Introduction

Cynicism was arguably the most original and influential branch of the Socratic tradition in antiquity, but not until D.R. Dudley’s *A History of Cynicism from Diogenes to the Sixth Century A.D.* (London 1937) did the literary and philosophical significance of the Cynics begin to be acknowledged by modern scholars. Curiously, until about 1975, Cynicism still remained in the shadows, apparently condemned to marginalization outside the canonical philosophical schools. Since that time, however, there have been many studies of the subject,\(^1\) and today Cynicism is finally being taken seriously as a philosophical and cultural movement of lasting interest. Léonce Paquet’s French translation of

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the major fragments—recently reprinted in the popular collection Livre de Poche—and the comprehensive edition of the ancient texts by Gabriele Gian- nantoni (1983–85; 2d ed. 1990) have made all the relevant evidence available. The fact that an international colloquium entitled “Ancient Cynicism and Its Influence” could be held in Paris in July 1991 testifies to the increasing interest that Cynic philosophy has aroused in recent years.2 The present work also shares in this revival of interest for Diogenes and his followers and illustrates once again the fascination that the “Dogs” have continued to exert.

The title we have chosen—The Cynics: The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and Its Legacy—indicates the nature and breadth of our project. Our purpose is, on the one hand, to investigate ancient Cynic philosophy and literature in all its aspects, and, on the other, to sketch the main lines of its impact on Western culture from classical antiquity to the present, focusing on the domains of literary production and of ethical reflection. To be sure, the figure of Diogenes, with his staff, knapsack, and tattered cloak, may seem remote from us. Yet the Cynic movement not only lasted for almost a millennium in antiquity, but also generated a remarkable range of literary forms that would outlive classical culture. Menippean satire is probably the most familiar Cynic genre, but in antiquity Cynics were known for innovating forms of parody, satire, dialogue, diatribe, and aphorism. Yet, as Heinrich Niehues-Pröbsting and Daniel Kinney demonstrate so persuasively in their contributions to this volume, Cynicism was also a central philosophical concern for thinkers as different as the Renaissance Humanists, Wieland, Rousseau, Diderot, and Nietzsche—although, as we shall see, the distinction between Cynicism’s literary and philosophical significance is often difficult to maintain.

The nature of the “movement” and its longevity call for some explanation. Cynicism was not a “school”: Cynic philosophers did not give classes in a specific place, nor do we find among them any scholars succeeding each other at the head of an institution. Their philosophy was less a matter of classes or lectures than of mimesis—the imitation in action of exemplary figures. In other words, what we have here is best understood not as a school, but as a philosophical and even a cultural movement that, albeit highly diversified, remained faithful to Diogenes’ example—to his way of life and philosophical principles as these were interpreted over the centuries. It is thus easy to understand that there are significant differences between Diogenes himself, whose target and audience was the highly cultured society of late classical Greece (in the fourth century B.C.), and those bands of Cynics who roamed the streets of Alexandria or Constantinople in the time of the Roman empire claiming him as their pa-

2. Le cynisme ancien et ses prolongements: Actes du Colloque international du C.N.R.S., ed. M.-O. Goulet-Cazé and R. Goulet (Paris 1993). Several of the papers read at this conference have been turned into contributions to the present volume: namely those of Billerbeck, Branham, Goulet-Cazé, Griffin, Moles, and Niehues-Pröbsting. We thank the Presses Universitaires de France (Paris), which kindly granted permission to publish them.
tron and model. Modes of behavior and perceptions of problems necessarily evolved, as a function of differing contexts, in the six centuries separating the age of Diogenes from that of the emperor Julian (A.D. 332–61).

One of the advantages of a collection is that, unlike a monograph, it can—and should—embrace divergent perspectives. The diversity of the contributions to this collection is a deliberate response to the variegated character of “Cynicism” as it has emerged over time. To approach such a motley set of traditions with a single point of view or methodology would be to deny its variety and thereby to impoverish it; while the collection is generally arranged chronologically—Greek, Roman, Renaissance, modern—we open not with the question of origins, but with a salvo of synoptic examinations of the most influential figures and concepts of the movement; these serve in turn as leitmotifs for the entire collection—such as the significance of Diogenes and Crates for moral philosophy (Long), the radical Cynic critique of religion (Goulet-Cazé), and the central Cynic concepts of freedom (Branham) and cosmopolitanism (Moles). Once the nature of the movement has been sketched, we turn to consider possible precedents for Cynic ideology in classical and archaic Greek culture with comparative studies of proto-Cynic forms of discourse (Romm) and of the legendary “Cynic sage,” Anacharsis of Scythia (Martin). When we then turn to consider a central figure of the third century B.C., the Cynicizing Stoic, Aristo of Chios (Porter), we are already involved in assessing the reception of Cynicism, a process that inevitably concerns us from the outset, given our sources, but that moves into the foreground of our account in the rest of the collection.

We approach the reception, or “legacy,” of Cynicism as a long, discontinuous, and centrifugal cultural process, not as a series of autonomous thinkers engaged in a timeless conversation. Some of the most important aspects of the Roman reception of this very Greek tradition are addressed in the areas of philosophy (Billerbeck), education (Krueger), and Roman society (Griffin). We next explore the complex literary and philosophical transformations of Cynicism in the Christianized culture of the Renaissance (Matton, Relihan, Kinney), and the modern reevaluation of Cynicism that begins in the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century and persists into the present in the work of Niehues-Pröbsting (q.v. in this volume), Sloterdijk, Foucault, and others, a reevaluation to which we hope to contribute. We conclude our survey of the Cynics and their legacy with an illustrated essay on the visual representation of Cynics in antiquity and the Renaissance (Clay).

The central problem encountered by our contributors is that of evidence. The most influential works of Cynic literature—which had once been abundant—have disappeared, and we are left with only meager fragments cited by intermediaries, who, moreover, are sometimes hostile to the Cynics they cite: this is the case, for instance, with the Epicurean Philodemus (in the first century B.C.) and with some of the Church Fathers. Further, these fragments are not
always easy to interpret, as is shown by a passage on law in Diogenes Laertius (6.72) that has already provoked extensive discussion. Consequently, we must be extremely wary in deciphering certain passages that, at first sight, we have no particular reason to suspect, but that, nevertheless, may be misleading, deliberately or otherwise. This may be the case for several traditions reported in Book 6 of Diogenes Laertius, *Lives and Opinions of Famous Philosophers* (of the first half of the third century A.D.), which, by positing the succession Socrates–Antisthenes–Diogenes–Crates–Zeno, attributed to Stoicism a Socratic pedigree by way of Cynicism. It is not impossible that, behind these texts, we can glimpse a thesis formulated after the fact, either by Stoics anxious for Socratic legitimacy or by authors of *Successions* in search of unambiguous lines of affiliation.

Consequently, the Cynics are known today not by their literary works, but by “sayings” (*apophthegmata* or *chreiai*) transmitted in ancient collections (*gnōmologia*) that were later drawn on by such authors as Diogenes Laertius. This fact alone justifies a cautious approach, since nothing guarantees the historicity of the tradition; indeed, some “sayings” are reported in more than one form or are attributed to more than one philosopher: at the most, we are justified in considering them to be part of the ancient dialogue provoked by the Dogs.

**History of the Movement**

Let us begin by recalling the origin of the word “Cynic”—literally, “Dog-like.” There are two competing etymologies. According to one, the word comes from the gymnasium where Antisthenes used to teach: that of the Cynosarges, dedicated to Heracles (who was to become a legendary proto-Cynic). Exactly what the name “Cynosarges” means is itself far from clear: Is it “White [or “Quick”]” Dog” or “Dog’s Meat”? It is easy to imagine that such an etymology (making Antisthenes the first “dog”) could have been fabricated after the fact, by analogy with the Stoa or the Academy, both of which are named after the places in Athens where their founders taught. The second etymology is far more plausible: it goes back to a joke that compared Diogenes (or Antisthenes) to a dog, presumably because his mode of life seemed dog-like—that is, “Cynic.” Accordingly, the Cynics were renowned not only for being frank and direct (e.g., for “barking” and “wagging their tails”), or for

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their skill at distinguishing between friends and enemies (in their case, those capable of philosophizing vs. those who were not), but, above all, for their way of living in public like dogs, "shamelessly indifferent" to the most entrenched social norms. Their deliberate rejection of shame, the cornerstone of traditional Greek morality, authorized them to engage in modes of life that scandalized their society but that they regarded as "natural." Their radical idea of freedom—"to use any place for any purpose" (Diogenes Laertius 6.22)—made the insulting canine epithet so appropriate to our philosophers that they defiantly claimed it as a metaphor for their novel philosophical stance. Or so the story goes.

