I
Agamemnon's Apology

The recesses of feeling, the darker, blinder strata of character, are the only places in the world in which we catch real fact in the making.

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SOME YEARS ago I was in the British Museum looking at the Parthenon sculptures when a young man came up to me and said with a worried air, "I know it's an awful thing to confess, but this Greek stuff doesn't move me one bit." I said that was very interesting: could he define at all the reasons for his lack of response? He reflected for a minute or two. Then he said, "Well, it's all so terribly *rational*, if you know what I mean." I thought I did know. The young man was only saying what has been said more articulately by Roger Fry[1] and others. To a generation whose sensibilities have been trained on African and Aztec art, and on the work of such men as Modigliani and Henry Moore, the art of the Greeks, and Greek culture in general, is apt to appear lacking in the awareness of mystery and in the ability to penetrate to the deeper, less conscious levels of human experience.

This fragment of conversation stuck in my head and set me thinking. Were the Greeks in fact quite so blind to the importance of nonrational factors in man's experience and behaviour as is commonly assumed both by their apologists and by their critics? That is the question out of which this book grew. To answer it completely would evidently involve a survey of the whole cultural achievement of ancient Greece. But what I propose attempting is something much more modest: I shall

[1] For notes to chapter i see pages 18–27.

merely try to throw some light on the problem by examining afresh certain relevant aspects of Greek religious experience. I hope that the result may have a certain interest not only for Greek scholars but for some anthropologists and social psychologists, indeed for anyone who is concerned to understand the springs of human behaviour. I shall therefore try as far as possible to present the evidence in terms intelligible to the non-specialist.

I shall begin by considering a particular aspect of Homeric religion. To some classical scholars the Homeric poems will seem a bad place to look for any sort of religious experience. "The truth is," says Professor Mazon in a recent book, "that there was never a poem less religious than the *Iliad*."[2] This may be thought a little sweeping; but it reflects an opinion which seems to be widely accepted. Professor Murray thinks that the so-called Homeric religion "was not really religion at all"; for in his view "the real worship of Greece before the fourth century almost never attached itself to those luminous Olympian forms."[3] Similarly Dr. Bowra observes that "this complete anthropomorphic system has *of course* no relation to real religion or to morality. These gods are a delightful, gay invention of poets."[4]

Of course—if the expression "real religion" means the kind of thing that enlightened Europeans or Americans of to-day recognise as being religion. But if we restrict the meaning of the word in this way, are we not in danger of undervaluing, or even of overlooking altogether, certain types of experience which we no longer interpret in a religious sense, but which may nevertheless in their time have been quite heavily charged with religious significance? My purpose in the present chapter is not to quarrel with the distinguished scholars I have quoted over their use of terms, but to call attention to one kind of experience in Homer which is *prima facie* religious and to examine its psychology.

Let us start from that experience of divine temptation or infatuation (*atē*) which led Agamemnon to compensate himself

for the loss of his own mistress by robbing Achilles of his. "Not I," he declared afterwards, "not I was the cause of this act, but Zeus and my portion and the Erinys who walks in darkness: they it was who in the assembly put wild *ate* in my understanding, on that day when I arbitrarily took Achilles' prize from him. So what could I do? Deity will always have its way."[5] By impatient modern readers these words of Agamemnon's have sometimes been dismissed as a weak excuse or evasion of responsibility. But not, I think, by those who read carefully. An evasion of responsibility in the juridical sense the words certainly are not; for at the end of his speech Agamemnon offers compensation precisely on this ground—"But since I was blinded by *ate* and Zeus took away my understanding, I am willing to make my peace and give abundant compensation."[6] Had he acted of his own volition, he could not so easily admit himself in the wrong; as it is, he will pay for his acts. Juridically, his position would be the same in either case; for early Greek justice cared nothing for intent—it was the act that mattered. Nor is he dishonestly inventing a moral alibi; for the victim of his action takes the same view of it as he does. "Father Zeus, great indeed are the *atai* thou givest to men. Else the son of Atreus would never have persisted in rousing the *thūmos* in my chest, nor obstinately taken the girl against my will."[7] You may think that Achilles is here politely accepting a fiction, in order to save the High King's face? But no: for already in Book 1, when Achilles is explaining the situation to Thetis, he speaks of Agamemnon's behaviour as his *ate*;[8] and in Book 9 he exclaims, "Let the son of Atreus go to his doom and not disturb me, for Zeus the counsellor took away his understanding."[9] It is Achilles' view of the matter as much as Agamemnon's; and in the famous words which introduce the story of the Wrath—"The plan of Zeus was fulfilled"[10]—we have a strong hint that it is also the poet's view.

If this were the only incident which Homer's characters interpreted in this peculiar way, we might hesitate as to the poet's motive: we might guess, for example, that he wished

to avoid alienating the hearers' sympathy too completely from Agamemnon, or again that he was trying to impart a deeper significance to the rather undignified quarrel of the two chiefs by representing it as a step in the fulfilment of a divine plan. But these explanations do not apply to other passages where "the gods" or "some god" or Zeus are said to have momentarily "taken away" or "destroyed" or "ensorcelled" a human being's understanding. Either of them might indeed be applied to the case of Helen, who ends a deeply moving and evidently sincere speech by saying that Zeus has laid on her and Alexandros an evil doom, "that we may be hereafter a theme of song for men to come."[11] But when we are simply told that Zeus "ensorcelled the mind of the Achaeans," so that they fought badly, no consideration of persons comes into play; still less in the general statement that "the gods can make the most sensible man senseless and bring the feeble-minded to good sense."[12] And what, for example, of Glaucus, whose understanding Zeus took away, so that he did what Greeks almost never do—accepted a bad bargain, by swopping gold armour for bronze?[13] Or what of Automedon, whose folly in attempting to double the parts of charioteer and spearman led a friend to ask him "which of the gods had put an unprofitable plan in his breast and taken away his excellent understanding?"[14] These two cases clearly have no connection with any deeper divine purpose; nor can there be any question of retaining the hearers' sympathy, since no moral slur is involved.

At this point, however, the reader may naturally ask whether we are dealing with anything more than a *façon de parler*. Does the poet mean anything more than that Glaucus was a fool to make the bargain he did? Did Automedon's friend mean anything more than "What the dickens prompted you to behave like that?" Perhaps not. The hexameter formulae which were the stock-in-trade of the old poets lent themselves easily to the sort of semasiological degeneration which ends by creating a *façon de parler*. And we may note that neither the Glaucus episode nor the futile *aristeia* of Automedon is integral

to the plot even of an "expanded" *Iliad:* they may well be additions by a later hand.[15] Our aim, however, is to understand the original experience which lies at the root of such stereotyped formulae—for even a *façon de parler* must have an origin. It may help us to do so if we look a little more closely at the nature of *ate* and of the agencies to which Agamemnon ascribes it, and then glance at some other sorts of statement which the epic poets make about the sources of human behaviour.

