INTRODUCTION

Opium’s History in China

Timothy Brook and Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi

Without opium, Chinese history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries would have been far different. Opium thrust the states of East Asia, and the imperial Qing state most of all, into the “modern” world of unequal treaties and gunboat diplomacy. It gave foreign powers the financial wherewithal to make colonial empire-building feasible. It presented Chinese states from the Qing empire to the People’s Republic with unparalleled opportunities to intervene in the lives of Chinese people, and indeed demanded that they do so. On those lives opium had an impact greater than that of any other internationally traded commodity. As smokers, Chinese consumed this addictive substance in volumes that beggar comparison with any other item in their history with the exception of tea—though that comparison belittles opium’s potency. As dealers, they set up commercial organizations and networks to handle the trade so as fully to realize its profit-making potential. As peasant farmers, they produced poppy harvests large enough to keep opium in circulation and in consumption long after foreign imports had stopped. As anti-imperialist revolutionaries, they struggled to rid their country of this stain of backwardness and sign of subjugation to foreign commercial and political interests. And as politicians, they devised elaborate regulations to remove the drug from social use and to limit or monopolize distribution so as to keep the huge revenues that opium could yield out of private hands (and sometimes in their own).

Opium’s addictiveness has proven irresistible to buyers, profitable to producers and dealers, alluring to states—and endlessly fascinating to those of us who know it only indirectly through history. With so much power vested in one simple substance, with so much evidently to be won and lost, it is not surprising that opium has inspired more in the way of strong reactions than dispassionate research. The sensationalism that seems
naturally to attach itself to opium is hardly new. As the great early scholar of China’s international trade, H. B. Morse, wrote in 1907 in the introduction to his own examination of this commodity,

Opium presents a thorny subject to handle for any writer. If he is a partisan of the opium trade, his tendency is strong to leave the ground with which he is familiar, that of commercial dealings and statistics, and try to demonstrate the innocuousness of the drug as smoked by the Chinese—to compare it to the relatively harmless ante-prandial glass of sherry. If his mission is to denounce the opium traffic, he invariably seems impelled, by an irresistible inclination, to leave the high moral ground on which he is unassailable, and descend into the arena of facts and figures, with which he is not likely to be so familiar, and among which his predisposition will lead him to pass by or to misinterpret those which make against his case. The writer who tries to investigate the facts with no predisposition to either side, is likely to find himself branded as a trimmer by the one party and a Laodicean on the other, with no opportunity to defend himself.¹

These contrary accusations of indifference—whether to the actual “facts” of trade and consumption on one side, or to the moral responsibility of the traders on the other—continue to color the ways in which opium gets represented in the history of China, and more especially in the history of China’s relations with foreign states. But it is moral failure that prevails in most accounts. A popular historiography targets foreigners as morally culpable for having used opium to intoxicate, impoverish, and demoralize the Chinese people—deploying what Chinese in the twentieth century have dubbed “policies to empoison” (dúhuà zhēngce). The charge originated at the time of the Opium Wars, when Western critics of the trade invoked the principles of fair diplomacy and temperance to condemn British conduct. Karl Marx as a journalist decried the “flagrant self-contradiction of the Christianity-canting and civilization-mongering British Government” for its energetic pursuit of what he called its “free trade in poison.”² Charles King, an American merchant in Guangzhou and a Christian temperance advocate, published a blast against British policy in the spring of 1839—even before the outbreak of armed hostilities—charging that government with duplicity in this “deadly traffic” for allowing the East India Company to be “employed in growing the drug in one place, and disowning it in another.” Noting from published British documents that the number of consumers in China had increased sixfold between 1820 and 1835, King declared that any continuation of the opium trade in the face of official opposition from China could only lead to “the impoverishment of the empire, and the disruption of every tie of morality and order.”³ The strong views of King and Marx, although not universal, were increasingly voiced through the nineteenth century. They were not heard as widely
as some would have liked, as one anti-opium activist observed forty years later:

Although to many persons something is known of the traffic in opium which is being carried on between India and China by the British Government, I am sure that the country generally cannot be aware of the true character of that traffic; of the dreadful wrongs it inflicts upon the Chinese people; of the total disregard it indicates of our high responsibilities in those regions; or of the retribution which must await this country, unless we repent and speedily put away the iniquity from us.⁴

This man hopefully assumed that the trade would not withstand scrutiny in public opinion, were it to be scrutinized. However, it would take several decades before public opinion swung far enough his way to pressure the British government to give up the opium regime on which its empire had once relied.

Those who profited from the trade were dubious about the value of sacrificing economic benefits in favor of moral considerations. They felt that opium was being fetishized to the exclusion of other interests. Some academic scholarship has also questioned the moral superiority of the anti-opium argument. Historians of this stripe insist that the first Opium War was a conflict between an expansive West and a tradition-bound China. The “problem” of opium was secondary to this struggle between states over issues of commercial access and extraterritoriality. It was even suggested that war might just as easily have broken out over molasses, rice, or cotton.⁵ Most Chinese opinion, not surprisingly, has resisted this “collision of cultures” view by arguing that foreigners wantonly, even consciously, used opium to victimize the Chinese people.⁶ A more recent variation on this theme portrays opium as the symbol of China’s sad inability to reform itself so as to resist foreign aggression. This interpretation dovetails nicely with the political claim of the People’s Republic of China that it has succeeded on both points whereas all previous regimes failed, that it has vanquished the foreign threat of opium and strengthened China in the process. Either way, a history based on moral reproach sits well with an aggrieved sense of nationalism among most Chinese, and resonates with many of the Western and Japanese observers who accept guilt for the opium trade.

Although we do not approach the question of opium in nationalistic terms in this book, we do not deny the salience of this critique. Opium was not a harmless commodity like molasses. It was an addictive substance with noxious and sometimes tragic effects for users, their families, and the social networks in which they lived. Abuse of opium eroded self-esteem and shamed both the nation and the colonized individual. Trafficking in opium tilted the balance of global trade to benefit the West, robbing the Qing
empire of the silver that had been flowing in for several centuries. It also
cast a decided pall on the reputation of Chinese living in the diaspora
outside China; opium was viewed as further evidence that this was a per-
nicious and untrustworthy ethnic group.  