It is both convenient and historically accurate to distinguish two phases of the movement: (1) early Cynicism (of the fourth to third century B.C.), and (2) its reception in the Roman empire (from the first century A.D. to late antiquity). These two great currents were separated by what our evidence suggests was a decline of Cynicism during the second and first centuries B.C. The first of these two phases took place in Greece, whereas the second had as its background the great cities of the Roman empire: Rome, Alexandria, and Constantinople. The first was based on a radically individualistic philosophy advocated by charismatic spokesmen, whereas the second, though not lacking in memorable personalities—one thinks, for example, of Demetrius, Demonax, or Peregrinus Proteus—evolved toward a collective philosophical praxis that gradually made Cynicism the preeminent popular philosophy of the Roman empire.

Why Did Cynicism First Appear in Greece in the Fourth (or Fifth) Century B.C. and Reappear at the Beginning of the Roman Empire?

At the beginning of the Hellenistic period (ca. 323–31 B.C.), Greek society enjoyed the refinements and luxury of a highly developed civilization, yet social inequalities were always widespread. It is often asserted, and with some justification, that with the decline of the polis (or city-state) as the comprehensive center of social life, each individual felt compelled to secure his own happiness in a world in which it was not uncommon to be sent into exile, taken prisoner by pirates, or sold into slavery, according to the whims of Fortune (Tukhē). From this point of view, Cynicism was intended as a response to this quest for happiness, by which the Greeks of this uncertain time were almost obsessed. Consequently, it offered Hellenistic society a systematic moral practice (tekhnē) capable of guiding the individual toward happiness and delivering him from anguish.

Of course, such an account does not "explain" why Cynicism arose when it

6. The most common way to designate a Cynic philosopher in Greek is simply the word "dog" (kuôn).
7. For more details on the fate of Cynicism in the second and first centuries B.C., see M.-O. Goulet-Cazé, "Le cynisme à l’époque impériale," ANRW 2.36.4 (Berlin 1990) 2723–24, and below note 34.
did, since a similar line of reasoning could be invoked to “explain” the emergence in the fourth century B.C. of other philosophies that sought to define the sufficient conditions of human happiness, such as Stoicism or Epicureanism (or the philosophy of Plato or Aristotle, for that matter). The reasons why a new ideology emerges in a particular time and place and becomes influential are complex and obscure. We offer this account as the conventional one, in lieu of a more persuasive alternative. A complete account would have to consider many other factors—demographic, social, and cultural—beyond the scope of this introduction. It would also need to consider that the Cynics themselves were agents of the historic changes of the fourth century, as we can see in the essay by Goulet-Cazé on religion and the early Cynics in this volume.

It is no less difficult to explain the revival of Cynicism in the early Roman empire. In this society, gravitas still had a meaning; Cynic cosmopolitanism, as reconstructed in John Moles’s contribution, did not readily cohere with the imperial assumptions of an ancient empire, and the extreme asceticism and subversive antics of our philosophers shocked more than a few Roman pluto-
crats. But in the midst of its prosperity the teeming metropolis of Rome offered its ruling elites wealth and luxury on such a scale that, as in late classical Athens, there was a calling for moralists and satirists who would denounce such excesses. It is not surprising, then, that the Cynics’ exhortations to return to an original simplicity and to a state of nature prior to all civilization found attentive audiences at Rome.

If, moreover, Cynicism is today attracting a lively interest once again, and a writer like Sloterdijk meets with phenomenal success when he calls upon his contemporaries to abandon modern “cynicism” (Zynismus) in order to return to ancient “Cynicism” (Kynismus), it is not because our sophisticated civilization, invaded by gadgets and enslaved to appearances, craves to learn all over again the meaning of such terms as “happiness,” “simplicity,” “freedom,” and “autonomy”?

The Early Cynics

Throughout antiquity Antisthenes (ca. 445—after 366 B.C.) was considered the founder of Cynicism. The son of an Athenian also named Antisthenes and of a Thracian woman, he first studied rhetoric under the great rhetorician Gorgias (D.L. 6.1—2) and became a rhetor himself before turning into an assiduous companion of Socrates; thanks to Plato, moreover, we know that he was one of the few followers present at Socrates’ death. Antisthenes was also the author

of an extensive literary oeuvre. Diogenes Laertius quotes an impressive catalogue of his works, which contains more than seventy titles divided into ten "tomes." Unlike later Cynics, Antisthenes wrote on rhetoric and logic, as well as on ethical, political, and literary topics.

Whether or not he was the first to be called "the Dog," it is probably more accurate to see Antisthenes as an important forerunner of the movement (rather than a founder) whose teachings, whether conveyed personally, by oral tradition, or by his writings, provided Diogenes' practice with some basis in theory. Particularly relevant would be his beliefs that virtue "is a matter of deeds and does not need lots of discourses and learning" and that it is sufficient for happiness "since happiness requires nothing else except the strength of a Socrates." If, as many believe, Xenophon follows Antisthenes in his representation of Socrates, then Antisthenes must have laid particular stress on Socrates' "self-mastery" (eugkrateia). In his Symposium (4.34–44), Xenophon represents Antisthenes as discounting the importance of wealth for happiness and actually praising poverty, which certainly resonates with Cynicism. Diogenes Laertius (6.15) says that Antisthenes provided the model for Crates' "self-mastery" and Diogenes' "imperturbability" (apatheia), which he learned by imitating Socrates (6.2; V A 12 G.), thereby inaugurating the Cynic way of life.

Whatever his relationship to Antisthenes, Diogenes of Sinope (ca. 412/403–324/321 B.C.) was the paradigmatic Cynic of antiquity. While Diogenes was a historical figure, he quickly became a literary character—probably in his own lost works; certainly in those of others. Hence, his life, lost writings, and oral teachings are intertwined in a tradition of at least two strands: a biographical strand, transmitted by Diogenes Laertius's Lives and Opinions of Famous Philosophers, that is itself a collage of literary and oral traditions about the Cynic, the historicity of which is always problematic; and the more overtly literary representation of Diogenes by writers of the empire such as Lucian and Dio Chrysostom. "Diogenes" is, therefore, always already in the process of reception. We lack the kind of extensive contemporary evidence for him that we have, for example, for Socrates in Plato and Xenophon.

Critical assessment of the biographical tradition is more than usually important in Diogenes' case, since his thought is transmitted to us primarily in the form of pointed anecdotes and aphorisms about his life. According to Diogenes Laertius, Diogenes was the son of the banker Hicesias and was exiled from Sinope (on the southern coast of the Black Sea) for defacing the city's coins.

11. Antisthenes was the first to define the λόγος; he held that there was only one predicate for each subject, which allowed the formulation only of judgments of identity and excluded all attributive judgments. He also upheld the impossibility of contradiction and even of uttering falsehoods.
12. See Appendix B, "Who Was the First Dog?"
14. As Niehues-Pröbsting observes (above, n. 1: 17).
“Defacing the currency”—the reason for the philosopher’s exile—was to become a central metaphor for Diogenes’ philosophical activity: driving out the counterfeit coin of conventional wisdom to make room for the authentic Cynic life. Surprisingly, numismatic evidence discovered in this century appears to confirm the story of Diogenes’ exile, but that may be the only trustworthy part of the biography. The tradition (in Diogenes Laertius) also claims that (1) Diogenes studied with Antisthenes;\(^\text{16}\) (2) that he discovered his vocation (“defacing the currency”) by consulting an oracle;\(^\text{17}\) and (3) that he was sold into slavery and spent the rest of his life as a private tutor to his master’s children.\(^\text{18}\) The first claim may be chronologically impossible (and may have been fabricated by Stoics eager to give their school a Socratic pedigree via the Cynics). The second claim is suspiciously reminiscent of similar stories told of Socrates and of Zeno of Citium, the founder of Stoicism. The third is incompatible with the tradition that Diogenes grew old spending his summers in Corinth and his winters in Athens living in his pithos, a large wine jar (Dio Chrysostom, \textit{Or.} 6.1–3). In all probability, both the second and third claims are based on literary works by or about Diogenes that were later treated biographically. This kind of “evidence” is characteristic of the tradition. There are three versions, for example, of how Diogenes died, reflecting both hostile and sympathetic views of the philosopher (D.L. 6.76–79).