There are a number of passages in Homer in which unwise and unaccountable conduct is attributed to *ate*, or described by the cognate verb *aasasthai*, without explicit reference to divine intervention. But *ate* in Homer[16] is not itself a personal agent: the two passages which speak of *ate* in personal terms, *Il.* 9.505 ff. and 19.91 ff., are transparent pieces of allegory. Nor does the word ever, at any rate in the *Iliad*, mean objective disaster,[17] as it so commonly does in tragedy. Always, or practically always,[18] *ate* is a state of mind—a temporary clouding or bewildering of the normal consciousness. It is, in fact, a partial and temporary insanity; and, like all insanity, it is ascribed, not to physiological or psychological causes, but to an external "daemonic" agency. In the *Odyssey*,[19] it is true, excessive consumption of wine is said to cause *ate;* the implication, however, is probably not that *ate* can be produced "naturally," but rather that wine has something supernatural or daemonic about it. Apart from this special case, the agents productive of *ate*, where they are specified, seem always to be supernatural beings;[20] so we may class all instances of nonalcoholic *ate* in Homer under the head of what I propose to call "psychic intervention."

If we review them, we shall observe that *ate* is by no means necessarily either a synonym for, or a result of, wickedness. The assertion of Liddell and Scott that *ate* is "mostly sent as the punishment of guilty rashness" is quite untrue of Homer. The *ate* (here a sort of stunned bewilderment) which overtook Patroclus after Apollo had struck him[21] might possibly be claimed as an instance, since Patroclus had rashly routed the

Trojans ὑπὲρ αἶσαν;[22] but earlier in the scene this rashness is itself ascribed to the will of Zeus and characterised by the verb ἀάσθη.[23] Again, the *ate* of one Agastrophus[24] in straying too far from his chariot, and so getting himself killed, is not a "punishment" for rashness; the rashness is itself the *ate*, or a result of the *ate*, and it involves no discernible moral guilt—it is just an unaccountable error, like the bad bargain which Glaucus made. Again, Odysseus was neither guilty nor rash when he took a nap at an unfortunate moment, thus giving his companions a chance to slaughter the tabooed oxen. It was what we should call an accident; but for Homer, as for early thought in general,[25] there is no such thing as accident—Odysseus knows that his nap was sent by the gods εἰς ἄτην, "to fool him."[26] Such passages suggest that *ate* had originally no connection with guilt. The notion of *ate* as a punishment seems to be either a late development in Ionia or a late importation from outside: the only place in Homer where it is explicitly asserted is the unique Λιταί passage in *Iliad* 9,[27] which suggests that it may possibly be a Mainland idea, taken over along with the Meleager story from an epic composed in the mother country.

A word next about the agencies to which *ate* is ascribed. Agamemnon cites, not one such agency, but three: Zeus and *moira* and the Erinys who walks in darkness (or, according to another and perhaps older reading, the Erinys who sucks blood). Of these, Zeus is the mythological agent whom the poet conceives as the prime mover in the affair: "the plan of Zeus was fulfilled." It is perhaps significant that (unless we make Apollo responsible for the *ate* of Patroclus) Zeus is the only individual Olympian who is credited with causing *ate* in the *Iliad* (hence *ate* is allegorically described as his eldest daughter).[28] *Moira*, I think, is brought in because people spoke of any unaccountable personal disaster as part of their "portion" or "lot," meaning simply that they cannot understand why it happened, but since it has happened, evidently "it had to be." People still speak in that way, more especially of death, for which μῖρα has in fact become a synonym in modern Greek, like μόρος in classical Greek.

I am sure it is quite wrong to write *Moira* with a capital "M" here, as if it signified either a personal goddess who dictates to Zeus or a Cosmic Destiny like the Hellenistic *Heimarmenē*. As goddesses, *Moirai* are always plural, both in cult and in early literature, and with one doubtful exception[29] they do not figure at all in the *Iliad*. The most we can say is that by treating his "portion" as an agent—by making it *do* something—Agamemnon is taking a first step towards personification.[30] Again, by blaming his *moira* Agamemnon no more declares himself a systematic determinist than does the modern Greek peasant when he uses similar language. To ask whether Homer's people are determinists or libertarians is a fantastic anachronism: the question has never occurred to them, and if it were put to them it would be very difficult to make them understand what it meant.[31] What they do recognize is the distinction between normal actions and actions performed in a state of *ate*. Actions of the latter sort they can trace indifferently either to their *moira* or to the will of a god, according as they look at the matter from a subjective or an objective point of view. In the same way Patroclus attributes his death directly to the immediate agent, the man Euphorbus, and indirectly to the mythological agent, Apollo, but from a subjective standpoint to his bad *moira*. It is, as the psychologists say, "overdetermined."[32]

On this analogy, the Erinys should be the immediate agent in Agamemnon's case. That she should figure at all in this context may well surprise those who think of an Erinys as essentially a spirit of vengeance, still more those who believe, with Rohde,[33] that the Erinyes were originally the vengeful dead. But the passage does not stand alone. We read also in the *Odyssey*[34] of "the heavy *ate* which the hard-hitting goddess Erinys laid on the understanding of Melampus." In neither place is there any question of revenge or punishment. The explanation is perhaps that the Erinys is the personal agent who ensures the fulfilment of a *moira*. That is why the Erinyes cut short the speech of Achilles' horses: it is not "according to *moira*" for horses to talk.[35] That is why they would punish the

sun, according to Heraclitus,[36] if the sun should "transgress his measures" by exceeding the task assigned to him. Most probably, I think, the moral function of the Erinyes as ministers of vengeance derives from this primitive task of enforcing a *moira* which was at first morally neutral, or rather, contained by implication both an "ought" and a "must" which early thought did not clearly distinguish. So in Homer we find them enforcing the claims to status which arise from family or social relationship and are felt to be part of a person's *moira:*[37] a parent,[38] an elder brother,[39] even a beggar,[40] has something due to him as such, and can invoke "his" Erinyes to protect it. So too they are called upon to witness oaths; for the oath creates an assignment, a *moira*. The connection of Erinys with *moira* is still attested by Aeschylus,[41] though the *moirai* have now become quasi-personal; and the Erinyes are still for Aeschylus dispensers of *ate*,[42] although both they and it have been moralised. It rather looks as if the complex *moira*-Erinys-*ate* had deep roots, and might well be older than the ascription of *ate* to the agency of Zeus.[43] In that connection it is worth recalling that Erinys and *aisa* (which is synonymous with *moira*) go back to what is perhaps the oldest known form of Hellenic speech, the Arcado-Cypriot dialect.[44]

