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Introduction: Sex, Society, and Identity

After having spent a long day in the Bibliothèque Nationale reading disintegrating old sex manuals, I was browsing through the wares of a quayside stall and came upon a popular French text on sexual virility published in 1971 that reiterated almost word for word the beliefs about male sexuality I had encountered earlier that afternoon. Young women on the lookout for virile lovers, I read, should consider men with dark and abundant body hair; they should pay special attention to their hands, because the hand was a reliable indicator of the size and shape of the penis, and a weak handshake a dead giveaway of impotence. The “primordial element” of a happy marriage, according to the author, was the husband’s ability to maintain an erection and sexually satisfy his wife. If he should fail in this task, he will set in motion both a “psycho-pathological inversion” of his natural dominance and her “instinct to feel herself dominated,” which will end in “neurosis, adultery, and divorce.”¹

In light of apparent advances in the twentieth century in sexual enlightenment and a gender revolution in social and economic life, the persistence of popular literature linking sexual anatomy and character with biological sex seems odd, even sinister. Indeed, many of us have grown accustomed to using the socially inflected term *gender* in place of *sex* to signify the difference between men and women, and we generally accept the post-Freudian notion of our sexuality as libido, which we may bestow in the manner we please on a person or object of our own choosing. When we use the word *sex* nowadays, it is in reference to sex *acts*, or to denote the sex of beings lower than ourselves in the phylogenetic scale. Our post-modern consciousness encourages a distrust of all determinisms and stimulates in us the conceit that we may reconfigure our selves infinitely, select new identities, slip in and out of roles in protean fashion. For those engaged in contemporary sexual politics, it seems perversely old-fashioned to consider sex, as our recent ancestors did, to be something that entails pre-ordained economic, social, and familial roles, and dictates desires and personal comportment in keeping with biological sex.

Inevitably, these changes in the outlook of our culture on sex and sex

difference have profoundly influenced the way we theorize about these concepts when they become objects of historical or anthropological study. Perhaps because we regard our sexual beings as something we may, at least in part, shape to a design of our own, we are able to imagine in turn the various ways the sexual natures of individuals in other societies or in earlier times were constructed in particular social and cultural circumstances. Our ability to think of sex as a constructed *identity* therefore provides us with a valuable analytical tool for understanding sex as a historical artifact furnishing individuals with particular kinds of self-awareness and modes of social self-presentation. As many theorists have noted, by historicizing sex we can escape the bind of thinking about it as an adamant and transhistorical category of being.²

Recently, the lines of influence have begun to move the opposite way, from history back to politics. The current debate between “constructionists” and “essentialists” that permeates feminist, gay, and lesbian politics is as much about historical epistemology as it is about political strategy. Constructionists have argued that because essentialist definitions of sex have been used in the past to justify oppression, women and sexual minorities will benefit from a conception of sex based on social rather than biological categories, on the grounds that the former admits of change and makes discrimination based on “type” less likely. On the other hand, some contemporary essentialists—to distinguish them from the old tradition of biological essentialism that is the subject of this book—have indicated that the best foundation for long-term understanding lies in acknowledging the existence of an unchanging substratum of sexual being. Women, gays, and lesbians, the argument goes, must base their politics on their “real” natures and needs and compete for rights with other interests in a plural society.³

Some feminist theorists have tried to reformulate this debate along more fruitful lines by considering the merits of constructionism and essentialism in historical context. Diana Fuss has argued that essentialism is not in itself either progressive or reactionary, nor is it a necessary feature of patriarchal societies. We must ask about each “essence” we encounter, “How does the sign ‘essence’ circulate . . . and what motivates its deployment?” Moreover, she cautions, just as the critic or historian should regard all essences as constructions, so should they realize that constructions are merely essences that have displaced their essence onto the concept of sociality.⁴ Denise Riley writes in a similar vein that instead of veering between these two categories, the meaning of *woman* must be assembled historically, through an “awareness of the long shapings of sexed classifications in their post-1790’s upheavals.” An identity that threatens “to be dissipated into airy indeterminacy” may be “referred to the more substantial realms of discursive historical formation.”⁵ The historical turn in recent feminist theory clearly illustrates that the epistemological caveats

and desiderata that characterize contemporary sexual politics have a direct connection to new ways of studying sexual identity in the past.

