CHAPTER ONE

Power and Popular Protest in Latin America

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Why do city-dwellers take to the streets and not to ballot boxes to express dissatisfaction with government policies under democratic as well as authoritarian governments? Why do the same angry workers sometimes support revolutionary movements and at other times express their outrage through foot-dragging, strikes, and rituals? Why do some peasants acquiesce to rural conditions not to their liking while others do not? Moreover, why do similar types of protest movements produce different outcomes in different countries? Neither political science paradigms of regime types nor theories of social movements that focus merely on the grievances, organization, and leadership of defiant groups adequately account for the conditions inducing common folk to resist and protest exploitation, degradation, and poverty, the range of ways in which they express dissatisfaction with their lot, and the outcomes of their defiance.

This chapter and those that follow highlight the diversity of expressions of defiance and, most important, the range of outcomes of defiance in Latin America. Timothy Wickham-Crowley and Cynthia McClintock deal with the common origins, but varying fates, of rural guerrilla movements; Leon Zamosc examines how and explains why the ideology, activities, and accomplishments of a peasant movement changed over time even when its social base did not; and June Nash focuses on miner protests that combine primordial beliefs, customs, and rituals with twentieth-century revolutionary and reactionary politics. Daniel Levine and Scott Mainwaring describe how, and explain why, lower-class movements simi-

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larly grounded in liberation theology have differed in their involve-
ments, depending on specific national and local conditions. Manuel An-
tonio Garretón, Maria Helena Moreira Alves, and Marysa Navarro, by
contrast, focus on multiclass movements based on common opposition to
repressive governments that have failed to resolve national economic
problems, Navarro dealing specifically with defiance organized and led
by women. John Walton examines protests in a number of countries by
the middle and “popular” classes against austerity measures imposed by
governments to mitigate their foreign debts, as well as government de-
fiance of policies imposed by international creditors.

The chapters cover movements that span the continent—from Mex-
ico in the north to Argentina and Chile in the south. They represent
a mere sampling of the ways in which Latin Americans have, often cou-
rageously, defied conditions they find intolerable. Protesters in many
countries in the region have been thrown out of work, imprisoned, tor-
tured, exiled, or killed. Latin American elites have at their command
substantial repressive resources, which they all too frequently have de-
ployed to defend their political and economic interests when challenged
“from below.”

While the collection intentionally includes studies of the gamut of
groups that have engaged in protest activity in recent decades, it in-
cludes neither the entire universe of groups and movements nor a rep-
resentative sampling of them. Rather, the book is designed to uncover
common patterns in movements with different social bases and different
goals, movements in different sociopolitical contexts, and defiance that is
diversely expressed. Our current knowledge of Latin America is pain-
fully inadequate and centered primarily on elite concerns and perspec-
tives. As a consequence, we know much more about state structures,
political parties, and interest groups than about the lives and preoccupa-
tions of “popular” groups. Usually it is only when U.S. interests and
dominant class hegemony have been challenged, as in Central America
in the 1980s, that attention has shifted to subordinate groups.

Our limited empirical and analytic understanding of Latin American
protest also reflects disciplinary biases and fads. When social science
research on Latin America “took off” in the 1960s, it was heavily in-
fluenced by modernization theory and its behavioralist assumptions,
according to which individuals would be economically mobile and coun-
tries would develop economically and become more democratic politi-
cally when the population assimilated Western values and participated in
modern institutions. However, democracy would be undermined by “extre-
mist” politics if individuals were uprooted from their traditional way
of life without being absorbed into modern institutions or if their expec-
tations did not materialize.

The fact that massive urbanization and marginality did not give rise to
revolutionary movements forced more and more (though certainly not all) scholars to abandon behavioralist analyses. The focus of concern shifted from society to the state, to analyses of bureaucratic authoritarianism and corporatist views of state-society relations. The emphasis turned to order and social control rather than mobilization, defiance, and protest. At the same time, the "dependency school of thought" challenged the evolutionary, cultural, and individualistic assumptions on which modernization theory was premised, arguing instead that Latin American development must be understood in the context of global economic dynamics. However, in emphasizing how global dynamics constrained Latin American options, "dependency" writers found little room for voluntarism and left conflicts grounded in noneconomic relationships unexplained.