Here, for the present, let us leave *ate* and its associates, and consider briefly another kind of "psychic intervention" which is no less frequent in Homer, namely, the communication of power from god to man. In the *Iliad*, the typical case is the communication of *mĕnos*[45] during a battle, as when Athena puts a triple portion of *menos* into the chest of her protégé Diomede, or Apollo puts *menos* into the *thumos* of the wounded Glaucus.[46] This *menos* is not primarily physical strength; nor is it a permanent organ of mental life[47] like *thumos* or *nŏŏs*. Rather it is, like *ate*, a state of mind. When a man feels *menos* in his chest, or "thrusting up pungently into his nostrils,"[48] he is conscious of a mysterious access of energy; the life in him is strong, and he is filled with a new confidence and eagerness. The connection of *menos* with the sphere of volition comes out clearly in the re-

lated words μενοινᾶν, "to be eager," and δυσμενής, "wishing ill." It is significant that often, though not always, a communication of *menos* comes as a response to prayer. But it is something much more spontaneous and instinctive than what we call "resolution"; animals can have it,[49] and it is used by analogy to describe the devouring energy of fire.[50] In man it is the vital energy, the "spunk," which is not always there at call, but comes and goes mysteriously and (as we should say) capriciously. But to Homer it is not caprice: it is the act of a god, who "increases or diminishes at will a man's *arĕtē* (that is to say, his potency as a fighter)."[51] Sometimes, indeed, the *menos* can be roused by verbal exhortation; at other times its onset can only be explained by saying that a god has "breathed it into" the hero, or "put it in his chest," or, as we read in one place, transmitted it by contact, through a staff.[52]

I think we should not dismiss these statements as "poetic invention" or "divine machinery." No doubt the particular instances are often invented by the poet for the convenience of his plot; and certainly the psychic intervention is sometimes linked with a physical one, or with a scene on Olympus. But we can be pretty sure that the underlying idea was not invented by any poet, and that it is older than the conception of anthropomorphic gods physically and visibly taking part in a battle. The temporary possession of a heightened *menos* is, like *ate*, an abnormal state which demands a supernormal explanation. Homer's men can recognise its onset, which is marked by a peculiar sensation in the limbs. "My feet beneath and hands above feel eager (μαιμώωσι)," says one recipient of the power: that is because, as the poet tells us, the god has made them nimble (ἐλαφρά).[53] This sensation, which is here shared by a second recipient, confirms for them the divine origin of the *menos*.[54] It is an abnormal experience. And men in a condition of divinely heightened *menos* behave to some extent abnormally. They can perform the most difficult feats with ease (ῥέα):[55] that is a traditional mark of divine power.[56] They can even, like Diomede, fight with impunity against gods[57]—an action which

to men in their normal state is excessively dangerous.[58] They are in fact for the time being rather more, or perhaps rather less, than human. Men who have received a communication of *menos* are several times compared to ravening lions;[59] but the most striking description of the state is in Book 15, where Hector goes berserk (*μαίνεται*), he foams at the mouth, and his eyes glow.[60] From such cases it is only a step to the idea of actual possession (*δαιμονᾶν*); but it is a step which Homer does not take. He does say of Hector that after he had put on Achilles' armour "Ares entered into him and his limbs were filled with courage and strength";[61] but Ares here is hardly more than a synonym for the martial spirit, and the communication of power is produced by the will of Zeus, assisted perhaps by the divine armour. Gods do of course for purposes of disguise assume the shape and appearance of individual human beings; but that is a different belief. Gods may appear at times in human form, men may share at times in the divine attribute of power, but in Homer there is nevertheless no real blurring of the sharp line which separates humanity from deity.

In the *Odyssey*, which is less exclusively concerned with fighting, the communication of power takes other forms. The poet of the "Telemachy" imitates the *Iliad* by making Athena put *menos* into Telemachus;[62] but here the *menos* is the *moral* courage which will enable the boy to face the overbearing suitors. That is literary adaptation. Older and more authentic is the repeated claim that minstrels derive their creative power from God. "I am self-taught," says Phemius; "it was a god who implanted all sorts of lays in my mind."[63] The two parts of his statement are not felt as contradictory: he means, I think, that he has not memorised the lays of other minstrels, but is a creative poet who relies on the hexameter phrases welling up spontaneously as he needs them out of some unknown and uncontrollable depth; he sings "out of the gods," as the best minstrels always do.[64] I shall come back to that in the latter part of chapter iii, "The Blessings of Madness."

But the most characteristic feature of the *Odyssey* is the way

in which its personages ascribe all sorts of mental (as well as physical) events to the intervention of a nameless and indeterminate daemon[65] or "god" or "gods."[66] These vaguely conceived beings can inspire courage at a crisis[67] or take away a man's understanding,[68] just as gods do in the *Iliad*. But they are also credited with a wide range of what may be called loosely "monitions." Whenever someone has a particularly brilliant[69] or a particularly foolish[70] idea; when he suddenly recognises another person's identity[71] or sees in a flash the meaning of an omen;[72] when he remembers what he might well have forgotten[73] or forgets what he should have remembered,[74] he or someone else will see in it, if we are to take the words literally, a psychic intervention by one of these anonymous supernatural beings.[75] Doubtless they do not always expect to be taken literally: Odysseus, for example, is hardly serious in ascribing to the machinations of a daemon the fact that he went out without his cloak on a cold night. But we are not dealing simply with an "epic convention." For it is the poet's characters who talk like this, and not the poet:[76] his own convention is quite other—he operates, like the author of the *Iliad*, with clear-cut anthropomorphic gods such as Athena and Poseidon, not with anonymous daemons. If he has made his characters employ a different convention, he has presumably done so because that is how people did in fact talk: he is being "realistic."

And indeed that is how we should expect people to talk who believed (or whose ancestors had believed) in daily and hourly monitions. The recognition, the insight, the memory, the brilliant or perverse idea, have this in common, that they come suddenly, as we say, "into a man's head." Often he is conscious of no observation or reasoning which has led up to them. But in that case, how can he call them "his"? A moment ago they were not in his mind; now they are there. Something has put them there, and that something is other than himself. More than this he does not know. So he speaks of it noncommittally as "the gods" or "some god," or more often (especially when

its prompting has turned out to be bad) as a daemon.[77] And by analogy he applies the same explanation to the ideas and actions of other people when he finds them difficult to understand or out of character. A good example is Antinous' speech in *Odyssey* 2, where, after praising Penelope's exceptional intelligence and propriety, he goes on to say that her idea of refusing to remarry is not at all proper, and concludes that "the gods are putting it into her chest."[78] Similarly, when Telemachus for the first time speaks out boldly against the suitors, Antinous infers, not without irony, that "the gods are teaching him to talk big."[79] His teacher is in fact Athena, as the poet and the reader know;[80] but Antinous is not to know that, so he says "the gods."

