

Introduction

In December 1994, the government of Panama told the United States that it would no longer permit the U.S. government to use Howard Air Force Base (AFB) to detain Cuban asylum seekers intercepted at sea. The announcement came at the end of a series of what the Defense Department (DOD) called “disturbances” during which 2 Cubans died, 30 suffered injuries, and 221 U.S. soldiers were wounded. Even before these disturbances transpired, over thirty people held at the camp had tried to commit suicide. Attorney Harold Koh (1994a, 172) warned: “In effect, we have built offshore cities of more than 20,000 people without constructive outlets, with little to do besides getting frustrated.”

Human-rights monitors who had visited earlier in the year reported in *Refugee Reports* that conditions at Howard were relaxed and welcoming for the Cubans. “The camps were spacious, set in beautiful surroundings, clean, and well-ordered” (Frelick 1994, 15). One resident of Camp One told the observers, “This is paradise. . . . Guantánamo was hell” (16). Camp One on Howard Air Force Base and Camp Bulkeley at the Guantánamo Bay Naval Base (GTMO) occupied the center of a carceral archipelago of military and civilian spaces planned, and in some cases established, as “safe havens” across the Caribbean for Haitian and Cuban asylum seekers in the early- to mid-1990s.

This Caribbean chapter of U.S. border-enforcement history remains largely forgotten. Despite important scholarship recollecting this history (Farmer 2004; Kaplan 2005; Shemak 2011; Lipman 2013; Paik

2013, 2016), these operations remain curiously separate from prevailing explanations for the rise of contemporary U.S. detention and deterrence policies. A central contention of this book posits that this popular forgetting is political. Political crises over migration and the nation-state repeatedly invoke “the border’s” porosity, absence, or lawlessness to rationalize further fortification. Thus, there exists a strategic relationship between knowing and not knowing, between rendering bordering practices visible and strategically erasing them from public knowledge. As a result of these spectacular dynamics, attention has been focused along the historically charged United States–Mexico boundary, both naturalizing deterrence and fortification practices in this region and obscuring related U.S. policies of deterrence, detention, and exclusion in the Caribbean.

Even as the “safe haven” crisis took place in the Caribbean, the Bill Clinton administration was rolling out its new national strategy to “control the borders of the United States between the ports of entry, restoring our Nation’s confidence in the integrity of the border” (U.S. Border Patrol 1994, 2). The Border Patrol strategy—called “prevention through deterrence”—was developed in consultation with the Defense Department’s Center for Low Intensity Conflict and aimed to prevent unauthorized entry (Dunn 1996). The plan entailed the deployment of additional Border Patrol agents, increased fortification and surveillance of the boundary, and harsher employer sanctions. The plan focused on the U.S. Southwest, prioritizing the securing of the boundary between El Paso–Juárez and San Diego–Tijuana, before again bolstering efforts in the Tucson and South Texas sectors (U.S. Border Patrol 1994).

Borders are more than material barriers along international boundaries; border operations are performative (Andreas 2009; Mountz 2010; Nevins 2010). The Border Patrol acknowledged as much in its strategic plan when concluding that “the absolute sealing of the border is unrealistic” (1994, 1). Indeed, the plan was launched in 1994, the same year as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was implemented to further integrate the economies of the region. Nonetheless, the border spectacle had the immediate and enduring effect of funneling attention and anxiety over migration and national sovereignty away from the Caribbean and isolating it along the United States–Mexico boundary. In so doing, as Joe Nevins shows in *Operation Gatekeeper and Beyond*, “a semblance of control and order has replaced the image of chaos that once seemed to reign in the urbanized border region of the San Diego Sector” of the Border Patrol (2010, 7).

This spectacle builds on long colonial and imperial histories in both regions. Yet Attorney General Janet Reno’s claim that the 1994 strategic plan was “necessary to establish a border for the first time” (in Nevins 2010, 115) obscures the much longer history of Border Patrol practices along the United States–Mexico boundary and their deadly consequences for border-crossers (Nevins 2003; Hernández 2010). Reno’s claim also obscures the explicit development and deployment of deterrence doctrine in the Caribbean during the Cold War, designed to prevent unwanted arrivals of asylum seekers from Haiti and Cuba. This deterrence doctrine, which was firmly established by the early 1980s, made mandatory detention a central component of federal strategy and practice in the Caribbean and elsewhere.

These transnational histories of detention and migration policing are the subject of *Boats, Borders, and Bases*. We seek to explain why the U.S. detention and deportation system ballooned to the scale of its contemporary operation. In 2012, the United States made a record number of 409,849 removals, a number that dipped in 2016 to 240,255 removals (these numbers may count individuals more than once). *Removal* is the technical, legal term for *deportation*; the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) defines *removal* as “the compulsory and confirmed movement of an inadmissible or deportable alien out of the United States based on an order of removal.” This number of “removals” does not count the hundreds of thousands of people whom the government “returned,” unless that individual was turned over to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for removal. DHS defines *return* as “the confirmed movement of a potentially inadmissible or deportable alien out of the United States not based on an order of removal, but through either voluntary departure, voluntary return, or withdrawal under docket control.”¹ There are different categories of removal (e.g., expedited, administrative, reinstatement of prior removal order) and different legal consequences that result from a removal or return process. These distinctions matter and have political histories that are part of the vast infrastructure of carceral spaces, transportation, and surveillance that has been constructed to accomplish this scale of expulsion. For readability’s sake, we sometimes use deportation, removal, and expulsion as synonyms, but we also try to take care to show how legal distinctions were developed. In 2009, Congress introduced language that would require ICE to maintain a detention capacity of at least 33,400 bed spaces, a provision that critics decry as a “bed quota,” which drives aggressive migration policing and inflationary contracts with the private sector.²

We trace the roots of today's historically unprecedented system of confinement and removal back to the late 1970s and early 1980s when the Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan administrations established policies and practices to deter the arrival of Haitian and Cuban asylum seekers. Our central argument is that the U.S. Cold War response to these Caribbean migrations established the legal and institutional basis for today's migration-detention and border-deterrence regime. Indeed, we show how struggles over decidedly racialized asylum policies created the conditions for detention and border deterrence as *interrelated* practices. That is to say, efforts to prevent entry were tied to efforts to remove unwanted asylum seekers who had reached sovereign territory. The history that we trace also points to the central role that anti-Black racism and Cold War geopolitics have played in U.S. foreign and domestic policy. *Boats, Borders, and Bases* shows how anti-Black racism has worked together with anti-Asian and anti-Latinx racism to obscure the violence and geographic scope of the United States's migration policing, carceral, and deportation apparatus.

Forcible confinement has become a central element of efforts to regulate migration and migrants' lives both on mainland territory and offshore. This system was built by Democratic and Republican administrations, and popular opposition to the expansion also crossed party lines, informed by different political beliefs. In the United States, the detention of foreign nationals is a legal form of administrative confinement distinct from the rights and procedures that have been developed under criminal-justice law. The agency currently in charge of the vast detention system that fuels this expulsion is Immigration and Customs Enforcement, a department within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which was established in 2003. Before this time, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in the Department of Justice (DOJ) carried out this role. ICE relies on a panoply of local jails, federally owned and operated detention facilities called Service Processing Centers, and privately owned and operated facilities to carry out its operations. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) also operates facilities at ports of entry for short-term confinement.