There is, however, one aspect of the close relation between politics and history that poses a problem to understanding sexual identity in the past or in societies different from our own. I refer to the use of the term *gender*, which, for reasons I have mentioned, has begun to supplant *sex* in current discourse. Gender is a concept borrowed from grammar that connotes “a socially agreed upon system of distinctions rather than an objective description of inherent traits.”⁶ We may readily appreciate the contemporary attraction of a distinction between men and women that seems less determinate than one based on “inherent” biological sex, but, despite the clear analytical value gender possesses, we risk misunderstanding how individuals and societies constructed or experienced sexual identity in the past if we substitute gender for the older category of sex or use gender and sex interchangeably as though they were the same thing. As I hope I am able to demonstrate in this book, our ancestors were much more likely than us to regard sex as destiny, an *amor fati* that swept them along in its powerful currents.

It may also be the case, as I will later argue, that because of its historical experience French culture has developed a particular bias in favor of biological sex as a primordial category of being that has persisted into the contemporary era. Perhaps no modern French text better exemplifies this notion of sex than Georges Bataille’s meditation on the sources and expressions of erotic excitement, *Erotisme* (1957). Bataille defines eroticism as a quest independent of the “natural” goal of reproduction, but he insists that the energy and direction of erotic feeling are determined by the fact that sexual reproduction makes each of us “discontinuous” (sexed) beings seeking to re-establish continuity with the natural order, even though death is our reward for achieving it; this fate makes us akin to all other species on the “scale of organisms,” all the way down to the sperm and egg. We differ from them only in our ability to exploit this irresistible drive for our own erotic satisfaction.⁷

None of this should lead us to conclude that sex was not a socially constructed mode of being in French culture, but it does remind us of the need to consider sex and gender dialectically, as Joan Scott does when she speaks of gender as “a social category imposed on a sexed body.”⁸ The anthropologist Harriet Whitehead has made a similar distinction this way: “When I speak of cultural construction of gender, I mean simply the ideas that give social meaning to physical differences between the sexes, rendering two biological classes, male and female, into two social classes, men and women, and making the social relationships in which men and women stand toward each other appear reasonable and appropriate.”⁹ A considerable part of my aim in this book is to discuss how these biological classes

were constituted in particular orders of meaning in modern society. As Ortner and Whitehead have argued, though men and women have assumed a wide range of gender roles in different societies, these roles are invariably subject to an ideological reinterpretation in terms of a rigid sexual hierarchy where men occupy the dominant and most prestigious positions.¹⁰ When a woman performs a traditionally “masculine” activity, her work is nonetheless considered to be less prestigious in the sexually inflected value system of the group; she remains a woman in the prestige hierarchy and a female in her own sexual identity.¹¹

Sex thus appears to have operated ideologically or normatively to ensure the maintenance and reproduction of the social order by disciplining individuals who have stepped outside or challenged the boundaries of their gendered roles. Until recently in European society, *charivari* enacted boisterous shaming rituals to reprove nagging or domineering women, henpecked or cuckolded husbands, by recalling to them, and to the whole community, their “true” sex, thus setting right a world which inappropriate behavior threatened to turn upside down.¹² Words were coined for men who helped their wives in the kitchen or did stitch-work, a woman’s task. In the Burgundian village of Minot, one scorned such a man as a “fanoche,” that is, “a man who behaves like a woman, ‘femme-fanoche’ suggests the assonance. In a word, he is no longer a man.”¹³

But what was “true” sex? As these examples suggest, traditional societies possessed some collective understanding against which individual sexual identity was measured, invariably some form of the binary opposition, “male–female.” But how is this identity constituted? What is the relation between the “individual” and the “social”? Pierre Bourdieu has argued persuasively in his *The Logic of Practice* that sexual identity is not based on formal rationality; it is a “practical belief,” “not a ‘state of mind’, . . . but a state of the body.”¹⁴ It is “social necessity turned into nature,” in which “. . . the most fundamental social choices are naturalized and the body, with its properties and its movements, is constituted as an analogical operator establishing all kinds of practical equivalences among the different divisions of the social world—divisions between the sexes, between the age groups, between the social classes. . . .”¹⁵

