Introduction

The ancient *velador* paces the streets between eleven at night and four in the morning in one of Uruapan's oldest and most dangerous quarters. It is an area stalked by gangs of *porros,* antisocial youths who prey upon their helpless victims in the darkness. Yet in all the years of the velador's lonely rounds, the gangs have never molested him. He is a living representation of Uruapan's enduring cultural heritage. The Mexican people, even the porros in their way, have an abiding respect for their pre-Columbian and Spanish cultural traditions. The defense of the sovereignty and economy of Mexico's national, state, and local regimes was the essence of the social revolution of 1910 and the nineteenth-century provincial uprisings that preceded it.

This study is an analysis of both the development of those forces whose interaction brought about the Mexican Revolution and the pursuit by the revolutionaries of their respective interests during that conflict. It examines each major social group—industrial and urban workers, peasants and *campesinos, pequeña burguesía* and provincial elites—in the context of its prerevolutionary development and its role in the unfolding revolutionary process until the basic social resolution achieved by 1924.

Understanding the Mexican Revolution requires analysis of why both socially conservative elites and restless lower-class groups chose to overthrow their government. By this analysis Mexico's social conflicts and the national economy will be placed in long-term, short-term, and global contexts. Those dimensions necessarily measure the sociopolitical effects of foreign-engendered domestic economic growth between 1867 and 1910 and assess the importance of increased foreign indebtedness and dependence on foreign investment during the economic crisis between 1900 and 1910.

The revolution itself will be examined in the context of the contending forces vying for control of Mexican society between 1910 and 1917. Four major social groups inside Mexico—the peasantry, industrial and urban workers, pequeña burguesía, and provincial elites—manifested distinct revolutionary objectives during the struggle. Their visions included violently contradictory goals as well as reconcilable ones. In this way the interactions of the revolutionaries with elements of the ancien régime and foreign interests and governments provide an essential dimension for understanding the ultimate outcome of the revolutionary process.

THE BACKGROUND

During the last decade of the ancien régime long-standing social, economic, political, and cultural conflicts exacerbated by an international economic crisis intensified to a point of national upheaval. In the long term Mexico's revolutionary unrest derived from internal stresses rooted in the castelike inequalities established by the Spanish conquest of the sixteenth century. The basis for those conflicts, however, deepened during the last hundred years of the Spanish colony and the first half-century after political independence. Then, between 1876 and 1910, the impact of the global economy upon the national social fabric dramatically increased. During the last ten years of the Porfirian regime the society entered deep crisis. Recurring foreign economic and financial contractions between 1899 and 1910 seriously undermined Mexico's well-being, especially after 1907. Displaced peasants and unemployed workers faced deprivation while the nationalistic pequeña burguesía and regional elites saw their economic opportunities increasingly limited and their federalist-democratic principles trampled upon by a government unable or unwilling to stem foreign competition.

The long-term development of Mexican social conflict began in the late seventeenth century when metropolitan and outside-controlled commercial estate agriculture and industry progressively encroached upon quasi-independent pueblos and local societies, destabilizing them. The resulting competition for land and water rights led to peasant revolts. In many cases the rural indigenous people had experienced prolonged periods of relatively autonomous isolation and social stability prior to the disruption of their economic, political, and cultural lives by the outsiders.

For most of the colonial era a sharing of benefits engendered common interests among provincial and metropolitan elites vis-à-vis the indigenous

and *mestizo* working classes. As a result, the leadership of the regional uprisings derived from elements of the residual indigenous village and local elites, not from the relatively high-status provincial landowners and political power brokers. In the late eighteenth century, however, the growth of metropolitan-controlled commercial agriculture and mining and the extension of state power provoked unrest among provincial and local political elites. This potent group demonstrated its political capacity by rallying the displaced classes and castes—the village peasant and artisan producers, Indians, blacks, and mestizos—to its side.[1]

Between 1810 and 1876 regional and local elites frequently used the militias of their respective territories to guard their economic and political privileges against outsiders. Absentee estate owners in Mexico City and provincial capitals sought profit through export agriculture in the center, south, and far north. The expansion of their enterprises and the intrusion of their supervisors was accompanied by the growth of small-scale businesses in the *pueblos*. The changing economic and cultural milieu often challenged the prerogatives of village communal holders and the traditional authorities of local regimes.