We refer to this infrastructure as a system of *migration detention* and expulsion. There is no one commonly accepted terminology for describing and analyzing the carceral infrastructure that nation-states have developed to restrict mobility across national borders and to regulate the presence of noncitizens within national territories. Some people use the term *noncitizen detention*, or *immigrant detention*; others use *immigra-*

tion detention; still others, *migrant prisons*. The difficulty of settling on a term is multifold and brings to the fore the power of language that infuses most aspects of migration politics. First, all of these terms involve political and legal issues that are tremendously politicized. If we were to use the term *immigrant* or *immigration detention*, we would be rehearsing a commonly-told story about long-distance emigrants who want nothing more than to settle permanently in the United States. *Immigrant* erases the reality of circular migration, temporary labor migration, and asylum seeking that we center in our history. Governmental and popularly used terms like *alien* and *criminal alien* are ones that we do not use because they contribute to the overwhelming criminalization and dehumanization of people with liminal legal status. These terms do appear in our text, however, and we analyze them within the context of their use.

Our use of the term *detention* is also fraught because it can euphemize the harsh reality of coercive confinement, which is usually referenced by the term *prison*. Carceral spaces encompass more than criminal legal spaces like prisons to also include spaces of forced institutionalization, ad hoc use of hotels and military bases, jails, and temporary holding areas. There are legal distinctions between the criminal legal and the civil immigration grounds on which many migrants are confined. These criminal and civil systems are also materially and ideologically interwoven. While neither of us has formal legal training, in our collective decades of research, we have witnessed how governments use these distinctions to facilitate the expansion of carceral space and to curtail rights. We, thus, do not use the term *detention* to suggest that confinement for relatively short or indefinite periods in a jail or migration detention facility is inconsequential or less harsh than a prison. On the contrary, detention has known harmful consequences for the physical and mental health of migrants and asylum seekers. Rather, in tracing the legal, institutional, and political disputes over these distinctions—between civil and criminal, economic migrant and asylum seeker—we illustrate both their entanglements and the transnational scope of the U.S. carceral state.

Finally, our use of the term *migrant* is meant to be expansive, encompassing long-term residents who are often understood as immigrants, and asylum seekers, also referred to as asylees. Asylum seekers formally are people who have left their place of residence and have requested that they be allowed to stay in a different country owing to their well-founded fear of persecution. This term is often used interchangeably with the term *refugee*, a category of people that also has fled owing to their own well-founded fear of persecution (both terms defined by the

1951 *Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees*). In the U.S. context, refugee and asylum cases are handled by different parts of the government and have distinct legal and administrative groundings. While the experiences leading people to seek safety may be similar, the way these two groups are treated is often very different. The United States sets a quota on the numbers of refugees that it will resettle in any given year. Both the numbers and their origin in the world are the outcome of political debate and foreign-policy objectives. In the current moment, people who apply for refugee status then go through an extensive vetting process before they are authorized for admission, at which point they are connected into a formal network of voluntary organizations that does the work of resettlement. These application processes may take place in their country of origin or in a third country where they have fled in order to await a longer-term resolution to displacement. Asylum seekers also ask the government for protection, but they do so at a point of entry to the United States or after they have already been present in the country for a time (as in the case of an individual who entered on a student or tourist visa). As in our distinction between *prison* and *detention*, we make use of both *asylee* and *refugee* not because they are so different. Both groups share similar circumstances leading them to leave their homes. We attend to these terms in order to trace how governments use them in *their* efforts to thwart human mobility and the international right to asylum. As such, we often use the phrase *migrants and asylum seekers* to challenge the frequent governmental erasure of asylum seekers by classifying all international border-crossers as economic migrants. Again, our effort to draw attention to asylum seekers is not to suggest that their rights should supersede those of other long-distance migrants, but rather to show how U.S. efforts to constrain the mobility of asylees also is used to undermine freedom of movement to and from the United States in general.

We argue that border-enforcement and detention policies must be understood together and transnationally across onshore and offshore spaces where they operate. Our attention to the domestic and more distant offshore dimensions of detention and border-deterrence policies illustrates how these developments are not separate, but interrelated. The histories we tell are at once regional, highly localized, and imperial in their geopolitical configurations. As such, we build upon the insights of feminist political geographers who have developed methods for research and analysis that attend to the power and politics of the global and intimate (Pratt and Rosner 2006; Pain and Staeheli 2014; Conlon

and Hiemstra 2017). Indeed, the deeply contingent and relational character of detention and border projects belies narratives of coherence and reason so often deployed by state authorities. The situated and contested outcomes offer readers a sense of futures that might be otherwise.

WHERE IS REMOTE? QUESTIONS GUIDING THIS STUDY

Our collaboration began while we were both living in the small city of Syracuse in central New York. We came to understand that this was a border city by learning about Border Patrol activity in the farmlands to our north and at the regional transportation center just on the outskirts of town. Border Patrol agents would board trains and buses in Syracuse and Rochester and ask passengers selectively for their passports and visas (Kim and Loyd 2008; NYCLU 2011; Mountz 2011b; Miller 2014). Many of these passengers were traveling to and from New York City, Boston, and Buffalo. They were not seeking to cross the international boundary into Canada, but the Border Patrol considered these transit hubs as *ports of entry*, a legal place, which they claim authorizes them to conduct stops and searches without probable cause, and to embark on some of the aggressive enforcement operations we discuss in this book.

We became involved in the local Detention Task Force that was trying to contest these practices, which appeared racially discriminatory and led to unjust confinement. The Border Patrol apprehended people who could not produce appropriate documents and detained them in local jails until they were transferred to an ICE facility, sometimes to the Buffalo Federal Detention Center about ninety miles west in Batavia, New York. Witnessing these practices and hearing stories of how activists in Rochester and Buffalo were organizing to protect migrant rights led us to question the prevailing explanations for the location and abundance of migration-detention facilities.


Questioning Border Narratives

Explanations of the large numbers of detention facilities often attribute their locations to geography, whether proximate to international boundaries or remote from migrant metropolises. Both explanations are informed by implicit narratives about the relationships among borders, detention, and exclusion. In one common narrative, movement across and/or apprehension in the United States–Mexico borderlands drives detention expansion. This explanation is understandable, given how spectacular state

stories, circulated through popular media, have worked to conflate (unauthorized) migration and the United States–Mexico borderlands. Such discourses have fueled border fortification and policing in this region, but they have also fueled policing and detention throughout the country. Further, this border-centric explanation does not readily grasp how the confinement of people under ICE custody is distinct from, if related to, Border Patrol operations, which often use spaces migrants refer to as *hieleras*, or “ice boxes” (American Immigration Council 2015).

