Introduction

In September 1948 there appeared on the cover of *Time* magazine the portrait of a solid and imposing middle-aged woman—her expression stout and angry, her hair pushed back and unkempt, and her strong, almost menacing presence easily confirming the description *Time* would make of her: she was, it declared, "the most powerful woman alive." In a feature of its own a few months later, *Life* magazine would describe her as having "undeniable strength. . . . Her voice is deep, her tone confident, her manner brisk. She is an extraordinarily dynamic woman."[1] To a leading Israeli diplomat, she was "a true Minister" who conspicuously stood out from the many ministers he dealt with at that time; to a representative of an international Jewish organization, she was an "exceptional" figure next to whom Golda Meir paled in comparison; and to a Zionist activist who had been a childhood friend but was later imprisoned by her regime, "[s]he was fascinating—full of spirit and utterly devoted to her ideals. If [she] were alive now and came through this door into my house, I would welcome her with all my heart."[2] Other accounts were far less flattering: to one observer, she was "a grim, clever and evil woman"; to another, a "ruthless female . . . , a vain, violent and unprincipled figure."[3] From any perspective, however, she was an object of fascination whose story had all the makings of a good drama: the daughter of poor religious Jews rising to the pinnacle of power in a country traditionally disdainful of both Jews and women. She was, of

course, Ana Pauker—then the great "Red Matron" of the Soviet bloc, and the star in the skies of Communist Romania.

Officially Romania's Foreign Minister from 1947 to 1952—the first woman in the modern world ever to hold such a post—Pauker was actually the unofficial head of Romania's Communist Party immediately after the war and for a number of years was the country's true behind-the-scenes leader. Always one of the first to be mentioned in the long list of outstanding revolutionary women, Pauker, unlike a Rosa Luxemburg or a Dolores "La Passionaria" Ibarruri, made it to "the top"—the first and the last woman to do so in the Communist world. Yet today, also unlike Luxemburg or Ibarruri, Pauker has all but disappeared from history. Discredited as a long-standing Stalinist leader, she is now barely known outside Romania. Few contemporary adherents of progressive or leftist politics seem ever to have heard of her, while many feminists, even those seeking to reclaim past matriarchs as today's role models, have no idea who she was.[4]

At the same time, Pauker is largely absent from Jewish historiography. This was, perhaps, a consequence of the conventional view of Jewish Communists as "non-Jewish Jews" who readily discarded their identities and abandoned their people for revolutionary universalism.[5] No longer Jewish protagonists pursuing particularly Jewish goals, they were considered outside the purview of Jewish history. Indeed, Jewish historians regarded Pauker much as Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion depicted her in 1949: "This daughter of a Jewish rabbi now living in Israel is endeavoring to destroy the Jewish community in her country. To her any Jew is a Fascist. She would like to bring famine to [Israel] in order to curb the wish of Jews to come here." As one scholar recently noted, Ana Pauker came to be known as an "archetype of self-hatred" among Jewish Communists.[6]

In Romania, on the other hand, Pauker has become a mythic figure symbolizing the perceived predominance of Jews in Romanian Communism, as well as the terror and repression of the Stalinist years. A key subject of the public discourse of post-Communist Romania, Pauker exemplifies what today is described as the "Cominternist" or foreign component in Romanian Communism, made up exclusively of ethnic minorities and always negatively contrasted with ethnic-Romanian "patriots" such as Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej or Nicolae Ceaușescu. This depiction of good and bad Communists is part of a long history of distrusting and blaming the "other"—be it foreigners or internal minorities—within the region. It is also part of a pattern of diversionist anti-Semitism in Ro-

mania, employed by the country's rulers, for instance, when dealing
with the ever-explosive peasant question in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. But by "other," we also emphatically mean gender;
Pauker was hated not only for being a "foreign" Jew, but also for being
a woman who dared to rebel against traditional norms.