Similarly, there are several conflicting versions of Diogenes’ literary activity in Diogenes Laertius. Two Hellenistic authorities, Satyrus and Sosicles, reportedly deny that Diogenes left anything in writing. Nevertheless, Diogenes Laertius records two lists of works attributed to him. The first consists of thirteen dialogues (including a \textit{Republic}), some epistles, and seven tragedies. A second list, transmitted by Sotion and probably of Stoic origin, consists of twelve dialogues (eight of which are absent from the first list), some letters, and sayings (\textit{chreiai}). The second list, therefore, implicitly denies the authenticity of Diogenes’ \textit{Republic} and of his tragedies.\(^\text{19}\)

But the confused state of the evidence need not prevent us from evaluating Diogenes’ philosophical significance, since that significance was as much a product of the manifold traditions purporting to represent him as it was of the facts of his life, of which we know few. The central ideas of Diogenes’ Cynicism are: (1) nature provides an ethical norm observable in animals and inferable by cross-cultural comparisons; (2) since contemporary Greek society (and

\(^{16}\) D.L. 6.21: V B 19 G.
\(^{17}\) D.L. 6.20: V B 2 G.
by implication any existing society) is at odds with nature, its most fundamental values (e.g., in religion, politics, ethics, etc.) are not only false but counterproductive; (3) human beings can realize their nature and, hence, their happiness only by engaging in a rigorous discipline (askēsis) of corporeal training and exemplary acts meant to prepare them for the actual conditions of human life—all the ills that mortal flesh is heir to; (4) the goal of Cynic “discipline” (askēsis) is to promote the central attributes of a happy life, freedom and self-sufficiency (autarkeia); (5) while Cynic freedom is “negative” in Isaiah Berlin’s sense—“freedom from” rather than “freedom to”—it is also active, as expressed in the metaphor of “defacing” tradition (by parody and satire) and in provocative acts of free speech meant to subvert existing authorities (e.g., Plato, Alexander the Great, et al.).

All these points find support in the anecdotes about Diogenes, but in summary form the daring, paradoxical quality of his experiment and the singular sense of humor that informs it are lost.21 Diogenes’ unconditional pursuit of happiness led him to challenge the most fundamental ideas and taboos of Greek civilization and to valorize nature as a greater source of moral insight than custom or the existing philosophical schools. While it is often said that Diogenes advocated “life according to nature,” this formula, as we shall see, raises as many questions as it answers.22

Plato’s famous characterization of Diogenes as “Socrates gone mad” (D.L. 6.43) encapsulates some of the most important questions posed by the Cynic tradition: In what respects is Cynicism continuous with the Socratic tradition of moral philosophy, and in what respects is it a reaction against that tradition’s distinctive intellectualism and attachment to the classical polis? The image of a “mad Socrates” calling us “back to nature” and seeking to redefine what it means to be human without an appeal to religion captures both the originality and the deeply ambiguous character of Cynicism, qualities that gave it and its founders (particularly Diogenes and Menippus) a rich literary and philosophical life after antiquity.

The most influential Cynic in antiquity after Diogenes was Crates of Thebes (ca. 368/365–288/285 B.C.),23 a wealthy landowner, and therefore at the opposite end of the social spectrum from a poor exile like Diogenes. (He was the brother of the Megarian philosopher Pasicles, a student of Euclid of Megara.)

21. It is often suggested that Diogenes (and the Cynic tradition generally) are lacking in arguments, but this is clearly untrue: the tradition abounds in inductive and deductive arguments in rhetorical form, i.e., in examples and enthymemes.
22. See Branham’s essay in this volume.
23. In addition to Crates, tradition mentions the names of several of Diogenes’ disciples: Onesicritus of Aegina and his two sons, Androsthenes and Philiscus; and a second Onesicritus (of Aegina or Astypalaea) who was helmsman of Alexander’s ship during the latter’s expedition to India. Others included Monimus of Syracuse; Menander, nicknamed “Oakwood”; Hegesias, nicknamed “Dog Collar”; the statesman Phocion “the Good”; and Stilpo of Megara.
He was a hunchback, and several anecdotes refer to his comic appearance (D.L. 6.91). He married Hipparchia of Maronea, who (along with her brother Metrocles) became a practicing Cynic and, as such, the most famous female philosopher of antiquity. Their Cynic marriage (kunogamia), based only on mutual consent, was consistent with Diogenes’ views but radically at odds with Greek custom.24 The tradition holds that Hipparchia adopted the simple Cynic garb of Diogenes—a rough cloak (without a chiton), knapsack, and staff—and lived on equal terms with her husband, attending events usually reserved for men and successfully defending her decision to pursue philosophy instead of weaving.25 Crates and Hipparchia were also notorious for living and sleeping together in public places, Cynically indifferent to shame and public opinion.26 It was Crates who described the fruits of philosophy as “a quart of beans and to care for naught.”27

However Crates came to know Diogenes, his life was a remarkable application of the Cynic’s principles. He clearly regarded himself as a follower, calling himself a “fellow citizen of Diogenes.”28 There are several (probably fictitious) accounts of how Crates became a Cynic, which revolve around the remarkable fact that he evidently sold all his possessions and gave the proceeds to his fellow citizens, thereby embracing poverty, as had Diogenes (D.L. 6.87). Crates died in old age and was buried in Boeotia. In contrast to Diogenes with his combative style and acerbic tongue, Crates was remembered as a benevolent figure and, thanks to his role as arbiter of family quarrels, actually revered as a household deity at Athens.29 But his fragments are clearly informed by a satiric (or seriocomic) perspective: “He used to say that we should study philosophy until we see in generals nothing but donkey drivers” (D.L. 6.82).

Crates was one of the most influential literary figures of the fourth century, and his writings did much to disseminate Cynic ideology and establish parody as a distinctly Cynic mode of “defacing” tradition. His oeuvre is notable both for its originality and for its variety. We know he composed “tragedies,” elegies, epistles, and parodies such as his poem in hexameters entitled Πέρα (Knapsack), a hymn to Frugality, a Praise of the Lentil, and an Ephemerides (Diary).

In addition to his wife Hipparchia and his brother Pasicles, Crates’ pupils include his brother-in-law Metrocles, who was probably the first to collect and publish Cynic “sayings” (chreiai), and Monimus of Syracuse, whose

25. D.L. 6.98: V I 1 G. The idea that “virtue” (aretē) is essentially the same for men and women goes back to Plato’s Meno and Republic as well as to Antisthenes (D.L. 6.12).
27. D.L. 6.86: V H 83 G.
28. He is also said to be the pupil of Bryson of Achaea (D.L. 6.85) and of Stilpo (Seneca, Ep. 1.10).
29. Apuleius, Florida 22: V H 18 G.
“trifles [paignia] blended with covert seriousness” were early examples of the “seriocomic” style—a hallmark of Cynic literature associated particularly with Crates and his followers.30

Menippus (of the first half of the third century B.C.) is the most famous Cynic of antiquity after Antisthenes, Diogenes, and Crates. He is said to have been a pupil of Crates. The unreliable biographical tradition depicts him as a Phoenician slave who acquired his freedom by begging or usury and hanged himself when his business failed. Be that as it may, Menippus is among the most influential of Hellenistic authors. He is the only Cynic expressly called spoudogeloios (“seriocomic”) in antiquity (Strabo 16.2.29, C 759), and, as the name indicates, he is credited with the invention of Menippean satire, a form that parodied both myth and philosophy. Diogenes Laertius attributes thirteen books to Menippus, including a Necyia. The imitations and adaptions of his work by Varro (116–26 B.C.) and Lucian (in the Icaromenippus, the Menippus, and the Dialogues of the Dead) gave Menippean forms a long and influential afterlife in antiquity and the Renaissance, making Cynicism one of the primary sources of satiric literature in Europe. “Menippus” also became a literary character in his own right, particularly popular with Renaissance neo-Latin authors (see Relihan in this volume).

Bion of Borysthenes (ca. 335–245 B.C.) also played an important role in early Cynicism, especially in the domain of literature. Tradition holds that he was sold into slavery as a boy but was bought by a rhetorician and received a rhetorical education. Later, he evidently received an eclectic education in philosophy at Athens: he studied with the Academics (Xenocrates and Crates), with the Cynics, the Cyrenaics, and finally, the Peripatetics. Bion probably originated the literary form of the diatribe—an argumentative monologue with imagined interlocutors that was an important model for satirists and essayists of the empire. Because Bion’s Cynicism seems less radical and more opportunistic than that of Diogenes, it has sometimes been characterized as a “hedonizing Cynicism.” 31 References in Horace and other writers suggest an eclectic thinker with remarkable literary talents, as do his witty fragments.

