PART ONE

SELECTED SITES OF CONFLICT IN SOUTH ASIA

1 The Wider Context

A somber reality and disillusionment of our epoch, which emerged from the ashes of World War II, is that although there have been successes in the push toward development and modernization, eradication of disease, and the spread of literacy, economic and political development programs have generated and stimulated, whether by collusion or in reaction, in good faith and poor anticipation, massive civil war and gruesome interracial and interethnic bloodshed. The same epoch has witnessed the rise in many countries of repressive authoritarianism in both military and democratic guises, equipped with Western weaponry, inflamed by populist slogans and fundamentalist doctrines, and assisted by a flagrant manipulation of the mass media, which have vastly expanded their reach.

The optimism of the sociologists, political scientists, and anthropologists who naively foretold an "integrative revolution" and the inevitable decline of "primordial loyalties" such as kinship, caste, and ethnicity in third world countries, has by now waned and dimmed. The introduction of constitutions and democratic institutions, enshrining human rights, universal franchise, the party system, elected legislatures, majority rule, and so on, has often resulted in strange malformations that are far removed from the goals of liberty, justice, and tolerance that were the ideological supports of Western European and North American liberal-democratic syntheses. Something has gone awry in center-periphery relations throughout the world, and a manifestation of this is the occurrence of widespread ethnic conflict, accompanied in many instances by collective violence among people who are not aliens but enemies intimately known.

THE UBIQUITY OF ETHNIC CONFLICT

At different times, certain ranges of phenomena, grouped under embracing labels such as "social class," "caste," "race," "gender inequality," "modernization," "the colonial encounter," and so on, have become foci of intensified scholarly interest. Then these inquiries fade away, not only because of diminishing marginal returns, but also because the phenomena themselves, as reflected on the screen of history, either lose their salience or are transformed into other events, which are more revealingly grouped under new labels.

One such label subsuming a range of phenomena with a family resemblance is "ethnicity." It is significant that the term *ethnicity* has come into vogue and found its way into standard English dictionaries, especially since the 1960s. Linguistic, national, religious, tribal, and racial divisions and identifications, and competitions and conflicts based on them, are not, of course, new phenomena, yet the recent salience of the term *ethnicity* "reflects a new reality and a new usage reflects a change in that reality" on a global scale in the latter half of the twentieth century, both in the industrialized first world and the "developing" third world.[1]

It seems that the term *ethnicity* gained popularity in the social science literature of the 1960s and early 1970s, not only to describe certain manifestations in the third world, but also in reaction to the emergence of ethnic movements in the industrialized and affluent world, especially in the United States, Canada, and Western Europe.[2] And since the dismantling of the USSR and the other communist regimes of Eastern Europe, the spate of internal conflicts that have exploded there are also viewed as ethnic and ethnonationalist in kind.

Ethnic conflict is a major reality of our time. This is confirmed, not simply by its ubiquity alone, but also by the cumulative increase in the frequency and intensity of its occurrence. According to a recent enumeration, some forty-eight countries (including the republics that have supplanted the USSR) are experiencing ethnonationalist conflicts of one kind or other. Since the 1960s conflicts have occurred or been perpetuated between anglophone and francophone in Canada; Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland; Walloons and Flemings in Belgium; Chinese and Malays in Malaysia; Greeks and Turks in Cyprus; Turks and Kurds in eastern Turkey; Basques and Spaniards; Jews and other minorities on the one hand and Great Russians on the other; Ibo, Hausa, and Yoruba in Nigeria; and East Indians and Creoles in Guyana.[3] Add to these upheavals that have become climactic in recent years, among them the Sinhala-Tamil war in Sri Lanka,

the Sikh-Hindu and Muslim-Hindu confrontations in Kashmir, and the turmoil engendered by the Ayodhya temple dispute; the Chackma-Muslim turmoil in Bangladesh, the actions of the Fijians against Indians in Fiji, the Pathan-Bihari clashes in Pakistan, and preceding the recent political settlement, the inferno in Lebanon, and the erosion of human rights previously manifest in Israeli actions in Gaza and the West Bank and the assassinations exchanged between Israel and the PLO; and, finally, the century-old difference exploded again between Christian Armenians and Muslim Azerbaijanis in March 1988.[4]