For over forty years, moreover, Romanian Communist propagandists
carefully portrayed Ana Pauker as an extreme and dogmatic Stalinist
who was the key promoter of Soviet-inspired policies in the early Ro-
manian Communist regime. This characterization continues today, and
a number of that regime's participants have recently articulated it. "Ana
Pauker . . . ," one of them asserted, "excelled in implementing Stalinism
in Romania as quickly as possible." Added another, "I would say that
she was the most Stalinist-minded leader of the party at that time." Her
actions, concluded a third, were guided by a simple and ruthless for-
mula: "Terror, Divisiveness, and Pauperization."[7] This portrayal has
been largely accepted by Western scholars, who, long denied access to
Communist Party archives, had no way of gauging the satellite leaders'
true reactions to the compulsory Stalinization of their regimes.[8] Yet, as
opposed to several of those leaders, historians seem to have had little
doubt of Pauker's submissiveness: amid persistent rumors that she de-
nounced her own husband as a Trotskyist during the Great Terror of the
late 1930s, "her fanatical subservience to Moscow was not only undis-
puted, it was legendary." One of the many jokes about this "describes
Pauker promenading through the streets of Bucharest on a cloudless
summer day with an umbrella opened over her head. On being asked
why, she replied: 'Haven't you heard the Soviet radio today? It's raining
in Moscow!'"[9]

This book reexamines Ana Pauker's life and career and finds much
of the conventional wisdom to be largely myth. The evidence reveals a
person characterized more by contradictions than by dogmatism: a
Communist leader fanatically loyal to Stalin and the Soviet Union but
actively opposing the Stalinist line and deliberately defying Soviet direc-
tives on a number of important fronts—uniquely, during the perilous
period of Stalin's final years. Indeed, Pauker's actions provide the most
striking instance of a satellite's noncompliance with the Stalinist *dictat*
during the heyday of "high Stalinism" (that is, between Tito's expulsion
from the Cominform in 1948 and Stalin's death in 1953), and they sug-
gest a far more complex political dynamic in post–World War II Com-
munism than is traditionally portrayed.

Likewise, the evidence presents Pauker as a Jewish Communist largely

untainted by self-hatred. Although outwardly disconnected from Jews and Judaism, she promoted an independent line on Jewish issues that rejected orthodox Marxism-Leninism's class-based approach, and she sanctioned the unrestricted emigration of Romanian Jews to Israel after the Soviets adopted an increasingly hostile stance toward the Jewish state. She did so, moreover, while firmly committed to revolutionary internationalism and while earnestly identifying with the Romanian people.

   This study began on the premise that Pauker's story, and that of Jewish Communists generally, is an important part not only of Communist and Romanian history but of contemporary Jewish history as well. As the late Israeli historian Jacob L. Talmon noted, "Hitler singled out the international Jewish-Marxist revolutionary as his main target, as the prototype of Jewish evil-doer, as the microbe destructive of all Aryan civilization" when he unleashed the Holocaust on European Jewry.[10] Further, these Jewish revolutionaries' fate ultimately reflected the tragedy of all European Jewry. In the end, no matter how aloof or remote they may have been to their fellow Jews, no matter how much they yearned to break from all things Jewish, these radicals connoted a clear continuity with the Jewish past.

The degree to which Ana Pauker has been stereotyped is emblematic of traditional inferences about Jewish Communists as a whole: the mythical "Judeo-Bolshevism" denoting the prevalence of Jews in the Communist movement. Like most stereotypes, this one is based on a grain of truth. Jaff Schatz's recent study on Polish Jewish Communists concisely summarizes a whole literature attributing the reasons for the Jewish presence in Communist and revolutionary politics generally. Schatz suggests that none of the various theories—all of which emphasize either psychological, cultural, or social factors—alone can explain a complex and diverse phenomenon that defies overgeneralization.[11] In Romania's case, Ana Pauker was one of a small coterie of Jews who joined the Romanian Workers' Social Democratic Party before World War I. In contrast, most Romanian Jews shied from revolutionary politics or joined Zionist movements in response to their increasing marginalization. As the political situation became more and more polarized with fascism's rise in the 1930s, a growing number of socialist Zionists went over to the Communists; indeed, the Marxist-Zionist *HaShomer HaTzair* movement became known to some party insiders as the primary training ground for Romanian Jewish Communists during that decade.[12]

Classified Romanian Communist Party (RCP) statistics listed the ethnic proportion of party members in 1933 as 26.58 percent Hungarian, 22.65 percent Romanian, and 18.12 percent Jewish; Jewish veterans of the RCP contend that the proportion of Jews during this period was actually much higher (roughly 50 percent), as a large number of those cited as Hungarians were in fact Magyarized Jews from Transylvania. Nevertheless, the numbers were hardly significant in comparison to Romanian Jewry as a whole (totaling roughly 800,000 by 1940): by the end of World War II, the RCP could claim a total of only 700–800 members and a few thousand sympathizers of *any* ethnicity.[13]