A similar distinction between what the speaker knows and what the poet knows may be observed in some places in the *Iliad.* When Teucer's bowstring breaks, he cries out with a shudder of fear that a daemon is thwarting him; but it was in fact Zeus who broke it, as the poet has just told us.[81] It has been suggested that in such passages the poet's point of view is the older: that he still makes use of the "Mycenaean" divine machinery, while his characters ignore it and use vaguer language like the poet's Ionian contemporaries, who (it is asserted) were losing their faith in the old anthropomorphic gods.[82] In my view, as we shall see in a moment, this is almost an exact reversal of the real relationship. And it is anyhow clear that Teucer's vagueness has nothing to do with scepticism: it is the simple result of ignorance. By using the word *daemon* he "expresses the fact that a higher power has made something happen,"[83] and this fact is all he knows. As Ehnmark has pointed out,[84] similar vague language in reference to the supernatural was commonly used by Greeks at all periods, not out of scepticism, but simply because they could not identify the particular god concerned. It is also commonly used by primitive peoples, whether for the same reason or because they lack the idea of personal gods.[85] That its use by the Greeks is very old is shown by the high antiquity of the adjective *daemŏnios.* That

word must originally have meant "acting at the monition of a daemon"; but already in the *Iliad* its primitive sense has so far faded that Zeus can apply it to Hera.[86] A verbal coinage so defaced has clearly been in circulation for a long time.

We have now surveyed, in such a cursory manner as time permits, the commonest types of psychic intervention in Homer. We may sum up the result by saying that all departures from normal human behaviour whose causes are not immediately perceived,[87] whether by the subjects' own consciousness or by the observation of others, are ascribed to a supernatural agency, just as is any departure from the normal behaviour of the weather or the normal behaviour of a bowstring. This finding will not surprise the nonclassical anthropologist: he will at once produce copious parallels from Borneo or Central Africa. But it is surely odd to find this belief, this sense of constant daily dependence on the supernatural, firmly embedded in poems supposedly so "irreligious" as the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. And we may also ask ourselves why a people so civilised, clear-headed, and rational as the Ionians did not eliminate from their national epics these links with Borneo and the primitive past, just as they eliminated fear of the dead, fear of pollution, and other primitive terrors which must originally have played a part in the saga. I doubt if the early literature of any other European people—even my own superstitious countrymen, the Irish—postulates supernatural interference in human behaviour with such frequency or over so wide a field.[88]

Nilsson is, I think, the first scholar who has seriously tried to find an explanation of all this in terms of psychology. In a paper published in 1924,[89] which has now become classical, he contended that Homeric heroes are peculiarly subject to rapid and violent changes of mood: they suffer, he says, from mental instability (*psychische Labilität*). And he goes on to point out that even to-day a person of this temperament is apt, when his mood changes, to look back with horror on what he has just done, and exclaim, "I didn't really mean to do that!"—from which it is a short step to saying, "It wasn't really I who did

it." "His own behaviour," says Nilsson, "has become alien to him. He cannot understand it. It is for him no part of his Ego." This is a perfectly true observation, and its relevance to some of the phenomena we have been considering cannot, I think, be doubted. Nilsson is also, I believe, right in holding that experiences of this sort played a part—along with other elements, such as the Minoan tradition of protecting goddesses—in building up that machinery of *physical* intervention to which Homer resorts so constantly and, to our thinking, often so superfluously. We find it superfluous because the divine machinery seems to us in many cases to do no more than duplicate a natural psychological causation.[90] But ought we not perhaps to say rather that the divine machinery "duplicates" a psychic intervention—that is, presents it in a concrete pictorial form? This was not superfluous; for only in this way could it be made vivid to the imagination of the hearers. The Homeric poets were without the refinements of language which would have been needed to "put across" adequately a purely psychological miracle. What more natural than that they should first supplement, and later replace, an old unexciting threadbare formula like *μένος ἔμβαλε θυμῷ* by making the god appear as a physical presence and exhort his favourite with the spoken word?[91] How much more vivid than a mere inward monition is the famous scene in *Iliad* 1 where Athena plucks Achilles by the hair and warns him not to strike Agamemnon! But she is visible to Achilles alone: "none of the others saw her."[92] That is a plain hint that she is the projection, the pictorial expression, of an inward monition[93]—a monition which Achilles might have described by such a vague phrase as *ἐνέπνευσε φρεσὶ δαίμων*. And I suggest that in general the inward monition, or the sudden unaccountable feeling of power, or the sudden unaccountable loss of judgement, is the germ out of which the divine machinery developed.

One result of transposing the event from the interior to the external world is that the vagueness is eliminated: the indeterminate daemon has to be made concrete as some particular

personal god. In *Iliad* 1 he becomes Athena, the goddess of good counsel. But that was a matter for the poet's choice. And through a multitude of such choices the poets must gradually have built up the personalities of their gods, "distinguishing," as Herodotus says,[94] "their offices and skills, and fixing their physical appearance." The poets did not, of course, invent the gods (nor does Herodotus say so): Athena, for example, had been, as we now have reason to believe, a Minoan house-goddess. But the poets bestowed upon them personality—and thereby, as Nilsson says, made it impossible for Greece to lapse into the magical type of religion which prevailed among her Oriental neighbours.

Some, however, may be disposed to challenge the assertion on which, for Nilsson, all this construction rests. *Are* Homer's people exceptionally unstable, as compared with the characters in other early epics? The evidence adduced by Nilsson is rather slight. They come to blows on small provocation; but so do Norse and Irish heroes. Hector on one occasion goes berserk; but Norse heroes do so much oftener. Homeric men weep in a more uninhibited manner than Swedes or Englishmen; but so do all the Mediterranean peoples to this day. We may grant that Agamemnon and Achilles are passionate, excitable men (the story requires that they should be). But are not Odysseus and Ajax in their several ways proverbial types of steady endurance, as is Penelope of female constancy? Yet these stable characters are not more exempt than others from psychic intervention. I should hesitate on the whole to press this point of Nilsson's, and should prefer instead to connect Homeric man's belief in psychic intervention with two other peculiarities which do unquestionably belong to the culture described by Homer.

