LECTURES ON AESTHETICS

I

1. The subject (Aesthetics) is very big and entirely misunderstood as far as I can see. The use of such a word as 'beautiful' is even more apt to be misunderstood if you look at the linguistic form of sentences in which it occurs than most other words. 'Beautiful' [and 'good'—R] is an adjective, so you are inclined to say: "This has a certain quality, that of being beautiful".

2. We are going from one subject-matter of philosophy to another, from one group of words to another group of words.

3. An intelligent way of dividing up a book on philosophy would be into parts of speech, kinds of words. Where in fact you would have to distinguish far more parts of speech than an ordinary grammar does. You would talk for hours and hours on the verbs 'seeing', 'feeling', etc., verbs describing personal experience. We get a peculiar kind of confusion or confusions which comes up with all these words.[1] You would have another chapter on numerals—here there would be another kind of confusion: a chapter on 'all', 'any', 'some', etc.—another kind of confusion: a chapter on 'you', 'I', etc.—another kind: a chapter on 'beautiful', 'good'—another kind. We get into a new group of confusions; language plays us entirely new tricks.

4. I have often compared language to a tool chest, containing a hammer, chisel, matches, nails, screws, glue. It is not a chance that all these things have been put together—but there are important differences between the different tools—they are used in a family of ways—though nothing could be more different than glue and a chisel. There is constant surprise at the new tricks language plays on us when we get into a new field.

5. One thing we always do when discussing a word is to ask how we were taught it. Doing this on the one hand destroys a variety of misconceptions, on the other hand gives you a primitive language in which the word is used. Although this language is not what you talk when you are twenty, you get a

[1] Here we find similarities—we find peculiar sorts of confusion which come up with *all* these words.—R.

rough approximation to what kind of language game is going to be played. Cf. How did we learn 'I dreamt so and so'? The interesting point is that we didn't learn it by being shown a dream. If you ask yourself how a child learns 'beautiful', 'fine', etc., you find it learns them roughly as interjections. ('Beautiful' is an odd word to talk about because it's hardly ever used.) A child generally applies a word like 'good' first to food. One thing that is immensely important in teaching is exaggerated gestures and facial expressions. The word is taught as a substitute for a facial expression or a gesture. The gestures, tones of voice, etc., in this case are expressions of approval. What *makes* the word an interjection of approval?[1] It is the game it appears in, not the form of words. (If I had to say what is the main mistake made by philosophers of the present generation, including Moore, I would say that it is that when language is looked at, what is looked at is a form of words and not the use made of the form of words.) Language is a characteristic part of a large group of activities—talking, writing, travelling on a bus, meeting a man, etc.[2] We are concentrating, not on the words 'good' or 'beautiful', which are entirely uncharacteristic, generally just subject and predicate ('This is beautiful'), but on the occasions on which they are said—on the enormously complicated situation in which the aesthetic expression has a place, in which the expression itself has almost a negligible place.

6. If you came to a foreign tribe, whose language you didn't know at all and you wished to know what words corresponded to 'good', 'fine', etc., what would you look for? You would look for smiles, gestures, food, toys. ([Reply to objection:] If you went to Mars and men were spheres with sticks coming out, you wouldn't know what to look for. Or if you went to a tribe where noises made with the mouth were just breathing or making music, and language was made with the ears. Cf. "When you see trees swaying about they are talking to one another." ("Every-

[1] And not of disapproval or of surprise, for example?
(The child understands the gestures which you use in teaching him. If he did not, he could understand nothing.)—R.

[2] When we build houses, we talk and write. When I take a bus, I say to the conductor: 'Threepenny.' We are concentrating not just on the word or the sentence in which it is used—which is highly uncharacteristic—but on the occasion on which it is said: the framework in which (nota bene) the actual aesthetic judgment is practically nothing at all.—R.

thing has a soul.") You compare the branches with arms. Certainly we must interpret the gestures of the tribe on the analogy of ours.) How far this takes us from normal aesthetics [and ethics—T]. We don't start from certain words, but from certain occasions or activities.