Meanwhile, Mexico's growing global economic involvement meant more outside competition for domestic industry. The gradual opening up of trade and the influx of high-technology goods eroded local artisanry. Agricultural and industrial dislocation created widespread public unrest, giving regional elites and local citizenries the popular base they needed for countless insurrections and successful political revolutions in 1853–1854 and 1876.

The process of economic intrusion and resulting regional multiclass and caste rebellions that characterized the revolution of 1910 first surfaced when commercial estate agriculture made rapid gains in the Chiapas-Isthmus of Tehuantepec region during the late seventeenth century. Absentee landlords in Mexico City created and controlled a new complex of industrial export agriculture, producing tobacco, cotton, sugar, hemp, and cacao. The principal estate involved, the enormous and expanding Marquesana hacienda, was once part of the Cortes heirs' Marquesado *latifundia*. The trouble began when hacienda owners seized lands claimed by the Isthmian Zapotec pueblos. Some local elites, suppliers, buyers, administrative personnel, and officials including *caciques* benefited from the development of the large-scale commercial and export-oriented great estates, but some did not. The result was a change in the balance of power in local political and economic hierarchies.

Conflict arose between those most closely associated with the still intact

Zapotec peasant-indigenous society and the beneficiaries and participants in the new order. Starting in 1707, ten years of violence rooted in deepening political, economic, and cultural conflict swept the Chiapas-Tehuantepec region in the form of village risings. Displaced and threatened local elites, mestizo townsmen, village peasants, and rural estate workers formed the core of the unrest.

In 1780 new violence erupted near the town of Izúcar in present-day southwestern Puebla. The recent introduction of large-scale commercial sugar production had transformed land tenure in the area. Although the estate owners made their homes in Mexico City, their local representatives undermined the traditional political hierarchy, indigenous cultural traditions, and peasant economy of their respective areas. The clash between the commercial landowners and formerly communal peasants reflected an early, isolated, but important emergence of capitalism when the latter complained of *"raquiticos salarios"* (feeble salaries). The Izúcar rebellion comprised a multiclass and caste alliance of rebels who fought to restore village autonomies, regional political authority, and usurped pueblo landholdings and to gain better wages for their part- and full-time labor on the estates.

In a similar manner the 1810 Independence Revolution in the Bajío resulted from regional social destabilization brought about by massive increases followed by erratic contractions in mining and commercial agriculture during the eighteenth century. The mining boom encouraged the development of estate agriculture in the region. A century of mining prosperity ended, however, with a severe contraction between 1800 and 1810. That crisis, characterized by industrial layoffs and falling silver production, compounded the region's prolonged problems of peasant displacement and endemic famine. The revolutionary alliance included political officials, factory owners, shopkeepers, village curates, displaced peasants, unemployed mine workers, and "villagers" from estate rancherías who claimed land usurpation at the hands of the growing estates.[2]

The local Creole elite led the principal revolutionary forces; smaller groups displayed mulatto, mestizo, and Indian village and tenant farmer leadership. As the revolution spread southward through the present-day states of Michoacán, Guerrero, and Morelos, it took on contrasting aspects. In the following years a professional class—pequeña burguesía—and ranchero (commercial middle holder) leadership characterized the main forces. However in the countryside, the village and rural farm worker population carried out a generalized attack against outside-controlled commercial agriculture and political interference.