The first is a negative peculiarity: Homeric man has no unified concept of what we call "soul" or "personality" (a fact to whose implications Bruno Snell[95] has lately called particular attention). It is well known that Homer appears to credit man with a *psyche* only after death, or when he is in

the act of fainting or dying or is threatened with death: the only recorded function of the *psyche* in relation to the living man is to leave him. Nor has Homer any other word for the living personality. The *thumos* may once have been a primitive "breath-soul" or "life-soul"; but in Homer it is neither the soul nor (as in Plato) a "part of the soul." It may be defined, roughly and generally, as the organ of feeling. But it enjoys an independence which the word "organ" does not suggest to us, influenced as we are by the later concepts of "organism" and "organic unity." A man's *thumos* tells him that he must now eat or drink or slay an enemy, it advises him on his course of action, it puts words into his mouth: θυμὸς ἀνώγει, he says, or κέλεται δέ με θυμός. He can converse with it, or with his "heart" or his "belly," almost as man to man. Sometimes he scolds these detached entities (κραδίην ἠνίπαπε μύθῳ);[96] usually he takes their advice, but he may also reject it and act, as Zeus does on one occasion, "without the consent of his *thumos*."[97] In the latter case, we should say, like Plato, that the man was κρείττων ἑαυτοῦ, he had controlled *himself*. But for Homeric man the *thumos* tends not to be felt as part of the self: it commonly appears as an independent inner voice. A man may even hear two such voices, as when Odysseus "plans in his *thumos*" to kill the Cyclops forthwith, but a second voice (ἕτερος θυμός) restrains him.[98] This habit of (as we should say) "objectifying emotional drives," treating them as not-self, must have opened the door wide to the religious idea of psychic intervention, which is often said to operate, not directly on the man himself, but on his *thumos*[99] or on its physical seat, his chest or midriff.[100] We see the connection very clearly in Diomede's remark that Achilles will fight "when the *thumos* in his chest tells him to *and* a god rouses him"[101] (overdetermination again).

A second peculiarity, which seems to be closely related to the first, must have worked in the same direction. This is the habit of explaining character or behaviour in terms of knowledge.[102] The most familiar instance is the very wide use of the verb οἶδα, "I know," with a neuter plural object to express

not only the possession of technical skill (*οἶδεν πολεμήια ἔργα* and the like) but also what we should call moral character or personal feelings: Achilles "knows wild things, like a lion," Polyphemus "knows lawless things," Nestor and Agamemnon "know friendly things to each other."[103] This is not merely a Homeric "idiom": a similar transposition of feeling into intellectual terms is implied when we are told that Achilles has "a merciless *understanding* (*νόος*)," or that the Trojans "*remembered* flight and *forgot* resistance."[104] This intellectualist approach to the explanation of behaviour set a lasting stamp on the Greek mind: the so-called Socratic paradoxes, that "virtue is knowledge," and that "no one does wrong on purpose," were no novelties, but an explicit generalised formulation of what had long been an ingrained habit of thought.[105] Such a habit of thought must have encouraged the belief in psychic intervention. If character is knowledge, what is not knowledge is not part of the character, but comes to a man from outside. When he acts in a manner contrary to the system of conscious dispositions which he is said to "know," his action is not properly his own, but has been dictated to him. In other words, unsystematised, nonrational impulses, and the acts resulting from them, tend to be excluded from the self and ascribed to an alien origin.

Evidently this is especially likely to happen when the acts in question are such as to cause acute shame to their author. We know how in our own society unbearable feelings of guilt are got rid of by "projecting" them in phantasy on to someone else. And we may guess that the notion of *ate* served a similar purpose for Homeric man by enabling him in all good faith to project on to an external power his unbearable feelings of shame. I say "shame" and not "guilt," for certain American anthropologists have lately taught us to distinguish "shame-cultures" from "guilt-cultures,"[106] and the society described by Homer clearly falls into the former class. Homeric man's highest good is not the enjoyment of a quiet conscience, but the enjoyment of *tīmē*, public esteem: "Why should I fight," asks Achilles, "if

the good fighter receives no more τιμή than the bad?"[107] And the strongest moral force which Homeric man knows is not the fear of god,[108] but respect for public opinion, *aidōs:* αἰδέομαι Τρῶας, says Hector at the crisis of his fate, and goes with open eyes to his death.[109] The situation to which the notion of *ate* is a response arose not merely from the impulsiveness of Homeric man, but from the tension between individual impulse and the pressure of social conformity characteristic of a shame-culture.[110] In such a society, anything which exposes a man to the contempt or ridicule of his fellows, which causes him to "lose face," is felt as unbearable.[111] That perhaps explains how not only cases of moral failure, like Agamemnon's loss of self-control, but such things as the bad bargain of Glaucus, or Automedon's disregard of proper tactics, came to be "projected" on to a divine agency. On the other hand, it was the gradually growing sense of guilt, characteristic of a later age, which transformed *ate* into a punishment, the Erinyes into ministers of vengeance, and Zeus into an embodiment of cosmic justice. With that development I shall deal in my next chapter.

What I have thus far tried to do is to show, by examining one particular type of religious experience, that behind the term "Homeric religion" there lies something more than an artificial machinery of serio-comic gods and goddesses, and that we shall do it less than justice if we dismiss it as an agreeable interlude of lighthearted buffoonery between the presumed profundities of an Aegean Earth-religion about which we know little, and those of an "early Orphic movement" about which we know even less.

NOTES TO CHAPTER I

[1] *Last Lectures*, 182 ff.

[2] *Introduction à l'Iliade*, 294.

[3] *Rise of the Greek Epic*[4], 265.

[4] *Tradition and Design in the Iliad*, 222. The italics are mine. Similarly Wilhelm Schmid thinks that Homer's conception of the

gods "cannot be called religious." (*Gr. Literaturgeschichte*, I.i.112 f.)

[5] *Il.* 19.86 ff.

[6] 137 ff. Cf. 9.119 f.

[7] 19.270 ff.

[8] 1.412.

[9] 9.376.

[10] 1.5.

[11] *Il.* 6.357. Cf. 3.164, where Priam says that not Helen but the gods are to blame (αἴτιοι) for the war; and *Od.* 4.261, where she speaks of her ἄτη.

[12] *Il.* 12.254 f.; *Od.* 23.11 ff.

[13] *Il.* 6.234 ff.

[14] *Il.* 17.469 f.

[15] Cf. Wilamowitz, *Die Ilias und Homer*, 304 f., 145.

[16] For this account of ἄτη cf. W. Havers, "Zur Semasiologie von griech. ἄτη," *Ztschr. f. vgl. Sprachforschung*, 43 (1910) 225 ff.

[17] The transition to this sense may be seen at *Od.* 10.68, 12.372, and 21.302. Otherwise it seems to be post-Homeric. L.-S. still cites for it *Il.* 24.480, but I think wrongly: see Leaf and Ameis-Hentze *ad loc.*

[18] The plural seems to be twice used of actions symptomatic of the state of mind, at *Il.* 9.115 and (if the view taken in n. 20 is right) at *Il.* 10.391. This is an easy and natural extension of the original sense.

[19] 11.61; 21.297 ff.