7. A characteristic thing about our language is that a large number of words used under these circumstances are adjectives —'fine', 'lovely', etc. But you see that this is by no means necessary. You saw that they were first used as interjections. Would it matter if instead of saying "This is lovely", I just said "Ah!" and smiled, or just rubbed my stomach? As far as these primitive languages go, problems about what these words are about, what their real subject is, [which is called 'beautiful' or 'good'.—R.][1] don't come up at all.

8. It is remarkable that in real life, when aesthetic judgements are made, aesthetic adjectives such as 'beautiful', 'fine', etc., play hardly any role at all. Are aesthetic adjectives used in a musical criticism? You say: "Look at this transition",[2] or [Rhees] "The passage here is incoherent". Or you say, in a poetical criticism, [Taylor]: "His use of images is precise". The words you use are more akin to 'right' and 'correct' (as these words are used in ordinary speech) than to 'beautiful' and 'lovely'.[3]

9. Words such as 'lovely' are first used as interjections. Later they are used on very few occasions. We might say of a piece of music that it is lovely, by this not praising it but giving it a character. (A lot of people, of course, who can't express themselves properly use the word very frequently. As they use it, it is used as an interjection.) I might ask: "For what melody would I most like to use the word 'lovely'?" I might choose between calling a melody 'lovely' and calling it 'youthful'. It is stupid to call a piece of music 'Spring Melody' or 'Spring Symphony'. But the word 'springy' wouldn't be absurd at all, any more than 'stately' or 'pompous'.

[1] What the thing that is really good is—T.

[2] 'The transition was made in the right way.'—T.

[3] It would be better to use 'lovely' descriptively, on a level with 'stately', 'pompous,' etc.—T.

10. If I were a good draughtsman, I could convey an innumerable number of expressions by four strokes—



Such words as 'pompous' and 'stately' could be expressed by faces. Doing this, our descriptions would be much more flexible and various than they are as expressed by adjectives. If I say of a piece of Schubert's that it is melancholy, that is like giving it a face (I don't express approval or disapproval). I could instead use gestures or [Rhees] dancing. In fact, if we want to be exact, we do use a gesture or a facial expression.

11. [*Rhees*: What rule are we using or referring to when we say: "This is the correct way"? If a music teacher says a piece *should* be played this way and plays it, what is he appealing to?]

12. Take the question: "How should poetry be read? What is the correct way of reading it?" If you are talking about blank verse the right way of reading it might be stressing it correctly—you discuss how far you should stress the rhythm and how far you should hide it. A man says it ought to be read *this* way and reads it out to you. You say: "Oh yes. Now it makes sense." There are cases of poetry which should almost be scanned—where the metre is as clear as crystal—others where the metre is entirely in the background. I had an experience with the 18th century poet Klopstock.[1] I found that the way to read him was to stress his metre abnormally. Klopstock put ⏑—⏑ (etc.) in front of his poems. When I read his poems in this new way, I said: "Ah-ha, now I know why he did this." What had happened? I had read this kind of stuff and had been moderately bored, but when I read it in this particular way, intensely, I smiled, said: "This is *grand*," etc. But I might not have said anything. The important fact was that I read it again and again. When I read these poems I made gestures and facial expressions which were what would be called gestures of approval. But the important

[1] Friedrich Gottlieb Klopstock (1724–1803). Wittgenstein is referring to the Odes. (*Gesammelte Werke*, Stuttgart, 1886–7). Klopstock believed that poetic diction was distinct from popular language. He rejected rhyme as vulgar and introduced instead the metres of ancient literature.—Ed.

thing was that I read the poems entirely differently, more intensely, and said to others: "Look! This is how they should be read."[1] Aesthetic adjectives played hardly any rôle.

13. What does a person who knows a good suit say when trying on a suit at the tailor's? "That's the right length", "That's too short", "That's too narrow". Words of approval play no rôle, although he will look pleased when the coat suits him. Instead of "That's too short" I might say "Look!" or instead of "Right" I might say "Leave it as it is". A good cutter may not use any words at all, but just make a chalk mark and later alter it. How do I show my approval of a suit? Chiefly by wearing it often, liking it when it is seen, etc.

14. (If I give you the light and shadow on a body in a picture I can thereby give you the shape of it. But if I give you the highlights in a picture you don't know what the shape is.)