Between 1832 and 1854 rural unrest continued with three major regional uprisings that swept the 60,000-square-mile area between the highly commercialized Tehuantepec region in the south and the new citrus-producing zones of the Balsas River basin in Michoacán and the sugar centers of Morelos and Izúcar, Puebla, to the north. The third revolt, that of 1853–1854, became national in scope and led to the overthrow of President Antonio López de Santa Anna and his replacement with southwestern provincial strongman Juan Alvarez.

Commercial agriculture grew rapidly during the eighteenth century, and the southwest was one of its focal points. Peasant displacement associated with the growth of the great estates advanced rapidly in the most commercially developed areas. The Marquesana hacienda in the Isthmus of Tehuantepec and the hacienda San Marcos located between Acapulco and Oaxaca were the region's largest. The latter reached 500,000 acres in size.

During the peasant offensives of the independence struggle between 1810 and 1821 the great estates in the southwest suffered heavy losses, but after the war with Spain they began to reconsolidate. The absentee estate owners residing in faraway Mexico City continued to exercise considerable power, and their efforts constituted a threat to the increased leadership role desired by provincial Creole elites as well as to the landholdings claimed by the village peasantry. The ongoing lower-class unrest was finally harnessed by the regional *caudillo* Juan Alvarez and his southwestern provincial elite allies, who used it during their seizure of national political power in 1854.

Many of Alvarez's Liberal party supporters shared a desire to emulate the political and economic success of the United States. They longed for the capital and technology of the North Atlantic power to undo a sense of defeat engendered by over forty years of chaos since 1810. Some carried their vision to the extreme of membership in the growing republic to the north. Most sought economic cooperation between the two nations. The close and unequal economic relationship formed between American investors and Mexicans became a critical element in the coming of revolution in 1910.

During the second half of the nineteenth century peasant and provincial rebellions shifted northward in association with railroad, commercial agriculture, timber, and mining investments. Major peasant and regional uprisings in the affected areas took place between 1868 and 1883. By the 1890s the pattern of intrusion and revolt had reached previously remote Chihuahua and Coahuila. The self-governing semiautonomous mestizo towns established in earlier times as frontier buffer colonies against ma-

rauding Indians were transformed from quasi-independence toward tenant farmers and laborers. During the economic prosperity that prevailed until 1899 the regional elites took part in only a few of the struggles.

In 1876, Porfirio Díaz, long a rebellious provincial caudillo from the southwestern state of Oaxaca, had rallied the provincial elites with the Revolution of Tuxtepec. Named after a small town in Puebla, the uprising began in earnest in January 1876 from Díaz's headquarters in Brownsville, Texas. Openly supported with cash and arms by important American capitalists, military commanders, and large-scale Texas landowners, Díaz was able to sustain his revolution for six months along the Río Bravo between Laredo-Nuevo Laredo and Brownsville-Matamoros. By June state governors and provincial garrison commanders had joined the movement to topple the destabilized and "anti-American" government of President Sebastian Lerdo de Tejada.

In the early years of its tenure the Díaz regime created a broad base of elite support. Its partisans included representatives of the state oligarchies including Evaristo Madero of Coahuila. They participated in an economic expansion dominated by North American and European capitalists. Now in direct contact with outside markets via the growth of the railroads and extractive industries, the northern oligarchs lost their political autonomy, but new wealth showered upon them. For the most part the fighting that took place during the Porfiriato involved the army and peasant villages suffering from land enclosure in isolation from the upper strata of provincial society.

By 1900 the situation was changing. The national government had centralized political authority to an unprecedented extreme, while increasing ties between the regime and foreign capital led to an influx of American colonists claiming title to Mexican land and resources. That situation was frightening to the northern provincial elites, who had witnessed the earlier loss of Texas to American colonists and the ensuing economic takeover of the territories that later became the southwestern United States. Those concerns, combined with a fiscal crisis that reduced the government's ability to provide sinecures through public works contracts, led provincial elites to feel they were being denied the opportunity to participate in the country's economic growth. After 1900, government-sponsored foreign commercial intrusion into provincial society reached an unprecedented magnitude, especially in the far north, often in competition with local landowners, businessmen, and artisans. By 1910, American real estate holdings totaled 130 million acres and encompassed much of the nation's most valuable mining, agricultural, and timber properties.

