Introduction

GHOSTS IN THE MACHINE

IN 1976, THE BAY AREA RAPID TRANSIT DISTRICT, known as BART, published a report on the possibilities of extending the system eastward. This was advanced planning by definition—the inaugural commuter trains would not start rolling until the following year. But considering how long it took to build a system as complex as BART, initially envisioned in the 1950s, thinking ahead made sense.

The area in question was eastern Contra Costa County, "East County" to locals (see maps 1 and 2). East County at the time was a big place (close to 100 square miles) with a small population. There were just over 50,000 people spread between the two main industrial cities, Antioch and Pittsburg, the old farming town of Brentwood, and a handful of unincorporated communities like Oakley, Discovery Bay, and Byron. Divided as it was from the core of the Bay Area by a series of hills, served only by a small state highway and a few backroads, East County was far from the rest of the Bay, even if it was only about 40 miles from downtown San Francisco at its westernmost point. The east side of East County was geographically part of the great Central Valley, and residents would be as likely to head east to Stockton to do their big shopping as to go over the hills into Oakland and San Francisco.

To planners from BART and Parsons Brinkerhoff Tudor Bechtel, the joint venture that brought together two of the country's most famous planning and engineering firms to build BART, East County represented an opportunity. They produced renderings of modern-looking stations that at first glance could seem fantastical. BART as a system was not yet open, and here they were imagining expensive stations in faraway places miles from the nearest suburb, let alone the major center of employment. But as they wrote in 1976, East County was a unique opportunity for regional planning. It was "an area



MAP 1. Places. Map by author.

where BART can direct growth rather than merely respond to growth" (Bay Area Rapid Transit District n.d.). The plan, although written long before planning dreamed in terms of "sustainability," "walkability," "transit-oriented development," and other contemporary buzzwords, was just that—part of a vision for a different kind of American suburban development.

As far and as empty as East County may have seemed, this wasn't crazy talk. New suburban-style subdivisions had begun popping up in the 1960s in East County. Highway 680, which would connect East County to the Tri-Valley area and Silicon Valley, was opened in 1971. The Bishop Ranch "edge city" was in the planning phase. Things were happening, and they were happening fast.

Yet if BART planners saw East County as an opportunity to finally get out ahead of the growth and to build the region in a new way, they also figured that it was their way or no way. Their words were unequivocal: "without major


Sonoma
Napa
Solano
Marin
Contra Costa
San Joaquin
San Francisco
Alameda
Stanislaus
San Mateo
Santa Clara
Merced
Pacific Ocean
20 Miles

MAP 2. The 12-county Bay Area. Map by author.

regional policy changes concerning highway funding and environmental acceptance, the corridor without a BART extension would most likely experience a limited level of growth" (ibid.). We have no way of knowing whether planners were right in believing they could "direct growth rather than merely respond to growth." We do know in hindsight that when it came to growth without BART, BART was wrong. The "major regional policy changes" and "environmental acceptance" never came, but the growth did. In a big way.

WELCOME TO EAST COUNTY

By 1982, without a widened Highway 4 and without a BART system and with no concrete plans for either project, the City of Antioch decided to double its population by adding more than 15,000 units for approximately 45,000 people on 6,500 acres.[1] By the 1990s, the fever had spread east to Oakley, which grew almost 1,000 percent between 1980 and 2000, and neighboring Brentwood, which earned fastest-growing city in California status for the better part of the 1990s (Heredia 1998).

By 2000, East County had more than 230,000 residents, almost four times the 1970 census numbers that had formed part of BART's forecasting baseline. By 2007, as the foreclosure crisis began morphing into a global economic meltdown, more than a quarter of a million people called East County home. Most would consider themselves middle class, whether blue collar and white collar. Many were immigrants or the children of immigrants. More than half were nonwhite.

East County's residents often worked in the building trades, constructing and reconstructing the rapidly growing Bay Area, including the subdivisions they lived in and those like it across a 250-mile-long arc stretching from Santa Rosa to Stockton to Gilroy. They were FedEx and UPS drivers, nurses and teachers, cable guys and repairmen, meter readers and other public employees who had kept the region running for generations. Many worked in white-collar jobs in the booming "edge cities" (Garreau 1991) near San Ramon or Pleasanton, job centers that blossomed during the late 1980s and 1990s along freeway corridors in central Contra Costa County and neighboring Alameda County. Some worked in well-paid executive and technical positions, others as part of the growing and feminized wave of back-office service workers whose work was steadily suburbanized over the past generation (Nelson 1986). Long-distance commuting was a way of life—well-paid local jobs were scarce, and people left home early and came home late, often stuck in terrible bottlenecks on freeways never designed for the traffic load they were now expected to handle.