Our focus here is less on the debilitating effects of opium on users or
the insult to national pride—although these must be the backdrop to any
study. Rather, we focus on the opium trade’s political and economic effects.
The artificially high price at which opium traded enabled a rate of capital
accumulation that could not but capture the attention of state elites and
create political pressures to confuse moral judgments on trafficking.
Opium was certainly too attractive for Britain or its colonial client states to
resist, so long as its consumption was restricted to Chinese and did not
cross to whites (every colonial state in the region except the Philippines
operated an opium monopoly). The Qing state in its turn was drawn into
complex relations with the individuals, businesses, and states involved with
opium, pursuing endless negotiations with foreigners around the legality
and volume of the trade. Within its own borders, it had to engage in the
multiple tasks of policing, taxing, and educating its people, thus formulat-
ing its own opium regime to manage the flow of opium into and around
China.  

We use the term regime to signify a system in which an authority declares
its right to control certain practices, and develops policies and mechanisms
to exercise that right within its presumed domain. The system can be a
formal organization, such as the League of Nations, that seeks to direct,
modify, or suppress the practices of governments. Or, like the National
Anti-Opium Association, which strove to play a visible public role in China
between 1924 and 1937, a regime can be a network of individuals who
pursue published political goals to achieve a positive social outcome. We
can consider the East India Company in similar terms: a corporate group
operating within a well-organized network of authority to obtain a partic-
ular end—in this case, profitable exchange—through the regulation of
public conduct. The East India Company’s aims happened to be explicitly
economic. Yet the company was nothing if not active in politics, as it had
to be to ensure that Parliament continued to support its monopolies. The
term regime usually signifies a state’s established government. The associa-
tion is apt in this instance because the state was interested in opium. How-
ever, it usually delegated its management to a specialized administrative
system that supervised distribution and revenue (the French in their col-
onies used the term régie). What characterizes a regime more generally is
its ability to impose conformity to policies that are profitable to it in the
public realm.  

Employing this concept allows us to highlight the systematic and com-
prehensive character of drug-control structures and to stress their capacity
for operating in the political realm—and their awareness that it was necessity to do so. The status of opium as a monopoly/contraband commodity makes this kind of political engagement inevitable. Supervision must be exercised at all stages from poppy planting to final sale. Wholesalers, carriers, distributors, retailers, and consumers must be licensed and checked. Supply must be gatekept and traffic policed to cut out competitors at each stage in the lucrative trade. Grouping the many different types of organization under this one rubric allows us to cross standard conceptual boundaries and to recognize the thoroughly political character of contraband trade, whether the entity that manages it is an established state or not.

The opium regimes we consider in this volume include formal state governments, both Chinese and foreign, state agencies, and businesses and civic organizations that acted in the public sphere to induce political outcomes. As the individual chapters show, the complex interweaving of commodity trading, addiction, and state intervention that took place because of opium prompted the formation of regimes to pursue political, economic, and even cultural arrangements that otherwise would not have been possible. The face of East Asia was refigured in the process. To track these changes, we start our coverage in the middle decades of the nineteenth century, by which time opium had become established as a major commodity linking Asian trade with British imperial power, notably through Singapore and Hong Kong. We take the story forward from the emerging patterns of distribution and consumption in the latter part of the nineteenth century, to the multistranded attempts to bring the drug under the supervision of state entities, civic associations, and international bodies during the first three decades of the twentieth. We complete the arc of opium’s history in East Asia by focusing on the crisis in drug control precipitated by Japan’s military adventurism in the 1930s and 1940s, which contributed greatly to the energetic and effective suppression of the opium trade by the Communist government of the People’s Republic of China in the 1950s.

OPIUM TO CHINA

The origins of the opium trade in East Asia can be traced from well before the nineteenth century. Opium was not native to China. Textual evidence of opium in a Chinese pharmacopoecic manual of the eighth century suggests that Muslim traders were already carrying opium from West to East Asia. This long genealogy anchors the history of a medicine that was prescribed for diarrhea up into the twentieth century and for that frequent complaint in traditional medical lore, male impotence. The history of opium as an object of recreational consumption begins much later, not until the seventeenth century, when Dutch and English traders were
extending their ever-growing networks in Southeast Asia into China. They made the drug available by lacing tobacco, a drug substance coming around the globe from the other direction, with opium. This substance, madak, was more potent and pleasurable for smokers to consume than raw opium. The earliest Chinese to consume it, as the court discovered early in the 1720s, were “worthless young men” from Taiwan, as first memorialized to the throne. This text portrays opium as a commodity that “cunning barbarians” used “to trick Chinese out of their money”—a complaint that would be repeated up to the present. When other reports from officials on the south coast followed, the Yongzheng emperor (r. 1723–1735) banned the sale and distribution of opium. His edict of 1729 identified dealers rather than smokers as legally culpable, reserving the damning epithet hanjian (Chinese traitor) for those retailing the opium, not those consuming it.\(^9\)

Subsequent edicts repeated the restrictions and imposed more specific penalties. It is impossible to say whether such legislation had any effect on the trade, which in any case continued to grow, albeit slowly. About two hundred chests (one chest weighs about 63.5 kilograms) of opium entered China in 1729. Sixty years later that amount had only doubled. Most of that increase probably occurred after 1773, when the East India Company began to ship opium to China through subcontracting agents known as “country traders.” The floodgates opened a little wider in the early decades of the nineteenth century, especially after the East India Company lost its monopoly on the opium trade in India in 1813. In response, the annual average for 1817–1820 rose to more than four thousand chests. The imperial government’s response was harsh when it perceived that consumption was spreading from commoners to the elite, and from southerners to residents of the capital and denizens of the court. But new legislation proved powerless against the deadly combination of expanding Chinese demand and skyrocketing British supply. When the activist official Lin Zexu was appointed imperial maritime commissioner in 1838 to stop the opium trade, the annual flow of the drug into China had risen to well over thirty thousand chests.

The British empire could not survive were it deprived of its most important source of capital, the substance that could turn any other commodity into silver. Thus followed the “Opium War” (1839–1842) in response to Lin’s tough measures against foreign opium suppliers. As we have already noted, British opinion was not unified behind this assault on what many perceived as China’s legitimate right to ban imports of opium. “A ghastly bloody farce” is what the satirical magazine Punch called it in 1842.\(^{10}\) The war resulted famously in military defeat and the granting of more concessions to foreign traders, notably the opening of five “treaty ports” along the southeast coast and the abolition of the trade monopoly that the Qing government had imposed on foreign merchants trading into Guang-
zhou (Canton). These concessions further frustrated official attempts to reduce imports. However, the focus at the time was less on the addictive consequences of opium than on the hemorrhaging of the Chinese economy through the rapid outflow of silver to pay for the opium imports.