Because the financing of Porfirian capitalist growth was foreign and not produced by dynamic internal processes, the increasing number of centers of commercial agriculture and industrial activity were superimposed on an otherwise peasant population in the countryside. The result was a crazy quilt of contrasting societies in rural Mexico. In five areas the conflicting forces of economic intrusion and traditional society were especially strong: Morelos and parts of Guerrero and Puebla in the center-south of the country; the Pacific coast from Sonora to Chiapas; Tamaulipas, Veracruz, Tabasco, and Campeche on the Gulf coast; the Isthmus of Tehuantepec; and the northern border states of Coahuila, Chihuahua, and Sonora. These became the starting points of the Mexican Revolution. Two of them—the center-south and the far north—became the focal points of sustained lower-class-led revolutionary activity.

An indigenous cohesion existed in Morelos, unlike much of the north, Gulf coast, and in the more developed areas. Over 20 percent of the rural population in 1910 still spoke only Nahuatl and even more were bilingual. In contrast to the nation's generally thinly distributed countryside population, Morelos was the most densely populated rural place in Mexico, and its strong Indian-mestizo village society was concentrated within one of the most intensely commercial agricultural zones. A legendary thirty-eight families controlled the state's sugar mills and plantation fields. Many of the absentee owners, some of them foreigners, resided in Mexico City. Competition between the estates and villages for acreage during the 1880s and 1890s resulted in victories for the great estate owners. By 1910 they claimed almost 98 percent of the arable land. Many of the pueblos faced the prospect of extinction. To increase sugar profitability and production, two railroad lines were constructed connecting the state to the Mexico City metropolis and the export centers of Veracruz and Acapulco. The furtherance of commercial ends also resulted in the nation's finest rural road system. The byways crisscrossed the state, bringing the ordinarily remote and disparate peasant villages into ready contact. News traveled fast in Morelos, and so did peasant guerrilla armies.

Located a mere 50 miles from Mexico City, the Morelos peasantry were affected not only by the efforts of metropolitan and foreign capitalists but also by the diffusion of European radical ideas. Nationalism, anarchism, and liberalism found a receptive audience there. Zapata acknowledged his debt to them in his myriad proclamations, "al pueblo Mexicano," while incorporating anarchist advisors from the revolutionary workers' organization, the Casa del Obrero Mundial. Ringed by rugged, inpenetrable mountains narrowly embracing fertile lowland fields, Morelos became the

ideal location for a sustained peasants' war. Its rugged topography contrasted sharply with the easily accessible Gulf coast-Isthmus of Tehuantepec zone of rebellion in Tamaulipas, Veracruz, Tabasco, southern Oaxaca, and Campeche.

Along the Gulf and Pacific coasts and in the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, an equally large revolution among fieldworkers on the great estates began in 1910–1911 and raged out of control in late 1912 through 1916. A high degree of commercialization had occurred centuries earlier, however, and the residual village communal regimes were weak. Only a remnant of small-scale landowning Mexican local elites remained to offer the insurrection cohesive leadership. On the coasts thin population dispersal and lack of intact traditional village hierarchies denied the unrest a sustaining basis. The flat, easily traversed coastal areas offered maximum opportunities to the conventional army and made guerilla actions more difficult, if not impossible. The repeated rebellions in the Gulf and Pacific coast zones were quelled by government forces in 1913, in late 1914–1915, and again in 1919–1920. In the Isthmus of Tehuantepec the fragmented rebels, remote from the nation's metropolitan center, achieved their ends by expelling hundreds of American landholders and companies. Uncontested, they satisfied their countryside revolutionary aims by reestablishing much of their pre-Porfirian land tenure system.

