Introduction

In the course of Japan's long history, its borders and its ethnic configuration have undergone some surprisingly dramatic changes. Illustrating this point, maps drawn before the mid-nineteenth century identify Mutsu and Dewa provinces, on the main island of Honshu, as the northernmost territories of the Japanese. These maps are missing the island now known as Hokkaido, "Northern Sea Circuit," a resource-rich, spacious piece of land that constitutes about 21 percent of the total land of Japan today.¹ Some seventeenth-century maps, such as the detailed 1644 Shōhō Nihon sōzu [Shōhō map of greater Japan], do crudely outline a northern, amoeba-shaped land formation called Ezochi, a term that means something like "barbarian land." However, compared to the rest of the map, the depiction of Ezo is surprisingly off-scale, off-center, and, with some exceptions, geographically inaccurate.
Figure 1. A 1700 map of Ezo, or the present-day islands of Hokkaido and Sakhalin and the Kurils. This provincial map (kuniezu) was modeled after an earlier version found in the Shōhō Nihon sōzu of 1644, and lacked the shogunal-imposed cartographic standards of other official maps of its day. The original 1700 map, once held at the Tokyo Imperial University Library, was destroyed in the Great Kantō Earthquake and subsequent fires. This map is a copy held at the Hokkaido University Library. *Genroku kuniezu* [Genroku provincial map]. Courtesy of the Resource Collection for Northern Studies, Hokkaido University Library.
Akizuki Toshiyuki, a historian of the North Pacific, speculates that the Ezochi map was the product of some early exploration or the circumnavigation of Hokkaido and that the later 1700 Genroku kuniezu [Genroku provincial map], absent some detail, is nearly identical to its earlier cousin (see figure 1). On both maps, the order of many of the place names is accurate, explains Akizuki, and some features, such as a giant swamp about midway down the Ishikari River and several large bays, could have been identified only through some exploration. However, in the depiction of Sakhalin Island and the Kuril Islands, most of the place names are out of order and include bizarre references to Eurasian continental locations in the Amur region, but their very presence suggests that the information was obtained through conversations with Ainu. Most of the place names are, after all, major Ainu kotan, or villages, making this a map of Ainu lands.

The Shōhō Nihon sōzu was the product of a realmwide mapping project mandated by the Edo shogunate, the military government (bakufu) founded by Tokugawa Ieyasu in 1603, and was crafted from individual provincial maps (kuniezu) submitted to the capital by domanial lords (daimyō). As part of the formation of a strong regime run by the Tokugawa shoguns, these provincial maps served important political and military purposes and needed to conform to a rigid cartographic standard, with 6 sun (7.2 inches) equaling 1 ri (2.44 miles), or a ratio of about 21,500 to 1. Once submitted to the capital, the provincial maps were redrawn by Hōjō Ujinaga at a newly calculated ratio, and the composite became known as the Shōhō Nihon sōzu. When the entire map was finished, the greater realm of Japan, with its rugged coastline and twisting rivers, was positioned under the gaze of the shogun, his councillors, and his military advisors in Edo. The final product is an astonishing map for its day, and it accurately portrays district borders, coastal ports, village names, and other political and geographic information; but the portion of the map depicting the northern section of Ezochi, in particular, is basically a patchwork of Ainu villages and exotic islands. These places remained couched in obscurity; they had been heard of but not yet seen by Japanese officialdom. In the seventeenth century, when Hōjō and his colleagues put the final touches on the Shōhō Nihon sōzu, this northern land was inhabited by the Ainu, an indigenous people of the northern part of
Figure 2. A map of Ezo from the 1830s. Drawn almost a century and a half after the Genroku kuniezu, it demonstrates a more sophisticated knowledge of the region documented in the final years of the Edo period (1600–1868). In particular, the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin Island had been explored by this time, and permanent Japanese fishery settlements had been constructed. Ezochi zenzu [Complete map of Ezochi]. Courtesy of the Resource Collection for Northern Studies, Hokkaido University Library.
the present-day Japanese Archipelago, and although Ezo’s presence on
the map may have foreshadowed later Japanese claims to the island, it
was still seen as a foreign place beyond the cultural pale.4