In this context it is worth mentioning Teles (fl. ca. 235 B.C.), a teacher and moralist who quotes extensively from such philosophers as Diogenes, Crates, Metrocles, Stilpo, and Bion, his favorite authority and model. The surviving excerpts of his Diatribes—seven fragments transmitted by Stobaeus (of the fifth century A.D.), who quotes them from the epitome of a certain Theodo-

30. See Demetrius, De Elocutione 170: V H 66 G.
31. So G.A. Gerhard, “Zur Legende vom Kyniker Diogenes,” Archiv für Religionswissenschaft 15 (1912) 388–408. Contrast Kindstrand in Bion of Borysthenes (66–67), who maintains that the original Cynicism was influenced by the eudaemonist asceticism of Socrates, and that Bion did not, therefore, inaugurate a new form of Cynicism, since it was already present at the beginning.
rus—are the earliest examples we possess of the influential tradition of the Cynic diatribe.

In the works of Cercidas of Megalopolis (ca. 290–220 B.C.)—the last important early Cynic—Cynicism takes a surprising political turn. Cercidas was unusual for a Cynic in being a soldier, politician, and lawmaker as well as a poet. He is best known for his *Meliambi* (written in the Doric dialect), in which he uses a lyric form to mount a serious Cynic critique of contemporary politics.32

Here we have given only a brief overview of the early Cynics, concentrating upon a few important figures. There were others, but for us they are little more than names.33 Also noteworthy in this context are early Stoics whose thought developed out of a dialogue with Cynicism, including the school's founder, Zeno of Citium (ca. 332–261 B.C.), who was converted to Cynicism by Crates before developing his own system, and his influential pupil Aristo of Chios (see Porter in this volume). We hope this brief survey will at least serve the purpose of underlining the crucial importance of the literary activity of the early Cynics and suggest the sources of the influence and authority they came to exert. Today, unfortunately, the fragments of their lost works can give us only a tantalizing glimpse of what this literature was really like.

*The Reception of Cynicism in the Roman Empire*

Whatever the causes of its apparent decline between Cercidas (ca. 290–220 B.C.) and Demetrius (of the first century A.D.),34 when Cynicism reemerges

32. The biographical tradition never gathers together all of Cercidas's functions into one notice, with the exception of the late source Stephanus of Byzantium (sixth century A.D.). The belief that Cercidas was a Cynic poet, however, is based on papyrological evidence (a subscription in *P.Oxy. 1082*, discovered in 1906: Κερκίδα κοινός μελιάμβος). Cercidas's involvement in political life does not, to be sure, harmonize very well with the antipolitical attitude generally adopted by the Cynics. Nevertheless, the themes of the meliambacs that have come down contain nothing that contradicts the hypothesis of a Cynic Cercidas. For reservations on this point, see J.L. López Crues, *Les Méliambres de Cercidas de Mégalopolis: Politique et tradition littéraire* (Amsterdam 1995), esp. 52-63. Two collections of poetry are attributed to Cercidas: the lambacs, only one verse of which is preserved, and the Meliambacs. Cercidas may also be the author of a *Moral Anthology*, if two texts written in iambics and transmitted by three papyri of the second century are really by him.

33. See Appendix A, "A Comprehensive Catalogue of Known Cynic Philosophers."

in the Roman empire, it has changed, as has the world. In a series of confrontations under Nero, Vespasian, and Domitian, Roman aristocrats with republican sympathies were put to death, and the philosophers associated with them—both Stoics and Cynics—were banished from Rome. The best-known Cynic of this period, Demetrius, a friend and hero of the philosopher Seneca, is a conspicuous example of Cynic involvement in the “philosophical opposition” to the emperor. He is said by Tacitus (Ann. 16.34–35) to have been present at the suicide of one of Nero’s most esteemed and influential opponents, Thrasea Paetus. Demetrius was evidently driven from Rome by Nero and returned under Galba only to be banished to an island by Vespasian, whereafter he is not heard of again (Dio Cassius 65.13).35 We also hear of Cynics’ getting flogged and beheaded under Vespasian (for publicly criticizing the proposed marriage of the emperor’s son Titus to the Jewish princess Berenice: D.C. 65.15).36 The final attempts to suppress the philosophical opposition were undertaken by Domitian and again resulted in a general expulsion of philosophers from Rome; moreover, the Roman authors (Arulenus Rusticus, Herrenius Senecio) of hagiographic accounts of Stoic martyrs (Thrasea Paetus, Helvidius Priscus) were put to death, and their books were publicly burned.

The story of the “philosophical opposition” in Rome provides a dramatic illustration of some of the defining features of Cynicism’s reception in the empire:37 (1) the Roman cultural context in which Cynics are ambiguously associated with, and sometimes ideologically conflated with, their more respectable descendants, the Stoics;38 (2) the imperial political context in which the price of engaging in Cynic parrēsia (“free speech”) may be flogging, exile, or beheading; (3) and, most significant, the striking ambivalence of the ruling elites toward philosophers generally and Cynics in particular, an ambivalence profound enough to provoke both hagiographic eulogies and book burnings.

The emergence of Cynicism as a potent political ideology—opposed to hereditary monarchy—in the first century A.D. is highly significant but potentially misleading: most Cynics lived not in Rome or the West, but in the Greek-speaking cities of the East, from Athens to Alexandria. Most were not politically active but busily engaged living the Cynic way of life—begging their daily bread and bearing witness to Diogenes’ example. Socially their

35. Pace Philostratus; see Kindstrand (above, n. 34) 89.
36. See Griffin’s essay in this volume.
37. Cf. D.R. Dudley, A History of Cynicism from Diogenes to the Sixth Century A.D. (London 1937) 135: “Opposition to the principle of hereditary monarchy may well have been a feature of Stoic-Cynic propaganda, and as Rostovtseff points out, philosophy made a truce with the monarchy when the principle of adoption was observed, as it was from Nerva to Marcus Aurelius.” For the “philosophical opposition,” see Dudley, chap. 7.
38. Commenting on Mucianus’s criticism of the Stoics that evidently led to Vespasian’s expulsion of philosophers (reported at D.C. 65.13), Dudley observes: “The passage is interesting as showing how at this period Stoic and Cynic philosophers were practically indistinguishable, alike in their rationale and their propaganda” (137).
status had been extremely mixed from the beginning, but as a rule they were not the associates of men of wealth and power such as Seneca the Younger.39

While all this is true, the Cynic role in the philosophic opposition is worth recalling, not only because it shows how seriously some philosophers and Cynic (or Stoic) teachings were taken in certain contexts, but also because it illustrates the range of activities that we are referring to here as “reception”—from idealization of the tradition (see Billerbeck in this volume) to selective reinterpretation and appropriation (see Griffin and Krueger), to satiric denunciation (e.g., by Lucian) and overt suppression (e.g., by Nero, Vespasian, et al.). It is also worth stressing that the “reception” of the Cynics does not begin as we turn our attention to the Roman period; the identities of the founders of Cynicism, presented above, are almost entirely constructed from imperial sources, particularly our primary source, Diogenes Laertius’s Lives and Opinions of Famous Philosophers, which is itself “a compilation of compilations.”40 We cannot readily contrast the original Dogs (of the fourth and third centuries B.C.) with later Roman representations, since our own representations are themselves based almost entirely on sources from the Roman period, written over five hundred years after the events related. The study of Cynicism—unlike, say, that of Platonism—is inseparable from the study of its reception.41

Accordingly, our contributors focus on some of the most important aspects of this convoluted process that we call the reception of Cynicism, a process distinguished both by its breadth in time and space, and by the intensity of the controversy it excited, and not only at Rome. But the controversy was not over contemporary Cynic literature. In fact, one of the central paradoxes of Cynicism’s reception in the empire is that the influence of Cynic ideology reached its apogee (in the second century A.D.) when very little in the way of original Cynic literature was being produced by practicing Cynics. Our most important sources (other than Diogenes Laertius) are sophists such as Lucian and Dio Chrysostom,42 who make extensive use of Cynic personae, and Stoic moralists such as Seneca and Epictetus, who are concerned to reconcile Cynicism with the mainstream of (Socratic and Stoic) moral philosophy in the empire. The most prominent Cynics of the second century A.D., Peregrinus and Demonax, are known not as writers but as teachers and practicing Cynics and would be all but forgotten if Lucian had not satirized the former (in On the Death of

39. See Goulet-Cazé (above, n. 34) 2731–46.
40. See Goulet-Cazé (above, n. 4) 3976–77.
41. For example, many of the stories told about Diogenes by Diogenes Laertius as if they reported actual events illustrating the practice of Cynicism may be lifted from literary works—dialogues, parodies, satires—by or about the early Cynics. See Niehues-Pröbsting (above, n. 1) 27.
42. It is often difficult to categorize the eclectic writers of the empire. This is symptomatic of their postclassical cultural context. Dio Chrysostom is clearly interested in both Stoicism and Cynicism, and may have made particular use of the works of Antisthenes. For his self-presentation as a Cynic at certain stages in his career, see J. Moles, “The Career and Conversion of Dio Chrysostom,” JHS 98 (1978) 79–100.
Peregrinus) as memorably as he eulogized the latter (in The Life of Demonax). Oenomaus of Gadara (of the second century A.D.) is the only Cynic of the empire known to us by his written work, Charlatans Unmasked, a lively if not particularly original attack on the veracity of oracles that survives because it is quoted by Eusebius (in Books 5 and 6 of the Praeparatio Evangelica) but does not seem to have made a great impression on Oenomaus’s contemporaries. Neither Diogenes Laertius nor Lucian mentions him. His other works, including “tragedies” that scandalized the pious emperor Julian (Or. 7.210d–211a), are lost.

