

1 Introduction

Citizenship, Markets, and the State

Appearing to urbanites as aimless and ominous as errant waters, China's sojourning peasant transients in the cities are outsiders, out of place.¹ In their millions, they seem to city folk and their supervisors to be streaming in, as if incessantly, out of control.² In the minds of their metropolitan detractors, they are aptly labeled: they are unrooted noncitizens, wanderers; they are the elements of the "floating population."³

The march of markets into the municipalities from the early 1980s—with the transition from socialism and the steady evisceration of the rules and institutions of the planned economy—is precisely what made this peasant migration possible.⁴ But the many attendant externalities of this spread of capitalism were double-edged: they served to heighten the feelings among settled residents of a negative impact issuing from the arrival in town of the transients.⁵ This process is still unfolding, as of the second half of the 1990s.

This volume charts the complex clash in Chinese cities between incoming noncitizens, the markets that bore them, city residents, and the officials and changing institutions of the old Communist urban political community. Its major point is that citizenship does not come easily to those outside the political community whose arrival coincides with deepening and unaccustomed marketization.

Thus it challenges formulations, such as those associated with the work of T. H. Marshall, that predict a positive and unilinear connection between the rise of capitalism and the creation of citizens; it also engages theories, like those of Barrington Moore and S. M. Lipset, that correlate commercialism or urbanization with the birth or the presence of democratic institutions.⁶ Even if these scholars are proven correct over the very long run, my story paints a portrait of the often ugly time in between.

In China in the 1980s and 1990s, this pair of forces—markets and migrants (both, initially, intentionally summoned up by top state officials)⁷—was sharply unsettling to popular perceptions among city people and to the agents and institutions of the state as well. It was so because of the collision of these forces with entitlements and expectations long and inextricably bound to the institutions of the prior regime. But, to complicate the picture, the state-in-transition continued for a time to dispense its wonted welfare to its own employees. If migrants could get a temporary job in a state firm, the job might lend them a modicum of mercy while in town and even offer a lowly, second-class citizenship.

For the institutions that comprised the socialist-era urban political system in China had a distinctly compassionate cast, certainly for their urban charges. They enabled the system to ground its legitimacy in two key functions, both of which the state was prepared to fulfill for urbanites, the “proper” citizens (*gongmin*) of cities: it provided and it watched. That is, socialist city managers for decades administered their system through a combination of welfare and control, in the terms of Andrew Walder, a kind of “organized dependence”;⁸ or, alternatively, a solicitude paired with surveillance, to quote from Janos Kornai.⁹

This organized solicitude was made possible as urban administrations granted all officially lodged residents a badge of proper affiliation, the urban household registration or *hukou*, and assigned all working residents to a “unit,” a *danwei*, charged with overseeing their sustenance and their behavior.¹⁰ In addition to the welfare benefits and an array of services afforded employees by their work units after the mid-1950s, the city also allocated all the daily necessities of city residents via rations. In the prereform-era days, no one was eligible for the perquisites of urban life who was not a registered member of that municipality’s population. While urbanites from another city could sometimes transfer their official household register among cities (with official approval or at official behest), ordinary peasants could almost categorically never do so.¹¹

As later chapters reveal, with the coming of the country cousins, in the main (but not under all circumstances) municipal gatekeepers sought to withhold the usual, and quite substantial, privileges—the welfare—of urban existence from them. At the same time, the outsiders themselves, when not employed by any city “unit,” typically slithered away from the controlling constrictions that had customarily tied “regular” urban dwellers to their moorings. Thus, toward the great bulk of the peasants newly in the cities, there was a bonding of the state’s refusal to grant sustenance

and security with its inability to dominate.¹² At the same time there was a reciprocal effect: because of the peasants' presence, the former rules and norms about community and inclusion, and about the official allocation of public goods in the city, came under assault.