The British felt frustrated as well, for bilateral trade did not grow as handsomely as some had hoped. By 1854, when China became third after the United States and France among suppliers of imports to an over-extended Great Britain, the value of goods (principally tea and silk) from China totaled more than nine times the value of British exports to China. The gap could be filled only by Indian opium, and in ever-increasing amounts. Without it, Britain could not hope to reverse its dreadfully skewed balance of payments with China into the black—short of asking the British to give up drinking tea (or to grow tea in India, which they eventually did do). Nor could Britain dream of maintaining its ever more expensive presence in India, or paying for its imperial stepping-stones in Singapore and Hong Kong. Nor, as J. Y. Wong has argued, could Britain afford to buy raw cotton from the United States in the huge quantities it needed to keep the mills of Manchester running. The entire imperial system on which Britain’s trade was delicately balanced depended on the funds it could extract from other commodity trades through opium, either in tax or profit. And as the scale of the empire grew, so too did that dependence. Given Britain’s desperate need to maintain its world trade position, a minor incident in 1856 involving a Chinese vessel under expired British registration known as the Arrow was sufficient to launch hostilities a second time in what is called the “Second Opium War” (1856–1860). With the signing of the Treaty of Tianjin at the end of the first phase of this war in 1858, opium was conditionally legalized as an import. The Qing ban on opium may have been only a minor barrier among the forces determining the scale of the trade. Still, without it, blocking the flow of opium into China became even more difficult.

OPIUM IN CHINA

Opium’s place in China expanded, deepened, and changed over the course of the next hundred years, which is why the subject demands a historical perspective. As opium went from medicine to mass drug food, patterns of consumption altered, demand increased, and the understanding of opium use changed. Both Chinese and Europeans could be found who took a benign view of opium, insisting that its moderate consumption was less of a social evil than alcohol abuse in the West. We might be tempted to dismiss this observation as cynical hypocrisy and point to the ban on opium importation into Britain in 1856 as evidence of a double standard. The moderation implicit in Morse’s “ante-prandial glass of sherry” could be found
among some opium smokers. On the other hand, the glass-of-sherry argument falls far short of adequately describing the actual experience of rum consumption among the European poor or the indigenous peoples in European colonies, many of whom spent their adult lives inebriated. To be fair to the comparison, since English courts did not regard rum sots as criminals, neither should opium sots be placed beyond the law. This analogy is implicit in Thomas Allom’s picture of Chinese in an opium den, drawn on his visit to Guangzhou at the time of the First Opium War. In it he shows people in poses of intoxication that viewers would recognize from pictures of the drunken lower classes in England (fig. 1). But middle-class mores in the nineteenth century were disinclined to countenance either type of intoxication. Accordingly, the anti-opium lobby found its supporters in the temperance movement.

The defense of opium as innocuous when consumed in moderation may be sound from a biological, and even a cultural, point of view. But if a historical point of view problematizes the exculpatory judgments one sometimes finds in nineteenth-century writings, it must do so by recognizing that the concept of “opium” was altering more quickly than these observers could guess. Changing notions among Europeans regarding intoxication, pharmaceuticals, and the role of the state in regulating dangerous substances, combined with the burgeoning scale of use in China, was changing the social meaning of opium. At the start of the nineteenth century, opium had been a foreign import consumed mostly by men in the southern coastal region. The very wealthy enjoyed it as an object of recreational consumption, the very poor as a palliative to help manage physical exhaustion and hunger. In the second half of the nineteenth century, conditions changed. Opium was more often locally grown than imported (a successful instance of private import substitution), and it was consumed among all strata of society, including the middle, usually as a homosocial recreation. A pair or small group of men, poorly or well attired, sprawled on an opium couch, became the recognizable image of “Chinese opium smokers”—or more broadly, of “Chinese” tout court—that Westerners liked to photograph. Figures 2 and 3 show smokers at different locations on the social spectrum. Its consumption in turn became more extensively commercialized, retailed not just in elegant halls in the big coastal cities (see fig. 10, pp. 172–173) but in little “smoke shops” (yanshi) throughout the countryside. Opium was also becoming an item of female consumption. Women appear to have smoked less than men, and with lower rates of addiction. But smoke they did, at home alone (see fig. 4) or in the company of other women.

Evidence of all these changes appears in the diary of Takezoe Shin’ichirō, secretary of the Japanese legation in Beijing. When Takezoe traveled from the capital into the western interior in May 1876, he crossed through the province of Shanxi and found it quite overgrown with poppies
and steeped in opium. He estimated with deep dismay—and gross exaggeration—that 70 percent of the people in Shanxi, men and women alike, smoked opium. Takezoe’s prediction of long-term effects ironically anticipates the rhetoric that Chinese would later use to worry about opium and challenge the right of Japanese to peddle the drug in their country:

It is in the nature of opium to consume the energies of the smoker and shorten his life. This poison is worse than venom. I fear that in another one hundred years’ time the four hundred millions of China will be utterly enervated and the race will approach extinction. The Father-and-Mother of the people [Emperor Guangxu] should take measures as soon as possible.\textsuperscript{15}

The individual consequences of drug abuse could be alarming, as Takezoe notes. But the integration of opium into China’s culture and economy was having other effects, as new research is now showing. Poppy production in the poorer interior regions created a golden opportunity for peasant farmers subsisting in otherwise marginal economies. The production and distribution of native opium did many things in the process: facilitate Chinese capital accumulation, expand the money supply, knit internal trade networks, and redistribute wealth away from the coast.\textsuperscript{14} In time it would
also redistribute political power away from the coastal provinces that had initially benefited owing to foreign trade and the rise of a new compradore class and Republican elites.\textsuperscript{15}

The spread of poppies across fields, and of opium across society, was not something to which the Qing state was indifferent. Li Hongzhang, who directed China’s foreign relations during the first two decades of Guangxu’s reign (1876–1907), was not persuaded that imported opium had a place in China. Constrained by China’s international treaty obligations to allow opium into the country, he could only keep the moral argument alive and hope to shame Britain with it. As he put it in a letter of 24 May 1881 to the secretary of the British Society for the Suppression of Opium, “China views the whole question from a moral standpoint; England from a fiscal.” These were state postures, however. “China” included peasants, transport coolies, merchants, and even officials such as Li Hongzhang who found the trade too lucrative—and smokers who found it too pleasurable—to abandon in favor of moral goods. Nor does Li’s opposition of moral to fiscal interests fully characterize the relationship that the Chinese state then had, and more particularly would later have, with opium. Li’s appeal to the

Figure 2. Lower-class opium smokers in Sichuan, as reproduced in Omar Kilborn, \textit{Heal the Sick} (1916), facing p. 110.
foreigners was phrased as morality, but his chief concern was to stop the drain of silver—to which his solution, realized in 1891, was import substitution. As many of the contributors to this volume demonstrate, fiscal concerns could not but influence decisions about whether and how to suppress the traffic. In any case the Qing state was not able to take effective action against the importing of opium, although by the 1890s the amount of opium coming into China began to lessen. Still, it accounted for half of the value of Britain’s exports to China. The decline in this higher-quality imported opium was more than offset by the lower-grade domestic product, however, which was flooding the market without any involvement of foreigners.