Eastern Europe has been on the boil since the vast Soviet empire was dismantled, and old "nationalities" have been resurfacing and jostling for power and for separate recognition. The death toll has been rising in the republics of the former USSR in tandem with the politics of secession.[5] In Yugoslavia, at first the Slovenes and Croats were ranged against the Serbs and declared their independence, and we have read daily since 1992 about the triangular warfare and carnage in Bosnia-Herzegovina between Serbs, Croats, and Muslim Slavs. Another recent phenomenon is the exodus of refugees from Albania into Greece and Italy. And the list lengthens every month.[6] It is this parade of disasters (on top of two world wars, economic crises, and authoritarianisms of the right and left) that probably prompted Isaiah Berlin to say, "At eighty-two, I have lived . . . the worst century Europe has ever had."

Most of these conflicts have involved violence, homicide, arson, and destruction of property. Civilian riots have evoked action by security forces, sometimes to quell them, sometimes in collusion with civilian aggressors, sometimes both in sequence. Events of this nature have happened in Sri Lanka, Malaysia, India, Zaire, Guyana, and Nigeria. Mass killings of civilians by armed forces have occurred in Uganda and in Guatemala, and large losses of civilian lives have been recorded in Indonesia, Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, and Rwanda.

Some dissident ethnic groups have declared secessionist aims that threaten to break up extant polities, and these aims in turn have invited invasion of one country by another (for example, the Somali invasion of Ethiopia), or armed intervention, such as by India in Sri Lanka in 1987. Moreover, ethnic conflict has also frequently caused massive displacements of people, many of them being deposited in refugee camps in neighboring countries, as in Africa, the Middle East, India, Sri Lanka and elsewhere. Nor, finally, should we forget large-scale expulsions of people, as happened to Asians in Uganda in the 1970s.[7]

The escalation of ethnic conflicts has been considerably aided by gunrunning and free trade in the technology of violence, which not only enable dissident groups to resist the armed forces of the state, but allow civilians to battle one another with lethal weapons.

The classic definition of the state as the authority invested with the monopoly of force has become a sick joke.[8] After so many successful liberations and resistance movements in many parts of the globe, the techniques of guerrilla resistance are now systematized and exportable knowledge. Furthermore, easy access to the technology of warfare by groups in countries that are otherwise deemed low in literacy and in economic development—we have seen what Afghan resistance can do with American guns—is paralleled by another kind of international fraternization among resistance groups—who have little in common save their resistance to the status quo in their own countries, and who exchange knowledge of guerrilla tactics and the art of resistance. Militant groups in Japan, Germany, Lebanon, Libya, Sri Lanka, and India have international networks of collaboration, not unlike—perhaps more solidary than—the diplomatic channels that exist between mutually wary sovereign countries and the great powers. There are, of course, global politico-economic processes at work, which cause disparities between countries, structure metropolitan centers and peripheries into configurations of uneven development, and stimulate neighbors of unequal power and status to confront one another.

Another development, not unknown in the past in the form of mercenaries for hire, but today reaching a sinister significance, is the "privatization of war"—that is, the ability of governments with extraterritorial geopolitical aims to fight their foreign wars, not by committing their own professional armies, but by farming out contracts for subversive military and political action to private professional groups willing to be hired or capable of being mobilized. The employment of ex-SAS (British Special Air Service) veterans by the Sri Lankan government to help in the war against the Tamil militants is one of many such examples. Analogously, the lessons the United States learned in Vietnam were later applied with zest in Nicaragua and Afghanistan, where local dissidents were armed and trained in the use of weaponry and the arts of destabilization. Professionalized killing is no longer the monopoly of state armies and police forces. The internationalization of the technology of destruction, evidenced in terrorism and counterterrorism, has shown a face of free-market capitalism and long-distance trade in action unsuspected by Adam Smith and by Immanuel Wallerstein. The ubiquity, the increased frequency and intensity, of ethnic conflict, serviced by modern technology of destruction and commu-