By 2008, East County had become a national epicenter of the foreclosure crisis. Readers of the *New York Times* were introduced to cities like Antioch, alongside similar communities in neighboring Solano, San Joaquin, and Stanislaus counties. The *San Francisco Chronicle* called Brentwood "the poster child for the housing bust," and reporters from around the world filed stories documenting how the American and Californian dreams were falling apart in subdivision after subdivision along the edge of one of the wealthiest regions in human history (Egan 2010; Moore 2008; Temple 2008). All told, the four major places of East County—Pittsburg, Antioch, Brentwood, and Oakley—and the nearby developer-built project of Discovery Bay saw 6,231 foreclosures in 2008. During the height of the crisis, from 2007–11, these same five communities saw almost 16,000 foreclosures. These communities together had only 90,000 housing units in 2010.[2]

These lost homes were a disaster for the families who lost them, and a fiscal nightmare for the cities in which they were built. Property values cratered, with homes trading at late 1980s prices when adjusted for inflation. This massive decline in real estate values gutted city budgets that were dependent on property tax revenues, pushing cities like Antioch to the brink of insolvency.

East County was not alone in its plight. Thirty miles to the west and across the Carquinez Strait, Solano County's largest city, Vallejo, did go bankrupt. The major cities in southern Solano County and the cities of East County form what I call the "Cities of Carquinez" (Schafran 2012b), and between them there were more than 10,000 foreclosures in 2008 alone. Thirty-six miles to the east of Antioch, Stockton became the largest municipal bankruptcy in American history, as foreclosure swept through the cities in western San Joaquin and Stanislaus counties as well.

By 2016, while prices recovered more in some places than others, virtually all of these communities lost value compared to 2004 (Badger 2016). In Antioch, on Lefebvre Way, an anonymous suburban street where just two blocks lost almost $4.6 million in housing value in the four years following the crash (chapter 3), one could still buy a house actively in foreclosure in 2016 that was worth 40 percent of what it was in 2006.

CHANGING GEOGRAPHIES OF RACE AND CLASS

This was not the case everywhere in the Bay Area. As Americans watched the continued struggle of Rust Belt regions and the now-exposed metropolitan economies of parts of the Sun Belt, the fortunes of the Bay Area as a whole remained golden. Median incomes and property values in San Francisco, Silicon Valley, the North Bay, and the East Bay's Tri-Valley area powered through the crisis.[3] A region made rich on gold and industrialized agriculture stayed at the top of the global economic food chain even after the dot-com crash of 2000 and the disastrous recession of 2008. Between Apple's 2012 announcement that it had $100 billion in cash and the subsequent Facebook IPO, realtors in San Francisco and Palo Alto braced for another uptick in home prices, one which had reached absurd proportions by 2016.

In the more centrally located cities and towns of the region, the crisis was about rising rents and unaffordable homes, not lost equity and destroyed credit. San Francisco's mayor convened an affordable housing task force in 2014, for once again, despite a real estate crash and global economic meltdown, gentrification and affordability were the primary questions of the day, not abandonment and foreclosure (Meronek 2015). Just a few years after Brentwood became the "poster child" for the housing bust, San Francisco emerged as a global icon of gentrification, a force that has more recently brought Oakland to the attention of the national press as well (Wood 2016).

San Francisco's affordability and inequality crisis have become a staple of national and international headlines (Wong 2016), much as East County's foreclosures did during the height of the crisis. National Public Radio ran a special series on income inequality in the region. *Fortune Magazine* and the *Economist* leant their particular perspective to the issue. Newspaper articles and blog posts abounded with well-publicized studies showing just how absurdly the prices had risen. Between 2012 and 2016, San Francisco saw the largest increase in the share of million-dollar homes of any metropolis in the country, followed by San Jose and Oakland (McGlaughlin 2016).[4] This meant that the three largest cities in the region were one, two, and three in the nation in this category, all while homes on the far edge of the region struggled to hold value. By 2016, perhaps only London was on par with the Bay Area as an international symbol of inequality seen through the lens of a growing affordable-housing crisis.

If one digs deeper, the picture of a very unequal region is even more profound. Many of the families that helped East County and the surrounding areas grow were African Americans from Oakland, a city which lost 37 percent of its black population between 1990 and 2014. San Francisco lost 42 percent of its black population during the same time period. The famed university city of Berkeley, just north of Oakland and across the bay from San Francisco, lost more than half of its black community. This meant that more than 100,000 African Americans had left the three cities in the core of the region in 25 years.

The profound changes in the race and class geography of the San Francisco Bay Area are not as simple as a gentrifying core and an impoverished periphery. The full region is a complex, hyper-diverse archipelago that defies easy categorization. Much of East County's growth was driven by Latinx, Asian, and white families whose stories, like those of African Americans, are complicated. San Francisco is very different from Oakland, and Antioch is different from Brentwood. Silicon Valley is an entire ecosystem in its own right.

We should be careful when talking in terms of the Californian *banlieue,* especially since this label is often based on a poor understanding of the actual French *banlieue* (Schafran and LeMoigne 2016). It is not as simple as "two Bay Areas," or what Alan Ehrenhalt (2012) calls "the Great Inversion"—wealthier and whiter folks moving into the city, poorer communities of color moving out.