A turning point came in 1906. Fired by reformist zeal in the wake of the disastrous Boxer Rebellion (1900), the Qing government launched a major campaign of eradication when assured of the international cooperation needed to make such a campaign viable. The Guangxu emperor issued a series of edicts that autumn calling for phased abolition based on a gradual reduction of native production, just as Takezoe had hoped three decades
before. This program was the first coordinated national campaign in Chinese history to bring drugs under control. Despite lapses during the first decade and a half of Republican rule when central policy proved precariously difficult to impose, the 1906 campaign did cut back opium production and put suppression on the agendas of all subsequent Chinese states. Opium did not suddenly disappear, but the ideal was now firmly established that it should. Only with the advent of an aggressively centralizing regime in 1949 was a Chinese government able take the matter fully in hand.

A notable component of the 1906 suppression campaign was Britain's willingness to comply, on condition that the Chinese government suppress native production. In 1907 the British and Chinese governments negotiated a schedule of import reductions, starting with a three-year trial period, designed to end imports by 1917. By that time, Britain could afford to bow to public pressure and allow its drug trade in China to lapse. As all colonial players in the international opium trade had come to recognize, opium eroded the productive capacity of colonial subjects, fed a stratum of tax farmers who were difficult to control, and generated an unstable revenue.
It was now also a blemish on a regime’s reputation and good grounds for local political opposition. These pressures were making themselves felt by 1906, when imported Indian opium accounted for less than a tenth of all the opium consumed in China, according to official figures. The burden of suppression had thus already shifted from the British Other to the Chinese Self. However, the intransigence of addiction at home would prove as difficult to break in the twentieth century as the intransigence of foreign encroachment had been in the nineteenth.

ILLEGALIZATION AND ITS ILLS

With a suppression campaign underway in the country of greatest use, international negotiations soon followed to bring the opium trade to a close. The United States took the lead by setting up an International Opium Commission in Shanghai in 1909 to explore ways and means of suppressing drugs, particularly opium’s inexpensive and potent derivative, morphine. The United States pressed for a second opium conference at The Hague in the winter of 1912, with a follow-up meeting in 1913. The Hague Convention urged members to restrict opium and its derivatives to medical uses, but allowed those states already involved in producing opium to phase it out gradually through a system of export licensing. The agreement made each contracting power responsible for developing its own legislation, which the United States did in 1914 with the Harrison Act, and Great Britain did in 1920 with the Dangerous Drugs Act. After the First World War, the League of Nations assumed the task of coordinating drug control through its Opium Advisory Committee. The committee’s two conventions at Geneva in the winter of 1924–1925 produced a new agreement to regulate the international drug trade, but one that allowed domestic monopolies to keep running for another fifteen years. A prolonged timetable for suppression encouraged producer states to close their doors to outside scrutiny. But in China’s case the challenge of bringing dangerous drugs under control was vexed by the precariousness of every Chinese regime’s hold over the country, particularly the poppy-growing interior.

The imposition of international controls stimulated another complicating development. By increasing the cost of doing business, it encouraged dealers to process opium into the more potent, less detectable, and far more toxic forms of morphine and heroin through industrial production. As smokable opium was edged aside by refined narcotics, drug use became a more powerfully addictive activity. Trafficking then took on an entirely new immoral hue. Since the consumption of refined narcotics could no longer be moderate, the much higher profits from refined narcotics made the urge to expand the trade irresistible, regardless of the human cost. The opium trade also lost its association—at least among Chinese who regarded
moderate opium smoking as socially acceptable—with the innocent peasant poppy-grower, whose livelihood depended on the drug trade’s continuance.\textsuperscript{21}

The legal consequence of government monopoly was the criminalization of opium traded outside the monopoly. Criminalization did not necessarily translate into effective control, especially because most of those who sold outside the monopoly also worked within it and were engaged simply in selling over quota. Instead, by increasing the profitability of handling a now scarce commodity, illegalization encouraged criminal organizations to get into the trade, thereby paradoxically tightening opium’s grip on society. Thus, as the new international regulations came into force, states and gangs found themselves in intense competition over the trade. They also found themselves doing business with each other to create mutually satisfying arrangements, with states using gangsters for political purposes and gangsters gaining political influence. As Brian Martin has noted in the context of 1920s Shanghai, “Prohibition encouraged the growth of a vast, illicit traffic that provided the economic basis for the development of organized crime in the major cities and helped define the ways in which criminal organization interacted with the world of politics.”\textsuperscript{22} The consumption of contraband drugs not only created the financial basis for the spectacular growth of organized crime in the 1920s and 1930s. It also provided the newly emergent and unstable Guomindang state with revenue. Moreover, this also gave the Guomindang state the intelligence and strong-arm capacities of organized crime that it felt it needed to silence its political enemies.

The tide of international legalization and domestic criminalization occurred at the same time that public associations and spokesmen were mounting anti-opium propaganda campaigns to persuade consumers to give up the drug and to pressure the government when they felt it was not sufficiently vigilant on the issue. Their rhetoric, which highlighted national, moral, and personal consequences for the smoker, was largely identical to the government’s. The mildest appeal was to the health of the nation, which opium was construed as undermining (see fig. 13, p. 255). A more powerful appeal to delegitimize opium consumption associated it discursively with other vices, most particularly prostitution (see fig. 5). During the Republican era, this way of gendering the opium vice was not difficult to effect, given the proliferation, at least in Shanghai, of “flower-smoke rooms” (\textit{huayan shì}), unlicensed brothels where opium was also retailed.\textsuperscript{23} The most dramatic appeal in the anti-opium propaganda of the time was not the shame of moral or even national debilitation, but the threat of personal ruin and execution (fig. 6). In actual fact, however, execution was for opium addicts a rare and exemplary penalty, being reserved rather for those who dealt in refined narcotics.
Figure 5. An anti-opium cartoon associating opium addiction with prostitution, which appeared in the inaugural issue of the magazine *Judu zhuanke* 1, no. 1 (December 1935): 19. It illustrates a story revealing how one puff taken at the behest of a prostitute was enough to addict a man for life.