nication, and publicized by the mass media, makes such conflict a special reality of the late twentieth century. Faced with recent disturbances in South Russia, Mikhail Gorbachev was moved to say that [ethnic] nationalism was the "most fundamental vital issue of our society."[9] And on a visit to Yugoslavia, a country that has a long history of tensions between "nationalities," he is reported to have said, "Show me a country without nationalist problems, and I will move there right away."[10] What a shift there has been in historical consciousness from Victorian times to the computer age of instant information! The Victorian perception of the people of the world was, as we well know, that they could be placed on a ladder of evolution and progress, with the Europeans at the summit. Other peoples were not really contemporaneous with the West, and archaeological metaphors such as "survivals" and the "contemporaneity of the noncontemporaneous" (a phrase coined by Karl Mannheim) were used to describe a global population whose development was assumed to be both uneven and discontinuous. Edward Tylor gave a vintage expression to this consciousness when he wrote:

> The educated world of Europe and America practically settles a standard by simply placing its own nations at one end of the social series. The principal criteria of classification are the absence or presence, high or low development, of the industrial arts . . . agricultural, architecture, etc., the extent of scientific knowledge, the definiteness of moral principles, the conditions of religious belief and ceremony, the degree of social and political organization and so forth.[11]

This Victorian perspective in the main persisted perhaps until World War II, but there has been a recent change in paradigms, positing common world historical processes that hold centers and peripheries in one dialectical and interlocked field. There are specific developments that have contributed to a shift in historical consciousness that views our present world as a global village. The revolution in the media, instant transmission of visual images and auditory messages, linking metropolitan centers and distant places, and wide coverage of events, so that news broadcasts (whether by NBC, CBS, ABC, or CNN) present diverse events occurring at diverse places as a single synchronic and simultaneously occurring reality. These communication processes bind us in a synchronicity of fellow witnesses of world events. We come to feel that the worldwide incidents of ethnic conflict are of the same order and are mutually implicated: strife in Northern Ireland; kidnappings in Lebanon; beatings on the West Bank; fire bombings in Germany; killing of civilians in Sri Lanka; riots against the Sikhs in Delhi; massing of Korean youth against a rightist government; attacks on

the "bush negroes" by the townsmen of Suriname, sniping by the Contras in Nicaragua, explosive tensions between Armenians and Azerbaijanis, unrelenting Serb attacks on the beleaguered Muslim Slavs of Bosnia, mutual massacres of Tutsi and Hutu—all belong to a contemporary world suffused by violence. The internationalization of violence and the simultaneity of its occurrences viewed on our TV screens make us all spectators and vicarious participants responding with our respective sympathies and our prejudices.

THE POLITICIZATION OF ETHNICITY

A major issue today is the transition from the politics of the nation-state to the politics of ethnic pluralism. It is useful at this juncture to take as our point of reference Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (1983), in order to recognize its contribution and also to go beyond it to take account of newer developments.

Immanuel Wallerstein contends that after its inception in Europe in the sixteenth century, world capitalism spread like a tidal wave from the metropolitan capitals and gradually inundated the peripheries. The versions of the "dependency" theory of world capitalism variously proposed by Wallerstein, André Gunder Frank, Paul Baran, Samir Amin, and Claude Meillassoux all in the end posit a monolithic global historical process. However, they leave out of account the parallel process by which the world was fragmented, differentiated and carved up as "nation-states." Anderson shows how easily the modular concepts of the "nation-state" and "nationalism" were pirated by third world colonial and postcolonial elites. Under colonialism, the "historical consciousness" of nineteenth-century Europe was transmitted to and imbibed by local elites subjected to the textbook learning propagated by colonial schools.

