both the martial “police
action” and the peopling of security forces across the rapidly growing conurb-
bations of distant lands, as well as the far reaches of the global countryside,
with well-trained and -equipped professional constabularies on a US or
“Anglo-Saxon” model. Contingencies of locale and rooted political structures
would inevitably shape particular permutations, subject to an endless ongoing
assessments of aid recipients’ fitness for advancement to equality, but it has
been a mistake of retrospective analysis to assume that territorial borders
constrained the prospective vision these historical actors mobilized. If US
streets could suddenly appear to those charged with pacifying them like for-

eign territory, expert pacification methods had already been developed
according only one globe-spanning vision of security. The professional itiner-
aries of public safety advisors as counterinsurgents, which crisscrossed oceans
and state agencies alike, were integral to their identities as experts. Many
political commentators have tossed around variations on the metaphor
“global policeman” in both positive and negative evaluations of US geopolitical power without realizing that security experts in the post-1945 era ensured that the United States used beat cops to police the globe.

The Kennedy administration popularized the term “counterinsurgency.” The neologism was barely a couple years old at Kennedy’s inauguration. Its meaning was unsettled. Histories of counterinsurgency’s elevation during the Kennedy years often center on preexisting rural approaches involving Army special forces, small-unit Marine Corps operations, or CIA covert infiltration tactics. But these military approaches were not novel during this period, and, despite the resources devoted to them, they saw limited application. Police assistance, which focused on the urban domain, had more extensive reach. Badges Without Borders demonstrates that counterinsurgency was a police-led, less-lethal, preemptive, and anticipatory approach to challenges to the state’s legitimacy and its monopolization of means of violence. Despite the variegated institutional pathways to the enactment of security that existed historically, from cloak-and-dagger espionage to tanks to ballistic missiles, one in particular—police-led counterinsurgency—rose to prominence in the minds of key policymakers and strategists in the period this book covers.

How to achieve counterinsurgent goals was an object of intense bureaucratic and intellectual contestation. Arguments involved the CIA, the Pentagon, the NSC, and a bevy of social scientists, not to mention strong personalities who had the president’s ear, including his brother Robert and advisors like Roger Hilsman and Maxwell Taylor. Lessons learned from comparisons with other empires’ experiences, or in US war-making against Japan, seemed apposite to some of these officials. Practically, however, these figures drew upon the opportunities created and institutional knowledge held by the likes of Engle and his greatest ally and defender on the NSC, Robert W. Komer. They were the winners of these contests over the shape of counterinsurgency. Attorney General Robert Kennedy indicated his commitment to counterinsurgency by visiting OPS’s Inter-American and International Police Academies. Kennedy loyalists later took these visits as evidence that the brothers would not have escalated the war in Vietnam, because of a commitment to the less bellicose approach constituted by public safety assistance. But, at the time, Robert Kennedy’s visits showed that the administration increasingly conferred the internal-defense mission on Engle’s shop,
with Komer at the helm. Engle and Komer supported police assistance around the globe before Kennedy’s arrival in the Oval Office, and they kept it going for years after his assassination. They took advantage of Taylor’s interest in a new, flexible defense posture, which Kennedy adopted, to create a strong institutional foundation for police assistance. What would keep the Cold War from becoming hot in Europe was counterinsurgency in Third World countries: uncompromising police, professionally trained and equipped on a US model. Keystone Kops could not catch communists.

The term “counterinsurgency” was a misnomer, because the insurgency to be countered was one that had not yet occurred. Counterinsurgency did, however, refer to specific practices that joined security imperatives to controlled uplift through economic development. In this sense, it embodied an older, plenary sense of the police power of the state, articulated to twentieth-century police institutions. Counterinsurgency was directed at a wide target—“the people”—and aimed to prevent civil violence, meaning symbolic and other violence against people and property that was organized, collective, and addressed to capital and state.28 Such prevention occurred by investing the people in their own security through calibrated penalties and rewards. Yet this procedure often sparked the activities labeled insurgency. Atrocities commonly associated with counterinsurgency flowed from failures to achieve pacification.

Counterinsurgency was imperial. It occurred in dozens of countries that fell into the national-security purview where no US troops ever fired a gun. The behemoth national security state would weave together intelligence gathering and covert action with unhampered military outlays. The covert action component was originally intended to be “a small capability that could be activated when and where needed” according to “discretion,” rather than a “large-scale continuing” operation in perpetuity.29 Police assistance in the end allowed both. And it would economize, whereas military assistance and projections of military power remained costly and of dubious effectiveness. Direct US military action in South Vietnam was a short-lived, though devastating, deformation of and departure from the civilian, police-led, proxy-dependent thrust of the US counterinsurgency effort undertaken across the globe in over fifty other countries. Unlike blunt aerial bombings, police assistance enabled more surgical arrests, killings, and disappearances. Despite the expansion of US special forces, in practice counterinsurgency was marked by its joining of civilian development and security objectives and its delicate attempt to use surrogacy to avoid neocolonial maternity. To empower the
police of often-weak allied regimes against internal challengers was also to prevent the United States from falling into older colonial patterns of direct rule. This effort had profound domestic consequences.

How is it possible to study these itineraries, and why have scholars occasionally assumed them but not substantiated them? State archives are divided according to the canonical separations this study is historicizing. “Foreign” and “domestic” are not ontologies. They are contested outcomes of social, political, and economic processes. By holding them together in a single analytic frame, Badges Without Borders takes the multifaceted connection between foreign and domestic as its case, rather than focusing on police in a particular city. This book tracks the policies, people, and processes that crossed the divisions of civilian and military, foreign and domestic. This analysis demands more than metaphor and analogy—the analytic tools of these historical actors—including the construction of a bespoke new archive. It is the archive left in the restless tracks of counterinsurgent knowledge, a state-legitimating form of expertise, both scientific and experiential, that distilled the task of governance into the problem of maintaining order. This archive tracks motion across multiple divides, based on often declassified federal and state records, professional and popular publications, social-scientific studies and reports, oral histories and memoirs, and many other sources. Put another way, this is the archive of the police power, external to the place-bound records of individual police institutions, yet also inherent in the circuits of their connection. To examine this archive is to confront a security apparatus that declared the imminence of chaos, the necessity of its protection from chaos, and the moral rectitude of its protective tools. This archive must be analyzed cautiously, with an eye to the tensions it reveals, as the exorbitant violence of security methods cannot but ooze from the edges of the energetic efforts to portray them as reasonable and exacting. This methodological imperative calls for a new theorization of the police power attentive to its expanding scales of activity and routes of travel, where mismatches appear. It is found in the perceptive explanation of the US “concept” of police by a Bolivian official, at the First Inter-American Conference of Uniformed Police in Lima, Peru, in 1966, facilitated by OPS: “This concept states that . . . ‘police’ has no ascertainable limits. Everything that tends to promote the public welfare is a matter for the police and for that reason its