15. In the case of the word 'correct' you have a variety of related cases. There is first the case in which you learn the rules. The cutter learns how long a coat is to be, how wide the sleeve must be, etc. He learns rules—he is drilled—as in music you are drilled in harmony and counterpoint. Suppose I went in for tailoring and I first learnt all the rules, I might have, on the whole, two sorts of attitude. (1) Lewy says: "This is too short." I say: "No. It is right. It is according to the rules." (2) I develop a feeling for the rules. I interpret the rules. I might say: "No. It isn't right. It isn't according to the rules."[2] Here I would be making an aesthetic judgement about the thing which is according to the rules in sense (1). On the other hand, if I hadn't learnt the rules, I wouldn't be able to make the aesthetic judgement. In learning the rules you get a more and more refined judgement. Learning the rules actually changes your judgement. (Although, if you haven't learnt Harmony and haven't a good ear, you may nevertheless detect any disharmony in a sequence of chords.)

16. You could regard the rules laid down for the measurement of a coat as an expression of what certain people want.[3] People separated on the point of what a coat should measure:

[1] If we speak of the right way to read a piece of poetry—approval enters, but it plays a fairly small rôle in the situation.—R.

[2] 'Don't you see that if we made it broader, it isn't right and it isn't according to the rules.'—R.

[3] These may be extremely explicit and taught, or not formulated at all.—T.

there were some who didn't care if it was broad or narrow, etc.; there were others who cared an enormous lot.[1] The rules of harmony, you can say, expressed the way people wanted chords to follow—their wishes crystallized in these rules (the word 'wishes' is much too vague.)[2] All the greatest composers wrote in accordance with them. ([Reply to objection:] You can say that every composer changed the rules, but the variation was very slight; not all the rules were changed. The music was still good by a great many of the old rules.—This though shouldn't come in here.)

17. In what we call the Arts a person who has judgement developes. (A person who has a judgement doesn't mean a person who says 'Marvellous!' at certain things.)[3] If we talk of aesthetic judgements, we think, among a thousand things, of the Arts. When we make an aesthetic judgement about a thing, we do not just gape at it and say: "Oh! How marvellous!" We distinguish between a person who knows what he is talking about and a person who doesn't.[4] If a person is to admire English poetry, he must know English. Suppose that a Russian who doesn't know English is overwhelmed by a sonnet admitted to be good. We would say that he does not know what is in it at all. Similarly, of a person who doesn't know metres but who is overwhelmed, we would say that he doesn't know what's in it. In music this is more pronounced. Suppose there is a person who admires and enjoys what is admitted to be good but can't remember the simplest tunes, doesn't know when the bass comes in, etc. We say he hasn't seen what's in it. We use the phrase 'A man is musical' not so as to call a man musical if he says "Ah!" when a piece of music is played, any more than we call a dog musical if it wags its tail when music is played.[5]

[1] But—it is just a fact that people have laid down such and such rules. We say 'people' but in fact it was a particular class. . . . When we say 'people', these were *some* people.—R.

[2] And although we have talked of 'wishes' here, the fact is just that these rules were laid down.—R.

[3] In what we call the arts there developed what we call a 'judge'—i.e. one who has judgment. This does not mean just someone who admires or does not admire. We have an entirely new element.—R.

[4] He must react in a consistent way over a long period. Must know all sorts of things.—T.

[5] Cf. the person who likes hearing music but cannot talk about it at all, and is quite unintelligent on the subject. 'He is musical'. We do not say this if he is just happy when he hears music and the other things aren't present.—T.

18. The word we ought to talk about is 'appreciated'. What does appreciation consist in ?

19. If a man goes through an endless number of patterns in a tailor's, [and] says: "No. This is slightly too dark. This is slightly too loud", etc., he is what we call an appreciator of material. That he is an appreciator is not shown by the interjections he uses, but by the way he chooses, selects, etc. Similarly in music: "Does this harmonize? No. The bass is not quite loud enough. Here I just want something different. . . ." This is what we call an appreciation.

20. It is not only difficult to describe what appreciation consists in, but impossible. To describe what it consists in we would have to describe the whole environment.