By the 1830s, however, cartographic portrayals of Ezo had changed
considerably. Two centuries of increasing interaction and exploration had
led to a more accurate geographic knowledge of this northern territory.
No longer an amoeba-shaped landmass, as in the 1644 or 1700 maps, Ezo
had a recognizable shape in such maps as the 1830s Ezochi zenzu [Com-
plete map of Ezochi], and there were detailed references to village names,
coastal inlets and ports, rivers and watersheds, prominent offshore is-
lands, and even specific mountain ranges (see figure 2). In provincial
maps from the 1830s, moreover, such as the Tenpō okuniezu [1838 provin-
cial map], a product of the last official mapping project of the Edo shogu-
nate, Ezo was basically scaled to fit within the domestic space of the rest
of Japan, suggesting that this once foreign place—this place that was
once “off the map,” so to speak—had been absorbed within the fluid
boundaries of Japan.5

This cartographic shift in the official portrayal of Ezo coincides with a
political shift in Ezo’s status in relation to Japan: over a period of nearly
two hundred years, the region had been transformed from a foreign place
to a northern administrative district of sorts. To trace Japan’s absorption
of Ezo and its Ainu inhabitants, historians must analyze the layers of this
two-century core sample extracted from the terrain of a longer historical
process by which Hokkaido became part of the Japanese Archipelago
and the Ainu, once a semi-independent people, became ethnic minorities
in the Japanese state. That absorption process is the topic of this book,
and excavating the roots of Ainu absorption and narrating how it oc-
curred require us to sift through the ecological and cultural strata de-
posited on the northern landscape of Ezo. In this book, I treat Ezo as a
historical site, as a good geologist would, centering it and its inhabitants,
whether Ainu or Japanese, in the narrative. I purposefully do not refer to
Ezo as the Japanese frontier, as is common practice, because as a concep-
tual tool, the notion of the frontier peripheralizes Ezo in relation to the
process of state formation and economic development in Japan. When
Ezo is positioned as a frontier, widespread trade, cultural interaction,
economic growth, and state expansion in Ezo are often cast as part of the pageantry of Japanese national progress, rather than as the subjugation of the Ainu homeland, that place Ainu considered to be their hunting and fishing grounds and the core of their sacred order.

My analysis, for this reason, extends laterally to explore diverse facets of Ezo during the early Tokugawa years, rather than linearly to investigate a longer historical trajectory and process in the Japanese conquest and settlement of Hokkaido. In the chapters to come, I highlight the distinct peoples that understood this region and its animal life to be at the core of their respective epistemological universes, because preserved in these universes, like fossilized images of prehistoric monsters embedded in stone, lie early traces of the weakening of Ainu society in the face of Japanese advances. Centering Ezo as a site downplays—but does not entirely dismiss, as chapter 1 illustrates—the role of the state in shaping Japanese national destiny or serving as the vanguard in the eventual settlement of Hokkaido. In this respect, I attempt a balanced approach, one that weaves together a story of human-animal relations, disease, medicine, inter-Ainu conflict, market growth, subsistence practices, shared ritual experiences, and environmental degradation, along with the more conventional tale of expanding Japanese state interests in Ezo. Put succinctly then, as a historical site, the place I investigate is (with necessary exceptions) neither the pre-1590 nor post-1800 world of the Japanese or the Ainu, but rather a temporally and spatially localized ecological and cultural snapshot suspended in a two-century historical moment, a moment that profoundly disadvantaged the Ainu and hastened their eventual conquest by the Japanese. In this approach to borderlands, or even ethnic and cultural contact points, I have found like company among the New Western historians.

