Introduction

The Dialectic of Jewish Enlightenment

David Biale, Michael Galchinsky, and Susannah Heschel

"It is necessary to refuse everything to the Jews as a nation and grant the Jews everything as individuals." So declared Count Stanislas de Clermont-Tonnerre in 1789 during the debate in the National Assembly over the emancipation of the French Jews. To enter modern society the Jews were confronted with a demand to surrender their collective identity in exchange for full rights as individual citizens. Although they were not the only group whose emancipation was made dependent on dissolution of their medieval corporate status, it was the Jews who seemed to pose the most intractable problem for the European states.

Today's struggle, over two centuries later, to create a multicultural society in the contemporary nation-state has its historical origins in the very issue posed by Clermont-Tonnerre for the Jews. What can and should be the role of religious, ethnic, and cultural groups in a state whose theory of citizenship is based on individuals rather than collectivities? How are the identities of such groups to be defined and understood in a world that has undermined all traditional identities, in which terms like religion, ethnicity, and culture are constantly being torn apart and refashioned?

In Europe the Jews were one of the first of marginalized groups to confront these questions, and in the Holocaust they paid the highest of prices for the inability of the European states to give them satisfactory answers. If the European Enlightenment promised full equality to individuals, its own internal dialectic, as Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno showed half a century ago, undermined the promise in a num-
ber of inescapable ways. The Enlightenment’s doctrine of universal rationality offered a new doctrine of human rights and individual liberties, but this very universalist rationality also prepared the ground for the bureaucratic state and mass society, whose logic contradicted those rights and liberties. The Enlightenment could be seen as simultaneously the source of liberation and totalitarian oppression, both produced from the same principles. Side by side with the presumed equality of citizenship came the romantic idea of the nation, a new construct that mobilized historical traditions in the service of a new, homogeneous community, frequently hostile to recently emancipated groups like the Jews. What the modern state gave to such groups with one hand it took away with the other.

Even today many European states remain caught on the horns of this dilemma. Throughout Europe immigrant communities and ethnic minorities are challenging the old ideal of the homogeneous nation-state. Yet between the ideal of citizenship proclaimed during the French Revolution and the ethnic chauvinism renewed after the breakup of the Communist bloc, multiculturalism in Europe remains a dim promise at best. In France liberals invoke “Republicanism” to reject the multicultural demands of North African Muslims, such as the wearing of a chador by Muslim schoolgirls. And in Bosnia ethnic “cleansing” appears to have defeated the attempt to create a multiethnic state.

The United States, heir to the same Enlightenment as the European states, exhibits a very different tension between a monolithic national identity and ethnic diversity. Lacking the corporate traditions of European monarchies and the state-sponsored churches of many European nations, the U.S. had less difficulty in absorbing religiously and ethnically different groups like the Jews, comprehending them as one among many waves of European immigrants to a nation increasingly imagining itself as a “melting pot.” The overwhelming impact of immigration on the formation of the American state stretched the definition of the nation in ways unimaginable in Europe.

Although the absorption process for marginalized European immigrants like Italians, Irish, and Jews was not always painless in America, these immigrants were not usually the Other around which the majority defined its identity and consolidated its power. Rather, the majority primarily defined itself—indeed, became “white”—in relation to blacks, Native Americans, and other “peoples of color.” One might argue that the Americanization of immigrants has involved a historical process of enlarging the definition of “whiteness” to include groups like the Jews who were initially considered “nonwhite.” Yet a contrary process has
obtained for Hispanics, who, despite their European origins, came increasingly to be considered "colored." The shifting meaning of these terms suggests how historically constructed they are in American culture and how central racial categories have been in creating the fault lines of American society.⁴

As a land of immigrants, America has always struggled with conflicting self-definitions, between what is today called "monoculturalism" and "multiculturalism." As some of the essays in the first section of this volume suggest, "melting pot," "cultural pluralism" and "ethnic diversity" were slogans hotly debated at the beginning of this century, with Jews often leading the way in challenging a monolithic American identity. These debates certainly foreshadow the current question of multiculturalism. Yet multiculturalism, as it is now invoked and as we shall use it in this book, has arisen in a specific historical context and has a set of meanings at once more focused and different from the simple affirmation of diversity. While cultural pluralism affirmed privately held ethnic identities as long as groups publicly affirmed the Anglo-Saxon character of America, multiculturalism challenges the priority of this monolithic identity in American history, highlighting racial as well as ethnic diversity and claiming public resources on behalf of these groups.