[20] *Il.* 10.391 is commonly quoted as a solitary exception. The meaning, however, may be, not that Hector's unwise advice produced ἄτη in Dolon, but that it was a symptom of Hector's own condition of (divinely inspired) ἄτη. ἄται will then be used in the same sense as at 9.115, whereas the common view postulates not only a unique psychology but a unique use of ἄται as "acts productive of infatuation." At *Od.* 10.68 Odysseus' companions are named as subordinate agents along with ὕπνος σχέτλιος.

[21] *Il.* 16.805.

[22] *Ibid.*, 780.

[23] *Ibid.*, 684–691.

[24] *Il.* 11.340.

[25] Cf. L. Lévy-Bruhl, *Primitive Mentality*, 43 ff.; *Primitives and the Supernatural*, 57 f. (Eng. trans.).

[26] *Od.* 12.371 f. Cf. 10.68.

[27] *Il.* 9.512: τῷ ἄτην ἅμ' ἕπεσθαι, ἵνα βλαφθεὶς ἀποτίσῃ.

[28] *Il.* 19.91. At *Il.* 18.311 Athena, in her capacity as Goddess of Counsel, takes away the understanding of the Trojans, so that they applaud Hector's bad advice. This is not, however, called an ἄτη. But in the "Telemachy" Helen ascribes her ἄτη to Aphrodite (*Od.* 4.261).

[29] *Il.* 24.49, where the plural may refer merely to the "portions" of different individuals (Wilamowitz, *Glaube*, I.360). But the "mighty Spinners" of *Od.* 7.197 seem to be a kind of personal fates, akin to the Norns of Teutonic myth (cf. Chadwick, *Growth of Literature*, I.646).

[30] Cf. Nilsson, *History of Greek Religion*, 169. Cornford's view, that μοῖρα "stands for the provincial ordering of the world," and that "the notion of the individual lot or fate comes last, not first, in the order of development" (*From Religion to Philosophy*, 15 ff.), seems to me intrinsically unlikely, and is certainly not supported by the evidence of Homer, where μοῖρα is still quite concretely used for, e.g., a "helping" of meat (*Od.* 20.260). Nor does George Thomson convince me that the Μοῖραι originated "as symbols of the economic and social functions of primitive communism," or that "they grew out of the neolithic mother-goddesses" (*The Prehistoric Aegean*, 339).

[31] Snell, *Philol.* 85 (1929–1930) 141 ff., and (more elaborately) Chr. Voigt, *Ueberlegung u. Entscheidung . . . bei Homer*, have pointed out that Homer has no word for an act of choice or decision. But the conclusion that in Homer "man still possesses no consciousness of personal freedom and of deciding for himself" (Voigt, *op. cit.*, 103) seems to me misleadingly expressed. I should rather say that Homeric man does not possess the concept of will (which developed curiously late in Greece), and therefore cannot possess the concept of "free will." That does not prevent him from distinguishing in practice between actions originated by the ego and those which he attributes to psychic intervention: Agamemnon can say ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ αἴτιός εἰμι, ἀλλὰ Ζεύς. And it seems a little artificial to deny that what is described in passages like *Il.* 11.403 ff. or *Od.* 5.355 ff. is in effect a reasoned decision taken after consideration of possible alternatives.

[32] *Il.* 16.849 f. Cf. 18.119, 19.410, 21.82 ff., 22.297–303; and on "overdetermination" chap. ii, pp. 30 f.

[33] *Rh. Mus.* 50 (1895) 6 ff. (= *Kl. Schriften*, II.229). Cf. Nilsson, *Gesch. d. gr. Rel.* I.91 f.; and, *contra*, Wilamowitz in the introduction to his translation of the *Eumenides*, and Rose, *Handbook of Greek Mythology*, 84.

[34] 15.233 f.

[35] *Il.* 19.418. Cf. Σ B *ad loc.*, ἐπίσκοποι γάρ εἰσιν τῶν παρὰ φύσιν.

[36] Fr. 94 Diels.

[37] In all cases but one (*Od.* 11.279 f.) the claims are those of *living* persons. This seems to tell heavily against the theory (invented in the confident heyday of animism) that the ἐρινύες are the vengeful dead. So do (*a*) the fact that in Homer they never punish murder; (*b*) the fact that gods as well as men have "their" ἐρινύες. The ἐρινύες of Hera (*Il.* 21.412) have exactly the same function as those of Penelope (*Od.* 2.135)—to protect the status of a mother by punishing an unfilial son. We can say that they are the maternal anger projected as a personal being. The θεῶν ἐρινύς who in the *Thebais* (fr. 2 Kinkel) heard the curse of the (living) Oedipus embodies in personal form the anger of the gods invoked in the curse: hence ἐρινύς and curse can be equated (Aesch. *Sept.* 70, *Eum.* 417). On this view Sophocles was not innovating, but using the traditional language, when he made Teiresias threaten Creon with Ἄϊδου καὶ θεῶν ἐρινύες (*Ant.* 1075); their function is to punish Creon's violation of the μοῖρα, the natural apportionment, by which the dead Polyneices belongs to Hades, the living Antigone to the ἄνω θεοί (1068–1073). For μοῖρα as status cf. Poseidon's claim to be ἰσόμορος καὶ ὁμῆ πεπρώμενος αἴσῃ with Zeus, *Il.* 15.209. Since writing this, I find the intimate connection of ἐρινύς with μοῖρα also stressed by George Thomson (*The Prehistoric Aegean*, 345) and by Eduard Fraenkel on *Agam.* 1535 f.

[38] *Il.* 9.454, 571; 21.412; *Od.* 2.135.

[39] *Il.* 15.204.

[40] *Od.* 17.475.

[41] *P.V.* 516, Μοῖραι τρίμορφοι μνήμονές τ' Ἐρινύες, also *Eum.* 333 ff. and 961, Μοῖραι ματρικασιγνῆται. Euripides in a lost play made an ἐρινύς declare that her other names are τύχη, νέμεσις, μοῖρα, ἀνάγκη (fr. 1022). Cf. also Aeschylus, *Sept.* 975–977.

[42] *Eum.* 372 ff., etc.

[43] On the long-standing problem of the relation of the gods to μοῖρα (which cannot be solved in logical terms), see especially E. Leitzke, *Moira u. Gottheit im alten griech. Epos*, which sets out the material in full; E. Ehnmark, *The Idea of God in Homer*, 74 ff.; Nilsson, *Gesch. d. gr. Rel.* I.338 ff.; W. C. Greene, *Moira*, 22 ff.

[44] Demeter Ἐρινύς and verb ἐρινύειν in Arcadia, Paus. 8.25.4 ff. αἶσα in Arcadian, *IG* V.2.265, 269; in Cypriot, *GDI* I.73.

[45] Cf. E. Ehnmark, *The Idea of God in Homer*, 6 ff.; and on the mean-

ing of the word μένος, J. Böhme, *Die Seele u. das Ich im Homerischen Epos*, 11 ff., 84 f.