In many ways this so-called floating population joined an ancient saga. Leaving home and becoming "other" is an experience known to multitudes of millions around the globe and over the centuries who stepped across the borders that defined their identities to brave a life in a realm unknown. Like migrants elsewhere, China's mobile peasants appeared to be cut loose and drifting, seemingly pouring out in waves, sometimes in torrents, into regions whose citizens and their governors—though usually well cognizant of the economic contributions of these sojourners—often reacted to them with distaste and repulsion at worst, with profound ambivalence at best.

For migration throws up a specter of an overwhelmed state, of assaulted citizenry, and of rampant social turmoil: the vision of the optimists—that it can simply deposit docile toilers who will become assimilated settlers, acquiescent and conforming to the mode, enriching the nation—seems to many to be just a mirage. Put starkly, the immigration of "foreigners," whether internal farmers or truly "other" folks from afar, frequently entails confrontation. That confrontation, while not without its benign dimensions, is often fraught, surely at first, with dangers and hostility for both parties. The broadest themes (and even many of the details) are everywhere the same: these people are viewed as an incursion on locals' perceived deserts; they quite typically carry the brunt of discriminatory treatment.

I present this encounter in the urban areas of China at the end of the century as a contest over citizenship (and its changing content) waged primarily between the state—with its socialist system disappearing—and an enormous set of seemingly interloping peasant migrants who jostled uneasily with it, in a context of accelerating market transition.

Citizenship

Why citizenship? In late twentieth-century urban China, markets and the migrants they bore together challenged the city *hukou*, a most fundamental political institution, one that really amounted to an emblem of (urban) citizenship. The very presence of this pair of newcomers in town precipitated a crucial systemic alteration. As one Chinese writer phrased it,

The floating population is summoning the household registration system, which is based on stable management, to transform into [one of] dynamic management.¹³

After migration took off in the early 1980s, Chinese journalists explicitly compared outsiders making their lives in the city to inferior citizens. One, discussing a governmental decision of 1984 that permitted peasants to acquire a new special *hukou* (household registration) for residing in towns, wrote of “the third kind of citizen, who had left the ranks of the peasantry and become an urbanite, but whose *hukou* is not the same as a real urban *hukou*.” Another sympathized with “peasants in the city” who, “because they still have the rural *hukou* while living in the city, have a very low social position, no house, no grain and oil supply, no labor guarantee, and who, therefore, become second-class citizens.”¹⁴

Indeed, the exclusion of peasants from state-sponsored benefits in cities¹⁵ entailed their rejection from what Harry Eckstein terms “civic inclusion,” or “access to institutions that provide capacities and resources.”¹⁶ For, as a Chinese scholar remarked, the *hukou*—very much as a badge of citizenship in a Western society would do—determined a person’s entire life chances, including social rank, wage, welfare, food rations (when these were in use), and housing.¹⁷

Any individuals living in a Chinese city without urban registration there were denied free compulsory education, deprived of many of the perquisites that went with permanent employment in state-owned factories, could normally not receive free health care, and could not even be conscripted into the army from their urban home.¹⁸ Without the *hukou*, transients were virtual foreigners within the cities of their own country because this elemental fact of urban life guaranteed citizenship there and the “goods and opportunities that shape life chances.”¹⁹ Indeed, at the March 1995 session of the National People’s Congress, then minister of labor Li Boyong actually proposed establishing a “system similar to international passport and visa requirements,” with the purpose of curbing transprovincial migration!²⁰ Thus, even as there were similarities between, on the one hand, the reactions and behavior of Chinese urbanites toward incoming peasants in China and, on the other, those of national citizens toward aliens in other “host” environments around the world, in this case the “strangers” who were despised were China’s own people; peasants from China’s own countryside were put outside the pale.²¹

Perhaps most centrally, as with residence requirements aimed at excluding foreign immigrants from political participation in liberal states,

the Chinese *hukou* even served as a means of preventing floating farmers from exercising the franchise in a city (for whatever it was worth in socialist China), no matter how long they lived there, and thus from being genuine members of the municipality.²² In other contemporary states, as Rogers Brubaker surveys them, a grant of the perquisites of "citizenry excludes only foreigners, that is, persons who belong to other states."²³