**JAPAN AND OPIUM**

As imperial Britain extricated itself from the nineteenth-century opium regime it had operated in China, imperial Japan began to assemble its own. Japan’s first colonial experience with an opium regime was in Taiwan, where it began a successful program to control addiction after occupying the island in 1895. With their expansion to the Asian mainland, first to Korea and then to Manchuria, Japanese discovered the irresistible power of opium to accumulate capital. Imperial Japanese subjects were smuggling opium into China as early as the 1890s, but the nature and scale of their activities began to change decisively during the interwar period, when first the great zaibatsu corporations and then the imperial government itself smuggled not just opium but refined drugs (first morphine, then heroin).Japan ratified the four international treaties between 1912 and 1931 that banned the sale and export of narcotic drugs for nonmedicinal purposes. But Japan soon found itself under censure in the League of Nations, where former trafficking nations criticized it for violating those treaties.

The importance of opium in Japan’s calculations increased exponen-
Figure 6. The descent of the opium smoker through addiction, rehabilitation, poverty, and execution, as depicted by a poster produced by the municipal Public Health Bureau of Beijing (1936). Panels, right to left, top to bottom: a. “Before ever smoking opium, he is healthy in body and content in spirit.” b. “After starting to smoke opium, he bankrupts his family, loses his job, confuses his mind, and reduces his body to kindling.” c. “Because he smokes opium, he is arrested and forced to undergo detoxification in an addiction treatment clinic.” d. “After being rehabilitated in the clinic, his health is restored and he is approved for discharge.” e. “After being rehabilitated, he goes back to smoking opium.” f. “Nabbed again by the police.” g. “The only thing to do now is take him out and execute him!” Reproduced with permission of the Hoover Institution, Stanford California.

In this period, particularly during its Asia-Pacific War (1931–1945), particularly in the early phases, Japanese opium operations in China sprang from three motives. First, opium funded undercover operations that facilitated aggression against Chinese territory outside of Japan’s control. Second, opium profits went to right-wing societies in Japan, and there is even some evidence linking laundered wartime opium monies with postwar conservative parties. Finally, and above all, the Japanese imperial government needed to finance a series of increasingly expensive client states in occupied China; opium
seemed the only expeditious way to do this. According to the last Qing emperor, Pu Yi, whom the Japanese installed as head of state in Manchukuo, that puppet regime received 300 million yuan, or about one-sixth of its total revenues, from opium.27 The Nationalist Party (Guomindang) averred that Japan used drugs to poison China into submission, and some Japanese war criminals detained on the mainland, such as Furumi Tadayuki, testified to that effect in the 1950s.28 But as Timothy Brook and Kobayashi Motohiro argue in their chapters, the Japanese used opium mainly because it raised sorely needed revenue—just as it did for Chinese warlords, criminals, the Guomindang, and even the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).29 Imperial Japan lacked the wherewithal to be a colonial power by conventional means. Its leaders therefore latched on to opium as a poor empire’s fiscal panacea.

Japanese opium operations in China developed in three overlapping stages.30 Stage one lasted from the 1890s through the Manchurian Incident (1931), which ended with the Tanggu Truce in May 1933. During this stage, imperial subjects smuggled drugs into Chinese treaty ports under the cloak of extraterritoriality. These riff-raff carpetbaggers or “continental adventurers” (tairiku rônin), as they were known, enjoyed at least tacit support from consular authorities in treaty port concessions and from imperial armed forces in colonial areas such as the Guandong (Kwantung) Leased Territories. The volume of morphine that Japanese were bringing into China by the 1910s was considerable. Of the close to fifty thousand kilograms of morphine that Japanese dealers bought from Great Britain in 1915, for example, most was going to China under extraterritorial privilege.31 Japanese treaty port officials did little to staunch the flow, and were discouraged from doing so when they tried. Yoshida Shigeru, a postwar prime minister of Japan who at the time was serving as consul in Tianjin, described the situation in that city in December 1922:

Of the 5,000 Japanese residents in Tianjin, 70 percent deal in morphine or other illegal substances. Almost all businesses traffic in these goods, even eateries and general stores, not just medicinal firms. . . . Police crackdowns here are not as strict as in Dalian, and the consulate’s policy is to arraign only the most flagrant violators. We prosecute only those caught by [Chinese] customs authorities or those uncovered in other crimes. We don’t arrest criminals or investigate crimes on our own. If we did so thoroughly, no Japanese would be left in Tianjin.32

Even when a Japanese subject came before consular officials for drug dealing, penalties were light. In his memoirs, Ishii Itarō recalled the trial of a Korean over which he presided as judge in 1918. After he handed down a six-month jail term, the consular police chief pulled him aside and said, “Look, we’d blow our budget if we had to feed that guy for six months.
Consul Yoshida [Shigeru] would have said two months at the most.” Ishii commented: “After all, I was still a rank amateur, so my first experience was a real knee-slapper. After three or four tries, I got better.”

Stage two in the history of Japanese opium operations began in June 1933 with the creation of a demilitarized zone (DMZ) in East Hebei as stipulated by the Tanggu Accords, and ended with the establishment of the Kōain (Asia Development Board) in December 1938. Trafficking by carpetbaggers continued during this stage, with connivance from consular officials, but it expanded south of the Great Wall into East Hebei. Only Chinese units were actually forced to leave this DMZ, whereas Japanese forces and their campfollowers could enter at will. The zone was placed under Yūn Rugeng’s regime for East Hebei Autonomy and the Containment of Communism, set up in November 1935. There, imperial subjects could sell opium with impunity. Furthermore, zaibatsu such as Mitsubishi shōji and Mitsui bussan liberally interpreted provisions in the Tanggu Accords to extend the DMZ out to sea and smuggle Iranian opium into north China under formal Foreign Ministry direction. Trafficking was no longer confined to individuals in Guandong or the treaty ports; the zaibatsu now operated in China proper with imperial government backing.

Stage three came with the creation in December 1938 of the Kōain, headed by the premier plus his army, navy, foreign, and finance ministers—a body that later became the Japanese government’s Greater East Asia Ministry. The Kōain ran opium operations through its Kalgan branch office, working hand in glove with the Mengjiang regime in Mongolia, which was also headquartered there after its creation in 1939. Eguchi Keichi, the historian who spearheaded academic research on what he terms “Japan’s opium war,” shows that Japanese officials controlling this puppet regime encouraged local consumption of the drug and taxed profits from it. They set up monopolies, got farmers to grow poppies on a large scale, bought up the harvests, processed the sap into raw opium, refined that opium into heroin and morphine, and exported these narcotics to other parts of China and to Southeast Asia. Thus, in stage one individuals trafficked in treaty port concessions and colonies under the protection of extraterritoriality. In stage two the zaibatsu extended smuggling south of the Great Wall by exploiting provisions of the Tanggu Truce under Foreign Ministry direction. Finally in stage three the Japanese imperial government itself manufactured and exported narcotics from Mengjiang into other regions of China.