We must also be wary of focusing too much on the intensely gentrifying centers of the region. As dominating a force as gentrification is in cities like Oakland and San Francisco, we should heed Jeff Chang's (2016: 72) advice: "By itself, gentrification can't explain the new geography of race that has emerged since the turn of the millennium . . . Gentrification is key to understanding what happened to our cities . . . but it is only half of the story."

As Chang notes, it is in gentrifying spaces where the region's growing inequality is most visible, but focusing exclusively on the center means ignoring the larger story at the heart of his work and mine. Even if it is not black and white, in either the literal or figurative sense, the clearly racialized nature of the divide between East County and San Francisco / Silicon Valley provides a clue to the first core argument of this book: what happened in the Bay Area is fundamentally about segregation. I mean this in both in the historical sense of the term, and in the new ways that the transformation of the Bay Area demands we understand it.

SEGREGATION, RESEGREGATION, AND THE ORIGINS OF AN URBAN CRISIS

While some people of color have prospered as part of the tech and property boom of the past few decades in the Bay Area, the numbers are clear—black, Latinx, Filipino, and Southeast Asian people are overrepresented in communities struggling with foreclosure and bankruptcy, and underrepresented in the more stable, high-property-value communities. Communities of color may no longer be exclusively trapped in underserved and disinvested inner cities, but the racialized map of foreclosure in the Bay Area and its relation to postwar segregation is a clue that one era has not entirely given way to another. This is not your grandparent's segregation—it is as much suburban and exurban as urban; it is multiracial, and not just black and white; it is more about moving too often than not being able to move at all. As I will explain in far greater detail in chapter 1, these changes nevertheless deserve to be called segregation, and this new, more mobile form of segregation is at the heart of the problem.

This new form of segregation, and the crisis it helped produce, is in every way a product of how the postwar segregated metropolis was built, and how we reacted to it a generation later. As I and others have argued previously (Schafran 2012a; Dymski 2009; Harvey 2009), the foreclosure crisis must be understood fundamentally as an "urban" crisis, or better, an "urbanization" crisis. By this I do not mean urban in the sense of cities, for obviously this is a suburban and exurban crisis as much as an inner-city one. By urban I mean rooted in the process of urbanization, in the production of cities and towns and regions, in the building of homes and schools and transport networks.[5]

Every house that was foreclosed upon had to be built somewhere by someone, approved by some council or agency, often as part of a long-term plan. The foreclosure crisis was not the dot-com crash of 2000, where companies with no real value were suddenly valuable, until they were not. Many of the loans that purchased these houses were toxic, both in their terms and in their amount. There was no doubt a radical bubble, with houses trading for two to three times what they should have been worth. But these were still real houses, in real places, mostly owned by real families. While there were plenty of people who overextended themselves into crazy speculation and an investment portfolio built on smoke and mirrors, people also lost homes that had been purchased with prime, fixed-rate mortgages, but at a price point that was unsustainable.

Most critically, this "asset bubble" could only have been built on an asset like the American home, a real thing that is often the source of an outsized dream, and for which there is potent demand. Where this demand came from, and how this demand was stymied in certain geographies and taken advantage of in others, is fundamentally part of the story of the foreclosure crisis. Foreclosure in the Bay Area cannot be reduced to bad banks or ill-informed homeowners.

Instead, we must look at the very foundations of how and for whom the region has been built, and we must do so over a long period of time. One of the many reasons to use segregation to describe what is taking place is that it forces us to see that this is a deeply historical phenomenon, not simply a product of the past decade. So while I and others, such as Chang (2016), refer to what has occurred in the Bay Area as *resegregation,* this book contends that *re*segregation is like *re*financing—it does not imply that one had ended before another began.[6] Resegregation and old-fashioned segregation are happening simultaneously, not only in the Bay Area but throughout the country.

These new forms of segregation are also not the antonym of integration. Antioch is a former "sundown town," a place where African Americans in the postwar era knew they were largely unwelcome after dark (let alone before—see chapter 2). Antioch is thus simultaneously the radical face of integration and a key example of twenty-first-century resegregation. Coming to terms with this paradox is critical to understanding how segregation has changed.

Using the term segregation also reminds us that what is happening in the Bay Area is not about *race* but, as Ta-Nehisi Coates (2015) would explain it, fundamentally about *racism*. The evidence from research shows clearly that the foreclosure crisis hit communities of color the hardest (Hall, Crowder, and Spring 2015), and cannot be separated from the racist production of the twentieth-century American metropolis (Rugh and Massey 2010).

Like all forms of segregation, the racialized and stratified landscapes in which this crisis has played out are not simply products of market forces, demographic change, or economic shifts. They are products of the culmination of innumerable political decisions, some major—like the decision not to extend BART and not to build East County in a different way—and some minor. They are products of specific decisions on land use, housing, transportation, environmental protection, and much more, decisions about how and for whom to build cities and towns and regions and neighborhoods.