21. I know exactly what happens when a person who knows a lot about suits goes to the tailor, also I know what happens when a person who knows nothing about suits goes—what he says, how he acts, etc.[1] There is an extraordinary number of different cases of appreciation. And, of course, what I know is nothing compared to what one could know. I would have—to say what appreciation is—e.g. to explain such an enormous wart as arts and crafts, such a particular kind of disease. Also I would have to explain what our photographers do today—and why it is impossible to get a decent picture of your friend even if you pay £1,000.

22. You can get a picture of what you may call a very high culture, e.g. German music in the last century and the century before, and what happens when this deteriorates. A picture of what happens in Architecture when you get imitations—or when thousands of people are interested in the minutest details. A picture of what happens when a dining-room table is chosen more or less at random, when no one knows where it came from.[2]

23. We talked of correctness. A good cutter won't use any words except words like 'Too long', 'All right'. When we talk of

[1] That is aesthetics.—T.

[2] Explain what happens when a craft deteriorates. A period in which everything is fixed and extraordinary care is lavished on certain details; and a period in which everything is copied and nothing is thought about.—T.

A great number of people are highly interested in a detail of a dining-room chair. And then there is a period when a dining-room chair is in the drawing-room and no one knows where this came from or that people had once given enormous thought in order to know how to design it.—R.

a Symphony of Beethoven we don't talk of correctness. Entirely different things enter. One wouldn't talk of appreciating the *tremendous* things in Art. In certain styles in Architecture a door is correct, and the thing is you appreciate it. But in the case of a Gothic Cathedral what we do is not at all to find it correct—it plays an entirely different rôle with us.[1] The entire *game* is different. It is as different as to judge a human being and on the one hand to say 'He behaves well' and on the other hand 'He made a great impression on me'.

24. 'Correctly', 'charmingly', 'finely', etc. play an entirely different rôle. Cf. the famous address of Buffon—a terrific man—on style in writing; making ever so many distinctions which I only understand vaguely but which he didn't mean vaguely—all kinds of nuances like 'grand', 'charming', 'nice'.[2]

25. The words we call expressions of aesthetic judgement play a very complicated rôle, but a very definite rôle, in what we call a culture of a period. To describe their use or to describe what you mean by a cultured taste, you have to describe a culture.[3] What we now call a cultured taste perhaps didn't exist in the Middle Ages. An entirely different game is played in different ages.

26. What belongs to a language game is a whole culture. In describing musical taste you have to describe whether children give concerts, whether women do or whether men only give them, etc., etc.[4] In aristocratic circles in Vienna people had [such and such] a taste, then it came into bourgeois circles and women joined choirs, etc. This is an example of tradition in music.

27. [*Rhees*: Is there tradition in Negro art? Could a European appreciate Negro art?]

28. What would tradition in Negro Art be? That women wear cut-grass skirts? etc., etc. I don't know. I don't know how Frank Dobson's appreciation of Negro Art compares with an

[1] Here there is no question of *degree*.—R.

[2] *Discours sur le style*: the address on his reception into L'Academie Française. 1753.—Ed.

[3] To describe a set ot aesthetic rules fully means really to describe the culture of a period.—T.

[4] That children are taught by adults who go to concerts, etc., that the schools are like they are, etc.—R.

educated Negro's.[1] If you say he appreciates it, I don't yet know what this means.[2] He may fill his room with objects of Negro Art. Does he just say: "Ah!"? Or does he do what the best-Negro musicians do? Or does he agree or disagree with so and so about it? You may call this appreciation. Entirely different to an educated Negro's. Though an educated Negro may also have Negro objects of art in his room. The Negro's and Frank Dobson's are different appreciations altogether. You do something different with them. Suppose Negroes dress in their own way and I say I appreciate a good Negro tunic—does this mean I would have one made, or that I would say (as at the tailor's): "No... this is too long", or does it mean I say: "How charming!"?

29. Suppose Lewy has what is called a cultured taste in painting. This is something entirely different to what was called a cultured taste in the fifteenth century. An entirely different game was played. He does something entirely different with it to what a man did then.

30. There are lots of people, well-offish, who have been to good schools, who can afford to travel about and see the Louvre, etc., and who know a lot about and can talk fluently about dozens of painters. There is another person who has seen very few paintings, but who looks intensely at one or two paintings which make a profound impression on him.[3] Another person who is broad, neither deep nor wide. Another person who is very narrow, concentrated and circumscribed. Are these different kinds of appreciation? They may all be called 'appreciation'.