FRONTIERS, BORDERLANDS, AND THE MIDDLE GROUND

It hardly needs to be said that Frederick Jackson Turner’s now famous thesis on the role of the frontier in forging American political and cultur-
al life has attracted the intense scrutiny of American historians. Turner positioned the westward migration of European settlers on the North American continent within the broader narrative of U.S. history by arguing that the “existence of an area of free land, its continuous recession, and the advance of American settlement westward, explain American development.” Kerwin Lee Klein points out that Turner implied that the process of settling the frontier gave birth to certain “intellectual traits” and to the “growth of democracy” and that these characteristics and trends later became celebrated hallmarks of American life.

Positioning frontier lands within the context of national development is not, of course, unique to Turner or to American history. In fact, Turner’s frontier thesis resembles the work of some Japanese historians who viewed the move into Ezo, and later Manchuria, as part of Japanese national development. Takakura Shin’ichirō, for example, a pioneer in the study of the Ainu, wrote in the early 1940s, the high point of Japanese imperialism, that the history of Japan is the history of national development based on continuous expansion. Even in the broadest sense, he continued, the history of Japan is the history of the expansion of the living sphere of the Yamato (ethnic Japanese) people. With this idea Takakura helped lay the groundwork for a Japanese frontier thesis that plotted the steady march of the Yamato people into the northern island of Hokkaido and, ultimately, Manchuria. Takakura defined the field of Ainu studies in Japan and elsewhere for decades, and despite his ethnocentric vantage point, his work remains unrivaled in the field of Ainu-Japanese studies.

A more recent case in point is Yamamoto Hirofumi’s study of seventeenth-century Japanese foreign relations. Reacting to historians who argue against the sakoku thesis, that is, against the notion that Japan was a closed country in the Tokugawa years, Yamamoto suggests more broadly that many specific examples of early-modern foreign contact pointed out by these historians were not, strictly speaking, foreign relations at all. Rather, he asserts that these regions were subordinate to the early-modern Japanese state or were at least incorporated into an anti-Christian “defensive perimeter”; thus, he basically positions them on the edge as frontiers and thereby deprives them of their status as autonomously foreign places. He argues that in the 1630s, when Japanese policymakers im-
plemented maritime prohibitions (*kaikin*), they sealed up the country from any outside contact and placed these lands within their administrative purview. Specifically, Yamamoto’s thesis places the Ryukyu Kingdom and Ezo, as well as Korea to a certain extent, as the administrative frontiers of the early-modern Japanese state.\(^\text{10}\)

In the field of U.S. history, dissatisfaction with the frontier thesis has led to the emergence of the New Western history, which posits that viewing the once expanding boundaries of the United States as simply “frontiers” badly distorts historical analysis of Native American homelands and, ultimately, belies the complexity of their conquest. With a few possible exceptions, no single historian has made this point as lucidly as Patricia Nelson Limerick. In *The Legacy of Conquest*, Limerick submits that by rejecting the frontier process as a model of analysis, “we gain the freedom to think of the West as a place—as many complicated environments occupied by natives who considered their homelands to be the center, not the edge.” She argues elsewhere that the frontier model is both “nationalist and racist” and that when “cleared of its ethnocentrism, the term [frontier] loses an exact definition.” She suggests that the frontier model should be rethought as a process that involves portraying diverse peoples and their “encounters with each other and with the natural environment.”\(^\text{11}\)

Richard White, another New Western historian, offers a compelling alternative to the view that ethnic and cultural contact points in the American West can be lumped together as “frontiers.” He suggests that the frontier be rethought as a “middle ground,” a place located “in between cultures, peoples, and in between empires and the nonstate world.” He eloquently describes the middle ground as a place where the local context and historical moment shape cultural and political interaction among diverse groups of people. It is, he explains in the context of the Great Lakes region, the “area between the historical foreground of European invasion and occupation and the back-ground of Indian defeat and retreat.” White adds, “On the middle ground diverse peoples adjust their differences through what amounts to a process of creative, and often expedient, misunderstandings. . . . They often misinterpret and distort both the values and practices of those they deal with, but from these misunderstandings arise new meanings and through them new practices—the shared meanings and practices of the middle ground.”\(^\text{12}\)
The New Western history, then, has sought to complicate the centrality of process in frontier studies and, as White points out, to illustrate how the middle ground arose from ethnic and cultural interaction between people and the natural world. In other words, with the focus now on place rather than exclusively on process, borderland history is no longer simply the tale of the conquerors.