Understanding contemporary segregation means grappling with the culmination of multiple generations of decisions. It is a product of many decisions made by many institutions, some of which were outright racist or classist. But many decisions were made by institutions that would contend they opposed segregation, and some of those same institutions have done important work to fight it. Just as importantly, contemporary segregation is the product of many decisions not taken, the product of political inertia as much as the product of bad ideas. When something has been so unequal for so long, it becomes normalized.

ROADS NOT TAKEN

Placing segregation at the center of the explanatory framework does not mean eschewing other well-known explanations for the crisis, but rather incorporating them critically and in pieces so as to avoid common missteps. As the crisis began to unfold and gather media and scholarly attention, prominent voices argued that this disaster proved that those who opposed development on the regional fringe were right all along. America's pattern of rapid, low-density, and resource-intensive suburbanization over the past half-century was not only environmentally destructive but financially unsustainable (Florida 2009). The crisis was an indication—one of many—that suburbs are declining (Kim, Chung, and Blanco 2013). For prominent urbanists like Chris Leinberger (2011), the crisis marked "the death of the fringe suburb," with foreclosure as the well-placed iceberg for America's regional development Titanic.

Especially when compared to earlier crises that involved places being abandoned and immiserated, the foreclosure crisis had a distinctive suburban or exurban quality (Newman and Schafran 2013; Pfeiffer and Molina 2013; Immergluck 2011). The foreclosure crisis can easily be considered the most devastating crisis in the history of American suburbia. Like those critics who pointed the finger at sprawl, suburban decline, metropolitan fragmentation, or other related ills, I also argue that how the Bay Area in particular and the United States in general was built since World War II is at the heart of the problem.

But the fundamental shortsightedness of the sprawl discourse in the United States is that it has a tendency to root the problem geographically: whereas sprawl in theory is a form and pattern of development, it too often becomes a geography of development. Any growth in a place like Antioch, 50 miles from San Francisco, becomes sprawl in the minds of many, especially those in the urban core secure enough to have no need for the affordable American Dream long available only on the urban fringe.

This geographical rooting of the problem makes Antioch and East County the problem in and of themselves. There is a deep tendency in America to assume *problems evident in geography are the result of choices and decisions and events made primarily in that geography.* Local actors are seen to bear primary responsibility, as opposed to the broader system of urban and regional development. Even if one also blames actors at higher scales or in different sectors, actors in other parts of the region like central cities and wealthier suburbs often get a free pass.

The parallels between the blaming of the Antiochs of America for the current crisis and the blaming of the postwar inner city for the urban crisis of the 1950s and 1960s are striking. Robert Beauregard's (1993: 6) statement that talking about the postwar inner-city almost exclusively in terms of decline provided "a spatial fix for more generalized insecurities and complaints, thereby minimizing their evolution into a more radical critique of American society," could just as easily have been written about the flood of post-foreclosure journalism and critique aimed at struggling communities on the metropolitan fringe (Schafran 2013). While we seem to have clearly learned that the struggles of the postwar inner-city were as much about the postwar suburb as they were about the city, places like Antioch have not been given the same benefit of a wider perspective.

When we seek this form of spatial fix, we also trod another all too familiar historical path best left untaken.[7] The "discourse of decline" brewing on the urban fringe has already begun to mark those who live there, a bitter irony considering that many communities who now call places like East County home are survivors of the earlier marking of the inner-city. There is no arguing with some of the facts on the ground, be they questions of rising poverty (Kneebone and Berube 2013) or the lack of social services. American suburbia is struggling in a way it has never struggled before.

Unfortunately, writers and pundits discussing suburbia's struggles use language that is strikingly similar to the language of mid-twentieth-century writers on urban decline—in effect, moving "urban problems" to the "suburban ghetto" (Murphy 2007: 21–37; Lucy and Phillips 2000). This scholarly perspective has been accompanied by a more popular discourse that goes further, again using terms like "slum" and "ghetto" to describe communities facing high rates of foreclosure, increasing poverty, limited fiscal capacity, and newly diverse communities (Schafran 2013).

In regurgitating this deep and dark tradition in American urbanism, in once again looking at problems in communities of color and declaring those places as problems in and of themselves, we again focus on a symptom and not the larger historical system of injustice. Rather than asking pointed questions about segregation, we simply cast aspersions, or discuss the "death" of these places without any regard for those who live there. The fast-growing cities on the fringe of the Bay Area are collectively majority-minority, in some cases more than two-thirds communities of color. Talking of their decline helps nobody.

Fragmentation, Regionalism, and Neoliberalism

Another set of explanations focuses on metropolitan fragmentation—the way in which too many small governments cannot come together to plan regionally. Since the days of Robert Wood's (1961) famous *1400 Governments,* scholars and practitioners alike have pointed to the fact that our regions are chopped up into innumerable overlapping jurisdictions. All of these separate local, county, subregional, and regional governments, authorities, and independent agencies make planning less efficient, limit cooperation, and empower certain jurisdictions to be selfish and exclusionary. The "natural" response to fragmentation, and in turn to the patterns of segregation and sprawl it is thought to cause, is some form of regional governance, itself a century-old dream of planners and political scientists (Weir 2004).