[46] *Il.* 5.125 f., 136; 16.529.

[47] That kings were once thought of as possessing a special μένος which was communicated to them in virtue of their office seems to be implied by the usage of the phrase ἱερὸν μένος (cf. ἱερὴ ἴς), although its application in Homer (to Alcinous, *Od.* 7.167 etc., to Antinous, *Od.* 18.34) is governed merely by metrical convenience. Cf. Pfister, P.-W., s.v. "Kultus," 2125 ff.; Snell, *Die Entdeckung des Geistes*, 35 f.

[48] *Od.* 24.318.

[49] Horses, *Il.* 23.468; βοὸς μένος, *Od.* 3.450. At *Il.* 17.456 Achilles' horses receive a communication of μένος.

[50] *Il.* 6.182, 17.565. So the medical writers speak of the μένος of wine (Hipp. *acut.* 63), and even the μένος of famine (*vet. med.* 9), meaning the immanent power shown by their effects on the human organism.

[51] *Il.* 20.242. Cf. the "Spirit of the Lord" which "came mightily upon" Samson, enabling him to do superhuman feats (Judges 14: 6, 15: 14).

[52] *Il.* 13.59 ff. The physical transmission of power by contact is, however, rare in Homer, and in Greek belief generally, in contrast with the importance which has been attached in Christianity (and in many primitive cultures) to the "laying on of hands."

[53] *Il.* 13.61, 75. γυῖα δ' ἔθηκεν ἐλαφρά is a recurrent formula in descriptions of communicated μένος (5.122, 23.772); cf. also 17.211 f.

[54] Cf. Leaf's note on 13.73. At *Od.* 1.323 Telemachus recognises a communication of power, we are not told exactly how.

[55] *Il.* 12.449. Cf. *Od.* 13.387–391.

[56] *Il.* 3.381: ῥεῖα μάλ', ὥστε θεός, Aesch. *Supp.* 100: πᾶν ἄπονον δαιμονίων, etc.

[57] *Il.* 5.330 ff., 850 ff.

[58] *Il.* 6.128 ff.

[59] *Il.* 5.136; 10.485; 15.592.

[60] *Il.* 15.605 ff.

[61] *Il.* 17.210.

[62] *Od.* 1.89, 320 f.; cf. 3.75 f.; 6.139 f.

[63] *Od.* 22.347 f. Cf. Demodocus, 8.44, 498; and Pindar, *Nem.* 3.9, where the poet begs the Muse to grant him "an abundant flow of song welling from *my own* thought." As MacKay has put it, "The Muse is the source of the poet's originality, rather than his conventionality" (*The Wrath of Homer*, 50). Chadwick, *Growth of*

Literature, III.182, quotes from Radloff a curiously exact primitive parallel, the Kirghiz minstrel who declared, "I can sing any song whatever, for God has implanted this gift of song in my heart. He gives the words on my tongue without my having to seek them. I have learned none of my songs. All springs from my inner self."

[64] *Od.* 17.518 f., Hes. *Theog.* 94 f. (= *H. Hymn* 25.2 f.). Cf. chap. iii, pp. 80 ff.

[65] On Homer's use of the term δαίμων and its relationship to θεός (which cannot be discussed here), see Nilsson in *Arch. f. Rel.* 22 (1924) 363 ff., and *Gesch. d. gr. Rel.* I.201 ff.; Wilamowitz, *Glaube*, I.362 ff.; E. Leitzke, *op. cit.*, 42 ff. According to Nilsson the δαίμων was originally not only indeterminate but impersonal, a mere "manifestation of power (*orenda*)"; but about this I am inclined to share the doubts expressed by Rose, *Harv. Theol. Rev.* 28 (1935) 243 ff. Such evidence as we have suggests rather that while μοῖρα developed from an impersonal "portion" into a personal Fate, δαίμων evolved in the opposite direction, from a personal "Apportioner" (cf. δαίω, δαιμόνη) to an impersonal "luck." There is a point where the two developments cross and the words are virtually synonymous.

[66] Occasionally also to Zeus (14.273, etc.), who in such phrases is perhaps not so much an individual god as the representative of a generalised divine will (Nilsson, *Greek Piety*, 59).

[67] 9.381.

[68] 14.178; cf. 23.11.

[69] 19.10; 19.138 f.; 9.339.

[70] 2.124 f.; 4.274 f.; 12.295.

[71] 19.485. Cf. 23.11, where a *mistake* in identification is similarly explained.

[72] 15.172.

[73] 12.38.

[74] 14.488.

[75] If his intervention is harmful, he is usually called δαίμων, not θεός.

[76] This distinction was first pointed out by O. Jørgensen, *Hermes*, 39 (1904) 357 ff. On exceptions to Jørgensen's rule see Calhoun, *AJP* 61 (1940) 270 ff.

[77] Cf. the δαίμων who brings unlucky or unwelcome visitors, 10.64, 24.149, 4.274 f., 17.446, and is called κακός in the first two of these places; and the στυγερὸς δαίμων who causes sickness, 5.396. These passages at least are surely exceptions to Ehnmark's generalisation (*Anthropomorphism and Miracle*, 64) that the δαίμονες of the *Odyssey* are simply unidentified Olympians.

[78] 2.122 ff.

[79] 1.384 f.

[80] 1.320 ff.

[81] *Il.* 15.461 ff.

[82] E. Hedén, *Homerische Götterstudien.*

[83] Nilsson, *Arch. f. Rel.* 22.379.

[84] *The Idea of God in Homer*, chap. v. Cf. also Linforth, "Named and Unnamed Gods in Herodotus," *Univ. of California Publications in Classical Philology*, IX.7 (1928).

[85] Cf., e.g., the passages quoted by Lévy-Bruhl, *Primitives and the Supernatural*, 22 f.

[86] *Il.* 4.31. Cf. P. Cauer, *Kunst der Uebersetzung*[2], 27.

[87] A particularly good, because particularly trivial, example of the significance attached to the unexplained is the fact that sneezing—that seemingly causeless and pointless convulsion—is taken as an omen by so many peoples, including the Homeric Greeks (*Od.* 17.541), as well as those of the Classical Age (Xen. *Anab.* 3.3.9) and of Roman times (Plut. *gen. Socr.* 581 F). Cf. Halliday, *Greek Divination*, 174 ff., and Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, I.97 ff.

[88] Something analogous to ἄτη is perhaps to be seen in the state called "fey" or "fairy-struck," which in Celtic belief comes on people suddenly and "makes them do somewhat verie unlike their former practice" (Robert Kirk, *The Secret Commonwealth*).

[89] "Götter und Psychologie bei Homer," *Arch. f. Rel.* 22.363 ff. Its conclusions are summarised in his *History of Greek Religion*, 122 ff.