In Anderson's account, historically speaking, it was the creole communities of Latin America, the former colonies of Spain, that developed "the conception of nation-ness well before most of Europe." Simultaneously "a colonial community and an upper class," the creoles mounted the first national liberation movement against the Spanish empire.

Anderson's plotting of the rise in Europe of national consciousness in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, inspired by linguistic and vernacularizing revolutions, followed from the mid nineteenth century on by the promotion and manipulation of "official nationalism" by the European monarchies, based on a national identification projected onto vernacular languages, led him quite correctly to perceive that the nation-building policies of the new states of the third world consisted of "both a

genuine, popular nationalist enthusiasm and a systematic, even Machiavellian, instilling of nationalist ideology through the mass media, the educational system, administrative regulations, and so forth. In turn, this blend of popular and official nationalism has been the product of anomalies created by European imperialism: the well-known arbitrariness of frontiers, and bilingual intelligentsias poised precariously over diverse populations."[12]

A weakness in Anderson's thesis, especially when we contemplate developments in pre- and postindependence India (a country he does not discuss), is his suggestion that nationalism in the colonies and the third world was largely a more or less passive or borrowed response to the European impact. An examination of India's nationalist discourse as articulated by three different personalities—the "early" thinker Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay; Mohandas Gandhi, who consolidated the national, while decrying the modern; and Jawaharlal Nehru, who married the national to the agency of the state—suggests that, although indeed derivative and mostly taking the form of "passive revolutions," the colonial and postcolonial responses were also dialectically engendered and filtered through the experiences and motivations of differently positioned local elites and leaders, whose voices were by no means unitary and homogeneous.

Similarly, in Sri Lanka, in the decades immediately preceding independence, while the dominant voice of the politicians of the Ceylon National Congress and their successors (including D. S. Senanayake and S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike) was collaborative with the British Colonial Office, there were other distinctive oppositional voices, such as that of Anagarika Dharmapala, the father of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism, and the radical communists and Trotskyites, whose rhetoric was revolutionary and anticolonial.

Anderson's Eurocentric sequencing is, in fact, locked into the project of nation-state making, as, indeed, is the more complex "derivative discourse" proposed by Partha Chatterjee,[13] and both have to be taken a stage further, which requires a radical transformation of their master narratives. The politics of the newly independent states, framed initially in terms of "nation-state" ideologies and policies, have by virtue of various internal dialectics and differences led to a new phase of politics dominated by the competitions and conflicts of "ethnic collectivities," who question unitary nationalist and "nation-state" dogmas. The politics of ethnicity is indeed a product of the interweaving and collision of the two global processes we mentioned earlier: world capitalism and its operation through multinational corporations, and widespread nation building by liberated colonies now ruled by

elite intelligentsias, who, however, have to react to their divided civilian constituencies. These interacting global processes, while having certain homogenizing effects, have simultaneously spawned differentiation and opposition within the new polities, manifested as ethnic conflict.

We have recently discovered with shocked surprise that the politics of ethnicity is not only a main preoccupation of the newly independent countries of the third world, but has emerged with a vengeance in what used to be called the second world: the recently dismantled Soviet empire and its erstwhile satellites in Eastern Europe. The dismantling and dismembering of the earlier formations have resulted in the creation and the demand for creation of new states on an ethnonationalist basis, and thereby the intensification of ethnonationalist conflicts, of which the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, and the triangular struggles between Croats, Serbs and Muslims in what used to be Yugoslavia are the most spectacular.