It is a diagnosis that makes sense on so many levels. The idea of defragmenting the region through some form of regional governance would seemingly undo the urban / suburban divide dialectic that has been so harmful. Rusk's (1993) "cities without suburbs" and Orfield's (2002) "metropolitics" appear to be intelligent ways of grappling with both the ongoing divide between cities and suburbs and the increasing division between the suburbs themselves. Place matters as much as it ever has (Dreier, Mollenkopf, and Swanstrom 2001), and these fragmentation / regionalism approaches have immense value.

The limitations of these approaches are much less severe than the sprawl and decline discourses, at least when they are mutually exclusive. Fragmentation and regionalism approaches stumble by making two key geographic errors, one theoretical and one historical. Conceptually, they engage in a common scalar fetishism that sees one particular geographic scale as ideal for the governance of the production of space. If we could only achieve regional governance, or some hybrid between local and regional activity (Katz and Bradley 2013), we would finally be able to achieve some of the long-desired plans, finally be able to counteract sprawl, segregation, etc., or so the argument goes.

To this day, advocates continue to push for more "regionalism," including in the Bay Area. But the production of cities, towns, and region, of homes, roads, jobs, and schools, of space and place, has always been a set of relationships among actors from different sectors operating at different scales (Storper 2014), and one must focus on the broader question of the politics of planning *across* scale rather than the possibility of planning at a particular scale.

This between-scale question is made all the more necessary by the unfortunate tendency to misread history, especially in the Bay Area. The region did not become fragmented, at least in the narrow sense of competing jurisdictions, during the period in question, or even immediately beforehand. The Bay Area was born fragmented and multicentered, spread out and sprawling. The overwhelming majority of growth implicated in the new geography of crisis did not occur in brand-new cities imagined by developers, postmodern versions of Levittown or Lakewood.[8] Virtually all of the major places in this book—East County's Antioch, Brentwood, and Pittsburg; central Contra Costa's San Ramon and Walnut Creek; the core cities of Oakland and Richmond; San Francisco and Silicon Valley and Marin County; the Central Valley cities of Modesto and Stockton—were on the regional map by 1900. In the 25 cities in the greater Bay Area that grew by 50 percent and saw at least 5,000 new residents between 1990 and 2010 (chapter 1), cities which have overwhelmingly borne the brunt of foreclosure, the median founding date was 1873. The Bay Area did not sprawl into an uninhabited desert in the postwar era, but rather grew into a regional skeleton of small industrial cities and old farm towns largely established by the end of the nineteenth century. As discussed in more detail below, the question is less about jurisdictional fragmentation and more about a generalized unwillingness and inability to plan for this region that was basically fragmented from the start.

From Scalar Fetishes to Institutional Ones

The regionalist / fragmentation approach has a strange bedfellow in the discourses of neoliberalism. Neoliberalism became an intellectual catchall during the first decade of the twenty-first century, used to describe a series of actions whereby the "market" was prioritized over the "state," financialization and privatization were rampant (Harvey 2005), and individuals were held to be the primary economic actors in society, heroic entrepreneurs in the mold of Ayn Rand's Howard Roark. Peck and Theodore (2002) divide neoliberalism into "roll-out" and "roll-back" neoliberalism, separating those sets of actions which eroded existing institutions or regulations from those that established new rules and new entities.

There is little argument from critical scholars that one can find direct and indirect relationships between virtually all aspects of neoliberalism and the foreclosure crisis. It was a crisis driven by deregulated capital spreading and taking on new forms while governments at multiple scales largely ignored the ticking time bomb. This bomb was fed by the persistent fetishization and promotion of homeownership, the latter led by an ever-powerful real estate industry and quasi-governmental institutions like Fannie Mae and Freddie

Mac that had been transformed during the past two decades to better serve capital and speculation.

If regionalism stems from a geographic view of fragmentation, scholars of neoliberalism emphasize the fragmentation or "splintering" of the state as a whole (Graham and Marvin 2001; Brenner and Theodore 2002). The question is not simply about the power or number of local jurisdictions, but about the increasing power of private-sector actors in the production of space. For Graham and Marvin (2001) in particular, what has been splintered is the "integrated ideal," in which the state is at the center of infrastructure provision. In its emphasis on the broad political economy of urbanization, the neoliberalism approach more closely resembles my own, and has contributed greatly to my thinking about the crisis in the Bay Area.