[90] As Snell points out (*Die Entdeckung des Geistes*, 45), the "superfluous" character of so many divine interventions shows that they were *not* invented simply to get the poet out of a difficulty (since the course of events would be the same without them), but rest on some older foundation of belief. Cauer thought (*Grundfragen*, I.401) that the "naturalness" of many Homeric miracles was an unconscious refinement dating from an age when the poets were ceasing to believe in miracles. But the unnecessary miracle is in fact typically primitive. Cf., e.g., E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic among the Azande*, 77, 508; and for a criticism of Cauer, Ehnmark, *Anthropomorphism and Miracle*, chap. iv.

[91] E.g., *Il.* 16.712 ff., and often. At *Il.* 13.43 ff., the physical and (60) the psychic intervention stand side by side. No doubt epiphanies of gods in battle had also some basis in popular belief (the same belief which created the Angels at Mons), though, as Nilsson observes, in later times it is usually heroes, not gods, who appear in this way.

[92] *Il.* 1.198.

[93] Cf. Voigt, *Ueberlegung u. Entscheidung . . . bei Homer*, 54 ff. More often the warning is given by the god "disguised' as a human personage; this may derive from an older form in which the advice was given, at the monition of a god or δαίμων, by the personage himself (Voigt, *ibid.*, 63).

[94] Hdt. 2.53. Lowie has observed that the primitive artist, following his aesthetic impulse, "may come to create a type that at once synthesises the essentials of current belief, without contravening them in any particular, and yet at the same time adds a series of strokes that may not merely shade but materially alter the pre-existing picture. So long as things go no further, the new image is no more than an individual version of the general norm. But as soon as that variant . . . is elevated to the position of a standard representation, it becomes itself thenceforward a determinant of the popular conception." (*Primitive Religion*, 267 f.) This refers to the visual arts, but it affords an exact description of the manner in which I conceive the Greek epic to have influenced Greek religion.

[95] Snell, *Die Entdeckung des Geistes*, chap. i. Cf. also Böhme, *op. cit.*, 76 ff., and W. Marg, *Der Charakter i. d. Sprache der frühgriechischen Dichtung*, 43 ff.

[96] *Od.* 22.17.

[97] *Il.* 4.43: ἐκὼν ἀέκοντί γε θυμῷ. As Pfister has pointed out (P.-W. XI.2117 ff.), this relative independence of the affective element is common among primitive peoples (cf., e.g., Warneck, *Religion der Batak*, 8). On the weakness of the "ego-consciousness" among primitives see also Hans Kelsen, *Society and Nature* (Chicago, 1943), 8 ff.

[98] *Od.* 9.299 ff. Here the "ego" identifies itself originally with the first voice, but accepts the warning of the second. A similar plurality of voices, and a similar shift of self-identification, seems to be implicit in the curious passage *Il.* 11.403–410 (cf. Voigt, *op. cit.*, 87 ff.). One of Dostoievsky's characters, in *A Raw Youth*, describes this fluctuating relation of self and not-self very nicely. "It's just as though one's second self were standing beside one; one is sensible and rational oneself, but the other self is impelled to do something perfectly senseless, and sometimes very funny; and suddenly you notice that you are longing to do that amusing thing, goodness knows why; that is, you want to, as it were, against your will; though you fight against it with all your might, you want to."

[99] E.g., *Il.* 5.676: τράπε θυμὸν Ἀθήνη ; 16.691: (Ζεὺς) θυμὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσιν ἀνῆκε ; *Od.* 15.172: ἐνὶ θυμῷ ἀθάνατοι βάλλουσι. Hence the θυμός is the organ of seership, *Il.* 7.44, 12.228. (Cf. Aesch. *Pers.* 10: κακόμαντις . . . θυμός ; 224: θυμόμαντις. Also Eur. *Andr.* 1073: πρόμαντις θυμός, and *Trag. Adesp.* fr. 176: πηδῶν δ' ὁ θυμὸς ἔνδοθεν μαντεύεται.)

[100] E.g., *Il.* 16.805: ἄτη φρένας εἶλε ; *Il.* 5.125: ἐν γάρ τοι στήθεσσι μένος . . . ἧκα.

[101] *Il.* 9.702 f. Cf. *Od.* 8.44: "a god" has given Demodocus the gift of singing as his θυμός prompts him.

[102] Cf. W. Marg, *op. cit.*, 69 ff.; W. Nestle, *Vom Mythos zum Logos*, 33 ff.

[103] *Il.* 24.41; *Od.* 9.189; *Od.* 3.277.

[104] *Il.* 16.35, 356 f.

[105] The same point has been made by W. Nestle, *NJbb* 1922, 137 ff., who finds the Socratic paradoxes "echt griechisch," and remarks that they are already implicit in the naïve psychology of Homer. But we should beware of regarding this habitual "intellectualism" as an attitude consciously adopted by the spokesmen of an "intellectual" people; it is merely the inevitable result of the absence of the concept of will (cf. L. Gernet, *Pensée juridique et morale*, 312).

[106] A simple explanation of these terms will be found in Ruth Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*, 222 ff. We are ourselves the heirs of an ancient and powerful (though now declining) guilt-culture, a fact which may perhaps explain why so many scholars have difficulty in recognising that Homeric religion is "religion" at all.

[107] *Il.* 9.315 ff. On the importance of τιμή in Homer see W. Jaeger, *Paideia*, I.7 ff.

[108] Cf. chap. ii, pp. 29 ff.

[109] *Il.* 22.105. Cf. 6.442, 15.561 ff., 17.91 ff.; *Od.* 16.75, 21.323 ff.; Wilamowitz, *Glaube*, I.353 ff.; W. J. Verdenius, *Mnem.* 12 (1944) 47 ff. The sanction of αἰδώς is νέμεσις, public disapproval: cf. *Il.* 6.351, 13.121 f.; and *Od.* 2.136 f. The application to conduct of the terms καλόν and αἰσχρόν seems also to be typical of a shame-culture. These words denote, not that the act is beneficial or hurtful to the agent, or that it is right or wrong in the eyes of a deity, but that it looks "handsome" or "ugly" in the eyes of public opinion.

[110] Once the idea of psychic intervention had taken root, it would, of course, encourage impulsive behaviour. Just as recent anthropologists, instead of saying, with Frazer, that primitives believe in

magic because they reason faultily, are inclined to say that they reason faultily because they are socially conditioned to believe in magic, so, instead of saying with Nilsson that Homeric man believes in psychic intervention because he is impulsive, we should perhaps say rather that he gives way to his impulses because he is socially conditioned to believe in psychic intervention.

[111] On the importance of the fear of ridicule as a social motive see Paul Radin, *Primitive Man as Philosopher*, 50.