Another powerful example of the conflation between the United States–Mexico borderlands and the national landscape of detention can be seen in then ICE Commissioner Dora Schirió’s (2009) study of ICE’s detention system. The report was completed to inform major policy reforms to the ICE detention system. It includes a series of heat maps that depict data on detention “demand” and capacity across the country. No methods are provided for how these data were collected or mapped, leaving readers to infer their meanings. In map 1 depicting detention “demand,” the blurring of apprehension and removal data creates an impression of “border-ness,” even though the field offices of San Diego and El Paso, which are on the United States–Mexico boundary, are not listed among the top apprehension offices. This interpretation is strengthened by the impression of a “flood” of detention data threatening to engulf the interior of the country, as population densities uncontrollably spread out into Mexico, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Atlantic. In the original version, the data are mapped in traffic-light colors—wherein green signifies safety and red symbolizes a danger that must be stopped. The maps contribute to hysterical migration narratives that have been promulgated repeatedly by politicians and media in the United States, stoking racialized fear and xenophobia.

Another map in the same report, which depicts the ratio of regional detention capacity to apprehension numbers, suggests that many southern border sectors have more space for detention than is filled by local apprehension efforts. Los Angeles and New York City stand out boldly in red for their limited capacity, followed by Atlanta, San Francisco, and Miami. This map, then, does not so much explain apprehension and detention dynamics as create what geographer Mark Monmonier (personal communication 2012) calls a “cartographic fog.” The scientific status afforded to maps lends authoritative credence to the impression of endless detention “demands,” perpetuating institutional interests, but not providing an accurate depiction of detention processes. The market language of “demand” naturalizes the report’s recommendation for more



MAP 1. Hysteria along the southern border. This map was originally published in a report written by then ICE Commissioner Dora Schriro on demand for detention. The gray denotes demand, blurring apprehension and removal, and indeed, the locations of national boundaries. [Source: *Immigration Detention Overview and Recommendations*. Homeland Security: Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2009.]

detention space by implicitly invoking its discursive twin of “supply.” These visual and rhetorical moves paint expansion as inevitable.

Explanations for the geography of U.S. detention that rely on border narratives tend not to account for “interior enforcement” operations, like raids, checkpoints, and scans of federal databases, which ICE conducts, often working with other federal and local police agencies, such as county jails (Coleman 2007b). These contacts with police agents also fuel the institutional push to expand detention capacity. As we will illustrate, persistent shortages of carceral space have led to the creation of a dispersed system within which ICE routinely transfers captive people to sometimes distant facilities in order to relieve crowding, disrupt organizing efforts, and speed removal proceedings.

Questioning Privatization Narratives

Migration detention is institutionally complex. In the mid-2000s when we began this research, ICE relied on a mix of federally owned and operated facilities, contracts with private firms and local governments for its use of both privately and publicly owned facilities, and per diem

arrangements with local jails. Apart from the role of private boarding houses used in the early to mid-twentieth century, private prison firms got a start in the migration-detention sector by first securitizing motels and then building “spec” facilities for the INS in the early 1980s (Hernández 2013; Shull 2014a, 2014b). Private firms have proven controversial for numerous reasons, including the ethics of profiting from confinement, the additional difficulties of oversight that private firms present, repeated allegations of abuse and incompetence, and costliness.

In the face of public concern over these issues, Schiro’s review of the migrant-detention system recommended that ICE continue its operations “without the assistance of the private sector” (2009, 19). Yet federal reliance on the private sector continued, leading many critics to point to the fundamental role that the private sector has played in the expansion and location of detention facilities, particularly after Congress’s so-called “bed mandate” that ICE should maintain a capacity for 33,400 individuals at any given time. Were private firms the main factor driving expansion and making decisions about where to locate facilities, or were private firms subjected to some of the same political pressures shaping the fate of federal and state prison-expansion plans? Did private firms hold the power, or were they subordinate to governmental operations and legislative decisions? These are questions we seek to answer through investigation of historical developments in specific places.

Questioning Distance Narratives

Distance opens another conundrum for explanation. The remote geographic locations of many of the facilities in the ICE archipelago *and* frequent transfers of detainees among facilities are among the most frequently criticized conditions of the U.S. detention system (Human Rights Watch 2009; National Immigrant Justice Center 2010; Hiemstra 2013). But how is remoteness measured, and can remoteness be produced? Answering these questions involves asking what constitutes remoteness: simply a place far away, a rural place, an island, a military base? And how does social distance intersect with physical distance? Does any one measure or conceptualization of remoteness inform decisions made over time about the locations of detention facilities? If so, how? Our search for answers to these questions revealed a complicated and historically contingent set of answers.

One important strand of research and advocacy concerning remoteness focuses on the role it plays in diminishing migrant rights, and

especially the right to legal representation. This argument has been made by advocates since the early 1980s, and recognized by federal courts. A recent example can be seen in the 2009 Human Rights Watch report *Locked Up Far Away*. The report analyzes ICE data gleaned from a freedom-of-information request to illustrate how transfers among facilities violate migrants' access to attorneys and right to seek asylum and defend themselves from deportation. The National Immigrant Justice Center (2010) measured remoteness by calculating the mileage from a detention facility to the nearest major city, which they used as a proxy for access to legal services. They then used this driving distance to rank the geographic isolation of detention facilities. Eight of the ten most isolated facilities had no or only part-time legal-aid services that were available to people detained there. This is notable because the government is not obliged to provide legal counsel in immigration court, as compared to the criminal legal system. A 2015 study found that only 14 percent of migrants held in detention had legal representation, and migrants who had legal representation fared significantly better in receiving relief from deportation than those without representation (Eagly and Shafer 2015).

Social scientists similarly find that “remote locations create ‘detached geographies’ through which detainees are spatially separated from the services that guarantee their rights” (Martin and Mitchelson 2009, 466), including resources found in larger cities that offer support, advocacy, interpretation, and information (Mountz 2011a). For example, Alison’s earlier work (Mountz 2011b) shows how Fujianese asylum seekers intercepted off the shores of western Canada in 1999 were detained in the interior of British Columbia. This location, remote from Vancouver, distanced them from where they would be more likely to have access to advocacy, legal representation, interpreters, and the tribunals of Canada’s Immigration and Refugee Board.

Narratives of remoteness often rely on geographical imaginaries that associate isolation with rurality, provincialism, conservatism, and racism (Bonds 2009). Remoteness, thus, is discursively constructed and materially built in opposition to cosmopolitanism, connection, community, rights, and freedom. Indeed, the negative outcomes of geographic isolation are often attributed to the “backwardness” or exceptionally racist dispositions of prison towns, explanations that rely on neocolonial understandings of marginal spaces rather than explain how these places are themselves politically and economically subordinated and exploited. This narrative thereby displaces the racism and inequities of

state practices that fuel carceral construction, and which often have broad popular support.