Immediately after the war, the numbers of Jews joining the RCP increased markedly, though, again, they by no means comprised a majority of Romanian Jewry. Many of these new recruits were apparently younger Jews attracted to the prospect of building a new "democratic" order after the horrors and destruction of the world war.[14] They proved vital in consolidating the new regime, given the sparsity of party members, the loss of Romanian professionals during the war, the extensive postwar purges, and the need for people who had not been implicated with the old order. This perhaps paralleled Soviet Russia soon after the October Revolution, when many Russian Jews, faced with the White armies' anti-Semitic onslaught, entered the government apparatus and replaced those of the old bureaucracy and intelligentsia who boycotted the Soviet regime; in fact, Lenin himself credited the Jews with having "sabotaged the saboteurs," in effect saving the revolution by neutralizing the boycott.[15] But if Jews were indispensable in Romania after World War II, they remained so only briefly: by the end of 1945, thanks to the RCP's mass-recruitment campaign, of more than 300,000 party members, no less than 71 percent were ethnic-Romanians and only 7 percent were Jews.[16]

Still, under the new regime Jews were conspicuous in positions of power for the first time in Romanian history. This led to a pronounced anti-Semitic backlash in the country, as it did in the Soviet Union in the 1920s. There the Jewish presence in government posts generated a maelstrom of resentment and animosity so great that even the Kremlin could not ignore it. According to one historian, the source of this anti-Semitism "lay among the dispossessed and declassed strata of the urban middle class, and penetrated into the upper strata of industrial workers, the university students, the membership of the Communist Youth, and, last but not least, into the Communist Party itself."[17] A major issue of contention was the Jews' social mobility in places where they had never

been seen before. This had occurred in postrevolutionary France, where emancipated Jews flocked to the urban centers and appeared to adapt more easily to the free-enterprise economy of the new liberal order. Many saw the Jews as the main beneficiaries of the recent changes and assumed they must have been responsible for them. They believed the Jews had used the individualism and atomization of liberalism and the internationalism of revolutionary socialism to destroy traditional Christian society, while maintaining their own cohesion.[18] In other words, both liberalism and socialism were seen as a Jewish conspiracy.

Another factor in this backlash was what Talmon observed to have been a "recurrent pattern" in Jewish history, stemming from the Jews' role as pioneers in European society.

> In his famous work on the beginnings of urban life in eleventh- and twelfth-century Europe, Henri Pirenne propounded the thesis that its earliest pioneers were human flotsam, fugitives from the law, serfs who had run away from their villages, men without name, occupation, standards or reputation. He went on to offer the generalization that, in great social transformations and new ventures, it was precisely people of this kind who served as pioneers. The long-settled and the well-established clung to patrimony and privileges. They shunned novelty, since it entailed displacement, risk, and had something disreputable about it. It was therefore men who had no ties, no reputations to lose, and were not permanently and safely rooted, who flocked into the new occupations. Pirenne's observation can almost be taken as a constant recurring law of Jewish life in the Middle Ages and in modern times. In the Middle Ages the Jews chose or were driven to fill a vacuum and to play a necessary pioneering role. They were at first invited, welcomed and granted privileges by the princes, the great builders of towns, as money-lenders and international tradesmen. . . . In time . . . , the Christian populations lost their horror of usury and began to look upon trade and commerce with approval as both respectable and profitable. . . . They resorted to a well-tried expedient and expelled the usurpers and parasites who, though ostracized and defenseless, were able and had the audacity to hold the well-born by the throat. The Jews were thus driven out from all the countries of Western Europe in the later Middle Ages.[19]

A similar scenario subsequently played out in East-Central Europe, where Jews were encouraged to assume an important economic role in certain undeveloped and largely townless regions. The Polish-Lithuanian, Hungarian, and Romanian aristocracies sought to develop industry in their countries but feared the growth of a native middle class that might become a political rival. They therefore preferred a politically harmless "foreign" middle class and offered Jews positions such as innkeepers, craftsmen, and lessors of mills and breweries in newly emerg-

ing towns bordering their vast estates. Deteriorating economic conditions and a massive population explosion in the nineteenth century brought a huge migration of impoverished gentry and destitute peasants to these towns, where they found the Jews already established. The consequent competition and nationalist tensions would end only with the Jews' disappearance from the region.[20]