All we have of Cynic literature from the empire to set beside Oenomaus are the Cynic Epistles, a collection of fictitious letters attributed to the early Cynics and other sages. The authors of the letters are unknown, and their dates of composition may vary considerably (from the third century B.C. to the second century A.D.). The epistles (written in Koine) offer a valuable survey of the topoi and anecdotes that must have informed many a “diatribe,” the term conventionally used to describe the oral performances of the Cynic street preachers that are so often remarked on by our sources. These oral performances were probably the primary means by which Cynic teachings were disseminated among the general populace. The Cynic Epistles confirm the impression that Cynic literary production in the empire is no longer marked by the innovative parodies and polemics of the classical period and now serves primarily to propagate Cynicism as a popular ideology and collective moral praxis.

It is precisely the collective, popular, and practical form that Cynicism takes in the empire that explains the controversy surrounding its reception from the time of Nero to that of Julian, and the curious ambivalence of our principal sources (e.g., Lucian, Dio Chrysostom [ca. A.D. 40–ca. 111], Epictetus [ca. A.D. 55–ca. 135], and Julian), who typically admire the Cynics of old—known, perhaps, from the lost Cynic classics—almost as much as they despise the mass of contemporary Cynics. This habitual contrast between the

43. For Oenomaus, see Goulet-Cazé (above, n. 34) 2802–3; J. Hammerstædt, Die Orakelkritik des Kynikers Oenomaus, Beiträge zur Klassischen Philologie 188 (Frankfurt 1988); “Der Kyniker Oenomaus von Gadara,” ANRW 2.36.4 (Berlin 1990) 2834–65.
45. For bibliography, see Goulet-Cazé, (above, n. 34) 2804 n. 538.
46. Some works by the early Cynics were undoubtedly available in the empire, but it is often difficult to tell when an author is drawing directly on them or on the extensive secondary literature that grew up around the Cynics. See Goulet-Cazé (above, n. 34) 2724–27. It is significant that Demetrius (De Eloc. 259) can speak (with reference to Crates) of a kunikos tropos (“Cynic style”), which suggests a well-known body of texts.
47. See Epictetus 3.22.50, 4.8.5; Dio Chrysostom 32.9, 34.2; Julian 7, 9. Lucian’s most vitriolic attacks on the Cynics are The Runaways and On the Death of Peregrinus.
contemporary and the classical, the real and the ideal, should not be dismissed as a mere commonplace. The persistence of this twofold response over several centuries is highly significant: our sources are registering the single most significant fact about the fate of Cynicism in the empire, namely, that the movement split along the lines of class, wealth, and education—the very social distinctions Cynicism sought to annul. So we now find a popular ideology and way of life, on the one hand, and a highly literate tradition of ethical reflection and satire, on the other. All our sources are affiliated to varying degrees with the latter; most practicing Cynics, some of whom were literate, were part of the former.

Cynicism was unique among classical intellectual traditions in becoming something like a “mass movement.” 48 While it is impossible to quantify exactly, we can identify over eighty ancient Cynics; 49 and if our sources are any indication, the sight of Cynics begging and preaching was not an uncommon one in the cities of the East. This popularization of a classical tradition provoked anxiety and outrage among the cultured elites, all the more so if they considered themselves to be the authentic spokesmen for this particular tradition, as did Lucian, Dio Chrysostom, Epictetus, and Julian. But the appeal of Cynic ideology was too contagious to contain and control, as we see if we consider how disparate were the positions, both social and intellectual, of those who took a serious interest in it: Philo Judaeus, 50 the early Christians, Roman aristocrats (see Griffin in this volume), satirists, Greek sophists, imperial educators and moralists, the Church Fathers (see Krueger in this volume), a pious emperor (see Billerbeck in this volume), and the urban poor, both free and slaves— all these parties had an opinion on the meaning and uses of Cynicism, an opinion shaped by their own social and intellectual trajectories. For that very reason we should resist the temptation to reduce these many individual acts of reception to a single structure or pattern. What we see taking place in the empire is an argument over a “legacy”: Who are the legitimate heirs? What is the ultimate value of the tradition—literary, social, ethical, political? And, not least, who is entitled to speak with the authority of Diogenes?

The careers of Lucian and Peregrinus offer themselves as allegories for the conflicting tendencies within the Cynic movement of the empire—the tendency toward “literary Cynicism,” on the one hand, and toward collective praxis, on the other. Like other imperial interpreters, they took what they needed from the tradition and in so doing tended to remake it in their own image. For Lucian, Cynic literature was a liberating example of innovation and subversion within the classical tradition. The Cynic classics (and Cynic ide-
ology) gave him nothing less than a license to write satire on all things Greek, which now, of course, included Cynics and Cynicism itself. When he was attacked for his hilarious caricature *Philosophers for Sale!*, in which the founding fathers of Greek philosophy, including Diogenes, are auctioned off as slaves, it is a comic-Cynic mask (*Parrhēsiai*) he dons to defend his literary principles. His many works using Cynic personae (e.g., Diogenes, Antisthenes, Crates, Menippus, et al.) or indebted to Cynic traditions of parody and satire (e.g., *Philosophers for Sale!, Zeus the Tragic Actor, Dialogues of the Dead*) give us the liveliest images we have of what the Cynic classics might have been like, and are the primary means whereby Cynic traditions became part of European literature. In his *Demonax*, Lucian even shows a serious interest in constructing a contemporary ethical model from Cynic (and Socratic) traditions. Yet for all his undeniable affinities with Cynicism, Lucian is scathingly satiric toward contemporary Cynics (other than Demonax), precisely because they offend his sense of the tradition’s true center of gravity—in the practice of satire (*parrhēsia*) and an individualist, not a collectivist, ethic. While other contemporary observers saw in Peregrinus a serious philosopher, Lucian can see in him only a fake who is hijacking Cynic traditions for reasons of self-aggrandizement and fame—pointedly un-Cynic motives. And, in a characteristically Lucianic twist, he is not even a good fake: to imitate Heracles’ fiery death is an absurd way to perpetuate the tradition, a comically inept attempt at mimesis: Heracles’ tragic death was forced on him; Peregrinus’s immolation is freely chosen (*Peregrinus 25*), announced four years ahead of time, and performed at the Olympic Games (A.D. 165)! By pushing Cynicism in

52. For an analysis, see Branham (above, n. 1) 28–38.
53. For an analysis of the *Demonax*, see Goulet-Cazé (above, n. 34) 2763–64; Branham (above, n. 1) 57–63.
54. Niehues-Pröbsting (above, n. 1: 211–13) usefully distinguishes three strands in Lucian’s Cynicism: (1) a tendency toward idealization in the *Demonax* and *The Cynic*; (2) the satiric critique of contemporary practicing Cynics in *On the Death of Peregrinus* and *The Runaways*; and, most important, (3) the use of Cynic voices and personae in his satire—e.g., *Zeus Refuted, The Downward Journey, Dialogues of the Dead*, etc. In general this is correct, but one could argue that *The Cynic* is a paradoxical encomium and its hyperbolic praise of the traditional Cynic garb is ironically intended. For *The Cynic*, see R. Bracht Branham, “Utopian Laughter: Lucian and Thomas More,” *Moreana* 86 (1985) 23–43; for the authenticity of *The Cynic*, see Branham (above, n. 1) 237 n. 4.
56. While suicide in some contexts is genuinely Cynic, Peregrinus’s showy suicide is a travesty of the Cynic attachment to life, even under the most adverse conditions. We should remember the story told of Antisthenes (D.L. 6.18) and Nietzsche’s comment (discussed by Niehues-Pröbsting [above, n. 1] 147): “When the ailing Antisthenes cried out, ‘Who will release me from these pains?’ Diogenes replied, ‘This,’ showing him a dagger. Antisthenes responded: ‘I said from my pains, not from life.’” Nietzsche commented apropos of this anecdote (cited by Niehues-Pröbsting 147): “Eine ganz tiefssinnige Ausserung, ... Es ist ersichtlich, dass der Cyniker am Leben hängt, mehr als die andern Philosophen: ‘der kürzeste Weg zum Glück’ ist so viel als, ‘Lust am Leben an sich’ und volle Anspruchslosigkeit in Bezug auf alle andern Güter” (*Philologica* 2.196).
the direction of a religious cult, by turning it into another myth, Peregrinus's
career inevitably appears to Lucian as a profound betrayal of the original Cynic
impulse to “deface” the idols of the tribe. On the Death of Peregrinus is not
only about the ambitious Cynic: it is a case study in how and why such am-
bitions get turned into myth and cult. Fame was a subject of particular interest
to Lucian, who had invested so much energy in the creation of his own author-
ity as a satirist, not least by means of a series of Cynic masks and voices.
Peregrinus’s theatrical imitation of Heracles thus struck him as an illegitimate
appropriation of the tradition he had cultivated: if successful, it would turn
Cynicism into just another cult; and, indeed, that is always what it is in danger
of becoming merely in virtue of reproducing itself over time, a process that
entails imitation and easily lapses into mere conformity to a type.