In Morelos the dense infrastructure of peasant villages, with their partially intact pre-Columbian cultural heritage and social and authority structures, came into conflict with an insistent, heavy-handed economic intrusion of outsiders, many of whom were concentrated in nearby Mexico City, to create a volatile situation. The state's rugged terrain and unique transport and communications systems combined with its wide exposure to outside revolutionary ideas dedicated to the liberation of oppressed peoples to make it a center of uncontrollable peasant-based guerrilla unrest.

In the north commercially oriented provincial elites became active in the political opposition because of the economic and political threat posed by growing national government and American domination. By 1902 more than 23 percent of all U.S. investments in Mexico were concentrated in those three rural states (Coahuila, Chihuahua, and Sonora) whose total population constituted only 1.5 percent of the nation's citizenry. Nationwide, Americans and other foreigners dominated industry, transportation, mining, and timber production and, holding more than 120 million highly capitalized acres, challenged the Mexicans in landownership. Americans were an important bloc among the cattle raisers and the new commercial farming elite. Despite their close trade ties to American entrepreneurs

across the border, the nationalistic northern elites were well aware that U.S. commercial and landowning hegemony in the affected regions had preceded the loss of Texas and, in 1848, of the massive territory that became the southwestern United States.

The politically sophisticated northern elites had exercised semiautonomous control of their provinces since colonial times and enjoyed geographical remoteness from the national government until the railroad and telegraph of the Porfiriato placed them under the thumb of the ruling operatives in Mexico City. In the meantime, an avalanche of new American capital seized control of most northern economic resources, orienting production toward foreign export. This occurred at the expense of local competitors while creating Mexican-owned support industries. Regional elite protest arose in the face of increasing American landholdings across the nation and exploded in revolution when financial contractions in the United States provoked a deep depression in the Mexican north after 1907.

During the second half of the nineteenth century the Industrial Revolution produced a potentially powerful industrial working class. Worker unrest rooted in colonial-era immiseration and artisan leadership found anarcosyndicalism a solution. Nationalistic industrial labor strikes and uprisings plagued Mexico after 1900. Directed against French, American, and Mexican owners, the workers' violence helped to undercut the regime's political legitimacy.

The factors that brought about the revolution of 1910 were active during most of the nineteenth century in diminished scale or on a regional level and included the following:

—the national government's failure to satisfy the nationalistic public demand to meet the overwhelming political, cultural, and economic challenges of foreign intruders;
—regional elite competition with an expansive central government and metropolitan ruling class for control of local resources;
—increasingly restricted access to public works contracts and polity;
—resentment of the government's overwhelmingly powerful foreign entrepreneurial allies;
—national government fiscal crises brought about by increasing interest burdens on debts and the need for infrastructure development;
—pequeña burguesa disillusionment with dictatorship and boss rule;
—imported revolutionary working-class ideologies;
—peasant displacement through the expansion of export agriculture far

out of proportion to the ability of new technology and industrial growth to absorb them through new employment; and
—peasant and industrial working-class repression and deprivation.

Between 1707 and 1910 the focus of political, economic, and cultural conflict—with the exception of Sonora and Yucatán, where almost continuous struggle took place—assumed a general pattern of movement from south to north. It did so in response to the rate of change and social dislocation in the countryside that began with metropolitan investments in tropical export agriculture and ended with an overwhelming takeover by the Americans. Throughout the process the loci of unrest paralleled the growth of commercial export croplands, mining, railroads, and timber until the onset of the revolution. The ever growing regional uprisings of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries anticipated the essence of the much larger conflagration of 1910.

In the short term, those critical ten years after 1900, the historically resistant agrarian and industrial working classes confronted food shortages, rising prices, and growing unemployment, which contributed to worsening living conditions. The peasants experienced new levels of displacement as 15,000 American colonists armed with property titles and rifles occupied large areas of Chiapas, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Puebla, Sonora, Sinaloa, San Luis Potosí, Tamaulipas, Veracruz, and the Isthmus of Tehuantepec. Apart from the colonists, American corporations bought massive land tracts in the north, Campeche, Chiapas, Colima, Durango, Tabasco, Veracruz, and Zacatecas.