This pattern followed a general rule concerning "out-groups": when a new ethnic or religious group immigrates into an already settled land, penetrating the established economic and social positions is difficult. The majority will tolerate the minority and allow it to encroach upon its positions only if the newcomers satisfy economic needs that do not seriously compete with its own. The minority must therefore seek untapped sources of income (that is, become pioneers), but once the minority establishes itself, the majority begins to covet the new positions.[21]

Hence, when the illegal Romanian Communist Party of the interwar years emerged from the underground to become the new establishment, its Jewish pioneers began to be seen as undeservedly and disproportionately privileged. Calls for "proportionality" quickly followed, and acceding to the majority, the regime responded with the "Romaniazation" of the party ranks. "Jewish predominance," long the reality of the risk-prone underground, was no longer tolerated from the late 1940s on: a permanent purge of the Jewish old guard ensued, with those replacing them being exclusively ethnic-Romanians.[22]

The purge of Ana Pauker in May 1952 was part of this process, though it also resulted from her genuinely deviationist policy and an upsurge of arrant anti-Semitism in the Communist bloc. The evidence indicates that Pauker was slated for the same fate as Rudolf Slansky of Czechoslovakia (executed in December 1952) but that her show trial was abruptly canceled after Stalin's death. She remained, however, one of the principal victims of the great Jewish purge of Stalin's final years, which signified a continuation of opportunistic anti-Semitism in the revolutionary left. This was the "socialism of fools" that August Bebel had railed against, the use of Jew-hatred by part of the socialist movement beginning in the nineteenth century. A phenomenon to be distinguished from political anti-Semitism, it first appeared with the Enlightenment, as progressive rationalists and anticlerical leftists attacked Judaism rather than their real target, the Christian Church. The Deists, fervent believers in "natural religion" and bitter opponents of the clergy, blamed Judaism as the "root of evil" in the church. Likewise, the "young Hegelians," advocating separation of church and state and

focusing on a radical critique of Christianity, bashed Judaism for causing everything despicable in the Christian religion. Beginning in the 1860s, Social Democratic parties applied similar tactics, including extensive acquiescence to right-wing anti-Semitism in the belief that it would ultimately benefit the socialist movement.[23] The German and Austrian Social Democrats eventually abandoned such strategies after losing ground to anti-Semitic parties in their countries. They continued in France and Western Europe, however, and they lay behind the Russian revolutionaries' praise of anti-Semitic pogroms in the 1880s. German Communists used them regularly during the Weimar Republic.[24]

When the Kremlin played the Jewish card for diversionist purposes after World War II, it signaled the end of Jewish attempts to integrate into East-Central European society through Communism. Assimilating out of the Jewish fold with particular fervency, Jewish Communists hoped to free themselves from nationalist oppression by eliminating or transcending nationalism through revolutionary internationalism. For them, "The Internationale" undoubtedly had far greater significance than for those who took their national rights for granted. This was, indeed, part of a long tradition within Jewish radicalism and was seen, for instance, among Jews in the *Narodnaia Volia* of nineteenth-century Russia, who practically alone among their fellow Populists embraced cosmopolitan socialism.[25] As Hebrew writer Chaim Hazaz wrote, while Russian, German, or French revolutionaries struggled to redeem the proletariat of their own countries, Jewish revolutionaries set out to save the entire world.[26] In the end, their hopes for redemption through revolution proved a tragic illusion.

The futility of Jewish integration under Communism, moreover, reflected the Jews' general failure to assimilate into European society. In parts of modern Europe, Jews were offered integration and acceptance consistent with the universalist tenets of the Enlightenment, but for a price: they must abandon their distinctiveness and way of life in exchange for an end to anti-Semitism and their pariah status.[27] This included giving up their traditional "parasitic" and "exploitative" occupations, as if they had chosen such positions in the first place. In offering this "assimilationist contract" to its Jewish minority, the majority group suggested that only the Jews' differences, their supposedly backward and unbecoming peculiarities, led to the prejudice and hostility against them and that individual Jews could gain acceptance by individually making themselves more acceptable.[28] Many Jews found this premise quite rea-

sonable. After all, was not the axiom of the modern world that education and culture were all that mattered? Did not the principles of the Enlightenment suggest that one could transcend all obstacles and overcome all hostility simply by educating oneself and becoming sufficiently "cultured"? A large number of emancipated Jews, therefore, became cultural fanatics obsessed with improving and cultivating themselves. Only yesterday completely marginalized and estranged from the majority community, they seemingly overnight became the most devoted adherents to the national culture in nearly every country they inhabited.[29] At the same time, they were only too happy to dispense with occupations into which they had been forced for generations and to embrace the opportunity to pursue professions and areas of employment heretofore denied them.