The Afterlife of Cynicism

While Cynicism as such disappears with classical antiquity, Cynicism as an
ideological force and literary tradition has had a remarkable afterlife, and its
consequences for Western culture are only beginning to be understood. Four
contributors to this volume (Matton, Relihan, Kinney, and Niehues-Pröbsting)
pioneer an attempt to map some of the uncharted terrain of Cynicism’s post-
classical reception from the medieval to the modern period. As we have already
seen in the Roman empire, the reception of Cynicism was not the exclusive
concern of professional philosophers but entered into literary, religious, politi-
cal, and moral discourse generally. In fact, the most potent expression of Cyni-
cism’s vitality in the early modern and the modern world is arguably not in the
domain of philosophy per se, but in a literary tradition of satiric (or seriocomic)
fantasy and dialogue that runs from Lucianic works such as Erasmus’s Praise
of Folly, More’s Utopia, and Rabelais’s Gargantua and Pantagruel through
Ben Jonson’s satiric comedies to Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels and Diderot’s
Rameau’s Nephew (see Niehues-Pröbsting). Yet one of the striking features
of Cynicism as an ideology throughout its postclassical history is how very
provocative the Cynic model remained even when its original practitioners had
become literary figures safely relegated to a legendary pagan past. Whether we

57. Dudley (above, n. 37: 179–81) argues that Peregrinus may have succeeded in establishing
a cult.
58. For an excellent analysis, see Niehues-Pröbsting (above, n. 1) 195–213; cf. Branham
(above, n. 1) chap. 4.
59. This is precisely the point of The Cynic’s ironic praise of the Cynic uniform — its reduction
of philosophy to the most literal form of imitation.
60. In addition to the contributions of Relihan, Kinney, and Niehues-Pröbsting in this volume,
see Niehues-Pröbsting (above, n. 1) 214–43; Branham (above, n. 54); M. Bakhtin, Rabelais and
His World, trans. H. Iswolsky (Bloomington 1984) chap. 2; M. A. Scroucher, Rabelais (Ithaca 1979)
441; D. Duncan, Ben Jonson and the Lucianic Tradition (Cambridge 1979); C. Robinson, Lucian
and His Influence in Europe (Chapel Hill 1979); R. E. Compean, “Swift and the Lucianic Tradi-
tion” (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Davis, 1976).
consider the response of medieval Christians (in the West: Matton), the Humanists of the Renaissance (Kinney, Relihan) or the _philosophes_ of eighteenth-century France (Niehues-Pröbsting), we find that the Cynic model of a naturally free and autonomous self exerts a powerful attraction that can be as difficult to resist as it is to domesticate. The ambivalence of the Roman response to Cynicism proved proleptic.

Thus Cynicism remained a vital source of oppositional discourse throughout its history, which consists of a continual process of reevaluation beginning with the Christians, as one dominant culture after another attempts to “house-break” the Dogs. Contact between Cynics and Christians probably dates from the earliest stages of Christianity. It has been argued that the Cynics provided an important pagan model for early Christian communities. Be that as it may, the two movements were closely associated in the minds of their sharpest critics, such as Lucian (in the _Peregrinus_), Aelius Aristides (Or. 46), and the emperor Julian (Or. 7.224); and there were Cynics, such as Peregrinus and Maximus Hero (of the fourth century A.D.), who evidently converted to Christianity for a time. Indeed, Lucian goes so far as to attribute the authorship of “many” Christian books to Peregrinus, probably as a way of subverting both the Cynic and his Christian audience; for the Christians themselves are represented as gullible fools who worship a “crucified sophist” and require no rational basis for their beliefs (_Peregrinus_ 11–13). The common ground shared by Cynics and Christians was presumably the practice of an ascetic way of life, but the end of Cynic “asceticism” (_askēsis_)—happiness—is unambiguously immanent and secular; and as Augustine was clearly aware, the Cynic rejection of shame flies in the face of the most basic Christian doctrine. Yet the ostensible resemblance of Cynic to Christian virtue—particularly the embracing of poverty and asceticism of some kind—inevitably excited the admiration of many Christians: Dante would place Diogenes among the greatest philosophers in the first circle of Hell, the Limbo reserved for the unbaptized yet virtuous. And as Matton shows in his contribution to this volume, both the medieval encyclopedic tradition and medieval humanism as represented, for example, by John of Wales (ca. 1220/1230–ca. 1285) and Jacques Legrand (ca. 1365–1415) evince a surprising sympathy for Cynic traditions as they attempt to reconcile pagan and Christian forms of wisdom.

The delicate medieval balancing act that permitted selective appropriation of Cynic ideology within a traditional Christian framework was destabilized by two factors: (1) the renaissance of classical culture fostered by humanists in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries brought into circulation previously inaccessible Cynic and Lucianic texts (including our principal source, Dioge-

62. _City of God_ 14.20; see Krueger’s contribution to this volume.
63. See Matton’s contribution to this volume.
nes Laertius’s Book 6) that would prove combustible in the polemicizing contexts of the Reformation; (2) inspired by their expanded knowledge of the relevant traditions, humanists writing in Latin, such as Erasmus and More, as well as vernacular authors from Rabelais to Montaigne, enter into the literary and philosophical perspectives disclosed by Cynicism with such imagination and evident glee that a conservative Christian backlash was engendered. The experimental “Christianization” of Cynicism by humanists is answered by a thoroughgoing demonization of the Dogs in the seventeenth century, as the Cynics are condemned as the source of contemporary heresies such as those associated with the “Society of the Poor” (or Beghards and Turlupins). Although there were still defenders ready to answer these often ahistorical attacks, the Counter-Reformation polemic against the Cynics was ferocious, and the Dogs were not systematically rehabilitated until they became part of the discourse of the Enlightenment in eighteenth-century France and Germany.

In his contribution to this volume, “The Modern Reception of Cynicism,” Heinrich Niehues-Pröbsting brings our story up to the present, arguing that neither the ideology of the Enlightenment nor the risks it ran can be understood historically without reference to the role played by Cynicism in the self-definition of such influential figures as Wieland, Rousseau, Diderot, and Nietzsche. His analysis is rich in its implications for the origins of both post-Christian and post-Enlightenment concepts of the self. He concludes his study with a telling critique of what is currently the most influential account of the relation of ancient Cynicism to modern cynicism, Peter Sloterdijk’s *Critique of Cynical Reason*.

There were many important topics that we would have liked to explore in this collection but could not, including (1) the Byzantine and Arabic receptions of Cynicism, (2) the vernacular reception in the Renaissance (by Rabelais or Montaigne), (3) the encounter of Michel Foucault and the Cynics. Much remains to be done. Of course, all our discussions assume some identifiable


65. See Matton’s contribution to this volume.


67. For the Arabic reception, see D. Gutas, “Sayings by Diogenes Preserved in Arabic,” in Goulet-Cazé and Goulet (above, n. 2) 475–519. For the Byzantine reception, see D. Krueger, *Symeon the Holy Fool: Leontius’s “Life” and the Late Antique City* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1995).

68. See Esclapez and Comte-Sponville (above, n. 64), and n. 60 above. There were also lively vernacular traditions in Spain (Menippean satires of the sixteenth century) and Italy. See, for example, *Il cane di Diogene*, a prose satire by F.F. Frugoni (ca. 1620–86), in which the author “impersonates” Diogenes’ dog. Each chapter is called a “bark,” *latrato*.