By contrast, in many regards the level of discrimination experienced by China's ruralites residing in its metropolises exceeds that visited upon urbanizing peasants in Latin American, Southeast Asian, or African cities. In the first place, the various perquisites of urbanhood in China formally marked city folk off from ruralites much more decisively than is generally the case in other societies. Indeed, ordinary urbanites at all levels of income in China were recipients of benefits that made for a much wider gap than we see elsewhere.²⁴

But in addition in those other places, it is obstacles that might theoretically be overcome—such as poverty, class, low skills and lack of education, or inadequate social connections—that stand in the way of incorporation.²⁵ Certainly these same factors isolated farmers in Chinese municipalities, but they were not at the core of the problem. Instead the Chinese peasants' lot in the city was much more akin to that of black people in South Africa before the 1990s or of blacks and Asians in the United States throughout the first half of the twentieth century.²⁶

In these similar cases, native residents were not just thrust to the bottom of a ladder of social mobility, as are ordinary rural transients upon arrival in third-world towns; instead—as in China—they were denied basic civil and even human rights as well.²⁷ What all such outcasts have in common is that they all bore the brunt of a form of institutionalized discrimination so stringent that it barred them from becoming full citizens in their own home countries.²⁸

So sojourners from China's rural areas entered the cities (unless ushered in with a post arranged for them in a Chinese work unit) not just temporarily bereft of state-granted wherewithal for their daily existence in town. In addition, they arrived altogether and categorically ineligible for this sustenance as well; this was so since their lack of association with the city *hukou* barred the great lot of them from enjoying any of the welfare benefits and social services that urbanites received as their natural birthright. For these reasons, to view Chinese peasants in the metropolises as foreign immigrants there—as noncitizens—is fully in line with the general literature on citizenship.

Citizenship has been variously defined. Most fundamentally, as Bryan S. Turner frames it, “the modern question of citizenship is structured by two issues,” which are much the same as those that pertain to possession of the urban register in China. The first of these has to do with social *membership*, or, one might say, with belonging to a community; the second concerns the right to an *allocation of resources*.²⁹ From another angle, the hallmark of citizenship (and of the urban *hukou*) is exclusivity, as it “confers rights and privileges” just to those legally living within specifically designated borders.³⁰ The boundaries that define members are usually drawn around the geographical community. But they may also delineate only some of the groups within it.

Various scholars term citizenship primarily a legal-cum-social status; a source of political identity; a claim for fulfilling duties and civic responsibilities; or a guarantee of social or welfare services, and of political rights. For some, the triad of citizenship rights attained by British citizens by the mid-twentieth century—civil, political, and social (in that order, historically)—identified in T. H. Marshall’s seminal essay on citizenship must all be present and reciprocally reinforcing for the status to become truly operational.³¹ Others underscore the access to goods that its ownership affords, its entitlements or privileges, and the expectations that accompany these.³²

Whatever the disagreements among analysts on the content of citizenship, up to now the literature on this topic has been dominated by Westerners and, for the most part, evinces a Western perspective. That is, writers have anchored their definitions in a European/American understanding, one that connects the practice of citizenship primarily with participation in the political life of the community, whether in decision making or in taking part in the electoral process, and roots it in a civil and legal status.³³

But there is also sometimes a recognition that the meaning of the concept and the nature of its content may vary from one place to the next;³⁴ and also that the phenomenon itself is part of or subject to a changing process.³⁵ Across societies, such differences may be a function of how the status is acquired—whether it is attained through struggle or bestowed as a gift from above; over time, the push of new peoples for entry, alterations in the supposed “global political culture” and attendant worldwide ideas about rights, and economic crisis all may result in contractions or expansions of the eligible population or of the treatment its possession accords.³⁶