Latin Americans have been more defiant than the available literature would lead us to believe, even if less so than we might expect, given existing injustices and inequities. The pervasiveness of protest does not, however, signify that global political and economic dynamics are inconsequential. Several of the authors in this volume highlight ways in which global forces directly and indirectly shape the outbreak and outcome of protest movements. But the impact of such forces must be understood in the context of local structures, local social arrangements, and local cultural traditions. Similar colonial heritages and similar postcolonial subjugation to global economic and political powers cannot account for the diversity of the ways Latin Americans have opposed conditions they dislike, even when subject to the same set of external constraints.

The analytic lenses through which contributors to this book view protest and resistance movements are somewhat eclectic. The diversity reflects the methodological and theoretical biases of the authors and their disciplines, which include sociology, political science, anthropology, and history. Differences among them notwithstanding, the authors share a historical-structural perspective. They show ideology, values, traditions, and rituals to be of consequence and trace the importance of culture to group, organizational, and community dynamics and to other features of social structure. Yet they never presume that protest is mechanically determined by social structure. They show the patterning of defiance to be contingent on historical circumstances.

Social structure is of consequence because the unequal distribution of power, wealth, and prestige generates disparate interests among people differently situated in group hierarchies. Those who control the means of physical coercion and the means of producing wealth have power over those who do not. This power can involve control over ideas as well as material resources. When the poor and working classes rebel, it is not because they are intrinsically troublemakers. They rebel because they have limited alternative means to voice their views and press for change.
The case studies in this book show economic relationships, especially changing economic relationships, to be the principal cause of protest and pressure for change. The means of protest chosen, however, will be shown to hinge on contextual factors: on cross-class, institutional, and cultural ties; state structures; and real, or at least perceived, options to exit rather than rebel. The analyses also demonstrate that politics and religion, as well as concerns based on race, ethnicity, and gender, independently and in combination with economic forces, may be sources of discontentment that stir defiance.

The historical-structural approach that the authors employ differs from analyses that explain collective action at the level of the individual. Psychological explanations emphasize character traits and stressful states of mind that dispose individuals to rebellion. Persons with authoritarian personalities (Hoffer 1951, Lipset 1981) and persons who are alienated and anomic (Kornhauser 1959), who feel frustrated and deprived relative to others with whom they compare themselves (Davies 1962, Feierabend and Feierabend 1971, Gurr 1970), and who are attracted to new norms and values (Smelser 1963) have all been portrayed as defiant types. Such persons have typically been portrayed as nonrational or irrational in rebelling.

Rational-choice theorists (see, for example, Olson 1965; Popkin 1979), also explain defiance at the level of the individual. However, they argue that mobilization is a calculated response, based on individual assessments of the costs and benefits of noncompliance with the status quo. Olson posits that rational, self-interested individuals are disinclined to assume the risks of mobilization for “collective goods” because they can “ride free.” He contends that collective defiance is likely only when actors receive selective rewards for their participation in anti-status quo movements and when nonparticipants are penalized for their lack of involvement.

Rational-choice theory cannot account for the ways group solidarities, moral commitment to the collectivity, and other nonrational values may mobilize people to act independently of individual self-interest. What is rational for the individual is not always consistent with the politically or culturally inspired choices of groups. Moreover, group involvements and cultural features pattern self-perceptions and how individuals defy conditions they dislike. Accordingly, even when defiance reflects individual self-interest, what individuals consider their self-interest can only be understood in the context of broader social and cultural forces.

Explanations on the individual level, in turn, often cannot account for the impact acts of defiance have, since the actual outcome of an act often differs from the envisioned outcome that motivated rebellion. That is, the patterned range of ways individuals and groups respond to conditions they consider unsatisfactory and the range of outcomes of defiant acts hinge not merely on psychological attributes, states of mind,
and individual rational decision making. Cultural and structural forces influence individual and group perceptions, sentiments, and actions, sometimes in ways that are not necessarily obvious to the actors. Such cultural and structural forces influence the extent to which any given situation is believed to be intolerable, whether grievances are expressed overtly or by covert defiance, and whether the aggrieved seek individual or collective solutions to their plight.