In its present theoretical and political forms, multiculturalism is a product of the civil rights movement of the 1960s. It emerged out of the tension between the demand for race blindness and the simultaneous recognition that race hatred would necessarily prevent realization of that goal. At just the moment when the political struggle for integration achieved legal successes, it became increasingly evident that this political achievement left unsolved the equally vexing problems of social, cultural, and economic integration. Political emancipation was not the same as social emancipation.

Multiculturalism arose to question whether in fact such social integration was achievable or even desirable. If the civil rights movement of the 1960s was a quintessentially Enlightenment project, its failure to achieve full social integration suggested to many an inherent flaw in the Enlightenment vision itself. The universalism of the Enlightenment appeared to be an ideological illusion, the imposition of the consciousness and experience of history's victors on its victims. The Enlightenment promised liberty for all, but its own view of reason frequently limited liberty to white men. From this perspective the Western cultural canon reflected not so much universal values as the particular values of a certain elite—white, propertied, Christian, straight, and male—in a certain time and place. The
Enlightenment belief in one, universal human nature seemed itself the creation of the same elite, a creation that failed to take into account the real differences in the cultures and experiences of non-Western peoples as well as, in the West, of groups of color, women, and gays, lesbians, and bisexuals. In this light the full liberation of women, for example, does not require the fulfillment of the Enlightenment but rather its replacement with a new philosophy of human beings that recognizes difference in place of sameness.

All of these issues resonate with Jews, for they are versions of the nineteenth-century "Jewish question" translated into an American idiom at the end of the twentieth century. Yet it is no secret that Jews confront contemporary multiculturalism with great ambivalence, trepidation, and even hostility. In part this is so because the Jewish question as it existed in Europe before the Holocaust has never existed in quite the same form or with quite the same intensity in America. Since World War II Jews in America have to a remarkable degree achieved that social emancipation that had eluded them in Europe. Judaism as a religion came to be accepted as one of the three great American religions—Protestantism, Catholicism, and Judaism—as if Jews were a third of the American population. Moreover, American Jews were able to make social and political gains in such an environment because they were now seen and were willing to be seen as "white" themselves, as part of a majority whose very self-definition as a majority was based on the exclusion of those termed "nonwhite." As a result of the structural racism in American society that favors "white" skin, Jews were no longer marginalized in the same sense as they were in Europe or in the sense that groups of color or sexual minorities often are in contemporary America.

But neither are the descendants of other European immigrant groups such as Irish, Poles, or Italians. They too have shed this stigmatized status and largely entered the "white" majority. Yet no one evidently feels the pressing need to write a book entitled "Multiculturalism and the Italians" or "Multiculturalism and the Irish." Why is it that only the Jews experience multiculturalism with such a special ambivalence? In part, the answer has to do with the vexed relationship between Jews and African Americans, a history that is much more complex than the prevailing myth suggests. To put the matter more bluntly, there are some extreme advocates of multiculturalism, especially in the African American community, who have singled out the Jews among the generalized category of "whites" for special criticism, criticism that is sometimes hard to distinguish from anti-Semitism.
Yet it is not only real and imagined anti-Semitism that makes Jews anxious about multiculturalism. As important is the consciousness Jews have of themselves as occupying an anomalous status: insiders who are outsiders and outsiders who are insiders. They represent that boundary case whose very lack of belonging to a recognizable category creates a sense of unease. This is not, of course, the first moment in Jewish history in which the Jews have occupied this liminal zone. Indeed, one might argue that the Jews succeeded in surviving for so many centuries as a marginalized group precisely because they were able to establish themselves close to centers of power and negotiate between competing elite and popular forces.\(^7\)