An implicit clause in the contract, however, proved the assimilating Jews' Achilles' heel: the majority group reserved the sole right to determine when the Jews had rid themselves of distasteful "Jewish" traits sufficiently to satisfy the contract. It soon became clear that no matter what the Jews did, that determination was never coming.[30] Those who had eliminated their cultural differences with the majority were ironically considered more different than ever before.[31] An incessant enthusiasm for the national culture suddenly and paradoxically became a sign of foreignness. "What more than anything else kept the assimilating Jews apart from any established section of the majority was precisely their assimilatory zeal. . . ."[32] "Jewishness" itself, believed by many to be an inexorable part of every assimilated Jew's makeup, was now singled out as a vice that Jews were to be shunned for (or, for that matter, praised for within certain avant-garde circles), and Jews remained inexplicably other.[33] Moreover, Jews soon found that, despite changing to more acceptable occupations, they made no headway with the majority. Magically their new occupations became stigmatized as having been "Judaized" and hopelessly sullied, even though the positions previously were always respectable.[34] At the same time, the traditional, hated "Jewish" occupations suddenly became acceptable as soon as only Gentiles were working in them. It became clear that the problem was not the occupations but the workers; Jewish professions were hated because Jews pursued them, and not the other way around.[35]

All this is evident in the Jewish experience under Communism. While Jewish party activists discarded their identities, renounced their past, and embraced the majority culture under the guise of revolutionary

internationalism, the Jewish community was systematically transformed into "productive" laborers, thus ending its previous socioeconomic role. But this did not prevent a resurgence of popular anti-Semitism in these societies; on the contrary, for the reasons noted, it enhanced it. The more assimilated the Jews became, the more cohesive and threatening they appeared to the majority, and the more productive they became, the more they were seen as usurping the majority.[36]

Ana Pauker's fate underscored not only this outcome but also women's ultimate failure under Communism to overturn their societies' traditional restrictions. Pauker's case is instructive, moreover, in that it sheds additional light on the topic of Jewish assimilation, which has undergone considerable revision of late among Jewish historians. At first glance, Pauker's position favoring Jewish emigration suggests that she had rethought the feasibility of revolutionary internationalism's solving the "Jewish Question," perhaps in response to the upsurge of popular and state anti-Semitism in the Soviet bloc during Stalin's later years. If so, it would add credence to the classic historiographical theory on Jewish assimilation emphasizing "bipolarity" in modern Jewish life. Originating from Jewish historian Simon Dubnov, the theory posited that the more open and tolerant a society became, the greater the danger of assimilation and internal disintegration within the Jewish minority; conversely, the more a society reverted to intolerance and Jew-hatred, the more the Jews responded with renewed solidarity.[37]

This dichotomy, however, fails to explain Pauker's continued association with Jewish groups during her early years in the socialist and Communist movement, when the party most accepted and tolerated Jews; nor does it explain Pauker's enduring respect for, and close relationship with, her Orthodox Jewish parents and brother throughout her Communist career. Here, it seems, was a case of a fully assimilated Jew's continued primordial loyalties—an anomaly that in other contexts led scholars to reject the "bipolarity" approach to Jewish assimilation and to stress a multiplicity of factors precluding sweeping generalizations on the issue.[38] Though Pauker's Jewish identity should not be overemphasized, her record further proves that Jewish assimilation, including the espousal of revolutionary internationalism, does not necessarily imply nonidentification with other Jews. Yet it is important to underscore Pauker's multifarious and contradictory loyalties. No matter how much her alienation as a Jew and a woman from Romanian society led her to Communism or how much her revolutionary internationalism eroded into a mechanical allegiance to the Soviet Union, in the end

she proved a tenacious patron of the Romanian peasantry—and did so against the will of her Soviet masters. This is one of this study's most important findings.