These insights help in generalizing about the specific substance of citizenship in any given context. It will vary in accord with the nature and with the prevailing conception of the political community in which it appears.³⁷ Correspondingly, and most critically, the values and behaviors that citizenship endorses in a society will reflect the norms of whatever might be the dominant participatory and allocatory institutions in the community with which the citizen is affiliated. And the society's receptivity to international influence is a function of the nature of the institutions already in place. Accordingly, the alleged shift in the "discursive order of rights at the global level"—a shift that Yasemin Soysal heralds as reshaping the practice of and eligibility for citizenship in Western Europe³⁸—is one that by no means necessarily takes root in all national soils, at least not with dispatch.

Turning to China, we find that the latest version of the state constitution, adopted in 1982, leaves the specific content of the country's citizenship vague. For this document simply announces in Article 33 that "All persons holding the nationality of the People's Republic of China" are citizens, equal before the law, and enjoying the rights while performing the duties prescribed in the constitution and the law.³⁹

For our purposes—since the chance for meaningful political participation in law making or in the electoral process was yet negligible to nonexistent for the urban resident in late 1990s China; and since gross disparities in social status and benefits exist between members of urban and rural communities—I follow the characterization offered by Turner and emphasize, as he does, not the political but just the identity/membership and distributive components of citizenship.

Accordingly, I consider as full, official, state-endorsed urban citizens those who had a form of valid, official membership or affiliation in the city, and who consequently were the recipients of state-disbursed goods. We will see that at century's end, though some peasant transients (those working, temporarily, in state-owned institutions) obtained a portion of these privileges and so could be viewed as half- or second-class citizens, officially ruralites in big cities were still denied genuine membership, the right to belong officially. Nonetheless, with the progression of marketization and economic "reform," socialist distribution steadily declined for *all* residents of the nation's municipalities. As this occurred, unentitled farmers subsisting on the fringes experimented with a new style of urban living, an untried model of city citizenship, in post-1949 China.

The Logic of the Market

Much social science theorizing centers on the indeterminate relation between economic and political institutions; this study contributes to that inquiry. My focus is the linkage between two great forces: the incursion of capitalism and challenges to established citizenship. As a form of capitalism—with its privileging of prices, profits, and market principles—resurged in China after decades of state planning; and as aliens entered where they were in the main shut out before, Chinese urban areas in the 1980s and 1990s became a field for studying this interaction at its inception.

Granted, both migrants and markets existed in China—if always in positions of ambivalence—in brief periods in the pre-1980 days dominated by the thought of Mao Zedong.⁴⁰ But during most of the time between the mid-1950s and the early 1980s the Chinese economy operated largely in the absence of markets. Moreover, the government treated the people of the cities and those in the rural areas as members of two separate worlds apart. What is novel about the experience of migrants and markets after 1980 is the freedom they each started to experience with accelerating vigor after that point. For these two reasons—the sudden license for capital, markets, and movement, and the vast differences between two populations rather abruptly thrust amongst each other—the introduction of two new and powerful forces, markets and migration, into Chinese cities after 1980 constitutes an excellent vantage point for observing the interaction of some very fundamental institutions and shifts, and for exploring the interactions among them.

My largest finding is a paradoxical one: as of the late 1990s both the extant state and the reemergent markets were blocking the achievement of normal urban citizenship, as once conceived in China. But at the same time those same markets set up a novel mold of urban citizenship, one whose content was quite different from what the state once forged. As for the state, a prior institution, the *hukou*, derived its stickiness and its suppleness long after the economic transition was well under way from the range of social and official groups that supported it, namely, most urbanites, along with the powerful bureaucracies of public security and labor, and the wealthier, magnet regions of the country. Because of this weighty, if latent, coalition disposed to conserve this one institution, the influences of market incentives had by no means changed the model of official urban citizenship as the century drew to a close.