The studies in this book point both to specific features of social structure that condition the ways subordinate groups address their plight and to elite responses. The authors show the patterning of defiance to be shaped by structural features independently of whatever rage and psychological attributes might have predisposed people to protest. The authors also trace the impact of defiance to elite responses and macro political and economic conditions, which cannot necessarily be deduced from the factors inducing individuals to defy the status quo. Rebels may usher in consequences they had not intended. The analyses accordingly show that features of social structure must theoretically and empirically be part of any full understanding of protest and resistance.

We are obviously not the first to posit a historical-structural perspective. Marx and his disciples have argued that antagonistic economic interests generate conflict and defiance. This chapter and the analyses that follow build on certain Marxist traditions: on Marxist analyses that highlight the importance of market as well as production relations, changing and not merely well-established economic relations, and injustices rooted in noneconomic as well as economic relations. People's lives are heavily influenced by their economic "location," but by other forces as well. Economic relations do not mechanistically determine whether, how, and when persons in subordinate positions rebel. Marx himself, it should be remembered, recognized that class politics vary with historical circumstances.

Non-Marxists have also argued a relationship between social structure and protest movements. There is a large body of literature in the United States that interprets social movements from a structural perspective. Much of it is not historically grounded, however, and some is too abstract to account for important nuances of movements. Neil Smelser (1963), for example, claims that determinants of collective defiance include structural conduciveness (the permissiveness of social arrangements to the generation of social movements), structural strain (the existence of ambiguities, deprivations, tensions, and conflicts in society), and the breakdown of social controls. But which features of social structure condition the array of responses to strains, and which pattern outcomes of defiance? His thesis does not adequately specify an answer to these questions.

While Smelser's thesis may have validity on an abstract level, the essays
in this volume illustrate why such abstract theorizing is not very enlightening: it leaves much unexplained. The strength of the essays lies not only or primarily in their implicit or explicit theoretical grounding but also in their subtle understanding of historical variability. Smelser’s thesis, by contrast, provides us with no framework for understanding, for example, why the austerity programs described by John Walton in his essay resulted in different types of protest movements and movements with different outcomes in different Latin American countries. It also does not help explain why the Colombian peasant movement that Zamosc analyzes began as a state-initiated reform movement, subsequently broke with the state and became radicalized, and then later became conservative and inconsequential. Nor can Smelser’s approach account for the varied ways in which Bolivian tin miners have articulated class-based grievances: their grievances have at different times been channeled into rituals rooted in their peasant heritage, into revolutionary movements, and into support for reactionary politicians.

Resource-mobilization theory is perhaps the most well formulated non-Marxist school of thought that explains social movements at the organizational, not individual, level (see Jenkins 1983 and McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1987 for excellent reviews of the resource-mobilization “school”). Proponents of this perspective argue that grievances are endemic to social structure, and that grievances therefore cannot themselves account for the emergence of social movements. Like rational-choice theorists, they see movement actions as rational responses to the costs and rewards of different lines of action. However, they emphasize that movements are contingent, above all, on resources, group organization, and opportunities for collective action. They have noted that economic, communication, and human resources (e.g., organizational and legal skills and the unspecialized labor of supporters) can be of consequence, and that the degree of preexisting group organization affects the mobilization potential of groups as well. Resource-mobilization theorists have posited that when groups share strong distinctive identities and dense interpersonal networks, members are readily mobilizable: both the identity and the networks provide a base for collective incentives. They have also argued that outside organizers or movement entrepreneurs can be critical for mobilizing movements, especially among deprived groups with minimal political and organizational experience.

Piven and Cloward (1979) also explain protest at the structural, not individual, level. Yet they do not agree with the resource-mobilization theorists who attribute social movement potential primarily to organizational features and organizational resources. They see organization, especially over time, as undermining possibilities for subordinate groups to bring about change. They argue that poor people are most likely to bring about change through disruption, and that disruption can be mo-
bilized without formal organization. In their view, organizations are vulnerable to internal oligarchy and to external cooptation, and organizations that develop within movements tend to blunt the main source of movement influence, militancy. In arguing that formal organization is necessarily incompatible with mobilization, they overstate their case. Piven and Cloward correctly note that there are conservatizing tendencies to most organizations, but organizations may also bring people together and instill values that stir defiance, intentionally or not.

Still other studies of social movements have noted that the origin and fate of defiance cannot be understood merely, or even mainly, either at the level of organization and group unruliness or at the level of the individual. Skocpol (1979) and Walton (1984), for example, highlight how state structures and macro economic influences shape rebellions. Such macro forces can pattern protest in ways that are not necessarily apparent to the people involved. We shall see below how such macro forces can influence the manner in which grievances are expressed and the success that defiance is likely to have.