A major contention of my book is that sexual identity has been largely experienced and regarded in the past as a *natural* quality, expressed in and through the body and its gestures. This is so, as Bourdieu indicates, because the acquisition and reproduction of this practical sense is not imitative or consciously learned, but is an *embodiment* which takes place

below the level of consciousness, expression, and the reflexive distance which these presuppose. The body believes in what it plays at; it weeps

if it mimes grief. It does not represent what it performs, it does not memorize the past, it *enacts* the past, bringing it back to life. What is “learned by body” is not something that one has, like knowledge that can be brandished, but something that one is.¹⁶

The gestures and practices of sexual identity are thus as corporeal in their lived reality as the sexual anatomy and the secondary sexual characteristics with which they are correlated, replicating in uncanny fashion the sexual divisions in the greater social world, “as if it produced a biological (and especially sexual) reading of social properties and a social reading of sexual properties. . . .”¹⁷ As Bourdieu states, “It is not hard to imagine the weight that the opposition between masculinity and femininity must bring to bear on the construction of self-image and world-image when this opposition constitutes the fundamental principle of the division of the social and the symbolic world.”¹⁸

Anthropologists or sociologists who study the continuum of sexual meanings that link the body and the social order can observe in their fieldwork the precise relation of physical appearance and movements to the social context in which they are expressed. Historians, however, cannot see their human subjects in this lived relation to their world but must try to reconstruct it as best they can from the evidence that survives. It is a subtle and difficult task for the anthropologist to accurately observe and interpret sexual identity in a small and relatively undifferentiated culture at a particular moment in time; it would be a labor of inconceivable difficulty for a historian to fully reconstruct the relationship of all bodies—male and female—to the social order in a complex, multitiered society over an extended period.

Although I have limited my topic in this book to the study of upper-class masculinity in France from the end of *l'ancien régime* to just after World War I, I hope to demonstrate how it will illuminate a remarkable part of the social, political, and cultural terrain of modern French history. I am in part concerned here with social structure and lines of cultural cleavage. My study reveals in particular how the bodies and sexuality of upper-class males and their modes of sociability and conflict were related to their elite social and political status. Women and femininity are not the subject of this work, but because French culture in this period continued to conceptualize male and female as a binary opposition, women are always in the field of focus as the “other” sex with which male sexual identity was in a persistent state of complementary equilibrium. Since the sexes were culturally defined in terms of one another, changes in one sex provoked adjustments in the other, producing moments of crisis and negotiation of great analytical interest.

I am also interested in how male sexual identity changes over time. I

address in this book the transition experienced by all European societies from a feudal world shaped over centuries by the values of noble warriors to an industrial order dominated by the commercial and professional bourgeoisie. What I learned, surprisingly, is that although the language and empirical basis constituting what it meant to be a man changed radically with the production of new formal knowledge about the body, the primordial qualities of manliness exemplified in the noble gentleman were adopted with minimal revision by middle-class men. The instrumentality that facilitated this process of adaptation was a male code of honor that survived the destruction of the Old Regime in 1789 by accommodating its practices and usages to the unique sociability and legal arrangements of bourgeois civilization. As it had done from the early Middle Ages, this honor code worked to both shape and reflect male identity and ideals of masculine behavior. It did this chiefly by regulating the social relations of men in groups and by providing a basis for adjudicating private disputes between them. The duel was only the most spectacular representation of this function of the honor code; on a more prosaic level, honor codes informed the day to day relations of men in professional life, sports, the political arena, and other areas of public life.

It is the remarkable endurance of this ancient code of honor that provides me with my principal problem of explanation: why did a code that sustained a military and landowning *race* (the term used by nobles themselves) appeal to their bourgeois successors who believed all careers were open to talent? There are three answers, I believe, to this question. One is well known to historians; it concerns the process of assimilation beginning well before the French Revolution wherein *roturiers* (commoners) intermarried and intermingled socially with the old nobility, appropriating along the way some of the usages of honor. Because the nobility retained much of its social, political, and economic power well into the nineteenth century, the prestige of the old aristocratic code continued to work its magic on successive generations of ambitious bourgeois, for whom noble *savoir faire* remained the ideal of fashion.