For the foreseeable future—and this is the crux of my argument—the

outcomes of marketization (a transition from bureaucratic modes of allocating, distributing, and exchanging factors of production and economic goods to market-based modes) must be understood in conjunction with institutional legacies left from the former socialist system.

Not just the Communist state, through its officials, its rules, and its set of bureaucracies, obstructed peasants from becoming regular, state-endorsed citizens in cities. In addition, markets here as elsewhere engendered among the original urbanites a competitive mentality that counted costs and whose rationality was geared to revenue-generation. This state of mind enhanced discrimination and xenophobia against outsiders who threatened city people's own accustomed shares of goods, especially as free markets knocked up against still-standing political institutions that had enshrined principles of distributive justice, principles expressly geared to block the market's untrammelled allocations. For Chinese urbanites had become accustomed to a range of benefits and entitlements I call the "urban public goods regime."⁴¹

Moreover, the modalities of these markets also encouraged bureaucrats to commodify underclass outsiders, that is, to gain financially from their presence. This they achieved by employing against them a constantly improvised, nontransparent, and slippery schedule of fees and charges. And even when outsiders managed to get the means to buy a *hukou*, it could turn out to be a piece of paper without much worth.⁴² So both of these forces, the state and the market, stymied peasants' acquisition of actual, normal citizenship in the cities, at least as this institution had been constituted in Chinese municipalities since the 1950s.

Yet the presence of markets—plus the use that peasant migrants made of them—did not just undercut peasants' participation in the old community. Markets also made possible new forms of association, new rules, and unprecedented modes of city life—in short, a space for agency—that transgressed the state's definitions of urban citizenship as long enunciated and enacted.

Alternatively, we could term the association between the state, markets, and migrants (or, also, that between capitalism and citizenship) a dialectical, recursive one.⁴³ For, under assault from the complex effects of markets and migrants, the state itself underwent some change, even as it excluded, discriminated against, and commodified peasant sojourners in the cities, and even as it prevented migrants from being full members of the metropolises. It was forced to accommodate the lifestyles of actors beyond its reach.

Thus, this study highlights the point that economic change (in this

case the shift back to markets from a planned economy) does not occur in a political vacuum. To evaluate a given polity's chances for concomitant political transformation while it is experiencing an economic transition, we must be attentive to the social offshoots of the markets themselves and to the lingering fallout from the institutions of the previous regime that enabled prior modes of economic behavior.

This attention to the impact from previous arrangements has implications beyond China and other once-socialist societies. The switch from a planned to a market economy involves an institutional dislocation that has much in common with the decline of the welfare state in the West. Both transformations were departures from systems that had protected their recipients from the force of the free market.⁴⁴ Just as the neoliberal "conservative project" in the West, with its dictate of social spending cuts—a consequence of the 1970s global economic crisis—introduced rampant uncertainty and shocks to the expectations of old beneficiaries,⁴⁵ triggering accusations and exclusionary initiatives against foreigners, so in China we find urbanites blaming peasants in their midst for the social ills induced by the market.⁴⁶ In both environments, the resentments and scapegoating against newcomers, as state-sponsored distribution diminished, were very similar. And in both milieus, immigrants suffered as a result.⁴⁷

All this implies that a market transition from socialism cannot easily breed the beneficent effects for newcomers (such as assimilation, conventional citizenship, perhaps democracy) that liberal ideology often predicts.⁴⁸ The point is that marketization by itself cannot promote inclusion and citizenship for outsiders while prior institutions retain some power. And indeed, marketization does not necessarily readily dismantle such institutions, even if it may alter them.

Thus, another set of findings concerns the interactive nature of the meeting of markets, the socialist state, and uprooted ruralites. As for the state, the farmers' settling in the cities set up endless predicaments for its agencies. These were dilemmas whose resolution threatened to change the shape of the urban community, and of the state itself since an uncommonly large proportion of urban life had been entitled, exclusive, and tightly patrolled under the Chinese city's earlier socialist system.