Yet there are two aspects of the neoliberalism discourse that are limiting. One is a failing that geographic fragmentation also faces—an at-times incomplete reading of history. To talk of a radically devolved and disempowered state may make sense in Europe or Latin America, but it makes little sense in California and most of the United States, where the brief window of Keynesianism is hardly the historic norm. The idea that intercity competition, private-sector power, or any of the other hallmarks of neoliberalism are somehow new is to misread regional history. These factors, much like geopolitical fragmentation, are virtually inborn in Californian and American urbanism.[9] As Mark Weiss (1987) makes so breathtakingly clear in his underacknowledged (and underread) classic, *The Rise of the Community Builders,* private-sector actors were at the heart of every stage of the formation of the regulatory and planning apparatus in California. Cities in the western half of the United States were engaged in serious entrepreneurial boosterism (Abbott 1981a, 1981b) before David Harvey was born, let alone before he penned his famous argument about the shift from the managerial to the entrepreneurial city (Harvey 1989) as part of academic urbanism's early engagement with neoliberalism. The line between "state" and "market" actors is so fuzzy in California that the terms lose much of the utility they may have elsewhere.

Scholarship on neoliberalism also has a tendency toward institutional fetishization, a trait it shares with many subgenres of urbanism. This is the viewpoint that favors or blames certain actors—developers, local government, banks, community-based organizations, etc.—an institutional parallel to regionalist pursuit of the proper scale. The power of certain institutions becomes the problem in and of itself, an institutional problem instead of a spatial one. But the production of space in the United States, and especially in California, has always been constituted by an intricate set of relations between a vast number of governmental and nongovernmental institutions at every scale, held together and driven apart at different times by different sets of collective politics and sociocultural / socioeconomic trajectories.[10]

What is needed instead is a deeper sense of political fragmentation, one more akin to historian Robert Fogelson's (1993) depiction of the early days of Los Angeles as a "fragmented metropolis," a sense that went beyond jurisdictions to consider deeper cultural and social issues. This notion of fragmentation goes beyond questions of the state or the number of local governments, beyond the "splintering" of the "integrated ideal" that ushers in an era of privatized infrastructure. As I attempt to show throughout the book, what ultimately drove this crisis was the broad fragmentation of the political economy of virtually every aspect of city- and region-building. Rather than build toward a political economy of development that could have produced a more equitable, environmentally sustainable, and fiscally and economically stable region, the politics became more divided and the economics much more fragile. Rather than recognize what California's long-forgotten 1978 *Urban Strategy* called the "common purpose" that is urban and regional development (California Office of Planning and Research 1978: iii; see also chapter 8), California grew even more divided when it came to building space and places, neighborhoods and regions.[11]

This broader sense of fragmentation enables us to see division where, on paper, there should be solidarity. The Bay Area not only has a reputation for being politically progressive, but over the course of the past 40 years, virtually every major elected official has been a member of the same party.[12] What one could consider the "Obama coalition"—middle- and working-class communities of color and generally middle-class, generally white progressive environmentalists—has been the overwhelming majority in the region for decades. There were no radical ideological differences on abortion, war, gay rights, or civil rights, as there has been in the country as a whole. There was no major reactionary movement that questioned government in every way. Of course there were the typical differences between business groups and environmental organizations, but especially with the ascendancy of the tech industry, many business leaders saw themselves as firmly green. In the hyper-multi-ethnic Bay Area, virtually all institutions avowed that they were progressives on issues of poverty and race. San Francisco became famous for having two types of politics—progressive Democrats and moderate Democrats.

As discussed in chapter 6, one could argue that the high-growth areas on the fringe of the region—areas like East County that built the homes which housed the people who took the loans—are more purple than blue. As you go deeper into San Joaquin County, places become even more Republican, and it was these elected officials who overwhelmingly voted to allow the type of suburban development that became a hotspot for foreclosure. But this type of political stratification on the megaregional scale is still not enough to explain the full story, for again, it would make the error of understanding places like East County only in East County. It does not account for innumerable other decisions made at other scales and in other places, most of which were made by people who voted similarly in November and were not divided by standard American political ideologies. While the relationship between party affiliation and land use politics / urban growth is underexplored, it is only a partial explanation for what occurred.

The stark reality is that faced with the profound challenge of remaking the unequal and unsustainable region built during the postwar era, leaders and institutions at every scale and in every sector in the Bay Area could neither find nor forge this "common purpose" that is urban and regional development, despite voting together in November. It was not simply the formal, jurisdictional political geography of a vast and growing region that had become fragmented, nor the party lines dividing communities on the outskirts of the regions from those in the core. It was the entire politics of planning and development itself. The relative political unity of the region masked the fact that like most of the United States, the Bay Area remained deeply divided over issues of race, space, and place.

To understand this, one has to think historically about how the region of one generation is built in reaction to the region of another. Despite its progressive politics and considerable economic resources, the San Francisco Bay Area was never willing nor able to heal the vast racialized wounds that were so foundational to its history, especially those wounds inscribed in space and place. The region's incredible record of economic and social innovation and environmental preservation was matched by similar innovation in racial exclusion and outright bigotry. Moreover, the radicalism and innovation for which it became famous never materialized into a similar world-class effort to overcome those spatialized inequalities and divisions that the collective racism produced. The Bay Area became more adept at conservation-minded park-building, technology-driven company-building, and preservation-minded neighborhood-building than equity-driven metropolis-building. At times, it also allowed important majorities to believe that these things were mutually exclusive. When the postwar form of ghettoized segregation began to unravel, the region had a chance to do things differently, rather than reinvent segregation on a much larger scale. Instead it fragmented, in this deeper and broader sense of the term, unable to overcome the racial ghosts in the regional machine.