In contemporary America this historical dualism has reached its greatest extremes. Never before have so few barriers existed to Jews’ entering the corridors of political, cultural, and economic power. Yet the path to integration has also created enormous contradictions in Jewish self-consciousness. Identification and integration with the majority stands at odds with the Jews’ equal desire to preserve their identity as a minority. Never before have Jews confronted so powerfully the tension between maintaining continuity with tradition and reinventing Jewish life so that it fully meets women’s needs for justice and equity. At a time when Jews are enjoying their greatest acceptance as part of the majority, never before has Jewish identity been founded so centrally on a history of victimization, consisting primarily in the memory of the Holocaust. Even the relationship of American Jews to Israel expresses an ambiguity in Jews’ sense of themselves as powerful and powerless: should they identify with Israel as a small, threatened state standing for centuries of Jewish vulnerability or as a regional military and economic power?

Standing somewhere between the dominant position of the white majority and the marginal position of peoples of color, Jews respond with ambivalence to the attack of multiculturalism on the Enlightenment. For two centuries Jews have staked their position in Western society on the promise of the Enlightenment. When given the chance, they used emancipation to enormous benefit and they came to repay the Enlightenment with almost excessive gratitude, rushing to adopt political liberalism and cultural rationalism to a much greater degree than any other group.\(^8\) At the same time, the Jewish embrace of the Enlightenment reflected the limitations within the Enlightenment itself: it was Jewish men, much more than Jewish women, who realized the benefits of the Enlightenment, so the very enthusiasm for the Enlightenment needs to be qualified to some degree along gender lines.\(^9\) And Jews also recognize that the very failure of the Enlight-
enment led to Auschwitz. The dialectic of Jewish Enlightenment therefore oscillates between these two poles of enthusiastic celebration of modern Western culture and awareness of its most horrific results.

Having finally reaped the fruits of the promise of the Enlightenment, American Jews sometimes ask why liberalism can’t do for other marginalized American groups what it has done for them. This is the source of the conflict among Jews about affirmative action, a policy often associated with multiculturalism. If Jews historically associate quotas with barriers to opportunity, it is then particularly difficult for some to accept such quotas (or similar vehicles) as just means for American society to redress inequities. As beneficiaries, for whatever historical and cultural reasons, of the Enlightenment’s equality of opportunity, some Jews find it hard to understand why such slogans might be inadequate in dealing with the long-term consequences of slavery. At the same time, however, since probably the proportionately greatest beneficiaries of affirmative action have been Jewish women, Jews have just as many self-interested reasons to see the virtues of preferences.

A similar ambivalence can be seen in the relationship of Jewish studies in American universities to ethnic studies. Emerging at about the same time, the late 1960s and early 1970s, these disciplines owe their origins to very different circumstances. Jewish studies in America developed precisely at the moment when Jews felt themselves fully integrated and the field became a vehicle for establishing their right to be considered part of the Western canon. Ethnic studies often took the opposite tack, criticizing the Western canon for its exclusionary practices and promoting ethnic and racial particularism. Jewish studies typically subscribed to an Enlightenment vision of the university while ethnic studies often challenged this vision.

Yet Jews are not immune to the notion that Jewish studies might affirm ethnic identity. A recent controversy at Queen’s College (City University of New York) highlighted these issues. A non-Jew was appointed to head the college’s Jewish studies program and a Jewish faculty member questioned whether a non-Jew should direct a program one of whose purposes was to foster ethnic identity. This professor pointed out that no one would entertain appointing a non-African American to head the African American program or a man to head the women’s studies program. But the almost universal condemnation of this argument by other Jews suggested that most see Jewish studies as differing qualitatively from other ethnic studies programs.

The differences between Jewish studies and ethnic studies are not always as stark as this case might indicate. Jews have not always promoted inte-
migration with the Western canon. In fact, Jewish studies emerged as a discipline in the nineteenth century in order to criticize the Christian bias inherent in the term Judeo-Christian and to suggest Jews’ distinct contributions to Western philosophy and history. Jewish studies in America can learn from ethnic studies to remember and value this strand of its own past. Perhaps women’s studies presents a good model for what Jewish studies should attempt to achieve: the use of methods and insights from many disciplines to rigorously articulate what makes Jews distinct while showing the ways in which Jewish history and thought contribute to the humanities at large.