Ruth Wilson Gilmore, in her analysis of the California prison system, explains, “This apparent marginality is a trick of perspective, because, as every geographer knows, edges are also interfaces” that “connect places into relationships with each other and with non-contiguous places” (2007, 11). Far from being disconnected from, or incidental to, the vast political and economic changes that California and the United States experienced since the 1970s, prisons, jails, and migrant detention facilities prove central features of economic and state restructuring. Gilmore (2007) ties prison expansion in economically dislocated, and often isolated, places in rural California to surpluses of state capacity, finance capital, land, and labor that have been generated in the course of global economic restructuring and the political gains of the Right. Bonds (2006) examines how reliance on prisons perpetuates poverty in both the rural places where most prisons are constructed and the urban spaces from which most imprisoned people come (also see Huling 2003; Hooks et al. 2010; Norton 2015).

Other geographers, including Allspach (2010), Moran (2013), and Moran Gill, and Conlon (2013), make parallel arguments to Gilmore’s observation about prisons as interfaces. They understand prisons not as Erving Goffman’s (1961) “total institution” that is fully enclosed and sealed from the outside, but rather as transcarceral spaces traversed by people, information, resources, and transport systems (Moran, Piacentini and Pallot 2013). Allspach illustrates how carceral spaces extend beyond prison walls following confinement to reinforce the marginalization of formerly incarcerated women. Moran and coauthors focus on moments of state custody before formal incarceration as ones of temporal and spatial liminality to emphasize the blurring of inside and outside life.

Attention to the circulation of people, goods, and ideas through prisons reveals remoteness as relational and perspectival. If we see the detention center in Batavia, New York, like a state (Scott 1998), we see its proximity to federal courts in Buffalo (there are also courtrooms onsite in the same building as the lockdown spaces), its location on the New York State Thruway that facilitates efficient movement of imprisoned people and staff, and its location within a historic prison belt. Attica is eleven miles south, Albion is seventeen miles north, and each of these towns hosts more than one carceral facility. This example suggests that no single dynamic accounts for the dispersed geography of places where migrants are detained, whether understood through a local, regional, or national lens.

STUDYING BOATS, BORDERS, AND BASES: ON METHODS

This book began as one part of a five-year study called the Island Detention Project (Mountz 2011a; Coddington et al. 2012; Mountz and Loyd 2014), a CAREER grant funded by the National Science Foundation (with Alison as Principal Investigator and Jenna as Postdoctoral Fellow for two years). The project involved research into the use of islands to detain migrants off the shores of Australia, the southern European Union (EU), and the United States. Some of these islands, like Lampedusa in the Mediterranean and Christmas Island in the Indian Ocean, have become focal points of sharp debate over freedom of movement, rights to asylum-seeking, militarized border policy, detention, and humanitarianism. We knew that the United States had been using its naval base at Guantánamo Bay to confine so-called enemy combatants and that it had also used this base to confine tens of thousands of Haitian asylum seekers in the early to mid-1990s. Was this island base part of the broader development of the U.S. detention system? Were the remote geographies of detention crafted by design? We worked together to carve out a project that was related to, but distinct from, the research on remote islands at the heart of the larger project. Living in Syracuse, we could not help but notice the proximity of Batavia to us, the Canadian border, and miles of farm fields and rural landscapes in Western New York. We wondered how the facility came to be there, and our research began with this simple discussion. Over time, the research expanded to include case studies of three sites around the country. We were surprised to find that their histories led us back to offshore enforcement and spaces of confinement on islands and bases.

In an effort to explain how the United States came to operate a dispersed onshore and offshore carceral archipelago (cf. Foucault 1995; Gregory 2007; Stoler 2011), we conducted historical, qualitative inquiry into the political, legal, and economic dynamics responsible for the pace of expansion and locations of confinement developed since the late 1970s. Given that the U.S. government uses hundreds of jail and detention facilities to confine migrants and asylum seekers (637 different facilities in 2015³), we decided to develop a case-study approach that would enable us to assess competing narratives about the geography of detention: proximity to the border, remoteness, and private profit-seeking. To explore border narratives, we selected the facility in our immediate vicinity—Batavia—and those in Pinal County, Arizona, located in the towns of Florence and Eloy. In order to explore the role of privatization

in the early 1980s establishment of the system, we selected Oakdale, Louisiana, as the site of the first large-scale detention facility that the INS constructed following the Mariel crisis. In the course of developing these case studies, we explored the ways in which border narratives, local politics, and subcontracting arrangements played out in these sites and elsewhere in the country. We also came to appreciate the roles that interinstitutional politics, interregional comparison and competition, and historical contingency played in siting decisions.

Because our research inquired about historical dynamics, we turned to archival records. The first obvious agency was the INS, yet when Jenna visited the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) Library in Washington, D.C., she learned that there were significant gaps in the records for the agency for the relevant period. This early setback eventually led to the development of a different archival-research strategy. By this time, we knew that records for the Cuban-Haitian Task Force (CHTF), which was responsible for responding to the arrivals, confinement, and resettlement of Haitians and Cubans in 1980, were held at the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library. This knowledge led us to pursue research at other presidential libraries covering our study period, ranging from the late 1970s to the early 2000s.

This approach involved several years of archival research beginning in 2010 in Arizona. In 2011, Jenna began a summer of research at presidential libraries beginning at the Ronald Reagan Library in Simi Valley, California, and making her way east to consult more archives in Arizona, then the George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, Louisiana State University, the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, and finally the National Archives in Washington, D.C., and College Park, Maryland. That same year, we submitted Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests at the George H.W. Bush and William J. Clinton presidential libraries in order to have relevant materials processed into the public record. In the summer of 2013, Jenna consulted records at Delta State University in Mississippi, and Duke University in Durham, North Carolina, and visited Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, where she also viewed photographs and a display of memorabilia at the Chaffee Crossing museum. In addition to our analysis of these materials, we draw on legal scholarship, media coverage, and visits to each of the case-study regions. Site visits repeatedly revealed the location of detention facilities in economically depressed towns, which also had ties to existing or decommissioned carceral and military facilities.

Archival work followed a systematic routine. At each archive, Jenna would consult with the librarians and research guides to determine

collections that seemed most relevant. She took notes of all collections reviewed in individual Word documents. At most archives, she was able to photograph documents herself. After a day of research, she would annotate the Word file to create a catalog linking individual documents to names of image files. At archives where Jenna made or was provided with paper copies, these were later scanned by a research assistant. All archival materials eventually were uploaded to the software Devonthink Pro, which converts images with text into searchable text. We also printed out copies of documents to read and notate. Our data analysis and writing for *Boats, Borders, and Bases* began in 2012.

This research strategy proved fruitful because the records we acquired provide insight into political negotiations among a range of government agencies and authorities from presidents and the National Security Council (NSC) advisors to local politicians and advocates. Moreover, our FOIA requests and mandatory review requests, which ask agencies to review documents that have been withheld from the public, for a variety of reasons, resulted in the release of documents on migration detention and Operation Safe Haven, which are now available for other researchers. Records of behind-the-scenes discussions within the NSC or among staff members for the White House or senators revealed frank policy-related discussions that were not always shared with the public. They also revealed discussions of strategies for informing the public and navigating difficult political situations. The combination of White House, NSC, Department of Justice, legislative, day-to-day administrative records, and available press clippings enabled us to analyze the interactions between geopolitical and domestic tensions, trace shifts in the implementation of plans over time, and map recurrent themes across different presidential administrations. These materials highlighted for us the local and historical contingency of policy development. High-level executive-branch strategies often foundered on local political pushback, just as the material limitations of logistical or organizational capacity shaped overarching strategic plans.