Researching Ana Pauker was problematic from the outset—not only because of Romania's prolonged resistance to opening its archives but also because of the many pitfalls inherent in Communist Party research. Tony Judt, for one, recently warned of "the danger of overestimating the knowledge and understanding to be gained from newly opened [Communist] archives, however promising they may appear. An 'archive,' after all, . . . is not a fount of truth. The motives and goals of those creating the documents, the limits of their own knowledge, the incorporation of gossip or flattery into a report for someone senior, the distortions of ideology or prejudice have all to be taken into account."[39] Added to this is the reported tendency of Communist leaders, perhaps simply out of habit, initially to preserve conspiratorial methods of the underground when conducting business during the postwar period.[40] At times they resolved to leave no record of certain meetings or ordered stenographers to stop their work when discussions turned particularly sensitive. According to one source, the party leadership sometimes doctored archival material in its perennial pursuit to rewrite history.[41] But such tampering, it seems, usually consisted of "losing" documents. We know, for instance, that General Secretary Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej ordered archival documents destroyed on at least one occasion.[42]

Thus using multiple sources is imperative, to amass as much material from as many sources as possible in order to corroborate information as well as to fill in the inevitable gaps and lapses. The archival evidence documented here therefore includes the transcripts of the Politburo and Secretariat of the Central Committee of the RCP (renamed the Romanian Workers' Party in February 1948), as well as those of the plenaries of the Central Committee, the sessions of the Council of Ministers, the periodic gatherings of regional party secretaries, and meetings of various sections of the Central Committee apparat. Added to this are investigative documents of official party commissions, as well as penal interrogations and declarations from the archives of the former *Securitate* (known today as the Romanian Information Service). Finally, I supplemented archival research with extensive interviews of some eighty witnesses from the inner circle of the party elite—many of whom were able to speak freely for the first time.

Obtaining such vast material enabled me to check the veracity of

certain documents—especially penal interrogations and declarations, which, for obvious reasons, are inherently dubious. In analyzing such sources, I followed several general rules of thumb. First, no penal interrogation can be taken at face value, unless corroborated by other sources. Second, the dates of prison interrogations are crucial. Torture began to be used on certain party members in Romania in the summer of 1952; hence, interrogations before that date are more reliable than those begun after. Third, interrogations by party commissions are more reliable than penal interrogations conducted in prison. This is not, however, foolproof: at times those questioned by party commissions tried to say precisely what their inquisitors wanted to hear, particularly in declarations made soon after being released from prison (perhaps as a condition of release). Thus, fourth, declarations to party commissions made before imprisonment are more reliable than, and take precedence over, those made after imprisonment. Fifth, in any declaration, testimony specifically involving a leader then in power is probably true, as both prisoners and interrogators were loath to misrepresent anything about a current leader for fear of repercussions (though attempts at flattery are always possible). Sixth, being simple propaganda devices, the considerable number of "recollective" declarations that from 1956 on were "requested" of witnesses explicitly to substantiate the party line blaming all Stalinist or leftist "deviations" on the Pauker faction are largely useless for our purposes. (Indeed, a list of leading questions provided to the declarants has been found in the archives.)[43] Still, in some instances declarants contradicted the obvious agenda of their "testimony," attributing a "right-wing" or liberal position to Pauker. I have accepted those accounts as more than likely true, for why would one fabricate such a statement and risk invoking the party leadership's wrath?

Likewise, oral sources have their own limitations: they are often subjective accounts of witnesses who might selectively remember only what most benefits them. Still, though they may be biased in certain areas, testimonials of direct participants provide a reservoir of information simply unavailable in "objective" written sources. "As Gibbon put it, the serious historian 'is obliged to consult a variety of testimonies, each of which, taken separately, is perhaps imperfect and partial'; he added that 'ignorance of this common principle' is itself a major cause of misunderstanding."[44] The challenge is to recognize oral sources' biases, separating the empirically verifiable from wishful thinking or outright falsehoods. I attempted to do this, first, by cross-checking oral testimony with archival sources and, second, by interviewing as many people as

possible to corroborate all claims with those of other witnesses. In the end, excepting dates (which, after fifty years, were invariably problematic), the information I gained from interviews was generally accurate and confirmed by the documents.

The first two chapters of this political biography of Ana Pauker examine her childhood and early revolutionary career. The remainder of the study covers her years in power and subsequent purge. This is not a history of Romanian Communism, nor does it attempt to document Communist actions and policies during Pauker's tenure. Rather, it focuses on Pauker's personal role in the party leadership and her positions on a number of key issues: agrarian policy, party purges, and Jewish emigration. This is only one aspect of what would be a very complex comprehensive history. It must, therefore, be supplemented with a thorough accounting of Communist rule from the perspective of the Romanian people—who have paid, and continue to pay, a painful and bitter price for its imposition.