As examples like these demonstrate, Jews are often caught between fervent affirmation of the Enlightenment and criticism of it. Many Jews believe that the replacement of the Enlightenment ideal of universalism with a politics of difference and a fragmented “multiculture” would constitute a threat to Jewish achievement. At the same time, they recognize the dangers of a homogeneous “monoculture” for Jewish particularity. As insiders who are also outsiders, they seek to rescue the virtues of the Enlightenment from the shards of its failures and salvage an inclusive vision from multiculturalism, where fragmentation and divisiveness now reign.

How to save multiculturalism from some of its own excesses and weaknesses is a question that has begun to preoccupy critics increasingly uneasy with what is sometimes caricatured as a “culture of complaint.” In the effort to restore the voices of history’s victims, these critics wonder if the status of the victim hasn’t become valorized for its own sake. They also question whether an exaggerated politics of identity doesn’t preclude solidarity between groups with different experiences. If understanding requires one to have personally experienced a certain history, then others must accept the insider’s account of that history on faith. With the breakdown in communication and even in the belief in the universality of language, all that is left sometimes seems to be dogmatic political correctness.

Many of these arguments have been made by neoconservatives who oppose multiculturalism out of indifference or even hostility to the claims of the marginalized. But these points have also been raised by those with a great deal of sympathy for the goals of multiculturalism, some of whom have tried to articulate what they call a “critical multiculturalism.” Todd Gitlin, writing from a progressive political position, argues that the Enlightenment desire to establish a common polity need not contradict the equally valid quest to honor cultural difference. David Hollinger challenges the assumption that identity is fixed and argues instead for a “postethnic America” in which such identities would be freely chosen rather
than forcibly inherited.\textsuperscript{13} Works such as these do not reject the desire to create a true multicultural but instead try to see beyond present multicultural politics toward a more inclusive vision of an America in which particularity and universalism are not contradictory goals but rather poles in a fruitful dialectic.

The present book is intended to contribute to this recent literature, which challenges and enriches the theories of multiculturalism. It is neither a complaint against multiculturalism by Jews who feel somehow excluded nor, from the other side, a celebration of multicultural theory as a potential savior.\textsuperscript{14} Instead of bemoaning the Jews’ anomalous status, we have sought to turn it into a productive virtue. In this spirit the contributors to this volume were asked to consider how the Jewish experience might challenge the conventional polar opposition of a majority “monoculture” and a marginalized “multiculture.” Precisely because we believe that the Jews constitute a liminal border case, neither inside nor outside—or, better, both inside and outside—they have the capacity to open up multicultural theory in new and interesting ways that may help it overcome some of the deficiencies that theorists of multiculturalism have begun themselves to see.

One such area explored in this book is the politics of identity, which too often assumes that a monolithic and inherited identity should dictate political action. Multicultural theorists have begun to recognize that no modern identity is stable and transmissible. Ethnicity is itself a modern construct, not an eternal given.\textsuperscript{15} Similarly, race is a homogenizing term that conceals the diversity within any so-called racial group.\textsuperscript{16} Feminist theory began by suggesting that the very category “woman” is a social construct, and more recently feminist theorists stress gender as “performance” to call attention to its radically unstable, constructed nature.\textsuperscript{17}

Here the Jewish experience has much to contribute and also much to learn.\textsuperscript{18} The Jews are perhaps the longest-standing case of a group whose self-definition was always a part of a multicultural context. For much of Jewish history, what it meant to be a Jew was to be multilingual and multicultural and never to live in splendid isolation from interaction and struggle with other cultures. Moreover, Jewish identity was always an indeterminate composite of what we would today call religious, ethnic, and national dimensions. In the modern and postmodern periods this identity has become even more unstable since it has interacted with other equally strong national identities: Jew and German, Jew and American, Jew and Israeli. Like women, African Americans, or just about any other grouping in society one can imagine, the Jewish community is in no sense
homogeneous. Rather, the word Jew has multiple and contradictory meanings: Orthodox, Reform, secular, Ashkenazi, Sephardi as well as male and female.