ANALYZING BOATS, BORDERS, AND BASES FROM A TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

How is remoteness produced transnationally? Much literature about transnational migration emphasizes the mobility of people and remittances across national boundaries (e.g., Rouse 1991). This definition of transnationalism remains important. We also use the term to analyze

work of the state that crosses national boundaries (Mountz 2011b; Hiemstra 2013). *Transnationalism*, importantly, also refers to relationships that nonstate entities—communities, families, friends, and compatriots—maintain across national geographies. Members of the Transnational Hispaniola Collective use *transnational* to “mean the transborder and binational exchanges of people, commerce, ideas, and ecologies that have long undermined attempts by colonial powers and ruling classes to make the border a rigid, transhistorical entity” (Mayes et al. 2013, 27).

Our starting point for developing a transnational perspective on migration detention was that most accounts of the expansion of migrant detention were confined to U.S. domestic space. Such “methodological nationalism” (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002; also see Agnew 1994) erases extraterritorial policing and confinement, which both work to keep migrants from reaching sovereign territory and to expel them from it. Remote island detention is thereby imagined as exceptional rather than fundamental to the United States’s detention and migration-deterrence regime. Accounts of migration and refugee resettlement also are often told in isolation from one another and in country-by-country accounts. This is not to say that nationality-specific or finer grained narratives of migration are unimportant. However, issues of methodological nationalism arise when the mobility of any one group of people is imagined as a discrete phenomenon unrelated to the fates and treatment of other groups. Put another way, governments have historically positioned, or triangulated (Kim 1999), groups in hierarchical relation to one another. Separate treatments of interconnected yet differentiated processes make it difficult to understand how asylum, refugee, detention, and deterrence policies are iteratively and relationally developed.

Placing Borders and the Carceral State in a Transnational World

We “scale up” the arguments on transcarceral spaces (Moran, Piacetini and Pallot 2013) to analyze transnational productions of remoteness that cross prison walls *and* national borders to create transnational carceral spaces. Our argument regarding the transnational dimensions of U.S. detention and deterrence practices may seem contradictory. How can a nation-state’s bordering and detention practices be transnational? As with European Union member states’ deals with some African countries or Australia’s arrangements with Indonesia to deter migration to their respective territories, states try to regulate human mobility with their own transnational mobility. By referring to U.S. policies and practices as

transnational, we emphasize the transnational work of the U.S. state and the mobility of its infrastructure and operations (Mountz 2011b). For the United States to operate transnationally, it has established bilateral and multilateral migration (control) efforts with other sovereign nation-states and with U.S. colonial territories. Negotiations for these agreements are not equal, given the United States's past and present imperial reach, but this does not make them inconsequential. This approach resonates with and builds on critical ethnic-studies scholar Dylan Rodríguez's (2008) contention: "The U.S. prison is a global statecraft, an arrangement and mobilization of violence that is, from its very inception, already unhinged from the delimiting 'domestic' (or 'national') sites to which it is presumptively tethered."

Border enforcement never begins or ends at national boundaries. As geographer Mat Coleman (2007a, b) argues, immigration has always blurred the imagined geographic binary dividing domestic and foreign spaces and laws. We have suggested that it can be difficult to appreciate this blurring because detention and border policies tend to be narrated apart from each other and separate from asylum and refugee policies. Breaking from histories tightly circumscribed around national origin or focused on only domestic or foreign policy reveals the deep interconnections between asylum and refugee policy and practice and legal constructs of illegality and criminality (cf. Ngai 2008). When analyzed together it becomes evident that states produce remoteness through the development of a transnational infrastructure to contain and disperse migrants in and through spaces of formal confinement and blocked migration routes in increasingly fortified and patrolled boundary spaces. State categories of "criminal," "alien," "asylee," and the like are mechanisms of sorting humans and expanding state capacities to deter.

The mid-1990s border-making stories with which we began the book emphasized the perspective of state authorities and how they explain their policy choices. Such tactical legitimation exercises have worked powerfully to concentrate migration and border issues along the United States–Mexico boundary and to funnel investments into boundary fortification and policing. While the United States–Mexico border has come to stand in for narratives about U.S. national borders and migration policies, Nevins (2010) convincingly shows how *local* political efforts proved fundamental to fueling fortification along the boundary and driving a national ideological debate.

We build on Nevins's insights about the historical and geographic specificity of national policy and practice by taking a regional approach

to U.S. deterrence policies. We bring Nevins's insights together with geographic scholarship on racism and racialization. Following Gilmore, racism is the "state-sanctioned and/or extra-legal production and exploitation of group-differentiated vulnerabilities to premature death, in distinct yet densely interconnected political geographies" (2002, 261). The construction of a regionally specific yet interconnected detention and deterrence system in the United States–Mexico borderlands and Caribbean Basin is one such differentiated yet interconnected political geography. Laura Pulido (2006), Wendy Cheng (2013), and Perla Guerrero (2016) develop ideas of regionally specific racial formations, wherein racialization is both a relational and place-based set of processes whereby differently racialized groups are constructed in relation to one another. We build on their work to argue that 1) bordering and deterrence practices developed by the United States in the United States–Mexico and Caribbean border regions were developed in relationship to one another, and 2) that regionally specific deployments of racialized, gendered, and classed constructions of illegality, refugeeness, and criminality shaped the politics of policy and racial hierarchies at local, national, and international scales.

Barbadian poet Kamau Brathwaite links "the shadow of this // Coast Guard // Cutter // of blockade" to the deaths at sea of African peoples stolen across the Atlantic to work as slaves in Europe's colonies (2007, 197). Brathwaite's historical memory of race and region signals centuries-long continuities of slavery and colonialism that continue to shape the imagined geographies of, and boundaries between, the Caribbean, Latin America, and the Americas (Grosfoguel, Maldonado-Torres, and Saldívar 1995; Wynter 1995; McKittrick 2013). In considering questions of race, Claudia Milian argues that the "tendency in Latino/a studies has been to orbit around the Hispanophone Caribbean, seeking to neatly point and comprehensively index blackness in the American hemisphere through this geography" (2013, 9). Historian Ada Ferrer continues, "Historically, the boundaries of the Spanish Caribbean shifted over time, and often back and forth. If part of what characterizes the Caribbean is mobility and contact, how do we delimit the 'Spanish' Caribbean? Indeed, should we delimit it at all?" (2016, 55).

Petra Rivera-Rideau, Jennifer Jones, and Tianna Paschel suggest that a "transnational understanding of *afrolatinidade*" holds potential to move away from studies focusing either on the United States or on Latin America and the Caribbean (2016, 3). Analyzing how Africanity, Americanness, and Latinidad have been constituted together is a decolonial project

for Agustín Lao-Montes (2007; also see Grosfoguel et al. 1995). As such, Lao-Montes argues that attention to specific “diasporic-translocal” histories and perspectives “places Afro-Latina/o difference at the heart of world processes of cultural and political contestation and construction of alternative futures” (2007, 327–28).