There appear to be two interrelated developments in this part of the world, which are characterized by both positive and negative features. The collapse of totalitarian political systems has opened space for their replacement by democratic regimes. While one can see the obvious virtues of democracy and representative government compared with totalitarian Communist party rule, yet the fact is that the alleged changeover to electoral democratic methods in Eastern Europe (and the Commonwealth of Independent States) has actually unleashed and/or intensified ethnic conflicts, and ethnic majorities have used their electoral dominance to inferiorize and assault or displace their minorities (while seceding former minorities do the same to their own minorities). This phenomenon of "ethnic cleansing" reached its most virulent climax in the former Yugoslavia with a battery of devices: food blockade, incessant shelling, causing the flight of people from their homes, killing of captured "enemies," systematic raping of women (causing them to become pregnant, so that they will carry the enemy's children—inasmuch as the Serbian, Muslim Slav, and Croat peoples are strongly patrilineal and male-dominated, the father's ethnic identity primarily determines the child's).

The second development concerns the effects—particularly in the short term—of the dismantling of the command economies of the former USSR and Eastern European countries and the change to market economies and free enterprise. Here various economic ills—the hijacking of enterprises by the bureaucracy in place; increasing unemployment, caused by the closing of inefficient firms; black-market operations; and the lack or weak functioning of capital, labor, and commodity markets—have fed into the frag-

mentation and uncertainties of sociopolitical systems increasingly dislocated by ethnic conflict, fascist racist propaganda, and ethnic cleansing.

Simultaneously, we are also witnessing a shakeup in the confidence and complacency of Western Europe, which has recently shown disturbing evidence of chauvinism, racism, discrimination, identity panic, and a thrust toward national separateness, accompanied by attacks on foreign workers and migrants, as economies worsen and unemployment rises. The Maastricht Treaty, with its hope of a unified currency, is falling apart; the concept of Europe as an entity is being questioned by British, Danish, and lately French misgivings; the European Community is suffering the strain of differential national economic interests. Britain has a history of racial problems vis-à-vis its West Indian, Pakistani, and Indian emigrants; and the German fire-bombings of Turkish guest workers and French assaults on Algerians and other North Africans led by Jean-Marie Le Pen and his Petits Blancs raise the specter of incipient racism, which mercifully is rejected, if not firmly resisted, by millions of citizens.

Our complacent assumptions of civilizational progress have been shaken. Lessons swept under the carpet and conveniently forgotten are resurfacing: that democratic politics and free-market capitalism have their prerequisites, their sociocultural conventions and contexts, and their own constructed myths; that they are not immune from their own internally generated contradictions and tensions; that they are not pills that surely and automatically cure illness.

There is another recipe for progress that is currently being tested: the idea of the nation-state as the desirable basis for structuring political life, a previously hegemonic concept that is currently undermined by regional and subnational resistances.

THE NATION-STATE IN CRISIS AND THE RISE OF ETHNONATIONALISM

An alternative title to this section might be "A Tale of Two Nationalisms." Ignoring the many nuances, there are two models of nationalism that are in interaction, as well as contention, in many parts of the world. Each model has its benefits and its costs, and our existential task at the close of the twentieth century is to find a way of reconciling the two and of constructing a new synthesis in the political lives of collectivities of people.

First, there is the nationalism of the *nation-state,* which was historically conceived and substantially first realized in Europe, particularly Western Europe. Second, there is what I call *ethnonationalism,* which has arisen

separately in many parts of the globe. Ethnonationalism has had and continues to have its European formulation and presence in (parts of) Germany, and today more vigorously in Eastern Europe. It also manifests itself in distinctive and similar ways in many other parts of the world—in Africa, in the Middle East, in South and Southeast Asia, and in Latin America. Ethnonationalism in its variant forms is most definitely not solely a Western construction. Regional and minority ethnonationalist movements in earlier empires and conquest states historically predate the appearance of the nation-state in Western Europe. Being more general in its stimulus, ethnonationalism has independently emerged at many different sites, although today global processes may drive them to converge.