While building on an already existent structural tradition, this book aims to specify, as no work has to date, the institutional and cultural features that pattern responses to grievances and influence outcomes of protest and resistance movements in Latin America. This chapter provides a framework for comprehending the varied forms defiance assumes, their varied origins, and their varied outcomes. In it I describe how and explain why economic relations and economic conditions are the principal cause of defiance, but also how conflicts rooted in political, gender, race, and ethnic relations may also be of consequence. The focus of the chapter then shifts to contextual factors shaping responses to grievances—namely, local institutional arrangements, class alliances, popular cultures of resistance, and state structures. Afterwards, structural features shaping outcomes of defiance are examined, including the impact of diverse, but structurally rooted, elite responses. The chapter ends with a brief summary of some of the distinctive features of Latin America's heritage that have patterned defiance in the region differently than in other parts of the world.

The remaining chapters illustrate propositions made in this introductory essay, and, indeed, provide some of the case material for some propositions I advance. Since the studies are few in number and not randomly selected, they do not in themselves provide evidence to prove an overarching theory of the causes and consequences of protest and resistance. The analyses are nonetheless interesting in their own right, and they contribute to our understanding of how the aggrieved try to alleviate their plight and how and why their success varies.

Precisely because the causes and consequences of defiance are complex (but patterned), this book has modest objectives. No theory can ade-
quately account for, and predict, the full range of ways in which groups in civil society express anger and the effects defiance has. Yet improved comprehension of the factors shaping movements of defiance and detailed studies of specific protests can contribute to more enlightened “theories of the middle range,” to borrow Merton’s (1961) phrase.

Despite the level of detail in the essays, this book should also be of interest to those who are not specialists in the area. Aside from the historical significance of the movements that the authors describe, knowledge of Latin American experiences can contribute to a better understanding of the universal and the historically specific features of protest movements. Much of the U.S. literature on social movements tends to generalize from the U.S. experience to all social movements. Consequently, the studies in this volume can indirectly help us better understand the historically rooted and contextual features that shape movements in the industrial world, while directly enlightening us about movements in Latin America.

**THE VARIED FORMS OF PROTEST**

Large-scale rebellions, let alone revolutions, are rare, and when they occur they are often either crushed or give rise to states that subordinate the interests of the rebels to those of dominant and ruling groups. Expressions of defiance that fall short of revolution in intent and effect are much more frequent. The range of ways in which people express defiance is delimited by social structure just as socially more accepted behavior is so delimited.

James Scott (1986) correctly and insightfully argues that peasants frequently engage in everyday forms of resistance—such as foot-dragging, passive noncompliance, deceit, pilfering, slander, sabotage, and arson—that stop short of outright collective defiance. There is reason to believe that other economically subordinate groups may resist conditions imposed by dominant groups in roughly similar ways, depending on circumstances. For people in structurally disadvantaged positions such “everyday forms of resistance” may accomplish more, in both the short and long run, than publicly organized protests; this is especially likely when the risks of repression are great. Their defiance may require little or no coordination, and it may not directly challenge elite domination and norms. While such quiet forms of defiance rarely result in major change, they can, on occasion, undermine government legitimacy and productivity to the point where political and economic elites feel the need to institute significant reforms.

In addition to such “everyday forms of resistance,” there exist more direct and explicit ways in which the aggrieved have historically protested conditions they dislike and tried to bring about change: strikes,
land seizures, demonstrations, riots, rebellions, and protests. In these instances the amount of coordination is generally greater.

These varied expressions of defiance have at least one important feature in common. They involve efforts of the politically and economically weak to resist conditions they consider unjust through noninstitutionalized channels.

Even when subordinate groups collectively and publicly defy conditions they dislike, they typically do not resort to violence, especially initially. If violence ensues, it usually is initiated by more powerful groups to coerce the weak back into docility. In Latin America, for example, the military and police have been responsible for many more injuries and deaths than have guerrilla bands.