As geographers who study state asylum- and migration-deterrence policies, our modest aim is to show the connections between the policies that the United States has deployed in the Caribbean and in the United States–Mexico borderlands. The Caribbean holds a significant place in the history of U.S. migration enforcement (Danticat 2007; Frenzen 2010; Hahamovitch 2011; Noble 2011; Shemak 2011; Lipman 2013; Paik 2016). Yet this regional history tends not to be understood in relation to the better known history of deterrence measures implemented along the United States–Mexico boundary in the early to mid-1990s (U.S. Border Patrol 1994; Dunn 1996; Nevins 2010; Hamlin 2012). Recounting this Caribbean history is important because it brings into view the relationship between asylum and detention, and allows us to historicize the criminalization of migration from a critical and overlooked vantage point, that of the Caribbean region as understood in the Cold War. Our insistence that we need to understand a longer history and different geography of deterrence and detention is not intended to minimize the fatal consequences of state and vigilante violence in the United States–Mexico borderlands. Rather, harmful practices both here and in the Caribbean have been sustained by imagined geographies that divide these places.

Deadly consequences also stem from the ways in which racialized, classed, and gendered categories of migration are deployed to subvert the mobility and undermine the lives of people from the Caribbean and Central and South America. As we detail, the concerted and creative efforts employed by the U.S. government to remove and prevent the arrivals of Haitian and Afro-Cuban people repeatedly led to the invocation of exceptional categories, the creation of new laws, and the consolidation of the tight discursive connections between Blackness and excludability, detainability, and criminality (Loyd 2015). Yet individuals targeted by these onshore-offshore logics also challenged the state’s efforts to banish them. In addition to organized advocacy, we repeatedly find protests, uprisings, and escapes in the archives, disruptions that counter the erasure of racialized, remote forms of detention developed by the United States.

While the imposition of mandatory detention of Haitian asylum seekers was forcefully and persistently contested, the implications of this policy change are consistently overlooked in existing accounts of

the origins of the contemporary migration-detention system. Not only do we need to attend to the role of anti-Black racism in U.S. society and the criminal legal system, but also in foreign and refugee policy.

To develop this argument, we bring critical asylum and refugee studies (Mountz 2010; Coutin 2011; Ashutosh and Mountz 2012; Nguyen 2012; Espiritu 2006, 2014; Paik 2016) together with critical carceral and criminology studies, which analyze criminalization, policing, and imprisonment as forms of racialized and gendered social control (e.g., Simon 1998, 2007; Sudbury 2005; Coleman 2007a; Gilmore 2007; Hernández 2008; Bonds 2009; Bosworth 2009; Cacho 2012; Camp and Heatherton 2016; Escobar 2016; Haley 2016). As criminologist Mary Bosworth writes, “Detention centres confound many usual categories of analysis, defying neat explanation. Prison-like yet not penal, they are filled with people recognizable but foreign” (2014, 210). Scholarship that focuses on the criminalization of migration has drawn attention to the ties between the criminal legal and migration-enforcement systems (e.g., Miller 2003; Stumpf 2006; Chacón 2007, 2009; Bosworth and Kaufman 2011; Dowling and Inda 2013; Inda 2013; Golash-Boza 2015; Escobar 2016; Macías-Rojas 2016). While there exist longer historical roots to this system (Buff 2008; Coleman 2008; Ngai 2008), it is widely accepted that these systems have grown considerably closer since the 1980s as part of the broader wave of legislating new crimes and tougher sentences and appropriating more money to policing. The well-known result was an explosive increase in jails, prisons, and people confined in them.

While we concur with the broad brushstrokes of this convergence narrative, we also build on arguments by Menjívar (2006), Chacón (2015), and Coutin (2000, 2003) that criminalization and illegalization do not result in neat categories of authorized versus unauthorized migrant, or legal permanent resident versus criminal alien. Rather, collisions of civil and criminal laws, and policing practices work to produce “legal liminality.” Chacón explains:

Liminal legality is characterized first and foremost by its inherent legal uncertainty. Individuals’ legal assurances against full marginalization lack definitive temporal scope and are generally extended as privileges, not rights. The inherent fragility and the indefinite nature of the period(s) of administrative grace create instability in many aspects of the lives of liminal legal subjects (2015, 716).

We argue that state authorities deployed mechanisms of legal liminality for asylum seekers differentially in relation to the Cold War and racialized

rationales. Further, we show how the detention and deterrence of asylum seekers *preceded* concerted criminalization efforts begun in the late 1980s. This argument is significant for two reasons. First, it points to a distinct genealogy of U.S. migration detention than that tethered to either United States–Mexico border narratives or domestic-crime politics. Second, it illustrates the precariousness of asylum, a possibility that can be undermined through the use of politically malleable terms like crime.

LOCATING BASES IN MIGRATION CONTROL

As with the broader scholarship on contemporary island spaces of migration control, our work on the history of detention facilities revealed the recurrent use of obsolete and active-duty military bases to deter, confine, and remove migrants within mainland territory and in offshore Caribbean locations. Site-specific histories of these facilities (e.g., Kaplan 2005; Vine 2009; Lipman 2008, 2013; Paik 2013, 2016; Espiritu 2014; Loyd et al. 2015) reveal the historical and contemporary impulse to segregate and contain by targeting and criminalizing racialized groups. It is on these racialized, colonized, and militarized grounds that we locate the United States’s transnational migration-detention and -deterrence regime. We thereby shift attention from the land border to the high seas and islands at the “edges” of American empire (Burnett 2005; Davis 2015). Migration “crises” in these sites reveal the disparate treatment of Cold War refugees and the enduring legacy of empire. The use of colonial military bases provided the practical and legal basis for building up today’s historically unprecedented detention, deportation, and border apparatus.

Decommissioned and active U.S. military bases in Guam, Puerto Rico, Cuba, Panama, and the U.S. mainland have served as material grounds of refugee- and migration-control operations, blurring civilian and military spaces and humanitarian and security rationales (Espiritu 2014; Loyd et al. 2015). Indeed, exceptionalist narratives of humanitarian rescue common to both the Vietnamese and Cuban refugee experiences (as explored by Bon Tempo 2008; Nguyen 2012; Espiritu 2014) obscure how racialized and militarized asylum practices created exclusionary border and detention policies. Yet the entanglements between military and carceral spaces remain virtually absent from current understandings of immigration and detention policy and operations. Recurrent productions of “emergency” also mask how the U.S. government’s humanitarian and enforcement practices are symbiotic.

Beginning with the Carter administration in our narrative, political crises have resulted repeatedly in the expansion of border enforcement, detention, exclusion, and removals. While the White House looked to military bases to resolve migration crises and pursue coherent national policies, these efforts were far from certain as local communities lobbied for and fought against the opening of temporary and long-term detention facilities. Attention to the local contingency of asylum and detention practices simultaneously provides unique insight into the growth of transnational border-enforcement and detention systems.