31. You talk in entirely different terms of the Coronation robe of Edward II and of a dress suit.[4] What did *they* do and say about Coronation robes? Was the Coronation robe made by a tailor? Perhaps it was designed by Italian artists who had their own traditions; never seen by Edward II until he put it on. Questions like 'What standards were there?', etc. are all relevant

[1] Frank Dobson (1888–1963) painter and sculptor; was the first to bring to England the interest in African and Asian sculpture which characterized the work of Picasso and the other Cubists during the years immediately preceeding and following the First World War.—Ed.

[2] Here you haven't made what you mean by 'appreciate Negro Art' clear.—T.

[3] Someone who has not travelled but who makes certain observations which show that he 'really does appreciate' . . . an appreciation which concentrates on one thing and is very deep—so that you would give your last penny for it.—R.

[4] Edward the Confessor.—T.

to the question 'Could you criticize the robe as they critized it?'. You appreciate it in an entirely different way; your attitude to it is entirely different to that of a person living at the time it was designed. On the other hand 'This is a fine Coronation robe!' might have been said by a man at the time in exactly the same way as a man says it now.

32. I draw your attention to differences and say: "Look how different these differences are!" "Look what is in common to the different cases", "Look what is common to Aesthetic judgements". An immensely complicated family of cases is left, with the highlight—the expression of admiration, a smile or a gesture, etc.

33. [Rhees asked Wittgenstein some question about his 'theory' of deterioration.]

Do you think I have a theory? Do you think I'm saying what deterioration is? What I do is describe different things called deterioration. I might approve deterioration—"All very well your fine musical culture; I'm very glad children don't learn harmony now." [*Rhees*: Doesn't what you say imply a preference for using 'deterioration' in certain ways?] All right, if you like, but this by the way—no, it is no matter. My example of deterioration is an example of something I know, perhaps something I dislike—I don't know. 'Deterioration' applies to a tiny bit I may know.

34. Our dress is in a way simpler than dress in the 18th century and more a dress adapted to certain violent activities, such as bicycling, walking, etc. Suppose we notice a similar change in Architecture and in hairdressing, etc. Suppose I talked of the deterioration of the style of living.[1] If someone asks: "What do you mean by deterioration?" I describe, give examples. You use 'deterioration' on the one hand to describe a particular kind of development, on the other hand to express disapproval. I may join it up with the things I like; you with the things you dislike. But the word may be used without any affective element; you use it to describe a particular kind of thing that happened.[2] It was more like using a technical term—possibly,

[1] Deterioration of style and of living.—R.

[2] 'Deterioration' gets its sense from the examples I can give. 'That's a deterioration,' may be an expression of disapproval or a description.

though not at all necessarily, with a derogatory element in it. You may say in protest, when I talk of deterioration: "But this was very good." I say: "All right. But this wasn't what I was talking about. I used it to describe a particular kind of development."

35. In order to get clear about aesthetic words you have to describe ways of living.[1] We think we have to talk about aesthetic judgements like 'This is beautiful', but we find that if we have to talk about aesthetic judgements we don't find these words at all, but a word used something like a gesture, accompanying a complicated activity.[2]

36. [*Lewy*: If my landlady says a picture is lovely and I say it is hideous, we don't contradict one another.]

In a sense [and in *certain examples*—R] you do contradict one another. She dusts it carefully, looks at it often, etc. You want to throw it in the fire. This is just the stupid kind of example which is given in philosophy, as if things like 'This is hideous', 'This is lovely' were the only kinds of things ever said. But it is only one thing amongst a vast realm of other things—one special case. Suppose the landlady says: "This is hideous", and you say: "This is lovely"—all right, that's that.

II

1. One interesting thing is the idea that people have of a kind of science of Aesthetics. I would almost like to talk of what could be meant by Aesthetics.

2. You might think Aesthetics is a science telling us what's beautiful—almost too ridiculous for words. I suppose it ought to include also what sort of coffee tastes well.[3]

3. I see roughly this—there is a realm of utterance of delight, when you taste pleasant food or smell a pleasant smell, etc., then there is the realm of Art which is quite different, though often you

[1] Cf. 'This is a fine dress.'—R.