In recent historiography related to Ezo, an approach to analyzing trade and other contact between Ainu and Japanese that downplays the ethnocentric vantage point of the Japanese, an approach similar to the New Western history in that it positions Ezo as a place rather than process, has been slow to permeate recent scholarship. To be sure, in the past several decades, a new generation of Japanese historians has shifted attention away from the political and economic process of “developing” (kaitaku) the northern frontier, to exploring the cultural and ethnic distinctiveness of this borderland itself. In the new historiography, Ezo is positioned not as a frontier, or not as open lands just waiting to be developed by the Japanese, but as a foreign land that served as the northern border for the early-modern Japanese polity. Kikuchi Isao nicely represents this generation of scholarship. In his fascinating work, he places Japanese contact with the Ainu in the context of the early-modern Japanese system, borrowed from China, of foreign relations and international order (ka’i chitsujo), which emphasized a two-tiered structure that viewed foreign relations as ceremonial meetings between a “civilized center” (represented by Japan) and a “barbarian edge” (represented by such groups as the Ainu). Because of this emphasis on an early-modern “system” of foreign relations, Kikuchi’s treatment of contact with the Ainu and their homeland needs to be seen as part of a longer historiographical trajectory linked to earlier critiques of sakoku. He thus places contact with the Ainu in the same context as relations with other foreign countries, such as Tsushima domain and Korea or Satsuma domain and the Ryukyu Kingdom. He admits that Ezo was, strictly speaking, not a foreign “country” like Korea, but because its inhabitants spoke a foreign language and had distinct cultural traditions, the place where they lived—Ezo—was thus seen by the Japanese of the day as a foreign country.

In this early-modern system of foreign relations and international order, the one employed by the Tokugawa regime, little room remained
for anything resembling White’s “middle ground,” or cultural and ethnic slippage in an ambiguous space—both familiar and foreign, civilized and barbaric—where the lines between the center (ka) and edge (i) were blurred through the interaction between two peoples. The ka’i chitsujo demanded, by its very nature and conception, that cultural, geographic, and even ethnic lines be drawn between people. Of course, as Kikuchi and others demonstrate, placing relations with Ezo in the context of an early-modern system of international order is highly instructive (I explore this point in chapter 8), but by too closely adhering to this system one risks overlooking a historical reality: Ezo’s conquest (at least from the perspective of the Ainu). Moreover, the early-modern system of international order resembles in its own way a new kind of frontier thesis. In the context of Ezo, an emphasis on the delineation of “Japanese” borders, and on the construction of “Japanese” identities, places the move into the Ainu homeland as an integral part of “Japanese” history and belies the more complex and troublesome story of increasing Japanese advances into Ezochi, in particular at the ecological and cultural levels. Borders between Ainu and Japanese were erected in Ezo (something I explore in chapter 1), but the Japanese-manufactured goods and foreign pathogens that so altered Ainu society and hastened their conquest failed to recognize these boundaries. In other words, one might say that as part of an earlier frontier thesis, or even the ka’i chitsujo of the Tokugawa world, Ezo failed to escape the orbit of the Japanese colonizers.15