The case studies in this book focus primarily on coordinated and overt nonviolent forms of defiance. However, most of the groups under investigation combine overt with more subtle forms of resistance and defiance, and a few have combined violent with nonviolent protest. In her discussion of the Peruvian Sendero Luminoso guerrilla movement, for example, Cynthia McClintock highlights how peasants who were not sufficiently committed to the movement to join quietly collaborated with the rebels in ways that contributed to an erosion of government legitimacy. Peasants in the area where Sendero initially operated tacitly lent support to the guerrillas by refusing to help officials hunt down cadres and by providing militants with food, shelter, and information; they also sabotaged elections, not by attacking the political system publicly, or, in Gramsci’s (1971) terminology, frontally, but by quietly and individually invalidating their ballots in large numbers. Once it had gained a footing in the highland region of Ayacucho, Sendero was able to spread its base to other regions of the country as well.

The relationship between overt confrontational and more subtle forms of defiance is also addressed in several of the other essays. June Nash shows how Bolivian miners, through their regular participation in centuries-old rituals rooted in their agricultural past, have reinforced a spirit of rebellion that has given impetus to strikes, protests, and even a revolution when conditions have been “ripe.” The rituals are deep-rooted and provide the bedrock upon which explicitly political protests have built. The rituals and overtly political acts build on shared grievances. In their article on religion and protest Daniel Levine and Scott Mainwaring, in turn, discuss how participation in nominally nonpolitical church-sponsored “base communities” may (or may not) lay the bases for political protest movements.

While the same groups and individuals may engage in overt and more subtle forms of resistance, the repertoire of collective action on which groups draw tends to be limited and heavily influenced by social structural features and historic traditions. It is no accident that some people
rebel by refusing to work or refusing to work at full capacity, while others loot, and still others demonstrate in the streets or turn to electoral sabotage. Factory workers strike because they can thereby defy rules of the workplace and restrict their bosses' profits. Workers in the informal sector, by contrast, seize land sites to erect dwellings and protest against increases in their cost of living. However unhappy they may be with their work and earnings, their work setting is not conducive to collective defiance: they are employed in small businesses with no job security or are self-employed.

Different groups not only draw on different forms of defiance. Over time, societal repertoires have also changed. Charles Tilly (1978) and his associates (Tilly and Tilly 1981; Shorter and Tilly 1974; and Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly 1975) argue, for example, that in Western Europe the repertoire shifted from food riots, resistance to conscription, rebellion against tax collectors, and organized invasions of fields and forests to demonstrations, protest meetings, strikes, and electoral rallies between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In the twentieth century, lengthy proactive activities by large-scale special-purpose associations have become more common. Tilly and his colleagues trace the changes to increased economic concentration and proletarianization on the one hand and the growing power of the nation state and the institutionalization of liberal democracy on the other. As the loci of power in society shifted, ordinary people's interests, opportunities, and capacities to act together altered.

Yet historical traditions, as well as institutional arrangements, influence how people respond to conditions they dislike. People learn repertoires of defiance partly in reaction to dominant group responses. The Latin American repertoire has been shaped—as we shall see later—by dependence on foreign trade, technology, and capital, a bureaucratic centralist tradition, and a distinctive, Catholic-inspired worldview.

Latin America is more of a "living museum" than Europe. New forms of defiance have appeared on the scene there, while old forms have persisted. Centuries-old types of protest, such as food riots and rural land seizures, appear alongside strikes, demonstrations, and protest meetings. The broader Latin American repertoire is no doubt rooted in the more partial nature of the region's industrial transformation, the restricted economic opportunities associated with "dependent development," and the more limited power of the nation-state over ordinary people's lives. Economically, Latin American industrialization has produced a proletariat. However, factory workers account for only a minority of the labor force in most countries in the region. The majority of laborers continue to work in agriculture or are self-employed or employees in small-scale paternalistic enterprises.

Latin America's broader repertoire is also rooted in its distinctive po-
litical history. Twentieth-century Latin American history has been punctuated by shifts between authoritarian and democratic rule. By contrast, with some exceptions, Western Europe experienced progressive democratization. As Latin American regime conditions have oscillated, so too has the nature of political strife; for this reason, the basis of political conflict has not evolved from one form to another, as historically in Europe.