Throughout this book, we link our analyses of enforcement activities involving boats, borders, and bases. Within this triumvirate, bases constitute a particular geographical form examined by other scholars (e.g., Davis 2011; Vine 2012). The U.S. military base infrastructure rests on and reproduces histories of empire (Gregory 2004; Kaplan 2005; Lipman 2008; Lutz 2009; Vine 2009; Davis 2011; Enloe 2014; Loyd et al. 2015). Following the seizure of Hawai'i in 1893 and the Spanish-American War in 1898, the United States would claim part or all of numerous island territories across the Pacific (including Guam, Wake Island, eastern Samoa, and the Philippines) and the Caribbean (Puerto Rico, Cuba, and, for a time, Haiti). Its "empire of military bases" in these regions would remain fundamental to its economic and political objectives in both regions (Camacho 2012).

While some locate bases on the periphery, as "edges of empire" (Burnett 2005; Davis 2015), others locate them as forward operations, as in David Vine's analysis of several waves of new U.S. bases established since the close of World War II. Vine (2009) situates the first wave as occurring during decolonization, with U.S. bases functioning as forward-looking efforts to exercise control in decolonizing regions. A more recent wave led to the proliferation of a smaller series of bases (Vine 2012) that the U.S. military calls "lily pads," platforms for military operations abroad. We also understand bases as nodes in global networks akin to Josiah Heyman's (2004) analysis of migration control operationalized through ports of entry. Whether used as platforms for military activity or militarized migration operations, bases operate as a networked archipelago for the deployment of U.S. military assets and the controlled movement of migrants (Loyd et al. 2015).

We follow scholars who demonstrate the systemic entanglement of humanitarian with military and imperial imperatives (Hyndman 2007; Fassin and Rechtman 2009; Nguyen 2012; Espiritu 2014; Williams 2014, 2015; Bryan 2015) and police and war operations (Neocleous 2014).

Rather than theorizing the blurring of civilian and military spaces and practices as exceptional, we regard efforts to draw such legal and political divisions, particularly at moments of crisis, as persistent, if contested. For example, Coleman (2007a, b) traces a history of immigration policing in Mexico intersecting with the U.S. wars on drugs and immigration across borders and jurisdictions. These “wars” utilize the same practices, strategies, tactics, and authorities, often targeting and criminalizing the same people onshore and offshore (Coutin 2010).

Like scholars of war who explain militarization as a process that relies on and recreates the material and ideological infrastructures for organizing violence, we show how efforts to create new legal geographies and categories are contingent and historically situated processes. In this effort, we are influenced and inspired by Cynthia Enloe’s (2014) writing on masculinist cultures of militarism. Enloe’s feminist analysis of military culture traces militarism’s movement into everyday life. Our text turns to the lives of those confined in some of those actual military spaces and to those elected officials and neighboring civilians who sought to put bases to other uses. Rather than conceptualizing the frequent use of military bases in refugee and migration operations as exceptions to an abstract or established rule of law, we draw on the longer history of imperial sovereignty—traced by historian Lauren Benton (2010). She emphasizes the practical efforts of rule-making and the fraught efforts to define the relationships between military and civilian authorities in international waters and on island territories.

The militarization of migration does not just occur along the border, but has ensued in a transnational landscape of military bases and multilateral agreements. William Walters (2008) argues that scholars need to pay more attention to the material sites where land meets sea. Accordingly, we attend to the buffer zones built by the United States across the Caribbean on land and at sea. The federal government’s turn to offshore migration-control efforts in the early 1980s represents a deterrence strategy through which the maritime spaces of U.S. territorial and international waters would function as a buffer zone deflecting people from U.S. shores. Not only was this strategy designed to prevent arrivals, it would also forestall the lengthy legal battles over asylum, parole, and detention concerning Haitian and Cuban people who had arrived. Transnational analysis of the U.S. carceral regime thus extends the existing conceptualization of transcarcerality in the carceral geographies literature to additional spaces of liminality (Walters 2008), where maritime spaces are constructed as sites of policing (Benton 2010; Pickering 2014).

As Walters (2008) and Benton (2010) argue, boats serve as important material—if juridically liminal—sites that connect the governance of land and sea. The erasure of such histories is part of the violence of migration detention, serving to distort and naturalize its uses. Thus, remembering the centrality of U.S. military bases and state violence to migration and detention policy means demonstrating and challenging the divisions between civilian and military domains, international asylum and domestic criminal justice. Understanding the sharp conflicts over the development of a militarized carceral asylum- and migration-control system will enable different ways of understanding and pursuing contemporary policy reform, legal advocacy, and activism.

CHAPTER OUTLINE

Throughout this book, we show how the problems associated with *remote* detention are tied to the policy of mandatory detention and to the historical *expansion* of the detention system. The expansion of onshore capacity, moreover, is deeply entangled with the rapid growth of local, state, and federal jail and prison capacity during the 1980s and 1990s (Simon 1998; Dow 2004; Welch 2004). We thus develop transnational framings of domestic carceral landscapes in order to better understand the relationship between offshore and onshore enforcement and detention regimes.

Boats, Borders, and Bases is organized chronologically and thematically into three sections with an introduction, seven chapters, and coda. Chapters in the book move between transnational and geopoliticized histories of migration and displacement and the more local, regional stories grounding them in the historical expansion of the vast U.S. detention system. Part I, *Race and the Cold War Geopolitics of Migration Control*, situates the emergence in the late 1970s and early 1980s of deterrence as a border-enforcement policy. We locate domestic political disputes within racialized Cold War politics and a longer colonial history of U.S. military bases spanning the Pacific to Caribbean. Part II, *Building the World's Largest Detention System*, examines how executive-branch decisions were implemented and how they were contested in some communities where detention facilities might have been built. The historical narratives of these chapters challenge popular explanations for the remote locations of detention facilities by drawing attention to the roles of military restructuring and locally situated carceral economies. Part III, *Expanding the World's Largest Detention System*,

traces the culmination of 1980s deterrence policy in the creation of off-shore “safe havens” and the entrenchment of detention through increasingly severe criminal-justice legislation in the 1990s.

Part I: Race and the Cold War Geopolitics of Migration Control

Chapter 1 opens in 1980 on a desolate Bahamian atoll where 102 Haitian migrants were stranded for four weeks as the U.S. and Bahamian governments negotiated their fate. We situate this moment of exclusion on this tiny island in relation to the contemporaneous “humanitarian” responses to Vietnamese refugees. Even as the United States implemented its first comprehensive refugee policy, President Carter’s exclusionary Haitian Program would plant the seeds of a racialized deterrence policy. We link these episodes to question how humanitarian and deterrence policies have come to be understood as opposing practices in the U.S. context. The history we trace shows them as simultaneous and symbiotic: U.S. foreign policy manifests in humanitarian rescue and migration control. This chapter, thus, illustrates how the racialized construction of a dichotomous discourse of rescue versus deterrence, good versus bad migrant, and bona fide versus bogus refugee animates exclusionary migration practices. These binaries were further mobilized into a relational and racialized taxonomy that categorized groups in relation to one another and Cold War geopolitics.