In a variety of ways, then, to be a Jew, especially at this historical juncture, means to lack a single essence, to live with multiple identities. Perhaps the Jews are even emblematic of the postmodern condition as a whole. If identity politics means to base one’s political activity on one particular identity, then the Jews’ experience of multiple identities suggests that identity politics conceived as monolithic or total needs serious rethinking. Many of the contributors to this volume argue instead for a politics that acknowledges the multifaceted nature of identity without abandoning the importance of identity altogether.

Multiculturalists have also begun to explore and embrace the implications of composite identities such as the mestizo or creole. Some argue that these hybrid and “impure” identities are representative rather than monstrous and that because of the increase in global migrations these hybrid identities will continue to characterize marginalized and majoritarian communities alike in the future. 19 Here is an area where the Jewish subculture and other American subcultures can begin to learn from one another, both in terms of their respective historical experiences and in terms of contemporary sociology.

In a similar way, the category of diaspora, which has become increasingly important in postcolonial theory, has critical resonance for Jews, whose history and religion have required a constant dialectic between “homeland” and “exile.” 20 In the contemporary world more and more people are said to live in diaspora and the creation of a true multiculture requires devising ways of negotiating between one’s home and one’s homeland. For Jews, this is an old problem and a new one. On the one hand, the Holocaust has destroyed what was the ancestral homeland for most American Jews. On the other, the state of Israel has provided a new homeland, although a paradoxical one since most American Jews neither come from there nor intend to live there. The complex ways in which collective identities are formed in the tensions between homeland and diaspora are common to Jews as well as other migrant groups (contrary to the assumptions of many American Jews). 21

Yet another question where we believe the Jewish experience may shed new light on multicultural theory is the debate about the canon. Multiculturalists have typically sought to open the Western canon to suppressed or forgotten literatures, while opponents of multiculturalism have lamented the loss of critical standards of culture and of a shared heritage.
Yet the very concept of a canon as used by both sides of this debate may be rigid and narrow, based perhaps too heavily on the Christian notion of dogma. For Jews, the canon means not only a sacred scripture but also a tradition of commentary that almost infinitely expands that scripture, often in radical and unexpected directions. The Talmud, based in some very loose sense on the Bible, is at once canonical and also the site for a remarkable polyphony of contradictory opinions. This type of sacred literature suggests that a canon need not reflect a monolithic set of doctrines but might instead involve an ever expanding and transforming culture composed of creative contradictions. Indeed, this Jewish concept of a canon is increasingly being accepted for the study of Western literature and it is one that is much more open to interaction with non-Western culture.22

In addition, the Jews’ own relationship to the Western canon betrays the same insider-outsider relationship that increasingly characterizes that of other marginalized groups living in the West. The Bible is the quintessential Jewish book, yet the way Jews read the Bible is not necessarily that of Christian culture. But if the Bible is one of the classic canonical texts of the West, the Talmud and other rabbinic literature remain very much on the margins. Here is a literature that at once resisted Hellenistic-Christian culture yet also absorbed and interacted with it in a variety of creative ways.23 This model of resistance and adaptation has much to teach contemporary multiculturalists about the relationship of a subculture to the dominant culture, just as American Jews can profitably learn from the experiences of the members of other subcultures.

These are only a few of the issues this volume attempts to address. We have arranged the essays in one of many possible coherent sequences, and we invite readers to take their own paths through it. In the first section, “American Symphony or Melting Pot?” the reader will encounter several essays devoted to tracing the history of varying definitions of America and the place of Jews in those definitions. How did these various definitions contribute to or detract from Jews’ relationships with the majority and with other subcultures, particularly African Americans? How might the Jewish experience suggest new definitions of multicultural theory and politics?

The relationship of the Jewish experience to the definition of the cultural canon is the subject of the second section, “Canons and Counter-histories.” What does the discipline of Jewish studies have to offer to the humanities as a whole? How might the way in which Jews have interpreted the Bible constitute an alternative to the traditional idea of canon as a set of monolithic texts? Alternatively, how might Jewish studies reconceptualize itself, using other multicultural models, as a form of “coun-
terhistory” to challenge the canon and historical assumptions of Western Christianity? And, finally, how does Judaism function in the very different counterhistories of Afrocentrism and feminism?