Simultaneously, the frustrated Mexican pequeña burguesía and local and provincial elites saw their own social position eroded and the national government politically overwhelmed by foreign economic invasion, their federalist-democratic principles abused by the resulting dictatorship and boss rule, and opportunities for social and economic success increasingly limited by erratic downturns endemic to the economy with new foreign competitors often working in cooperation with the national government. Mexico's vulnerable and dependent position in the world economy caused a foreign-controlled, excessively narrow, unbalanced pattern of economic growth, with centers of American, British, Belgian, French, and German prosperity protected by armed *rurales* juxtaposed to and often combined with increasing native deprivation.

The Porfirian commercial and industrial revolution transformed traditional peasants and artisans, creating agrarian and industrial workers. It forged an army of technocrats and administrators, while small businessmen

proliferated. Regional elites acquired unprecedented riches from commercial agriculture and mining. Yet as time went on, foreign investment and the ever-stronger national government foreclosed on provincial elite autonomy and competed with it for local opportunities. In the first ten years of the twentieth century elements of all four classes—peasant, industrial worker, pequeña burguesía, and provincial elites—separately espoused the revolutionary doctrines of anarchism, liberalism, or democracy. In the context of growing foreign economic, political, and cultural domination and deepening economic crisis, however, all four could and did rally to nationalism.

In the long and short term, the causes of the Mexican Revolution of 1910 were comparable to those that engendered contemporary multiclass upheavals in the transitional societies of China, Iran, and Russia. The nationalistic autonomy-minded Mexican provincial elites and their pequeña burguesa allies, like their counterparts in China, Iran, and Russia, led workers and peasants in the demand for increasingly effective representation of their interests by the national government in its dealings with foreigners. With their expectations crushed by an overwhelming foreign economic and political presence meshing with the policies of their national governments, the excluded provincial elites and pequeña burgesía found no peaceful means to enter the national political arena.

In all four countries the restricted political base of the national governments became obsolete as economic growth created new economically and technologically important, yet politically excluded, social groups. As transitional societies China, Iran, Russia, and Mexico shared a common dependence upon foreign financial support for their industrialization. Immediately prior to their early twentieth-century upheavals these nations experienced deep socioeconomic and political trauma when their sources of financial support in Western Europe and the United States were cut off by banking crises between 1899–1904 and 1907–1908.

In the midst of general socioeconomic instability, rising foreign influence, political dissent, and fiscal crisis, the Porfirian government gradually lost its ability to rule. Foreign companies' increasing power coupled with the cost of public indebtedness dictated the regime's inability to respond to the complex economic and political problems that arose in the first ten years of the twentieth century. The regime's subordinate-dependent relationship to foreign capital precipitated a confrontation between the metropolitan elites and the provincial elites led by Francisco I. Madero over the issues of home rule, a more open political system, and the disbursement of local economic opportunities. In order to gain lower-class support for

his insurrectionary cause, Madero offered industrial workers the right to organize freely and peasants the opportunity to reclaim usurped lands.

As a consequence of elite crisis a partially paralyzed state could not activate the traditional mechanisms of social control with full efficiency, and a nationwide conflagration broke out. Foreign revolutionary ideologies—nationalism, liberalism, anarchism, and socialism—offered the alienated groups both explanations of and solutions to their dilemmas. Between 1910 and 1920 the rival classes clashed in a series of struggles that shook the nation, threatened the interests of foreign companies and governments, provoked foreign intervention, and reshaped the society and state.

This study is an analysis of both the development of those forces whose interactions brought about the Mexican Revolution and the revolutionaries' pursuit of their respective interests during that conflict. It examines each major social group—industrial worker, peasant-campesino, pequeña burguesía, and provincial elite—in the context of its prerevolutionary development and its role in the unfolding revolutionary process until the basic social resolution achieved between 1916 and 1924.