Despite some shared political and economic experiences, Latin American countries have not had entirely parallel histories. National variations in levels of industrialization, the timing and extent of unionization, economic wealth, and political repression, for example, make for some patterned differences in contemporary expressions of defiance among Latin American countries. The different modes of “popular” defiance against unpopular austerity measures described by Walton—riots in Jamaica, street demonstrations in Chile, and strikes in Andean nations—are at least partially rooted in different traditions of protest that have evolved over the years in countries with distinctive political and economic histories. Nonviolent demonstrations are a typical Chilean form of protest. As Garretón notes, Chileans turn to demonstrations not only to defy austerity measures that have caused their living standards to plunge but also to defy political injustices of the repressive Pinochet government. Yet aggrieved groups have turned to the streets to press for change under democratically elected governments as well as under military rule. The “popular” classes have most typically done so. However, when the socialist government of Salvador Allende favored the lower and working classes, the middle classes mobilized through extra-institutional channels as well: housewives with their pots and pans, truck-drivers with their vehicles (which they used to block traffic and the delivery of goods). Indeed, pots and pans have since been added to the symbolic repertoire of protest in Chile. Opponents of Pinochet’s military government bang them at designated times.

Within Latin America the Bolivian repertoire also stands out. When dissatisfied with policies, peasants and city-dwellers there, more than elsewhere in the region, block roads. In a country with a poorly developed road system, this disruptive tactic can be quite effective.

Defiance, whether overt or covert, presumes intent. Defiance must therefore be analytically distinguished from noncompliance grounded in ignorance or confusion about expected and appropriate behavior. Nonetheless, both intentional and unintentional noncompliance may generate the same social consequences, including an erosion of elite legitimacy.

The intent of defiance may be defensive, restorative, or offensive; in Tilly’s terms, it may be reactive or proactive, designed to deny claims made by superordinate groups or to press new claims. While defiance is deliberate, it may usher in changes the actors never intended. The failure to
account analytically for the ways in which the outcomes of defiance may differ from intent is a serious shortcoming of much of the existing literature on protest and social movements. In the Mexican revolution, for example, Zapatistas protested against the agents of agrarian capitalism who violated their ancestral property claims. Their movement was anticapitalist and restorative in spirit. Yet their quiescence once their poor-quality parcels of land were returned facilitated capitalist development in the rest of the country. Similarly, Nash shows in chapter 5 how Bolivian miners have supported revolutionary movements and populist military coups d’etat only to usher into office governments that turned on them. While people of all classes tend to have a limited understanding of the forces of history, the subordinate position of the politically and economically weak limits their ability both to understand the full ramifications of their actions and to counter the power of superordinate groups, including groups they had not envisioned would be of consequence. Subordinate groups tend to direct their defiance against local targets, but national and even international structures and circumstances can influence what their acts accomplish. I shall examine factors shaping the outcomes of defiance after discussing how social bases and contextual factors shape the patterning of protest.

THE SOCIAL BASES OF DEFIANCE

Domination and subordination are common features of institutional life, and they give rise to certain contradictory interests. Top positions incline the occupants toward preserving the status quo, while bottom positions incline their occupants toward change to improve their lots. Structurally rooted inequities and injustices may be tolerated by subordinates, but obviously not always. Given the importance of working for a livelihood and employer extraction of surplus from laborers, there are structural reasons why conflict has frequently focused on wage and work conditions. This is true even in socialist enterprises in socialist societies. However, the nature of the conflicting interests of people differently situated in institutional hierarchies and the responses of persons in subordinate positions to such conflicting interests are shaped by organizational settings and by the broader society in which the organizations are embedded. Below I discuss how production and market, but also gender, political, racial, ethnic, and religious relationships, may be sources of contention and foci of defiance.

1. As Mills (1959:185) notes: "Some men have the power to act with much structural relevance and are quite aware of the consequences of their actions; others have such power but are not aware of its effective scope; and there are many who cannot transcend their everyday milieu by their awareness of structure or effect structural change by any means of action available to them."
Conflicts Rooted in Relations of Production

People experience deprivation within concrete settings. Laborers' anger typically is directed at their bosses, who they believe to be oppressing them, not at broad invisible forces like capitalism or distant agents of capitalism, like banks, which may ultimately be responsible for their plight.

Marx gave us reason to believe that industrial workers would be more defiant than peasants, not because their work conditions are worse, but because large numbers of them experience their misery collectively. Since Latin American governments in the post–World War II era have promoted industry, initially for domestic consumption and more recently for export, Marx's logic would lead us to expect that societal strife should have intensified as the productive bases of the countries shifted.