[2] The judgment is a gesture accompanying a vast structure of actions not expressed by one judgment.—R.

'This is fine' is on a level with a gesture, almost—connected with all sorts of other gestures and actions and a whole situation and a culture. In Aesthetics just as in the arts what we called expletives play a very small part. The adjectives used in these are closer related to 'correct'.—T.

[3] It is hard to find boundaries.—R.

may make the same face when you hear a piece of music as when you taste good food. (Though you may cry at something you like very much.)

4. Supposing you meet someone in the street and he tells you he has lost his greatest friend, in a voice extremely expressive of his emotion.[1] You might say: "It was extraordinarily beautiful, the way he expressed himself." Supposing you then asked: "What similarity has my admiring this person with my eating vanilla ice and liking it?" To compare them seems almost disgusting. (But you can connect them by intermediate cases.) Suppose someone said: "But this is a quite different kind of delight." But did you learn two meanings of 'delight'? You use the same word on both occasions.[2] There is some connection between these delights. Although in the first case the emotion of delight would in our judgement hardly count.[3]

5. It is like saying: "I classify works of Art in this way: at some I look up and at some I look down." This way of classifying might be interesting.[4] We might discover all sorts of connections between looking up or down at works of Art and looking up or down at other things. If we found, perhaps, that eating vanilla ice made us look up, we might not attach great importance to looking up. There may be a realm, a small realm of experiences which may make me look up or down where I can infer a lot from the fact that I looked up or down; another realm of experiences where nothing can be inferred from my looking up or down.[5] Cf wearing blue or green trousers may in a certain society mean a lot, but in another society it may not mean anything.

6. What are expressions of liking something? Is it only what we say or interjections we use or faces we make? Obviously not. It is, often, how often I read something or how often I wear a suit. Perhaps I won't even say: "It's fine", but wear it often and look at it.[6]

[1] Someone . . . who tells you he has lost his friend, in a restrained way.—R.

[2] But notice that you use the same word and not in the same chance way yon use the same word 'bank' for two things [like 'river bank' and 'money bank'—R.] —T.

[3] Although in the first case the gesture or expression of delight may be most unimportant in a way.—T.

[4] You might discover further characters of things which make us look up—.R.

[5] Some one might exaggerate the importance of the type of indication.—T.

[6] If I like a suit I may buy it, or wear it often—without interjections or making faces.—R. I may never smile at it.—T.

7. Suppose we build houses and we give doors and windows certain dimensions. Does the fact that we *like* these dimensions necessarily show in anything we say? Is what we like necessarily shown by an expression of *liking*?[1] [For instance—R] suppose our children draw windows and when they draw them in the wrong way we punish them. Or when someone builds a certain house we refuse to live in it or run away.

8. Take the case of fashions. How does a fashion come about? Say, we wear lapels broader than last year. Does this mean that the tailors like them better broader? No, not necessarily. He cuts it like this and this year he makes it broader. Perhaps this year he finds it too narrow and makes it wider. Perhaps no expression [of delight—R] is used at all.[2]

9. You design a door and look at it and say: "Higher, higher, higher . . . oh, all right."[3] (Gesture) What is this? Is it an expression of content?

10. Perhaps the most important thing in connection with aesthetics is what may be called aesthetic reactions, e.g. discontent, disgust, discomfort. The expression of discontent is not the same as the expression of discomfort. The expression of discontent says: "Make it higher . . . too low! . . . do something to this."

11. Is what I call an expression of discontent something like an expression of discomfort *plus* knowing the cause of the discomfort and asking for it to be removed? If I say: "This door is too low. Make it higher", should we say I know the cause of my discomfort?

12. 'Cause' is used in very many different ways, e.g.

(1) "What is the cause of unemployment?" "What is the cause of this expression?"

(2) "What was the cause of your jumping?" "That noise."

(3) "What was the cause of that wheel going round?" You trace a mechanism.[4]

[1] Our preferring these shows itself in all sorts of ways.—T.

[2] But the tailor does not say: 'This is nice.' He is a good cutter. He is just contented.—R. If you mean 'this year he cuts it broader' then you can say this. This way we are contented, the other not.—T.

[3] '. . . *there*: thank God.'—R. '. . . yes, that's right.'—T.