THE STRUGGLE

The Mexican Revolution comprised the same social forces and groups that carried forward the first massive popular uprisings of the twentieth century (between 1905 and 1911) in Iran, Russia, and China. Peasants, industrial workers, pequeña burguesía, and provincial elites mobilized, challenging the government while meeting the threats presented by foreign intruders and one another. In all four of these early twentieth-century national revolutions, formally constituted political parties possessed little of the organizational strength and unity between peasants and industrial workers that characterized later struggles in Russia and China. In Mexico, although anarchosyndicalism was strong among the revolutionary industrial workers and influenced the Zapatistas and Villistas, there were no Marxist-Leninist cadres. As a result, the organizational strength and resources of the pequeña burguesía, provincial elites, and their foreign supporters, reinforced by the latter's geographical proximity, proved decisive.

In the course of the revolution an olio of contending forces arose, each setting forth demands and perceptions rooted in its historical development. The peasants, industrial workers, pequeña burguesía, regional elites, foreign capitalists, and metropolitan Porfirian oligarchy all behaved in ac-

cordance with patterns and interests established earlier. Their experience and behavior prior to the onset of national crisis is a major dimension of this study and essential to understanding the revolution.

The roles and importance of the various interest groups that brought about the Mexican Revolution can be discerned during the course of the struggle itself in the context of three phases. The first phase, that of *elite crisis and mass mobilization,* began with the emergence of the Mexican Liberal party and heightened with the revolt of landowner-businessman Francisco Madero in 1910 and endured until 1914. It involved a mutually destructive rivalry between provincial and national ruling elites for control of the government in Mexico City. In the vacuum created by that strife the long repressed and rebellious peasants of the center-south were able to organize a formidable armed force, the Zapatistas, which also challenged the government. In 1911 the fall of the far-removed border town of Ciudad Juárez triggered riots in Mexico City. Meanwhile, countless rural insurrections against commercial and foreign property owners were carried out by local peasants, agricultural workers, and miners across the country; and the mobilization of American troops along the border hurried the shaken president into exile without a real fight.

Unable to control the demands and actions of revolutionary peasants and workers, Madero failed to reconcile the resentful oligarchy and foreigners to his upstart rule. For about fifteen months Madero attempted to govern while confronted by a rising tide of revolt in the countryside and violent labor-organizing efforts in the urban areas. The fall of 1912 brought a nationwide wave of campesino assaults against foreign-owned properties that reached a peak in 1914. The attacks were frequently led by local small landowners and other men of note, who usually called themselves Villistas and Zapatistas but who were in fact outside any organized authority. In the face of rising unrest, army commander General Victoriano Huerta overthrew Madero in February 1913. The new regime, backed by the oligarchy and foreigners—including the Americans, who provided Huerta with large-scale arms aid—faced a new insurrection led by the northern elites in Sonora and Coahuila and lower-class leaders in Chihuahua.

Eventually victorious, the Constitutionalist faction, led by the great estate owner and governor of Coahuila, Venustiano Carranza, and backed by part of the Sonoran state oligarchy, waged a civil war against Huerta. As a result of the northern oligarchy's incomplete control, tens of thousands of townspeople, peasants, and agrarian workers mobilized in Chihuahua in 1913 and 1914 under the lower-class leadership of Francisco

Villa. Dozens of groups calling themselves Zapatistas and Villistas carried out raids in the countryside. Zapatista raiders appeared in Tamaulipas, Sinaloa, and Sonora. Groups self-identified as Villista operated as far south as Chiapas, Oaxaca, and Campeche. Invariably they were made up of local campesinos, miners, artisans, and rancheros. Some operated in the manner of bandits; others seized claimed lands and occupied them or destroyed foreign (especially American) mining, ranching, and farming properties.