69. While Foucault did not live to publish his late work on the Cynics, see Flynn’s account (above, n. 1).
idea or set of concepts to which the term “Cynicism” refers; but the problem of identifying Cynicism—whether as a practical ascetic morality for the have-nots, as a universal ethical model of freedom and autonomy, or as a cultural practice devoted to “defacing” the false values of the dominant culture—is one of the central concerns of this volume, to which we now turn.

Was Cynicism a Philosophy?

It may seem strange to ask such a question since the Cynics presented themselves as philosophers. We cannot avoid asking it, however, for since antiquity many have denied them the status of philosophers.70

It must be admitted, moreover, that the Cynics furnished their opponents with a great many arguments. They had no school, in the institutional sense of the term, and they did not hesitate to make stinging criticisms of the philosophical praxis of their contemporaries. Above all, they made no secret of their intention to “deface the currency,” not only in the areas of social intercourse, religion, politics, and ethics, but also in philosophy. As a matter of fact, they distrusted words and demanded action instead; they rejected the very idea of culture as traditionally conceived and conducted their philosophical praxis more as a mode of life than as an intellectual discipline.

The Reproaches Formulated by the Cynics’ Adversaries

While the Cynics’ status as a philosophical school was always problematic—as the anecdotal tradition shows clearly enough—the fact that there were also formal critiques of the school’s status at least from the time of Hippoboutos (of the second century B.C.) suggests that “Cynicism” had to be taken seriously by Hellenistic philosophers.71 In any event, there were three principal criticisms leveled against “Cynicism” as a philosophical school.

The absence of dogmata. The movement was reproached with not having philosophical dogmata (“a principled set of beliefs”). In antiquity, there were two competing conceptions of a “school of philosophy” (hairesis),72 both of them Skeptic in tone. We find the echoes of them in Diogenes Laertius (1.20)

71. Hippoboutos was the author of a work entitled Περὶ Αιρέσεων and another entitled Τῶν Φιλοσόφων Ἀναγραφή. According to D.L. 1.19, he refused, in his Περὶ Αιρέσεων, to range the Cynic school, not unlike the Eleatic and Dialectical schools, within the αἱρέσεως. Hippoboutos’s date is controversial; the editor of his fragments places his floruit in the first half of the second century B.C. Cf. M. Gigante, “Frammenti di Ippoboto: Contributo alla storia della storiografia filosofica,” in Omaggio a Piero Treves, ed. A. Mastrocinque (Padua 1983) 151–93.
72. For the concept of hairesis, see Long (above, n. 8) 138–40.
and in Sextus Empiricus. One of these defines a “school” (hairesis) as the “adherence to several beliefs, apparently coherent with one another,” according to one view, and “belief” being defined as an “assert given to something that is uncertain.” The other views a “school” (hairesis) as a form of “conduct that is apparently based on a philosophical principle that indicates how it is possible to appear to live correctly.”

By excluding the Cynic school, Hippobotus shows that he considered the presence of a systematic form of speculation—a set of beliefs or hypotheses—to be a necessary condition for a tradition to lay claim to the title “school” (hairesis). For critics like Hippobotus, if Cynicism does not present a systematic ensemble of beliefs, it is merely a “way of life.”

*The absence of an “end” or “philosophical goal” (telos). The second criticism was that Cynicism lacked an “end” (telos). To be sure, we do possess ancient evidence on the Cynic telos, but it cannot be attributed to Antisthenes or Diogenes. It was not until philosophical schools began to be characterized according to the “sovereign good” at which they aimed (following Aristotle) that later authors, who wished to consider Cynicism a genuine “school,” formulated a particular telos for it. According to the definition given by Diogenes Laertius (6.104), “the ‘end’ [of Cynicism] consists in living in accordance with virtue.” It has been suggested that this formulation probably originates with the Stoic Apollodorus of Seleucia, whom we also owe the famous definition of Cynicism as a “shortcut to virtue.” In attributing to Cynicism its*

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74. πρόσκλασιν δύχωσεν πολλοῖς ἀκολουθίαν ἔχονσι πρὸς ἀλληλά τε καὶ φανώμενα.

75. δύχα ματίν ἀδήλων συγκατάθεσιν.

76. τὴν λόγον τυχαὶ τὰ τὰ φανώμενα ἀκολουθήσασιν ἐκείνῳ τοῦ λόγου ὡς ἐκτῶν ὁδηγῶν δικήν τοῦ ὑποδείκνυοντος. The text we have quoted of the two definitions is that of Sextus, since he presents them in more developed form than does Diogenes Laertius.

77. The formula ἔνστασις τοῦ βίου (“way of life”) is used by D.L. 6.103. To be sure, the latter does not attribute it expressly to Hippobotus; he merely says: “We maintain that Cynic philosophy is a school of thought and not, as some believe, a way of life.” Inasmuch as he explains in 1.19–20 that Hippobotus excluded the Cynic school from the list of αἰρέσεις, it is likely that Diogenes Laertius ranges Hippobotus among those who consider cynicism a mere way of life.

78. Beginning with Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* (cf. Book 1 ad init.), it became customary to go through an enumeration of the various ends and especially the ultimate end, or telos. One sovereign good was then attributed to each philosophical school so that they could be placed in relation to one another.

79. Thus Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* 2.21, 130, 7; vol. 2, p. 184, 18 Stählin (“Antisthenes says that atuphia is the goal of life”); Julian, *Or.* 9.8.188b–c (“The goal of the life of Antisthenes, Diogenes, and Crates, and their end, was, in my view, knowledge of oneself, contempt for vain opinions, and also the pursuit of the truth . . . with all the strength of their intelligence”); 12.192a (“The goal proposed by Cynicism is apathy, which is equivalent to becoming God”); and 13.193d (“The goal and the end proposed by Cynic philosophy, as, moreover, by all philosophy, is happiness; now, this happiness consists in living in conformity with nature, not according to the opinions of the crowd”).

80. Goulet-Cazé (above, n. 4) 3941–49.

81. D.L. 7.121.
own particular end, Apollodorus was trying to support his belief in a genealogy (Socrates—Antisthenes—Diogenes—Crates—Zeno of Citium) that linked the Cynics and Stoics directly to Socrates. This construction was vital to Apollodorus’s claim that Cynicism should be recognized as a full-fledged philosophical “school” (hairesis).

Others, however—and not only Hippobotus—denied that Cynicism had its own telos. We find an echo of this position in a passage from Varro’s De Philosophia in which Cynicism is reduced to a simple “style of life” (habitus or consuetudo) compatible with any philosophical school, whatever its telos.  

The rejection of all intellectual culture (paideia). In order to do philosophy, the Cynics refused to take the route of intellectual culture (although this did not prevent them from being cultivated). They therefore neglected the traditional disciplines, such as music, geometry, and astronomy, which they judged to be useless and unnecessary. In their view, such theoretical pursuits distract humankind from its proper study—the human being (anthrôpos).

This attitude was often criticized in antiquity. Galen reproached the Cynics with shunning everything that had to do with logic and transformed the characterization of Cynicism as a “shortcut to virtue” into a “shortcut to conceit.” Similarly, Lucian speaks of a “shortcut to notoriety.” Apuleius, for his part, was scathing in his contempt for those “brutish, filthy and uncultivated people,” who “by speaking badly and living likewise” were corrupting philosophy.

Clearly, Cynic philosophy had a dubious reputation in antiquity, and critics did not hesitate to denigrate it and even to deny its status as a philosophy. When the emperor Julian speaks about it, he feels obliged to add that “it is not the most vile and discredited form of philosophy, but the rival of the most estimable forms”; when Eunapius (in the fourth century A.D.) evokes the Cynic Carneades, he feels it necessary to add: “He was by no means obscure among the Cynics, if we are to take Cynicism into consideration.”

What Philosophy Did the Cynics Claim as Their Own?

The Cynics were undaunted by the criticisms showered upon them from all sides: they declared themselves, unequivocally, to be philosophers and chal-
lenged all others to the title. Their conception of philosophy, however, turns out to be highly idiosyncratic, since they defined it by the act of “defacing.”

“Defacing the currency.” As represented by tradition, Diogenes’ aim was to demonstrate by his own example the superiority of nature to custom, and he spent his whole life trying to “deface” the false values of the dominant culture. In every area of human activity, this “defacing” led the Cynics to adopt scandalous positions.