Japan tried to parry foreign criticism of its opium operations in China. But its trafficking was condemned by the League of Nations in the 1930s and continued to be exposed by non-Japanese observers in the 1940s. The Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal took up the issue from 30 August to 6 September 1946, and behind-the-scenes questioning of principals such as
Tanaka Ryūkichi yielded still more information to Allied prosecutors. In their own postwar settling of accounts, the Guomindang government executed 149 imperial Japanese subjects on drug-related charges as B- and C-class war criminals, and the People’s Republic detained war criminals involved with drugs until 1956. Yet despite the prominence that Japan enjoyed as a narcotics regime during the war, its record as a narcotic imperialist is much less well known than Britain’s.

THE ARC OF OPIUM’S HISTORY

This collection of new research on the opium trade in East Asia covers the period from roughly 1839 to 1952. Our point of departure, 1839, was the year in which the Qing emperor sought to impose a new regime for opium on two fronts: he dispatched Commissioner Lin Zexu to Canton, and he ordered an investigation of opium coming into China over the northwest border. Our terminus, 1952, marks the final suppression of opium in China, at least for this stage of its history. Our purpose in bringing this wide-ranging work together is to introduce fresh perspectives on a topic that, until recently, most historians assumed was adequately understood and therefore of little interest. In the last few years the scholarly community has started to see opium as a more complex phenomenon with a multi-stranded history. This is not to say that our contributors dismiss the moral judgments long since passed on the opium trade. But we seek to move beyond these conventions. Our chapters investigate the complex global and local processes that channeled the drug to and from certain places, created particular markets, and extracted enormous volumes of wealth. All of these actions entailed costs, and some yielded benefits. Costs and benefits affected victims and victimizers differently. Our intention is less to repeat the narrative of British, or even Japanese, victimization of China than to explore more fully how costs and benefits arose and played out in political contexts.

The book is organized in four parts. Part 1, “The International Context,” introduces the nineteenth-century foundations of the opium trade. Gregory Blue tracks the economic and political considerations involved in creating the British opium regime in Asia. He locates opium in what he terms a “cohesive trade structure” that Britons, Indians, and Chinese created through the energetic pursuit of profitable trade. Britain dominated, and gained greatest advantage from, this structure. A “bifurcated framework of formal colonialism and the ‘imperialism of free trade’” characterized the British presence in Asia in the nineteenth century. Through it, Britain was able to impose the legalization of opium in China after 1858, and thereby secure an important financial pillar of its far-flung political empire. Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi then turns our gaze to nineteenth-
century Japan. The Tokugawa and Meiji regimes, both before and after 1868, enjoyed almost total success at controlling opium within Japan’s borders, and both used this control to enhance state consolidation and centralize power. Just as British politicians and merchants had established an opium regime in China earlier in the nineteenth century, Meiji Japanese moved to establish their own. Japan would eventually go beyond Britain by selling not just opium but also refined narcotics, doing so in the face of ever-mounting Chinese resistance and international censure. Wakabayashi examines the historical origins of the Japanese involvement in this opium trade by analyzing changing Japanese views of opium use in Qing China. He shows how the mechanisms of sakoku (national isolation) furthered political consolidation in Tokugawa Japan, and he argues that Meiji Japan used opium to move away from being a co-victim of Western imperialism, to become a co-predator in China.

In Part 2, “Distribution and Consumption,” we consider how opium was being distributed and consumed in China and by whom. Here, to a considerable extent, we move away from the conventional focus on imperialists operating from the outside and shift attention to the pivotal roles that Chinese played in enjoying opium and developing the trade in it. All five chapters in this part focus on locations at the interstices of China’s relations with the outside world. Carl Trocki shows how much the development of Singapore, the most important opium entrepôt between India and China, hinged on Chinese economic networks. Opium in Singapore, as in other colonial possessions, was handled through privately held monopolies granted by the colonial state, known as “opium farms.” These were owned and operated by Chinese kongsi or shareholding partnerships (gongsis in Mandarin, now the standard term for a limited liability company). The kongsi discovered that exploiting the Malay hinterland could only be profitable if they were able to recoup labor costs through opium sales. This arrangement is what in turn made British colonialism affordable in Singapore. As Trocki has noted elsewhere, “Opium was the trap in which the kongsi economies were captured by colonial capitalism. Having trapped the local economies, British merchants were able, perhaps even forced, to leave the details of the opium trade to others, but they relied on its presence.”

Without this well-oiled link in the chain of opium shipments and receipts, the British empire could not have bridged the distance between its colony in India and its market in China. However, when the British attempted to replicate their Singapore success in Hong Kong, they found it impossible to trap the local economy there, thus exposing any notion of establishing a genuine colonial foothold in China as impossible. As Christopher Munn shows in the next chapter, the British quickly abandoned the one flawed attempt by Scotsmen to run an opium farm in Hong Kong and shrewdly gave it to Chinese merchants who could turn a profit. Marx may have crit-
icized the British monopolistic position as “incompatible with the development of legitimate commerce.”40 But in fact the local integuments of commercial activity throughout East Asia derived form and vigor from the power of opium to concentrate capital.

David Bello’s chapter moves us away from the coastal periphery and the agents of colonialism operating there, which past studies of the opium trade have made familiar. He chooses instead to look at the networks by which Muslim traders brought opium into China across the northwest border. His work demonstrates that before 1839 the Qing drug problem was not solely or even mainly a coastal issue involving the British. He also indicates, as Munn does, that without energetic Chinese mercantile involvement, the opium trade could never have penetrated the Chinese economy to the extent that it did. Motohiro Kobayashi then takes us to another periphery, this time the northeast coast. He tracks the activities of another group of outsiders, Japanese and Korean, who plied the drug trade later in the nineteenth century in the port city of Tianjin. The profitability of this trade, which spread rapidly and produced revenues quickly, would lure Japanese imperial government organs to take it over in the twentieth century.