More recently, David Howell has explored the possibility of a middle ground in Ezo during the early-modern period. In the ambiguous space of Ezo, he points out, along with a heightening of material and technological exchange between Ainu and Japanese, there was interaction at the human level that exemplifies the ways in which the middle ground influenced individual lives. In 1634, for example, records from a Dutch ship made reference to a trader whose father was Japanese and whose mother was Ainu, and who spoke both languages. Howell submits that prior to Shakushain’s War in 1669 (after which more-rigid ethnic boundaries between Ainu and Japanese were erected), a middle ground existed where Ainu and Japanese interacted, at the basic human level, to form altogether new relationships. Howell also provides the example of Iwano-
suke, of Kennichi village, who appears to have been thoroughly assimilated to the everyday customs of Japanese life. He had a Japanese name, explains Howell, lived in a predominantly Japanese village, and wore his hair in a trendy Japanese fashion. However, on the seventh day of the new year, Iwanosuke underwent what Howell calls a “curious metamorphosis.” Like a proper Ainu, he grew his hair long and, “as a representative of the Ainu people,” or the country of Ezo, went to Fukuyama Castle to participate in an audience with the Matsumae lord. Howell argues that “Iwanosuke assumed what had become for him a false identity for reasons that had little to do with old Ainu customs and everything to do with the institutions of the Matsumae domain.” In different ways, both of these examples reveal people who stood at the intersection of Ainu and Japanese life. Howell argues that “contact and interdependence led to the birth of a new identity” for such people, and even if a middle ground did not exist at the macro level, everyday Ainu and Japanese worked and lived together in the fisheries, making ethnic interaction a reality.

For this book, the notion of the middle ground, as a broader historical context, is crucial because the contrast between Ainu society before and after the period investigated, a period that might be seen as a kind of middle ground in itself, is striking. Like the “area between the historical foreground of European invasion and occupation and the back-ground of Indian defeat and retreat” investigated by White, Ezo, when positioned as a middle ground, demonstrates how early Ainu groups once stood as militantly independent people, forging inter-island alliances and boldly repelling Mongol invasions of Sakhalin Island in 1263 and 1284, and frustrating Japanese advances in southern Ezo on at least nine different occasions between 1456 and 1536. However, by the end of the eighteenth century, Ainu communities were dependent on trade with Japan, and the Ainu were resigned to watching as Japanese exploited once-bountiful hunting and fishing grounds, reportedly raped their wives, drowned their prized hunting dogs, and eventually settled their homeland. In the space of about two centuries, the Ainu degenerated from a relatively autonomous people, willing to spill blood for their land and way of life, to a miserably dependent people plagued by dislocation and epidemic disease—viewed by later Japanese and foreign observers as in dire need of
benevolent care (buiku) or even as a dying race (horobiyuku minzoku)—and hence easily manhandled by the late-Tokugawa and early-Meiji states. The point is that the Ainu culture that emerged in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was in some respects a product of interaction on the middle ground, as was much of Japanese behavior in Ezo; and so, ironically, because this Ainu culture sprouted from the seeds of contact with Japanese, its very existence spelled its own dependency and, ultimately, its own destruction.