The threads of the second answer may be located in the structures of manners and sociality woven into the patterns of the middle-class social and political order. In these domains honor provided bourgeois men both with the basis for claims of individual distinction and a collective warrant for certifying the superiority and exclusiveness of their class. The code thus played the same role in bourgeois culture as it had played in the court society of the Old Regime, where, in the words of Norbert Elias, "Court society represents itself, each individual being distinguished from every other, all together distinguishing themselves from non-members, so that each individual and the group as a whole confirm their existence as a value in itself."¹⁹

The third reason for the endurance of honor was suggested to me in a passage from Foucault's *The History of Sexuality*. In discussing the difference between the old nobility and their successors, he wrote:

The bourgeoisie's "blood" was its sex. And this is more than a play on words; many of the themes characteristic of the caste manners of the nobility reappeared in the nineteenth-century bourgeoisie, but in the guise of biological, medical, or eugenic precepts. The concern with genealogy became a preoccupation with heredity; but included in bourgeois marriages were not only economic imperatives and rules of social homogeneity, not only the promises of inheritance, but the menaces of heredity.²⁰

Because their fortunes were dependent not simply on inheritance, but on viable and talented *inheritors*, there was much more at stake in marriage and reproduction for bourgeois families than there had been for Old Regime nobles. A nobleman had only to produce or designate an heir who could serve as an appanage to an entailed estate, but a bourgeois *paterfamilias* needed a successor who would preserve and augment a legacy built with the energy and skill of his forebears. In the course of the nineteenth century, doctors and scientists produced a body of rules and precepts governing the hygiene of reproduction that reflected and shaped in turn the practical requirements of bourgeois inheritance. By the logic of these rules, the sexuality of an individual was subsumed in his or her sex and judged by a consistent standard of reproductive capacity. A man's sexual identity was thus revealed in his physical sex and manly character, a view that, for a number of geopolitical and demographic reasons, may have been more deeply rooted in France than elsewhere in the West. In effect, honor was *embodied* in bourgeois men as a set of normative sexual characteristics and desires that reflected the strategies of bourgeois social reproduction. A man who deviated from these standards by choice or by "nature" dishonored himself and brought shame to his family—a judgment applied with equal severity to both the bachelor and the homosexual.

We may gain an appreciation of the effects of this process of embodiment by considering honor codes in modern Mediterranean societies. Around the rim of the Mediterranean, honor and shame have operated primarily to regulate the relations between the sexes, families, and clans; to distribute prestige (and therefore status) among them; and, finally, to promote cohesion in the whole society through the "shaming" of individuals who have forfeited their honor. But honor is also an ideal, providing "a nexus between the individuals of a society and their reproduction in the individual through his aspiration to personify them."²¹ In honor and shame societies men are regarded as the "active" and women the "passive" principle. Both sexes are attributed a measure of honor at adolescence, but

women's honor is primarily sexual in nature and consists first of her virginity and later her strict marital fidelity. Women can only lose their honor, but men are permitted to accrue to theirs by seeking glory and distinction in the public arena. Men, however, may also lose their honor in a variety of ways, suffering a kind of annihilation and social death. They might act in a cowardly or fearful manner, commit civil crimes, break a betrothal, engage in unprovoked violence, or fail to oversee and protect the honor of the women in their family.

Because the profound connections between sexuality and identity encourage a man to aspire to a manliness "that subsumes both shame and masculinity," his sexual identity becomes a key element in his social identity as a man of honor, legitimizing his claims to the worldly honors he may have won.²² The criteria of male identity may take graphically material form. A cuckold is assumed to be lacking in the usual marital authority because he is in some sense deficient as a man, that is in his genital endowments. Various insults in rural Andalusia locate willpower in the genitals, and among the Sarakatsani, a man "must be well-endowed with testicles and the strength that is drawn from them."²³ Effeminacy is deplored, especially when linked to cowardice, and there is widespread fear in honor and shame societies of impotence. The irony of male authority in such societies is that the considerable power males possess by virtue of their masculinity is exceedingly fragile, is open to constant challenge, and produces keen feelings of vulnerability in men.

I do not wish to argue that one may directly apply the concepts of honor and shame derived from the study of modern Mediterranean cultures to historical societies, even those, like France, with an important Mediterranean heritage; modern cultures and the codes that regulate them are themselves the product of a long historical evolution and deserve study in their own terms.²⁴ But acquaintance with the codes that regulate honor and shame offers the historian an insight into the crucial relationship between a man's sexual and social identity. As David Gilmore has written, ideals of masculinity "are not simply a reflection of individual psychology but a part of public culture, a collective representation."²⁵ We cannot easily penetrate the veil that cloaks private sexual experience and identity in the past, but the representations in the surrounding culture to which they are dialectically bound have left abundant traces in the public record. As several observers have noted, since codes of honor operate like systems of informal law, the rules, and the sanctions and rewards that compel submission to them must circulate openly, where they may be read by all, including the historian.²⁶