[4] Cause: (1) Experiment and statistics.
(2) Reason.
(3) Mechanism.—T.

13. [*Redpath*: "Making the door higher removes your discontent."]

Wittgenstein asked: "Why is this a bad way of putting it?" It is in the wrong form because it presupposes '—removes—'.

14. Saying you know the cause of your discomfort could mean two things.

(1) I predict correctly that if you lower the door, I will be satisfied.

(2) But that when in fact I say: "Too high!" 'Too high!' is in this case not conjecture. Is 'Too high' comparable with 'I think I had too many tomatoes today'?

15. If I ask: "If I make it lower will your discomfort cease?", you may say: "I'm *sure* it will." The important thing is that I say: "Too high!" It is a reaction analogous to my taking my hand away from a hot plate—which may not relieve my discomfort. The reaction peculiar to this discomfort is saying 'Too high' or whatever it is.

16. To say: "I feel discomfort and know the cause", is entirely misleading because 'know the cause' normally means something quite different. How misleading it is depends on whether when you said: "I know the cause", you meant it to be an explanation or not. 'I feel discomfort and know the cause' makes it sound as if there were two things going on in my soul—discomfort and knowing the cause.

17. In these cases the word 'cause' is hardly ever used at all. You use 'why?' and 'because', but not 'cause'.[1]

18. We have here a kind of discomfort which you may call 'directed', e.g. if I am afraid of you, my discomfort is directed.[2] Saying 'I know the cause' brings in mind the case of statistics or tracing a mechanism. If I say: "I know the cause", it looks as if I had analysed the feelings (as I analyse the feeling of hearing my own voice and, at the same time, rubbing my hands) which, of course, I haven't done. We have given, as it were, a *grammatical* explanation [in saying, the feeling is 'directed'].

19. There is a 'Why?' to aesthetic discomfort not a 'cause' to it. The expression of discomfort takes the form of a criticism

[1] Why are you disgusted? Because it is too high.—R.

[2] What is the advantage of 'My feeling of fear is directed' as opposed to 'I know the cause'?—R.

and not 'My mind is not at rest' or something. It might take the form of looking at a picture and saying: "What's wrong with it?"[1]

20. It's all very well to say: "Can't we get rid of this analogy?" Well, we cannot. If we think of discomfort—cause, pain—cause of pain naturally suggests itself.

21. The cause, in the sense of the object it is directed to is also the cause in other senses. When you remove it, the discomfort ceases and what not.

22. If one says: "Can we be immediately aware of the cause?", the first thing that comes into our mind is not statistics [(as in 'the cause of the rise in unemployment')—R], but tracing a mechanism. It has so very often been said that if something has been caused by something else this is only a matter of concomitance. Isn't this very queer? Very queer. 'It's only concomitance' shows you think it can be something else.[2] It could be an experiential proposition, but then I don't know what it would be. Saying this shows you know of something different, i.e. connection. What are they denying when they say: "There is no necessary connection"?

23. You say constantly in philosophy things like: "People say there is a super-mechanism, but there isn't." But no one knows what a super-mechanism is.

24. (The idea of a super-mechanism doesn't really come in here. What comes in is the idea of a mechanism.)

25. We have the idea of a super-mechanism when we talk of logical necessity, e.g. physics tried as an ideal to reduce things to mechanisms or something hitting something else.[3]

26. We say that people condemn a man to death and then we say the Law condemns him to death. "Although the Jury can

[1] If I look at a picture and say: 'What's wrong with this?', then it is better to say that my feeling has direction, and not that my feeling has a cause and I don't know what it is. Otherwise we suggest an analogy with 'pain' and 'cause of pain'—i.e. what you have eaten. This is wrong or misleading, because, although we do use the word 'cause' in the sense of 'what it is directed to' ('What made you jump?'—'Seeing him appear in the doorway'), we often use it in other senses also.—R.

[2] If you say: 'To speak of the cause of some development is only to speak of the concomitants'—'cause is only a question of concomitants'—then if you put 'only', you are admitting that it *could* be something else. It means that you know of something entirely different.—R.

[3] You want to say: 'Surely there is a connection.' But what is a connection? Well, levers, chains, cogwheels. These are connections, and here we have them. but here what we ought to explain is 'super'.—R.