TOWARD A NEW EARLY-MODERN JAPAN

This Ezo-centered approach can be extended beyond the northern frontier, into Japan proper, to cast in a fresh light issues more confined to early-modern Japanese studies. For example, I address several ongoing debates about state formation in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, suggesting that from the perspective of Ezo, the fledgling Japanese polity that emerged from the turmoil of the late-medieval era boasted more central authority, or at least more political influence, than recent portrayals acknowledge. In particular, when I focus on aspects of the early-modern symbolic economy and on the alliances forged in the ceremonial arena of gift giving and audience, the political core emerges as at least powerful enough to project its hegemony into territories once outside its range of power, into places such as Ezo with its Ainu inhabitants. Moreover, this projection of state authority into Ezo, and the ensuing consequences, should be viewed as further refuting the already badly damaged sakoku thesis. In the weary eyes of Ainu leaders such as Shakushain, who died in defense of his sacred land and a vanishing way of life among his people, neither the Edo shogunate nor domains acting under its authority appeared to be governments run by isolationists. A Eurocentric approach, Ronald Toby points out, led to the false impression that Japan was a closed country; an Ezo-centered approach, however, illustrates that Japan was expanding in the Tokugawa years, a notion that highlights the importance of the historical site, or ethnic vantage point, from which the past is rendered as history.18
In the chapters ahead, I will also attempt to integrate discussions of ecological change and environmental degradation into debates concerning early-modern commercial growth, and even Japanese expansion in East Asia. Environmental degradation resulting from trade in Ezo cautions against the argument that commercial growth in early-modern Japan was confined to, as some suggest, a “total environment.” In the Tokugawa years, the Japanese did not set their collective sights exclusively on resources that lay within the traditional provinces or confine themselves to a “total environment,” but rather cast their gaze widely over Hokkaido, the Kuril Islands, and much of Sakhalin Island, searching for new resources to fuel the flames of market growth, to fertilize cash crops, and to feed a stable urban population. In this way, even in early-modern Japan, the environmental context was not fixed but was, as Conrad Totman insists, “shaping and being shaped by human activities.” Environmental changes were “crucial variables in the Tokugawa economic experience.”

This economic expansion into Ezo, in addition to having implications for Ainu and other groups in the North Pacific, raises intriguing questions concerning whether Japanese colonialism in East Asia should be viewed as an exclusively post-Meiji phenomenon, or in other words, as the imperialist implications of modernization shaped predominantly by Western models. To begin with, in the realm of what Alfred Crosby calls “ecological imperialism,” the exchange of contagions in Ezo and the demographic and cultural consequences of massive epidemics introduce the horrible specter of the interactions between semi-insular populations such as the Ainu and endemic-disease carriers such as the Japanese. Of all the many facets of Ainu-Japanese relations discussed in this book, disease cleared the way for the Japanese settlement of Hokkaido possibly more than any other factor and, hence, pushes historians to confront the ecological implications of expansion in Japan’s pre-Meiji world. On a political level, moreover, the link between the state, merchants, and foreign conquest in Ezo resembles the later Japanese colonial experience in Korea, where, as Peter Duus argues, the “symbiotic ties” formed between government and business facilitated the national enterprise of the annexation of Korea. The political process of colonizing Korea, writes Duus,
was associated with the “penetration of the Korean market by an anonymous army of Japanese traders, sojourners, and settlers,” resembling, with important distinctions, the situation in Ezo.  

Therefore, this study presents a new vantage point from which to view the life and death of what Japanese historians call *kinsei*, that is, the early-modern period in Japan. The Edo shogunate, at least in relation to Ezo, was a regime that boasted a fairly strong core—a core bolstered by real political power and, more importantly, by the pervasive symbolic personal relations that solidified, with gifts and audiences, ties between the shogun and the dominal lords who remained scattered throughout the country. This regime then projected this complex web of legitimizing strategies beyond the traditional confines of the polity, even beyond those people understood to be ethnic Japanese, employing ritual and audience as a means to shore up its influence over Ainu chiefs in distant lands. This was a fairly far-flung extension of state power: the Ainu were a people, with their elm-bark clothing, poison arrows, and owl ceremonies, who stood well outside the wildest imaginations of most Japanese of the day.

Once in these lands, the state allied with merchants to exploit resources, inadvertently introduced deadly contagions to local populations, and sponsored the introduction of a market culture, the hub of which became the trading post; and the introduction of that culture led to local environmental degradation, the emergence of new social hierarchies, and pervasive cultural changes among the Ainu. For example, in the Ainu mind, animals that in the past had been viewed as exclusively gods (whose killing liberated spirits and cemented sacred ties to the land) metamorphosed into what Japanese physician Ōuchi Yoan called “hunted commodities” to be exchanged at posts for Japanese-manufactured items. The Japanese, too, began to view the natural world differently, cataloging and categorizing it, fostering the birth of a natural history and positioning the environment for its more thorough exploitation in the context of the commercial growth of the day.  