To take an example from politics: the Cynics appeared at a time when, even though the traditional polis was beginning to be shaken to its foundations by the conquests of the young Alexander, many were not yet ready to abandon their traditional roles in civil and political life. And yet Diogenes preached “cosmopolitanism,” declaring himself “without a city” (a-polis), “without a home” (a-oikos), and “citizen of the universe” (kosmopolitēs). Until now, such cosmopolitanism has been considered essentially negative—a rejection of all existing states—but Moles’s contribution to the present work has launched the debate once again. Be that as it may, Diogenes urged people to abstain from all political engagement that, like family or social obligations, might constitute an obstacle to individual freedom.

Cynic “defacing” was just as radical in religious matters. In the first place, they stood the traditional hierarchy of beings on its head: the series animal—man—god was transformed into man—animal—god. For man, as a being of desire and anguish, animal and god constituted, respectively, the concrete and the theoretical model of self-sufficiency and indifference, and consequently of happiness. This does not mean, however, that the Cynics were pious. They had no interest in religious questions, and considered god as a mere theoretical reference point. In general, one can say that their attitude toward religion was skeptical or agnostic: they preferred not to pronounce judgment upon questions that transcended their understanding. Although they viewed man as confronted by an irrational world, constrained to bend to the whims of Fortune, they refused to live in constant fear of the gods and the punishments of Hades. This, moreover, is why they envied animals, which they considered happy for lacking any idea of a god who can reward and punish. Such viewpoints, combined with scathing criticisms of anthropomorphism, the Mysteries, prayer, the interpretation of dreams, ritual purifications, and other religious institutions, ran directly against traditional religious ideology.

Diogenes also “defaced” philosophy, not only because he criticized such contemporary philosophers as Plato, Euclid, or Aristippus and rejected all sys-

90. Cf. ibid. 6.63 (= V B 355 G.).
91. See Goulet-Cazé’s contribution to this volume.
tems, preferring to demonstrate his beliefs by his actions, but also because he asserted that philosophy is not within our grasp, and that all we can do is pretend.\textsuperscript{92} How like Diogenes it was to disown his “defacing” loud and clear! Just as Socrates had urged, philosophy was no longer to be reserved for a social or intellectual elite: everyone could philosophize. It is thus not surprising that, under the Roman empire, Cynicism became the popular philosophy of antiquity.

Armed with the metaphor of “defacing” that he himself had chosen, Diogenes was prepared for every act of “shamelessness,” and accepted his role as one who scandalizes society.

Ethical choice leading to practical philosophy. The Cynics, following in the footsteps of Socrates, adopted a strongly ethical orientation. Even if we are appropriately skeptical of the characterization of them by Diogenes Laertius (according to which they rejected the logical and the physical topoi of philosophy),\textsuperscript{93} it remains true that their entire philosophical attitude was inseparable from the field of ethics. For the Cynics, what mattered was to live well in order to be happy. When Diogenes was asked what was the profit he derived from philosophy, he replied: “This, if nothing else—to be prepared for every kind of luck,”\textsuperscript{94} or “To be rich even without an obol to my name.”\textsuperscript{95} The point of Cynicism is, among other things, to demonstrate that we are so constituted by nature that happiness is possible under the most adverse conditions. Whoever practices it lives a life close to nature. Cynics broke away from the intellectualist model of philosophy and privileged the existential experience of the sage.

In order to obtain happiness, Diogenes and his successors insisted on the importance of acts as opposed to words. Ironically in view of their extensive literary activities, their slogan could have been: “good living instead of good talking.” We ought not to be surprised, therefore, if the forms of speech they became known for bore little resemblance to traditional philosophical discourse. The Cynics’ discourse was caustic and aggressive; it backed the interlocutor into a corner until he was forced to put himself in question. This is why wordplay, biting sarcasm, and merciless witticisms are characteristic of their own methods and of the way they were represented by others.

\textsuperscript{92} D.L. 6.64 (= V B 364 G.).

\textsuperscript{93} Cf. Goulet-Cazé (above, n. 70) 291–92. The conclusions of the global demonstration carried out by P. Hadot, “Les divisions des parties de la philosophie dans l’antiquité,” \textit{Museum Helveticum} 15 (1979) 201–33, may be applied to D.L. 6.103. We are therefore justified in supposing that it was after the fact that some Stoics—perhaps more specifically Apollodorus of Seleucia—gave to the conception that the Cynics had of philosophy, which was certainly unitary, a formulation that brought into play the three parts of philosophy that they themselves distinguished.

\textsuperscript{94} D.L. 6.63 (= V B 360 G.).

\textsuperscript{95} \textit{Gnomologium Vaticanum} 743, no. 182, p. 74 Sternbach (= V B 361 G.).
Cynic Discipline

Cynicism defined itself—or rather, was defined\textsuperscript{96} as “a shortcut to virtue” as opposed to the long road, which passed through laborious textual study and the acquisition of theoretical knowledge. But this “shortcut” was arduous and difficult, for it required the application of a demanding method: \textit{askēsis} (“exercise,” “practice,” “training,” “discipline”).\textsuperscript{97}

Understood in the Cynic sense of the term, \textit{askēsis} was intended as a preventive method. Every day, the Cynic trains the self physically in the arts of endurance; the daily exercise of the will causes fear to dissipate, since the practicing Cynic is constantly fortifying the self against unforeseen misfortunes.

The concept of “discipline” (\textit{askēsis}), borrowed from the vocabulary of athletics, was not used by the Cynics only in a metaphorical sense. Like the athlete’s, the philosopher’s “discipline” (\textit{askēsis}) was wholly concrete. The only difference resided in the \textit{telos} of his training: while the athlete trained his body with a view to victory in the stadium, the Cynic trained it in order to strengthen his will and to ensure his capacity for endurance.

Cynic training (\textit{askēsis}) is in preparation for a contest, and the agonist must be sure not to miss the point of his struggles. Diogenes warned against any useless suffering demanded by social custom, family, business, or politics as not worth the candle: “He would praise those who were about to marry but did not, those who were about to set sail but did not, those who were about to engage in politics but did not, those who were about to raise children but did not, those who were about to live at court but did not” (D.L. 6.29). Instead of such vain pursuits, Diogenes trained himself to fight against such existential adversaries as exile, poverty, hunger, and death. For him, this was the only battle worth winning. Whereas civilized existence represents these trials (\textit{ponoi}) as evils, the Cynic sought to endure them precisely by refusing to consider them evil. In order to acquire this state of mind, the Cynics exhorted themselves and others to practice a life in accordance with nature (\textit{kata plusin}). Someone “trained” to drink water, sleep on the ground, eat and dress simply, and put up with the heat or cold of the seasons will know how to respond with serenity when Fortune attacks. The law of Cynic \textit{askēsis} was simple: it consisted of living in poverty and satisfying only one’s natural needs—“the tuition-free way to learn philosophy.”\textsuperscript{98} In this way, the Cynic sought freedom from emotional turmoil (\textit{apatheia}) and independence from the outside world. In Diogenes’ Cynicism, there is no self-denial for its own sake or in the service of a transcendent goal. While it is true that much that made

\textsuperscript{96} Cf. Goulet-Cazé (above, n. 4) 3941–49. This definition can hardly be due to the first Cynics; it must rather be attributed to the Stoics and more specifically to Apollodorus of Seleucia.

\textsuperscript{97} D.L. 70–71 conserves an extract from a work by Diogenes in which the philosopher presents his conception of \textit{askēsis}. For an analysis of this passage, see Goulet-Cazé (above, n. 1).

\textsuperscript{98} Stobaeus 4.2, 32, 19 (= V B 223 G.).
Diogenes influential in antiquity is lost if we characterize his Cynicism solely as a practical morality, the practical element was, nevertheless, fundamental to his appeal.

Diogenes liked to proclaim himself 99

Without a city, without a home, bereft of fatherland,
A beggar and a vagabond, living from day to day.

The tangible signs of his “discipline” (askēsis) were the accoutrements the philosopher carried with him: his knapsack containing everything he possessed, his walking staff, and his short, coarse cloak, his only clothing in winter or summer, which he also used as a blanket. The Cynic, missionary and “doctor” of souls,100 headed out on the road to spread his message. The therapy he recommended was highly unusual: it was based, in the first instance, on frankness and freedom of speech (parrhēsia), which often led to withering retorts and reprimands, and on laughter—fearless laughter that shook the interlocutor and forced him to react. Finally, it was based upon provocation, particularly in the form of “shamelessness,” which Diogenes used not as an end in itself, but as a pedagogical instrument intended—here again—to shock his interlocutors out of their complacency. Diogenes’ practice sought to make others become aware of the incoherencies of civilized life when compared with “natural life” and to make them abandon their false shame. These were the indispensable preliminaries to any pretensions to practice philosophy.

100. For the philosophical application of this metaphor in other Hellenistic schools, see M. Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics (Princeton 1994).