GHOSTS IN THE MACHINE

The second core argument of this book is that this new form and map of segregation, and the foreclosure crisis it helped to enable, was produced by the highly specific way in which the politics of space and place during the more recent era reacted to the ghosts of postwar urbanism. What has occurred is not simply some path-dependent aftermath of the postwar era, the result of a postwar model destined to fail. Nor, as I have stated before, is it simply the result of neoliberalism or bad decisions in the 1980s and beyond. Rather, it is the end result of a "neoliberal era," that period from the mid-1970s until the foreclosure crisis of 2008, built on the ghosts of the postwar era.[13]

When it comes to urbanization and development, the neoliberal era must be conceived as the result of a multiplicity of reactions to the sins and unsolved problems of the urban crisis of the postwar era—the complex math of one era being built in reaction to, on top of, and side by side with another era that never truly went away, etched as it is in the built environment, in political institutions, and in collective memory.[14] This historical residue, from concrete freeways through poor and racialized communities to abandoned plans for regional mobility, from institutional memories of top-down planning to the deep legacy of racial exclusion both residentially and politically, is what I collectively refer to as *ghosts in the machine.* Any understanding that does not hold both eras up to the light simultaneously will fail to understand the contemporary moment.

Postwar sub / urbanization established an unworkable and racialized urban / suburban dichotomy, structuring metropolitan areas into distinct zones of opportunity. It was also wasteful, environmentally destructive, and economically and fiscally unsustainable. What was at times sold during the postwar era as a collective effort was in reality driven by a powerful but narrowly constructed coalition of elites, a top-down "growth machine" (Logan and Molotch 1987) that extended far from downtown, especially in California. Developers, planners, bankers, lawyers, newspaper publishers, unions, real estate brokers, and businesspeople of all types supported, pushed, and boosted this machine that had undergirded the development of California from the outset. The postwar era relied on a blind majoritarian politics to prop up an elite and top-down urbanization that was harmful to minority communities and the natural environment, even as it built needed infrastructure and turned a generation of (mostly white) Americans into a homeowning middle class. State-led urban planning, heavily influenced by modernism, never fully recovered from its involvement with the sins of the postwar period, while never getting the credit it deserved for its profound successes.

The broad implosion of postwar urbanization in the Bay Area and beyond came as a result of an attack on this machine from virtually every side, from left and right, environmentalists and racial justice advocates, local governments and homeowners, suburbanites and urbanites. Opposition to the way cities and towns and the region as a whole were built, planned, and developed began to grow in incredibly diverse circles. Actors in different sectors with different cultures and political beliefs knew that the way the region was growing and building wasn't working and couldn't continue.

But the reaction to this destructive majoritarianism was not a coming-together across various differences and spectrums to build a new, less racist, and more environmentally and economically sustainable urbanism. Instead, the broad opposition led to further fragmentation. Both environmental and racial justice advocates grew more powerful during the neoliberal era, but in different spaces fighting for different things. Local governments, regional agencies, transportation authorities, community-based organizations, unions—virtually everyone involved in the urbanization process found their niche to defend, their issues to promote, and their spaces to build and rebuild, but the collective endeavor needed to meet the truly massive challenge of a post–civil rights metropolis in a booming and gentrifying megaregion was never likely. Developer power did not wane in the least, but they too carved out new spaces and territories and ways of operating, they too retrenched politically. Some focused on building increasingly expensive places for an increasingly rarified elite; others fled over the hills to areas that had not yet rejected their postwar model.

One result of this broad and deep fragmentation was that certain aspects of the modernist planning project which underwrote the postwar era, including the ability to think big and connect far-flung portions of the metropolis, were dramatically undermined even as they remained necessary. The planning and development that emerged from the postwar era was determined to do better at respecting the micro scale, and in this it somewhat succeeded. It could no longer run roughshod over places the way it once did, and the lessons learned from Jane Jacobs and many others about small-scale and bottom-up began to take hold.

But larger-scale challenges—the bigger systems needed to move, house, and educate a growing region that began the day divided and unequal—could not be met by this fragmented body politic. Again, this was not simply a case of local jurisdictions not being able to cooperate or regional agencies not having enough power, but the inability of all of the major institutional actors involved in the production of space to come together to confront the ghosts of planning's past and meet the challenges of a rapidly growing and rapidly changing region still heavily scarred by inequality and beset by the double-edged sword of a beautiful but difficult physical geography.