The cataloging of Ezo products and medicines by such scholars as Matsumae Hironaga, in the eighteenth-century *Matsumaeshi* [Matsumae record], illustrates this point in the context of trade with the Ainu. However, positioning Ezo for its
more thorough exploitation meant not simply exploring and trading but also waging war against certain Ainu chieftoms that resisted Japanese designs.23 Fighting ensued with the Shibuchari Ainu in 1669, and later the Edo shogunate ordered military deployments in southern Sakhalin, as well as in the Kurils, protecting the area from the menace of such “maritime barbarians” as the Russians. In the process, the Edo shogunate demarcated new borders for the realm, only now with the admittedly tentative strokes of swords wielded by domainal and shogunal armies.

To make these points and many others, chapter 1 begins with some historical background leading up to the latter part of the career of Oda Nobunaga, the warlord hailed as the first great unifier of late-sixteenth-century Japan, and his efforts to bring the defiant lords of the northeast under his hegemony. The chapter then explores in more detail the policies of the second and third great unifiers, Toyotomi Hideyoshi and Tokugawa Ieyasu, and focuses on the consolidation of the early-modern state in southern Ezo. It is this state presence in the north, particularly the formation of trade monopolies, that sets the stage for chapter 2, which explores the bloodiest war fought between the Japanese and Ainu: Shaku-shain’s War of 1669. Although chapter 2 investigates the ethnic and political tensions that fanned the flames of this deadly conflagration, it focuses primarily on identifying the roots of the war, which can be traced to transformations in Ainu society and culture that resulted from trade with Japanese. Chapters 3 and 4 explore this trade in more detail, highlighting the kinds of goods exchanged; the relationships between trade, the environment, and economic autonomy; and the integration of goods, now emblems of prestige, into the ritual practices and political hierarchies of both Japanese and Ainu.

Chapters 5 and 6 shift our attention from Ainu relations with Japanese to more far-flung commercial and cultural relations that linked the Ainu to Eurasian continental groups such as the Chinese, the Tungus, the Ul’chi, and even the Russians. In many ways the Ainu were a maritime people, and disruption of their overseas relations by Japanese officials contributed to the ultimate absorption of the Ainu into the borders of Japan by depriving them of alternative trading partners. Chapter 7 turns our attention back toward the northern ecology of Ezo and looks at the
role that epidemic disease and the trade in pharmaceuticals played in Japanese conquest. Not surprisingly, disease profoundly weakened Ainu society, but it also led to new medical practices that attracted the attention of Japanese physicians and officials. In an ironic twist, some of the medicines used by Ainu to combat disease were sought by Japanese and then exchanged as gifts in political circles. This practice, I argue, strengthened early-modern political ties already developing between Japan’s core and Ainu communities in the north. Finally, chapter 8 investigates ritualized gift giving between the Ainu and the Japanese and describes how it was manipulated to bolster Japanese centrality in the north. Here, some Ainu rituals were even recrafted by Japanese to strengthen their claim to administrative suzerainty over Ainu lands.

NOTE TO THE READER

Following traditional practice, I have written all Japanese names with the surname preceding the given name. Ainu names, however, are written exactly as they appear in the original sources, despite the fact that the Japanese syllabary alters the original pronunciation, which in most cases is lost. Diacritical marks appear on most Japanese words and names, except in common words such as Tokyo and Ryukyu. All Chinese is romanized according to the Pinyin system, and the diacritical marks are excluded. In most cases the Ainu language has been standardized according to Kayano Shigeru’s Ainugo jiten [A dictionary of the Ainu language]. Most geographic locations are written as they appear in the sources and thus sometimes differ from contemporary readings. Locations can be referenced on the maps provided in the text. Finally, months have been left in the lunar calendar, whereas years are estimated according to the modern Western calendar. Equivalents for weights and measures are usually provided in the text.