In the final chapter of part 2, Alexander Des Forges moves from distribution to consumption to examine the opulent world of high-class recreational consumption in coastal Shanghai. At one level opium may have been tainted as a noxious foreign substance, yet it enjoyed a conspicuous place in the new urban culture of leisure that the hybridizing environment of Sino-foreign contact was creating. The culture of consumption and enjoyment that took shape in Shanghai would never have emerged without the opium that was streaming in from India, through Hong Kong and the treaty ports as well as over the northwest border. And yet opium would not have continued to circulate within China without the effective demand that made this appropriation of opium into the culture of consumption possible.

Part 3, “Control and Resistance,” turns to the ways in which national and regional efforts to control or suppress opium served to promote the integration and penetration of the modern Chinese state. In these chapters, state is used to signify political regimes with different orders of magnitude. All imply greater consolidation and centralized control vis-à-vis centrifugal forces such as local elites, though at different levels. Examples would be the Qing empire as a whole, provincial or warlord or collaborator regimes, and the Guomindang. This term state connotes the conditions that those regimes aspired to attain as often as it indicates a political entity powerful enough to assert effective control over administration and revenue throughout its realm. Contrary to what one might expect, these chapters show that opium contributed to, rather than detracted from,
strengthening state power by co-opting local elites, and even peasants, into new state structures. This effect occurred whether the state’s aim was to suppress the drug outright, or to control it gradually and thereby milk the trade for revenue, at least temporarily. Whether controls worked depended on many factors, not all of which functioned as the state might wish. These included state power (which in China before 1949 was variable and weak), the profitability of the revenue, the cooperation of local elites, the ability of poppy-growing peasants to survive by disguising their poppies or cultivating other crops, and the degree of domestic and international pressure brought to bear on the opium trade.

The Chinese state faced considerable challenges in establishing opium regimes. Getting a grip on opium meant penetrating local society to an extent that went beyond normal Qing imperial practices. Bin Wong begins this section with a chapter on Chinese state-making and the impact of opium control on that process. He looks back to earlier efforts by the Qing state to control society in order to appreciate its impressive campaign of 1906 as an attempt “to resecure a neo-Confucian social order.” The difficulties that modern China faced in its state-making enterprise would have been simplified had the British not imported opium into China, he argues. In that sense China “bore the burden of opium.” But the great challenge of framing new state institutions and state-society relations would have been on the agenda in any case. In the next two chapters, Judith Wyman and Joyce Madancy look at two provinces to assess the Qing suppression campaign. Wyman stresses how successful representatives of the central government were in enforcing the 1906 campaign in Sichuan. By contrast, Madancy focuses on the local side of the equation in Fujian. She describes how provincial officials worked to win the cooperation of elites and co-opt them into their power structure, using opium policy to orchestrate new relations between the state and local elites.

Moving further into the Republican period, Edward Slack studies how those relations played out in the National Anti-Opium Association, set up by activists within and beyond the Chinese Christian community to press the state to rid China of opium. The movement struck a sympathetic chord among some sectors of the emerging urban elite. However, the Guomindang state was not keen to have a competitor regime in spheres crucial for state-building and revenue. Hence it used both co-optation and coercion to force the association to disband in 1937, just nine days before Japan’s invasion. The Guomindang felt pressured not just to take up the cause of opium control, but to take it over. Thus arose the second “successful” opium campaign in China, which Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) mounted in 1935. In his study of it, Alan Baumlter describes how Jiang was able to gain the upper hand in the trade over his warlord counterparts by getting almost complete control over supply and distribution. Jiang worked on the
fine line between control and suppression. Whether the ambitious six-year plan would have achieved its declared goal of total elimination cannot be known, for the plan was thrown into chaos when Japan invaded two years later. Opium suppression lost its priority at the beginning of the war, but the Guomindang government rapidly re-emphasized it as a key component of the war effort and kept the original plan going in west China.

Lucien Bianco rounds out part 3 from the other side of opium suppression by shifting our attention down to the cultivators whose livelihoods, and even survival, were directly affected by the state’s opium regimes. Growing opium could be a life-saving option for cultivators in bad times and a great boon in good. Suppression and control led to a nightmare of oppressive demands by tax agents (when revenue demands were uppermost) or crop destruction by opium-control officials (when suppression was on the agenda), or sometimes both in the same season! The unevenness with which the state policed the rural sector in the Republican era added to the instability of the relations between them and the high degree of suspicion with which they viewed each other. Guomindang campaigns made progress in the 1930s. But the project to rid China of opium—like the larger project that loomed behind it, the consolidation of the central state—remained far from complete when Japan invaded in 1937.

Japan’s occupation of north China and its invasion of central China in the summer of 1937 forced all these projects into abeyance. The fourth and final part of this volume, “Crisis and Resolution,” examines the tremendous impact of Japan’s onslaught. Japan threw existing opium regimes into disarray, but then quickly reconstituted them in ways designed to increase revenues to itself and the client states it set up to run its occupation. Timothy Brook reconstructs the formation of the agencies of collaboration in central China in 1938 under the aegis of a state entity called the Reformed Government, through which Japan sought, among other goals, to manage the opium/narcotics trade. He concludes that the revenue opium generated was essential for keeping both the regime and its military patrons financially solvent. But solvency came at a cost of legitimacy, which even collaborators needed to claim. Motohiro Kobayashi in the next chapter carries the story forward into the Wang Jingwei regime, which replaced the Reformed Government in Nanjing in 1940 and survived to the end of war. Wang strove for a higher degree of autonomy from Japan than did the leaders of the Reformed Government, but he was placed in a tug-of-war over opium revenues because of Japan’s need to purchase war matériel from other collaborator regimes in China. Without opium, Kobayashi concludes, Japan could not have waged “total war.” It was beyond Wang Jingwei’s capacity to resist that necessity. A dramatic public incident in that tug-of-war was the anti-opium movement that broke out in the streets of Nanjing in December 1943, which Mark Eykholt reconstructs in the
following chapter. University students took to the streets to smash opium dens and to demand that the Wang regime take a more active role in stamping out opium consumption—and by so doing, loosen Japan’s control. The Chinese in occupied areas were not as quiescent as resistance propaganda liked to suggest.

The powerfully negative wartime image of opium as a drug of conquest—however melodramatized by Guomindang propaganda—may have helped to inspire the political resolve and popular support that allowed the Communist Party to mount suppression campaigns in 1950 and 1952. This would bring the trade forcibly to an end within just a few years of the party’s assumption of state power. That process is the subject of the final chapter in the volume. Zhou Yongming is the first scholar to do research on the Chinese Communist campaigns to suppress opium. The scarcity of materials on these campaigns he attributes to the pressured international environment in which they were carried out, at a time when the Chinese government did not wish its difficulties with opium to be made known to a hostile United States, with which it was unofficially at war in Korea. The success of the suppression campaign in the early 1950s was relatively complete, although it has been eroded since the 1980s with the decline of state socialism.