Not all of the ghosts in the machine involve things done that should not have been done. The notion of ghosts refers equally to what was left on the table—generations of good ideas and worthwhile plans that have gathered dust even as the situation on the ground worsened. Much like the BART plan that opened this introduction, many of the plans and ideas from the 1960s and 1970s show evidence that planners and leaders recognized some of the failings of postwar suburbanization. There was no lack of concrete ideas throughout this entire history on how to make changes.

There were also many who understood the risk of repeating the failures of postwar sub / urbanization once again—only this time farther from the core with hundreds of thousands of new residents. As I mentioned at the outset, even the plans that unleashed growth in East County included ideas which perhaps could have allowed things to unfold differently, ideas which today are taught as contemporary "solutions" to long-standing planning problems, particularly in the suburbs: transit-oriented development, walkable and bikeable communities, improved connections between housing, jobs, and education, local agricultural preservation, and so on. But these ideas, like so many of the time, were left on the table, or left buried in plans on the shelf and never implemented.

The true shame of what happened to East County and to the Bay Area and plenty of other areas like it in the United States is that planners, politicians, activists, and academics long saw the writing on the wall, but were unable or unwilling to build the type of planning politics necessary to alter the direction of history and build a different geography. From the late 1950s up and through the first wave of foreclosures, regional and state agencies, local planning departments, respected consulting firms, powerful advocacy organizations, academic institutes, and developer trade associations knew what was slowly unfolding on the region's fringe. They wrote reports and plans and projections, argued for solutions and fought battle after battle after battle, but little actually changed. Planning failed not because it saw the future incorrectly, but because it saw it all too clearly and failed to adequately intervene. The Bay Area had many good plans, and even more good planners, but at the end of the day the system of planning could not alter the course of history.

What the Bay Area lacked, and still largely lacks, was not good ideas or good policies, but *effective politics*—a politics of development capable of producing the actual existing urban fabric that we all need to survive in an equitable and sustainable way. The true tragedy of the way in which these two eras came together is how both periods combined to undermine any possible faith in the political economy of urbanization. The region had the resources and know-how to avoid its fate, to avoid resegregating itself on a much bigger scale, to avoid becoming such a tempting market for bad mortgage debt, to avoid inhumane and unsustainable commuting patterns, but it could not come together politically to make these difficult decisions. Instead, the region continued to divide itself along false choices—environmentalism or development, gentrification or abandonment. This twentieth-century either / or mentality was ill suited to the twenty-first-century both / and problems the region was facing, and furthered the fragmentation and inertia. This helped reproduce twentieth-century problems and create new twenty-first-century ones at the same time, but in different parts of the region.

Responsibility for this failure of planning, for the continued fragmentation of the politics of urbanization and development, lies in virtually every institution and at every scale; it was driven by developments on the ground and in turn drove those developments. This insistence on a broad geographic and institutional understanding of responsibility for the resegregation of the Bay Area informs the organization of this book. Chapter 1 lays out the case for understanding the transformation of the Bay Area as segregation, and for transforming our understanding of segregation. The second section of the book then examines how this transformation occurred in different parts of the region. It starts in East County (chapter 2), moving west through Contra

Costa County (chapter 3), the cities of Oakland and Richmond and the old military-industrial spaces of the inner Bay Area (chapter 4), and what I call the West Bay Wall—Silicon Valley, San Francisco, and Marin County (chapter 5). This section ends by returning east, over the Altamont Pass and into the Central Valley (chapter 6).

The final section of this book examines why this resegregation was never prevented either at the regional scale (chapter 7) or by the state of California (chapter 8). All throughout these chapters I try to show how "common purpose" was never achieved, and how a series of seemingly paradoxical dilemmas furthered a set of false choices. These dilemmas collectively hamstrung the very possibility of turning the regional ship around, as real solutions became unthinkable. Each chapter bounces back and forth between the historical and the contemporary, a fact that may make orthodox historians nervous but which is a necessary part of grappling with how the past and the present come together in each place to produce the contemporary moment.

As I discuss in the conclusion, building a new, more unified politics of development, this "common purpose," will take time. It will require rethinking who plans and who is a planner. It will require rethinking the very role of urban development in our economy as a whole. It will require that we abandon some of the normative baggage with which we judge places and housing choices, and work to make sure everyone's place and everyone's home is as secure and risk-free as possible. It will require a concerted and honest effort to come to terms with the ghosts of planning past, so that the type of political grand bargain needed to build the homes and transport and communities we all need becomes possible, rather than just another set of good ideas left on the shelf, or good intentions left unfulfilled. And it will require a renewed commitment to combatting exploitation in all aspects of metropolis-building.

One way of reformatting our thinking so that this type of grand bargain becomes possible is to reimagine sustainability. One of the most important planning and development buzzwords over the past two decades, sustainability came to symbolize both the hope and failure to unify environmental, equity, and economic goals. Rather than simply abandoning sustainability as an idea, we need to understand it for what it is and was on the ground—a failed coalition. Only sustainability as a true political coalition among institutions advocating for each of these goals can help us realize the unfounded promise of the Bay Area as the equitable and sustainable region it wants to be but has never been.