In advanced societies, the rituals, gestures, and ceremonial occasions that are the data for Bourdieu's notion of personal identity as "practical sense" exist alongside systems of formal law, pictorial images, and innu-

merable forms of discourse that may either reinforce or oppose these informal practices. As Michel Foucault and the school of cultural history he has inspired remind us, the cultural sphere is the site of power struggles between competing representations that may not be reduced to, but must somehow be correlated with particular interests and social groups. But because representations have a kind of independent and fluctuating status, the truths they assert and the dominion they seek may be tailored to a multitude of ends. They may serve as markers of collective identity and similitude or they may undermine community in alliance with discrete factions or individuals. Cultural representations are thus both structures of meaning and discursive practices that are employed in contingent ideological strategies.²⁷

If we are to successfully understand the meaning of representations, including the evidence they reveal about forms of individual and social identity, we must read them carefully in historical context. As Roger Chartier has written, "Cultural history is able to reflect usefully on social questions, since it focuses its attention on the strategies that determine positions and relations and that assign to each class, group, or milieu a perceived being which constitutes its identity."²⁸ We must not forget, however, that in the past these identities have assumed forms that entailed a high degree of fixity and determinism. We may be misled by the enthusiasm that post-modern critics have for speaking of the instability of identities, their evanescent forms and degrees of "density." Though the social origins, assumptions, and purposes of those in the company of honorable men varied between the Old Regime and World War I, the men who submitted themselves to the sexual prescriptions and the social rituals of the honor code felt themselves enmeshed in a fatally narrow circle of alternatives. The forms and content of the code changed markedly in the course of the centuries, but its power to command obedience remained intact.

Compared with the extraordinary growth in the history of women and femininity, the history of men and masculinity is a comparatively underdeveloped field. Inspired as much by political as by scholarly concerns, women's history has sought to bring to light not only the contributions women have made to our civilization, but also how they have suffered, often silently and invisibly, in the thrall of patriarchal culture.²⁹ This does not mean that only men have been well-served in the history written prior to the growth of women's studies; it could well be argued that men have been written about only as politicians, diplomats, generals, tycoons, and the like and not *as men*. Because feminists and historians of women have provided most of the methodological tools historians are now using to write the history of men and masculinity, there has been a temptation to continue the tradition of treating men and male sexuality as less problematic than the *vita sexualis* of women. Peter Gay, for example, has written that

the bourgeois erotic experience is “inseparable from the nineteenth-century debate over female sexuality.” Gay quotes as justification for this emphasis the early twentieth-century sexologist Iwan Bloch, who argued that “expressions of male sexual desire and lust” are “fairly unequivocal,” while the “old controversy” over the nature and strength of women’s sexual appetites has “not been resolved even today.”³⁰

The conviction that men have imposed various forms of subjugation on women has helped establish the idea that the category “woman” has been historically unstable and that men have construed women’s bodies and sexuality more or less as they pleased, making them by turns wanton or passionless, domestic angel or promiscuous tramp. There is certainly some truth in this view, but it seems odd to conclude, as Tom Laqueur has done in *Making Sex. Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud*, that men have constructed women from the archimedean point of “a generally unproblematic, stable, male body,” leading him to the pronouncement that “it is probably not possible to write a history of man’s body and its pleasures. . . .”³¹ One wonders why Laqueur does not consider a point made years ago by Alain Corbin, to wit, that if men have constructed an amatory and familial regime that has brought suffering to women, the historian would do well to also regard these regimes as “signs of masculine suffering,” in the sense that “the emotion of the partner, wife or concubine, cannot be isolated from the forms of expression or inhibition, or the satisfaction or frustration of masculine desire.”³² It brings little credit to men to say that their constructions of women’s “nature” have been designed to cover a variety of masculine anxieties or shortcomings, but it does suggest that there is something in the history of men’s experience that has provoked periodic reassessments of both women’s nature *and their own*. How could it be otherwise if “man” and “woman” have been yoked together as complementary if fluctuating terms from time out of mind?