CONCLUSIONS

The study of opium in East Asian history is an ongoing project, and whatever conclusions can be drawn at this stage are provisional. If there are two we would offer, they are these: First, despite the common assumption that opium is a single, unitary thing, it was historically many things and was capable of undergoing transformation from one to another. As a physical substance, it was the sap exuding from the head of ripe poppies that Indian and Chinese peasants collected and sold, the tarry paste that merchants boiled up into marketable form, the commodity that businessmen used to capitalize commercial and industrial ventures elsewhere, the raw material that wholesalers refined to produce more intense narcotics, and the toxins running in smokers’ veins. As a substance observed, it was a palliative medicine, an item of recreational consumption, an addictive drug food, a form in which capital could be stored, a sign of national and ethnic degradation, and a mechanism for transferring wealth and power between regions and nations. The variability of opium’s identity is confirmed and further complicated by David Courtwright’s sensible reminder that “what we think about addiction very much depends on who is addicted.” For opium to be the drug of choice for the wealthy is very different, in culture and consequence, than when it is the drug of sole resort for the poor. And when opium is the drug of Chinese, rather than of Britons or Japanese, it rein-
forces assumptions about which race or ethnic group is mastering history and which is mastered by it.

Our second conclusion follows from the first. Given the polymorphous character of a substance that changed in meaning according to its context, opium generated a wide range of problems for those who opposed its consumption. These problems were never amenable to straightforward solutions, although many were tried, from modest control to violent suppression. Because opium could be many things to many people, it usually eluded whatever controls that regimes, legislators, and moralists placed on it. The narcotic, economic, political, and even cultural pulls of opium went so strongly in favor of its continued use—despite the increasingly popular perception that opium was a bad thing. Almost every proposal for its limitation foundered as soon as it was launched.

We hope that this volume will map out a new state of the field. Our contribution fits together the numerous new studies now appearing into a coherent temporal arc: from British imperialism in the nineteenth century, to Chinese capital-formation and state-making earlier in the twentieth century, to Japanese imperialism through the 1930s and 1940s, and finally to the resolution of that long phase of China’s “opium problem” in the 1950s. Each of the chapters furnishes a piece in this long arc. With this structure in place, it now may be possible to appreciate more fully the complex history of the buying, selling, and banning of opium over the past two centuries. It was a history of exploitation favoring few at the expense of many. But what kept it going were vast complicities that are best understood by probing the economics, politics, and cultural practices at work below the surface—not by repeating the moral claims that glossed the surface. This phase of opium’s history in East Asia is over, but our understanding of it will continue to grow as scholars delve more thoroughly into the historical records of the trade and as we reflect more deeply on the narcotics-based regimes that flourish in our own time.

NOTES

5. For examples see Chang, *Commissioner Lin and the Opium War*, p. 15; Morse, *International Relations of the Chinese Empire*, 1:539; Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, *East Asia*, p. 136.
6. Communist historiography before and after 1949 was more moderate,
emphasizing only the economic aspect. For example, Fan Wenlan in his authoritative Zhongguo jindai shi stresses the role of opium as the “decisive commodity in Sino-British trade” (p. 5). Equally reticent to voice moral arguments was Hu Sheng, whose study of imperialism was in the 1950s the most widely read account of China’s nineteenth-century foreign relations. Hu declined to pursue the notion that the British were deliberately poisoning or enslaving the Chinese people, and instead saw opium more simply as a device in Britain’s larger imperialist strategy to impose a colonial relationship on China; see his Imperialism and Chinese Politics, pp. 12–17. This disinclination to emphasize opium may be related to the political context of opium suppression in the 1950s that Yongming Zhou explores in the last chapter of this volume.

7. On the racialization of drug use in Canada, see Carstairs, “‘Deport the Drug Traffickers.’” Filipinos, conditioned to regard the Chinese in their midst with suspicion, blamed them for introducing the vice of opium to the Philippines; Alip, Chinese in Manila, p. 21.

8. We are indebted to Alan Baumler for his suggestions regarding the concept of “regime.”


12. This argument is presented in Newman, “Opium Smoking in Late Imperial China.” Lodwick, Crusaders against Opium, pp. 76–85, argues that those who represented opium as relatively harmless were not disinterested in their advocacy, as H. B. Morse suspected (see note 1).

13. This excerpt from the diary of Takezo Shin’ichirō (1842–1917) is quoted in Keene, Modern Japanese Diaries, p. 141. Oka Senjin (1832–1913), in his travelogue of China in 1884–1885, registers the same shock and dismay that caused many Japanese to abandon the sinophilia with which they were culturally prepared to regard China; see Fogel, Literature of Travel in the Japanese Rediscovery of China, pp. 75–77.


19. The history of international controls is sketched in Walker, Opium and Foreign Policy, pp. 14–19, 35–40; Lodwick, Crusaders against Opium, pp. 137–44; and Meyer and Parssinen, Webs of Smoke, pp. 21–33. As the hosts of the Hague conferences, the Dutch were in the awkward position of having to go along with the implementation of international controls while at the same time wanting to protect the commercial
INTERRODUCTION

interests that their opium monopoly in Java served, in regard to which see Rush, *Opium to Java*, pp. 232–33.


22. Martin, *Shanghai Green Gang*, p. 45. For the nexus between drugs and politics in the 1930s, see Wakeman, *Policing Shanghai*, pp. 120–31, 260–75.


27. In *From Emperor to Citizen*, p. 384, Aisin-Gioro Pu Yi quotes the figure from Furumi Tadayuki; he gives no dates for the period covered.


30. Much of the information that follows, but not the periodization, is from Eguchi, *Nit-Chū ahen sensō*.


33. Ishii, *Gaikokukan no isshō*, pp. 38–40. This passage is cited in Liu Mingxiu [Itō Kiyoshi], *Taiwan tochi to ahen mondai*, pp. 134–36, and Eguchi, *Shiryō*, p. 27n. 31, though both, for complicated postwar political reasons, decline to identify the defendant as Korean.


36. E.g., the Institute of Pacific Relations published Frederick Merrill’s *Japan and the Opium Menace* in 1942.


38. The reason for this is explored in Wakabayashi, "Japanese Wartime Operations and Postwar Political Correctness."


41. Courtwright, *Dark Paradise*, p. 3.