There was added reason to believe that industrialization in Latin America would stir unrest: factory workers in the region earn little compared to their equivalents in the highly industrial countries. Yet the response of Latin American factory workers to their work situations must be understood in the context of their respective countries. They are a relatively privileged group. They rank among the minority who earn at least the official minimum wage and who qualify for unemployment, health, and social security benefits. Industrial workers have succeeded in winning such concessions in part because they are comparatively few in number, but also because their work has been considered central to their countries' economic advancement and because industrialists initially sought labor support in their struggle against entrenched oligarchies for control of the state. Under the circumstances, governments and private employers granted concessions to the proletariat, though often only in response to real or threatened strike activity.

Although wildcat strikes sometimes occur, unions organize most strikes. We see here how defiance and organization can be closely linked. However, the impact of unionization on strike activity will be shown subsequently to be contingent on state/union relations, and not on organization per se.

While strike activity reflects underlying conflicting interests between labor and capital, its absence does not necessarily imply worker satisfaction. Discontent is least likely to be expressed in overt, coordinated work stoppages under nondemocratic regimes where strike activity is outlawed and so likely to be repressed that the costs are often perceived to outweigh possible gains. This cost/benefit interpretation of strike activity is consistent with rational-choice theory. Where strikes are outlawed, workers who strike may even run the risk of being fired. Yet rational-choice theory does not sensitize us to the variety of ways in which workers might, under the circumstances, undermine elite interests without directly confronting the powers that be: for example, through foot-
dragging, absenteeism, and pilferage. Such quiet defiance will minimally undermine employers' ability to generate surplus, and will possibly also bring some material gains to workers as well. The varied expressions of defiance cannot be explained at the level of the individual, on which rational-choice theory is premised.

The nature of workers' grievances can be expected to differ somewhat in socialist and capitalist enterprises, with different inequities in the distribution of power, wealth, and prestige in the two types of organizational hierarchies and different expectations about justice and enterprise objectives in the two types of societies. Cuba, for example, claims to be a "proletarian state," and most units of production in the country are state-owned. Yet the state's public identification with workers has not eliminated tensions between workers and managers. Instead, the revolution has changed the nature of workers' grievances and how grievances are articulated. Since Cuban workers are not free to strike and since unions are politically controlled, workers have turned to quieter and more covert forms of defying work conditions they dislike. They have, on occasion, quite effectively expressed resentment with their hands and feet in poor on-the-job performance and high absenteeism. Their low level of compliance, for example, compelled the revolutionary leadership to modify policies implemented in the late 1960s. At the time, workers had been asked to work long hours, and, in the case of the sugar harvest, without additional pay. Meanwhile, material living standards plunged as the government stressed exports and investments in basic industries. Although asked to work for "moral" reasons, out of a commitment to communism, workers resented the demands on their time and the deterioration in their living standards. They expressed their resentment through poor work performance in the absence of institutional channels to voice their discontent. Productivity plunged, and the economic crisis received much international publicity. Pressed to alter its accumulation strategy, the government not only reintroduced material incentives and expanded the supply of consumer goods but also granted labor greater participatory rights in enterprise, union, and government decision making. Ideally, of course, labor should be free to organize. Yet in the Latin American countries where it enjoys organizational and strike rights, labor has rarely had as great an impact on state policy and won such economic and political concessions as the seemingly uncoordinated acts and publicly unarticulated complaints of Cuban workers in the late 1960s.

Employers (in Cuba, the state) are probably most responsive to pressures "from below" when labor resistance, however expressed, results in a sudden decrease in productivity, when alternative sources of labor are unavailable (because of labor regulations, skill requirements, or full employment), and when repression to enforce conformity is too politically or economically costly. By contrast, when pilfering, foot-dragging, and other forms of quiet resistance persist at long-established levels, employ-
ers probably either tolerate the costs to their profit maximization or try to modify work conditions in small ways to induce greater output.

Not merely conditions of industrial employment but the loss of such employment may provoke protest. Garretón notes, for example, that as many Chilean workers have lost their jobs under the right-wing government of Pinochet, the base of mobilizations shifted from the "classes" to the "masses": that is, from the more organized, formal sector of society to the more economically marginal sectors. They mobilize, though, through neighborhood, not work-based, groups. In contrast, unionized Chilean workers have been relatively quiescent, despite their history of militancy. They fear losing their jobs if they protest. Also, the military has been better able to regulate the activity of union organizations than that of the large, amorphous nonunionized population.