I hope to demonstrate in this book that men have also constructed their bodies and sexual nature, but perversely, in the form of ideals that few men have been able to realize in practice. The psychoanalysts Robert Stoller and Nancy Chodorow tell us that the mother’s predominant responsibility for child-rearing in our society makes it necessary for a boy to break violently at some point from the orbit “child–mother” and forge a new oedipally oriented masculine identity.³³ Because his quest is premised on an impossibly exaggerated fantasy of a powerful father or a rigid cultural standard of male ideals, a man’s sense of self will be invariably partial and provisional, subject to endless revisions and fresh efforts. As Walter J. Ong has put it, a man can never wholly interiorize his masculinity, but is always seeking it “in some way outside of himself.”³⁴

As I have already suggested, we can only exceptionally reconstruct the private, oedipal experiences of French males, but we can try to recover

from the historical record the surviving traces of what French culture decreed men *should* be. Honor codes, with their exacting and often brutal exigencies, afford us a chance to glimpse the challenge that faced any man who aspired to honorability. The “problem” of honor, as I hope will emerge in this book, is that it was never secure, required constant reaffirmation, and was always open to challenge. Ironically, in a society governed by honor, masculinity is always in the course of construction but always fixed, a *telos* that men experience as a necessary but permanently unattainable goal. A man was in greatest danger of dishonoring himself at the very moment he most expressly affirmed his honor. Though the metaphor may seem imprecise, even gratuitous, the French ethnologist Michel Leiris has caught the sense of this dilemma in his autobiography, *L'Age d'Homme* (translation, *Manhood*), in which he equates the writer's requirement to tell the truth to the code of the *torero*, which was to his mind far worse because of its physical danger:

I have already spoken of the fundamental rule (to tell the whole truth and nothing but the truth) to which the writer of confessions is bound, and I have also alluded to the precise ceremony to which, in his combat, the *torero* must conform. For the latter, it is evident that the code, far from being a protection, contributes to his danger: to deliver the thrust under the requisite conditions demands, for instance, that he put his body, during an appreciable length of time, within reach of the horns; hence there is an immediate connection between obedience to the rule and the danger incurred.³⁵

My plan in this book is to trace the evolution of male honor codes from the Old Regime through the second decade of the twentieth century. As I have suggested, there were two domains of male honor in modern France: the honor embedded in the sex of the male body and its sexual hygiene, and the public rites of honor expressed in male sociability and the duel. My aim is to show how these two domains of honor stood in relation to one another over time. For analytical purposes I devote most attention to the body in chapters 3 through 6 and stress the public forms of honor in chapters 7 through 10. In chapter 2, I discuss the earliest forms of the honor code in France, including the duel, and the relation of the code to Old Regime society, politics, and noble inheritance. Chapter 3 concentrates on the process of social integration that led bourgeois males to adopt certain usages of noble honor, but I focus in particular on the development of a conception of bourgeois patrimony that included a distinctive set of inheritance practices and a related ideology of sex and sexual behavior. In chapter 4, I show how the French Revolution institutionalized and normalized bourgeois inheritance and the family order that depended on it. This is the era when men and women were first identified in law and

medicine as opposite but complementary beings whose unequal social status was expressed in their bodies and sexuality.

In chapter 5 I trace the effects of this “embodiment” process on theories of biological inheritance and reproductive fertility that arose in the mid-nineteenth century. I discuss how these theories, in conjunction with a “depopulation” crisis and France’s threatened fall from great power status, brought unusual pressure to bear on men to conform to new cultural standards of manliness. Chapter 6 deals with the “discovery” of the perversions by fin de siècle psychiatrists. I explain how these forms of non-reproductive sexual behavior, particularly male homosexuality, operated ideologically as negative counterpoints to the period’s conventional cultural norms of masculinity, and I compare French medicine, which had an unusually intolerant view of these sexual aberrations, with the more progressive psychiatric outlook elsewhere in Europe.

In chapter 7 I backtrack to the revolutionary era to discuss male bourgeois sociability and its relation to dueling practices in the first half of the nineteenth century. Chapter 8 is concerned with the rediscovery of the manly rituals of fencing and the real and symbolic links between the culture of the sword and the political culture of the early Third Republic. I examine at length the varieties of the duel that prospered from 1860 to 1914 in chapter 9, which is divided into six appropriate sections. I conclude by considering courage—the most splendid adornment of the man of honor—in its various pre-war and wartime manifestations. As I hope my conclusion will show, the legacy of honor to the twentieth century has been far from positive. Honor was invented to sustain order in a patriarchal and violent world, but it has ended by perpetuating both violence and patriarchy in ours.