There were manifold effects on the migrants as well. They were undertaking their mobility while this core institution, the *hukou* (along with its informal legacies in behavior, expectations, and status markings), kept much of its original potency (even as many of the benefits it once bestowed became available on open markets). Therefore, in order to sur-

vive with even a modicum of decency, the migrants entering the city had to attempt to garner an array of disparate resources—but without any hope of using these to gain higher status or upward social mobility—resources commensurate with the range of institutions shaping their existence: cash, the currency in markets, and connections to city offices and cadres, the medium in the state bureaucracy.

Migrants also had to learn to contend with a medley of rules that pertained to one or the other of these contending institutions, even as their own daily praxis was undercutting these rules. Perhaps the most stable refuge in this shifting milieu, for those with access to it, was bits of community—their own social networks—that they had brought from home. In the chapters that follow, I explore the multifold ways in which the state's ongoing presence differentially conditioned the coming of different groups of peasants, as well as variably mediating their lot once in town. For instance, those recruited by or contracted to state agencies fared very differently from those who were not. I also examine the ways that peasants coped, some of them by creating their own separate societies whose existence mocked the state or their own largely discrete labor markets that disturbed official monopolies.

Organization of the Study

This book explores the manner in which peasant migration into the cities of China at the end of socialism distinguished it (sometimes subtly so, sometimes more blatantly) from seemingly similar cityward movement elsewhere in the developing world. In short, the differences were the result of remnant socialist institutions—both positive and negative—and their impact on the process.

Thus I organize the study by beginning from this point: China's style of socialism-supporting statism encompassed three powerful institutions relevant to our story: (1) a form of exclusive and state-managed migration, bolstered by the (hereditary) household register (the *hukou*); (2) a set of mighty urban bureaucracies; and (3) a regime of planning and rationing that privileged an ascriptively composed group, the officially registered urbanites. This was a regime underwritten for over two decades in part by the combined action of these institutions: they excluded the peasantry from the cities and bureaucratically decreed and enforced their mandatory delivery of grain, all in order to keep the city-based, industrializing population fed and, in the main, quiescent.

The book is arranged to show how these three institutions from the days of socialism that privileged the cities affected the movement of

migrants and their new, yet ultimately transient city lives; channeled officials' responses; and prejudiced urbanites' perceptions. But they did so even as the transition toward markets and the arrival in town of peasants reshaped these institutions in turn. In each chapter we will find that, in the midst of socioeconomic transition, state institutions, markets, and migrants continually determined and redetermined one another.

The study begins with three chapters about *structure*, though this was a structure undergoing transformation. Each of them, respectively, presents one of the three institutional features of the old system noted above—state-managed migration policies, state bureaucracies in the cities, and the urban planning regime, respectively. And at the same time each chapter demonstrates how markets and migrants affected these institutions.

Chapter 2 outlines the stance of the Chinese state toward the geographical mobility of its subjects, from imperial times to the present, contrasting the position—and the behavior—of earlier regimes with that of the People's Republic. It indicates how in the first decade of the P.R.C. the leadership managed—for its own developmental purposes—to make of the peasantry an ascribed underclass. Chapter 2 also reviews the changes introduced by the post-Mao state, which, despite its economic reforms that began in 1980, modified—but only somewhat—the post-1949 political elite's essential inclination to keep peasants' physical persons outside the urban system even as their labor shored it up.

Chapter 3 lays out the second structural feature, the set of bureaucracies that managed migrants; it also inquires about the ways in which transients in the municipalities helped, along with markets, bring about institutional change. I investigate the lineup—among urban bureaucracies and among various cities and regions—for and against mobile peasants. I then survey the changes that those most hostile to the outsiders underwent as these "hosts" found ways to profit from the peasants' presence. Here it is as if migrants, in their pairing with markets, appeared in the guise of siren (unwittingly enticing their antagonists with the lure of lucre) more than of specter.