Yet in Latin America labor defiance has by no means been confined to urban settings. Marx argued that the relations of production made peasants a conservative political force, but recent studies of revolution have shown that peasants should not be politically dismissed. Peasants, Marx noted (1959: 338), do similar but uncoordinated work: in contrast to factory workers who work side by side in related activities, peasants, he asserted, were a "simple addition of homologous magnitudes, much as potatoes in a sack form a sack of potatoes." They often also own "the means of production," de facto if not de jure. Such structural constraints notwithstanding, in Latin America peasants have played a critical role in the Mexican, Bolivian, and Cuban revolutions. However, the role of the peasantry should not be exaggerated. While agrarian rebellions in regions of each country helped bring down the anciers régimes, peasants' "social location" restricted what they attempted to accomplish through defiance and what they actually accomplished. In no country did peasants bring down the state on their own. Moreover, they helped "make" the revolutions more by seizing lands, disrupting production, and creating disorder than by participating in movements inspired by revolutionary ideology.

But even when peasants are outwardly passive, deferential, and quiescent, they can, as noted earlier, defy conditions they dislike by withholding production or by keeping crucial information from their superiors. Such subtle forms of defiance of exploitation and abuse are undoubtedly more common than outright rebellion. Peasants generally only take on the risks of direct confrontation when injustice is perceived to be intolerable, when the demands made of them increase suddenly (rather than incrementally), and when local and national institutional and cultural conditions (discussed below) incline them to seek redress collectively.

Peasant grievances, however expressed, vary with property and labor

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2. Although their arguments differ see, for example, Moore 1966; Wolf 1969; Scott 1976; Migdal 1974; Paige 1975; Skocpol 1979; and Popkin 1979.
relations. For this reason, the concerns of tenant farmers, sharecroppers, smallholders, and wage laborers differ. Rural wage laborers are preoccupied with wage and work conditions, propertied peasants with the prices of the products they market and the goods and services they consume, and tenant farmers and sharecroppers with the demands on their labor (or the product of their labor).

The impact of tenancy arrangements on peasant rebellion is a subject of great debate. Wolf (1969) argues that the global economy devastates the moral economy of the peasantry and radicalizes the "middle peasant" in particular. Paige (1975), by contrast, argues that sharecroppers and migratory estate laborers are the principal base of revolutionary movements, owing to specific conditions rooted in their relationship to noncultivators. According to him, agrarian rebellions will range from reformist protests over commodity prices and working conditions to nationalist and socialist revolutionary movements, depending upon particular combinations in the organization of land, capital, and wages. When cultivators depend on wages and noncultivators on land for income, conflict is most likely to produce revolutionary movements. Both Wolf and Paige base their studies on twentieth-century peasant experiences around the world.

Contemporary Latin American history suggests that peasant grievances vary with forms of land tenure, but that economic dislocations, and not land-tenure patterns in themselves, fuel agrarian rebellion. Wickham-Crowley shows in chapter 4, for example, that guerrilla movements (begun typically by educated university students) have won greatest peasant backing in regions populated heavily by sharecroppers, squatters, and migratory laborers. Yet he finds that dislocations that erode peasants' sense of security, and not merely rural class relations, contribute to agrarian radicalization. Peasants embroiled in change are more likely to support revolutionary movements than either peasants who remain secure in possession of land or rural wage workers where agrarian capitalism has been in place for some time. Similarly, in chapter 2 McClintock suggests that the Sendero Luminoso guerrilla movement secured a peasant base among smallholders in the Ayacucho region of Peru in the late 1970s and early 1980s because of a subsistence crisis there; her findings imply that the dislocations and insecurities that incline agriculturalists to support a guerrilla movement may involve no actual or threatened change in land tenancy arrangements. Peasant claims to land were not challenged, but the meaning of land to peasants' livelihood changed. Yet McClintock's study also shows that peasant perceptions, and not merely their objective economic conditions, influence their stance toward guerrilla movements. Sendero's support in Ayacucho

3. On subsistence crises as a source of peasant rebellion, see Scott 1976.