Temporarily allied under Carranza's titular leadership, the larger but disparate northern revolutionary groups gained crucial American neutrality in the summer of 1913 and open support in the winter of 1914. The initial elite crisis-mass mobilization phase of the revolution ended early in the summer of 1914 with the defeat of Huerta. At that point tens of thousands of fighters were arrayed in two coalescing and hostile groups while independent groups still stalked the countryside.

The critical second phase of the revolution, that of *class confrontation, American intervention, and workers' defeat,* began with a struggle that surfaced in mid-1914 between the victorious provincial elite- and pequeña burguesa-led forces arrayed with Carranza and the populist northern rural cohorts of Villa with their initially ranchero, artisan, and rural lower-class leaders. The basically peasant followers of Zapata and the most extreme of the radical agrarian reform leaders such as Eulalio Gutierrez of San Luis Potosí quickly rallied to Villa. During the ensuing civil war the organized urban workers, pequeña burguesía, the bulk of the intelligentsia, and, subtlely, the American companies and government supported the broad-based reformist appeal of Alvaro Obregon Salido, the military commander of the Constitutionalist forces, and Venustiano Carranza.

The American intervention at Veracruz in April 1914 constituted the focal point of the U.S. government's effort to control events in Mexico. It began with an attempt to oust Huerta but quickly became a means to gain concessions from Carranza. The Americans controlled an immense strategic stockpile of arms there. The military equipage included over 4,500 crates of armaments and filled three warehouses to overflowing, each of which measured 57.5 yards in width and length and over 21 feet in height. More arms including machine guns and artillery were placed in reinforced depositories, among them the Baluarte of Veracruz, the Benito Juárez lighthouse, and the San Juan de Ulloa fortress. In the meantime American ships quietly supported the beleaguered Constitutionalist forces by entering the ports of Mazatlán, Manzanillo, Acapulco, Salina Cruz, and Guaymas, maintaining the flow of supplies without entering into hostilities.

The American authorities at Veracruz, led by presidential envoy John

Lind and U.S. Army General Frederick Funston, also contributed to the maintenance of "law and order" in Campeche and Tabasco by shipping weapons to "police and planters" there. Four American companies owned over 3 million acres of hardwood forest and henequen and rubber plantations in Campeche alone. Another company held a 3.5 million-acre timber concession in Quintana Roo and Yucatán. The American properties extended in a solid body north from the Guatemalan border to the Gulf of Mexico at Carmen and on to the capital of the state. After August 1914, the onset of World War I made Campeche's supply of rubber, already a strategic material, even more central to U.S. government concerns. The United States was the world's largest consumer of raw rubber, and Mexico was an important producer.

The provincial elite- and pequeña burguesa-led Constitutionalist and industrial worker alliance was crucially aided by freely imported American munitions and the massive quantities of arms stockpiled at Veracruz. Equipped with modern artillery, machine guns, barbed wire, trucks, radio transmitters, and rifles, they quickly succeeded in defeating the much larger but less well-equipped Villista and Zapatista main forces directed by mostly rural working-class leaders. They achieved strategic domination of the Villistas and Zapatistas by mid-1915, although the fighting continued for another five years.

The second stage of the revolution continued when the urban working class and the bourgeoisie turned on each other in mid-1915 after the military collapse of the Villistas in the Bajío and north-central Mexico. The Constitutionalist government, supported by foreign companies and the most important industrialists of Mexico City, violently opposed the plans of the principal industrial labor organization, the Casa del Obrero Mundial.

The Casa planned eventually to seize control of Mexico's private enterprises and to reorganize them on an anarchosyndicalist basis. The government refused urban labor demands for relief from inadequate salaries, the elimination of script currencies by private enterprises, price controls to stop inflation, and the resolution of widespread unemployment. Increasingly militant and large-scale strikes, mass demonstrations and street violence continued for fifteen months. Factories closed while armed workers maintained barricades and angry crowds surged through the streets. The unrest finally ended in August 1916 when troops broke the second general strike of that year, smashed the various Casa centers located in the nation's cities, and with them the power of the revolutionary urban labor movement.