Chapter 4 focuses upon the third institutional, structural feature of the old regime, the planning system and its perquisites for urbanites. It considers the effect that the evisceration of this system under economic reform had on the permanent, original urban residents, those people whose own entitlements were being winnowed away as markets and migrants impinged on their world. In particular, it examines migrants' specific imprint upon the public goods Chinese cities offered in the days

of socialism—employment, public order, urban services, and low, steady prices. Here we see how migrants served as a metaphor for the market in urbanites' perceptions about the impact of these intruders on the cities. This process, of course, stymied the assimilation of these outsiders into urban society.

The second section of the book brings *migrants' agency* more to the fore. Each chapter here corresponds to one of those in the first section. Chapter 5 takes up peasants' departure from the countryside, the factors that shaped their choices, the recruitment channels that charted their pathways out of the villages, and the impact of migrants on their native places. But, it shows, theirs was an agency that was somewhat hobbled or bounded. For this chapter documents the ways movement was mediated both by state policies and practices and also by the specific ecosystems formed by native-place geography, resource endowments, and locational situations, in short, by economic and market forces that vary across the countryside. This chapter fleshes out chapter 2's overview of state stances and policies toward peasants.

The sixth and seventh chapters situate the sojourners in cities and consider their differential fates once there, as well as highlighting the interactive connections into which they were thrust with both markets and the state. They demonstrate that, despite marketization (which greatly assisted the transients in their efforts to subsist materially in cities), the existing political institutions did nearly nothing to permit outsiders to begin to belong. Instead, they forced most of the peasants to construct excluded worlds of their own.

Chapter 6, on the migrants' entry into urban labor markets, relates to chapter 3 (on state bureaucracies), as it describes how the arrangements of the labor bureaucracy in particular, in conjunction with the *hukou*, and the ways in which the old labor market was organized—with its dominant and exclusive state-owned enterprises—forced peasants in the cities to create their own labor markets. But depending upon the nature of the occupation chosen and the native place specializing in it, some of these markets were more benign than others; and a job in a state firm generally promised more benevolence than one outside.

Chapter 7 then asks how the outsiders coped with dailiness without official services and benefits, that is, as noncitizens in the city in the eyes of the state. It is paired with chapter 4 in examining how the migrants created a new lifestyle entirely outside the urban public goods regime. Certainly the marketization of the wherewithal for subsistence allowed them to exist in town; also, markets helped generate new, unofficial

intermediary groups outside the state. Equally important, the networks of native place and/or job helped them set up a wide variety of lifestyles that, taken together, did away with the monotony that used to characterize the socialist city in China. The chapter shows how three gross sets of transients surfaced: those who were state-protected, those who were community-connected, and the anomic isolates.

Chapters 6 and 7 together show how urban peasants, excluded by the state institution of the *hukou* and working within incipient markets, participated in writing new rules of urban life. They focus on the peasants' persistent occupation of urban spaces (made possible by markets) that called into question the exclusivity of official urban citizenship. For—to return to Turner's usage—both the highly limited belongingness and the customary patterns of distribution (i.e., the marks of citizenship) that had existed before economic reform were threatened when outsiders appeared on the premises. The conclusion draws out comparative insights inherent in the study and spells out the implications of the analysis for the future forms of peasant citizenship in urban China. It also formulates conclusions about the larger relationship between incipient capitalism and the bestowal or acquisition of citizenship.

The data for the study come from nearly 150 hours of interviews in China with city officials, with scholars, and with over fifty migrants in six major cities (Tianjin, Harbin, Wuhan, Nanjing, Guangzhou, and Beijing) during trips to China in 1990, 1991, 1992, and 1994. The study also draws on extensive documentary research in Chinese governmental reports and in scholarly Chinese journals—which in recent years contain a wealth of academic scholarship, statistical data, and results of surveys—and on the new genre of reportage and journalistic accounts. Its focus is the period 1983 to 1996. Before we launch into the story itself, a brief definitional, demographic appendix serves as orientation to the tale.