The final section, “Diaspora Negotiations,” addresses the complex ways in which Jews have defined, adapted to, and resisted exile. What is the relationship of the Jewish experience to postcolonial diaspora theory? How has the particular form of Jewish multilingualism in America served to construct a kind of homeland? How does modern Hebrew literature challenge the privileging of homeland in modernism and postmodernism? And, finally, what is the meaning and what are the implications of the peculiarly “Jewish” form of vicarious politics which seems as prevalent in multiculturalism today as it was in earlier political movements in the Jewish diaspora?

This selection of articles follows no single ideological line or definition of multiculturalism. Each of the authors has been encouraged to advance his or her own point of view rather than one that we have imposed at the outset. Yet we would be disingenuous to pretend that we have no underlying agenda in undertaking this book. For too long, we believe, relations between Jews and other groups in the emerging multiculture have been marked by discomfort, suspicion, and even overt hostility. It is our hope that this effort to bring multicultural theory into conversation with Jewish experience and Jewish studies will promote real conversation outside of these pages.

We are also fully cognizant of the way history has been used to advance the claims of some groups against those of others. We acknowledge that different kinds of oppression have damaged communities in different and to some degree incommensurable ways. By acknowledging these disparities of experience at the outset, we hope to transcend the trend toward comparative victimology which has distracted Jews and other groups from more important questions. Perhaps the most urgent of these questions is whether American subcultures can construct a collective American history that gives due recognition to the oppressions of the past without permitting those oppressions to dictate the narratives of the future. We believe that the future lies in a shared commitment to writing a new narrative rather than in the competition between histories of persecution.

Our aim in this volume is not to overcome difference or erase past inequities in favor of some homogenized culture. In the final analysis, we seek ways to negotiate between marginalized groups and the majority culture, between “minor” and “master” narratives, so that the Enlightenment ideal of the universal and the multicultural vision of difference can be
brought under the same roof. We seek alliances with other subcultures so that each can define its own uniqueness. At the same time, we seek a common civic discourse, a truly democratic process in which all ethnic, racial, and religious subcultures are represented. For Jews, as well as all of American society, this should be the challenge of multiculturalism: to create a community of communities and a culture of cultures.

Notes


2. See Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, The Dialectic of Enlightenment (New York: Continuum, 1995). Horkheimer and Adorno focused primarily on the rationality and commodification inherent in the technology of late capitalism and their role in producing genocidal anti-Semitism.

3. It is interesting that the French prime minister declared that while the chador is disruptive because it is "ostentatious," the yarmulke is acceptable since it is so small. Thus does the size of head covering draw the line between those accepted in the French republican consensus and those excluded.


5. For the most famous formulation of this vision of the three great religions of America, see Will Herberg, Protestant, Catholic, Jew: An Essay in American Religious Sociology (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1955).


7. For more on the historical relationship of Jews to centers of power, see David Biale, Power and Powerlessness in Jewish History (New York: Schocken Books, 1986).

8. See David Sorkin, The Transformation of German Jewry (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), for an account of how the German Jews adopted the Enlightenment value of Bildung (cultural education) long after other Germans had abandoned it.


12. Todd Gitlin, The Twilight of Common Dreams: Why America Is Wracked by Culture
INTRODUCTION


15. The argument for ethnicity as a modern construct was presented long before multiculturalism in Frederik Barth, ed., Ethnic Groups and Boundaries (Oslo: Oslo University Press, 1969). It has been argued more recently by the contributors to Werner Sollors, ed., The Invention of Ethnicity (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), and in Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1991).


21. See, for example, Paul Gilroy, The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), for a very interesting discussion of these issues of home and homeland for African Americans as well as some illuminating comparisons between African Americans and Jews.


23. For two different points of view on the relationship of talmudic culture to its surroundings, see Daniel Boyarin, Carnal Israel: Reading Sex in the Talmud (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993), and David Biale, Eros and the Jews (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997), chapter 2.