Chapter 2 discusses the politics of deterring asylum seekers by exploring the simultaneous efforts to find new detention space for Cubans and Haitians who had already arrived in the United States and to develop “contingency” space in the event of another mass migration. This chapter focuses on the pivotal role of military bases in the ad hoc creation of U.S. migration policy during the Carter and Reagan administrations. Haitian and Cuban asylum seekers who arrived in 1980 found themselves confined on separate military facilities from Florida to Wisconsin to Arkansas. Faced with election-year pressures, the Carter administration faced repeated pushback from local authorities and residents over the conditions and use of military bases for its migration operations. The search for and negotiations surrounding new places to site detention facilities reveal racialized imaginations and seemingly irrational commitments to expansion. This chapter explores these quixotic siting efforts: why some facilities lasted while others closed down, and still others never opened. The deeply contingent and contested use of decommissioned military bases ultimately led to the search for more permanent detention space.

Part II: Building the World's Largest Detention System

Where part I explores the White House's response to Cold War refugees and migrants, part II examines the local response to and contestations of foreign-policy decisions and the role of existing prison infrastructures in building an immigration-detention system. We question popular explanations of the role of "the border" and private prison corporations in the remote locations of immigration-detention facilities.

Chapter 3 examines how central Louisiana became the unlikely site for the Immigration and Naturalization Service's first new long-term detention facility and hub for deportation. Faced with high unemployment following the collapse of the local lumber industry, the enterprising mayor of Oakdale spearheaded a campaign to secure the new federal facility. Simultaneously, the Department of Justice debated which agency was best suited to carry out the new mandate of long-term detention of noncitizens. The INS did not have the carceral experience of the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), but because migrant detention was not a criminal-justice punishment, their imprisonment threatened to create legal liabilities for the government. These legal questions also informed jurisdictional conflict over where this new facility would be sited. Oakdale's efforts were jeopardized as Associate Attorney General Rudolph Giuliani backed the Bureau of Prisons's proposal to run a migrant-detention facility near one of its prisons in Oklahoma. The forceful backing of Louisiana politicians eventually won the facility for Oakdale.

Like Oakdale, every community has a particular history in the path to becoming a prison town. Chapter 4 examines how migrant detention became one part of the vast carceral landscape in Florence and neighboring Eloy, Arizona. Neither proximity to the border nor privatization adequately explains the patchwork of carceral facilities in this central Arizona locale. Rather, the landscape of migrant detention builds on multiple histories of confinement, including World War II (WWII) prisoner-of-war (POW) camps and Florence's status as Arizona's prison town, thereby setting the stage to examine the growing interconnections between migrant detention and the burgeoning prison system. The chapter further explores the legal histories of expulsion that form the basis for the development of "criminal alien" legislation, bolstering rationales for detention construction.

These prison towns disrupt potent and popular narratives that national land-border spaces and private industry hold a gravitational force on the expanding detention landscape. In both Florence and Oakdale, federal

detention facilities are connected to a sprawling network of local jails and private facilities where the federal government contracts for detention space. Citizens and noncitizens confined in these prison belts are held on criminal and administrative grounds by multiple state authorities (federal, state, county) and their agents (public and private). The resulting interjurisdictional patchwork underscores the tight connections between migration and criminal-justice practices. Moreover, these sites illustrate the close linkages with military spaces; both Oakdale and Florence rely on nearby World War II airfields to transfer migrants within and outside U.S. territory.

Part III: Expanding the World's Largest Detention System

Part III traces the practical and legislative elaborations on the early-1980 policy of detention and offshore deterrence of migrants as they evolved into the 1990s. Second, it follows the steady push from the mid-1980s to criminalize migration and to create increasingly severe consequences for migrants convicted of felony and misdemeanor crimes. Together, these policies created a transnational infrastructure of immigration enforcement and detention and a diaspora of deported people (cf. Kanstroom 2007; De Genova and Peutz 2010; Golash-Boza 2012).

Chapter 5 tells the history of the Bush- and Clinton-era creation of an offshore detention archipelago in the Caribbean. This transnational Caribbean history is an important immediate precursor to the expansion of deterrence operations along the United States–Mexico border in the 1990s and the use of Guantánamo Naval Base (GTMO) during the War on Terror. As the numbers of Haitians and Cubans held at Guantánamo exceeded 40,000, the United States opened camps for Cubans on its military base in Panama and built additional “safe haven” sites in other countries in the Caribbean. We show how the use of offshore sites was designed to prevent the arrival of asylum seekers on U.S. shores. This moment provides a window into the insidious lengths that the executive branch traveled to redraw legal geographies and thereby separate domestic territory from international waters (and law).

Chapter 6 explores how political crises over migration and crime dovetailed to cement detention into the landscape materially and discursively. Criminal legislation passed in the mid-1980s to mid-1990s repeated the pattern earlier established in *Boats, Borders, and Bases*: asylum seekers are detained, followed by executive orders and congressional legislation authorizing these practices. Like previous efforts to

deter asylum seekers and other unauthorized migrants, criminalization established far-reaching legal and institutional bases for expanding enforcement and detention. We demonstrate the many ways that asylum seekers were criminalized in legislation and policy. As with the earlier treatment of “undesirable” Cubans and “bogus” Haitian asylum seekers, the figure of the criminal alien was consolidated through its juxtaposition with notions of legal, good, and contributing refugees and immigrants. As migration and criminal-justice policy became more closely entwined, the basis for expanding detention shifted more explicitly from deterrence to a more robust tool of punishment and expulsion.

The concluding chapter 7 maps changes to detention and border-enforcement policy in recent years. We counter much contemporary scholarship that places 9/11 as a significant turning point in the securitization and criminalization of migrants and asylum seekers. While not denying the seismic securitization that followed the attacks, we place these changes in historical context to show that they continued a cycle of racialized and geopoliticized exclusions that already had been well rehearsed in U.S. border-enforcement and immigration law, and detention and deterrence policies and practices.

In the coda, we consider how more than three decades of commitment to deterrence and criminalization have led to a robust policing and detention infrastructure that harms already vulnerable groups of people and resists oversight and reform. Over three million people were removed and over two million people returned during President Barack Obama’s time in office. These staggering figures follow more than 2 million removals and over 8 million returns under President George W. Bush, and 870,000 removals and over 11 million returns under President Bill Clinton (Chishti, Pierce, and Bolter 2017). Over these three presidencies, hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of people were separated from their families, and most struggled to repay debts from migration and make a living in economies that have undergone privatization and deregulation. Following deportation, many face subsequent criminalization as they are blamed for the violence and unrest fueled by decimated safety nets and economies. In this final essay, we discuss the recurrence of crisis during the Obama administration through reflection on Central American youth at the Mexico–United States border and the whole new round of crises presented in the opening months of the Donald Trump administration. We also discuss contemporary enforcement efforts in the Caribbean, noting that history continues with Haitians as a seemingly permanent exception.