In their global role as imperial powers, the nation-state's European progenitors sought to transplant the form to their third world dependencies and colonies, a process that accelerated with decolonization after World War II. Its impact on the social forms and practices of these erstwhile colonies in fact brought into prominence an intensified form of ethnonationalism in regional reaction to the excessive or unwelcome centralizing and homogenizing policies of the nation-state. In Eastern Europe, a similar imposition after World War I of the nation-state blueprint on a terrain differentiated by linguistic, religious, and ethnic cleavages, followed by the subsequent imposition on the same terrain after World War II of authoritarian communist regimes, has been succeeded today by an outbreak of ethnonationalist and regional claims that are competitive, divisive, intolerant, and violent, as well as euphoric and full of aggrandizing ambitions and collective promises for the participants.

It is this historic meeting, collision, and dialectic between the project of nation-state making and the counterclaims of ethnonationalism that provides the primary focus for this book. It is suggested that what is happening in the countries of South Asia (and in many other newly independent third world countries) is not very different from what is happening in Eastern Europe and the newly founded Commonwealth of Independent States.

THE NATION-STATE AS A HISTORICAL CONSTRUCTION

In its Western European form, the secular nation-state was predicated on the ideals proclaimed by the French Revolution, on the one hand, and the universalist claims of Enlightenment rationalism, on the other. Essential components of this nation-state were separation of church and state (and the virtual privatization of religion), the conception of citizenship based on the formal equality of all individuals who are its members; the jurisdiction

of the nation-state as valid in the territory that it covers and that is defined by its frontiers; and finally, the arguable notion that politics is a secularized domain of activity shaped by its own objectives of power and by its own logic and rules.

The secularization of politics carried distinctive entailments, which are worth underscoring. In Western European history, the separation of church and state, and the relegation or confinement of religion to the private domain, was linked to the stimulation given the scientific revolution and experimentation by certain trends in Protestant Reformation thought. In maintaining that God had instituted the laws of nature, and that scientists could legitimately discover these laws, the Protestant Reformation thereby also in the long run had opened the door for God to become otiose or distant with regard to the pursuit of science. The scientists' religious beliefs and attachments, if they had any, were supposedly irrelevant to establishing the laws of science.

Historically, the development of the Western nation-state was linked to the launching of the Industrial Revolution, and the impulsion of capitalism as an expansionary force, creating wide-ranging, interlocking markets for goods, relatively free geographic mobility of labor, and a progressive erasing of parochial boundaries. Capitalism was a dynamic homogenizing agent in the newly industrializing countries. It also generated the expectations and hopes of a continuing economic expansion, despite "temporary" slumps and downturns. The expectation of economic growth and expansion generated aspirations to social mobility, cultural homogenization, and more egalitarian distributions of wealth.

We may also introduce into this heady mix another tendency: the drive to create a national culture, usually around a common dominant language, which gains precedence over other dialects or minority languages. (Switzerland is an exception in this respect.) The growth in literacy rates, linked to expanding educational facilities, and opportunities, and the explosion of cheap printing are other integral components of the Western success story.

In the creation of the Western nation-state, political integration, continuous economic expansion, and, frequently, linguistic homogenization for administrative purposes and for "high" cultural productions went hand in hand. The concepts of nation and state were fused into an entity, the bounded nation-state. And in the end, above all, national identity required from the citizen a loyalty to the state conceived of as a *secular* entity. This

was the ideal-typical construction, claiming *normative* authority, whatever the deviations in actual fact.

Now, since the secular nation-state has been advocated by many Western theorists and third world intellectuals and political leaders as the bedrock on which modernization and economic development can be raised, it is extremely relevant to bear in mind two warnings.

First, historically, the Western European nation-state was achieved as the end result of very special developments, including social upheavals, internal strains, revolutions, and divisive wars between states. (We tend to forget this when we are impatient with the problems of governance and economic development in other countries.) Second, there is the possibility of a fundamental fallacy being perpetrated when an attempt is made to impose a historical construction such as the nation-state, achieved on distinctive soil, on a dependent world, as if its realization were a necessary stage in Universal History. This supposition, derived from Enlightenment assumptions, perhaps has near "hegemonic" status in global affairs (although in Europe itself it has been questioned and contested).

What happens—and indeed how do we perceive and represent and interpret what happens—in many parts of the world where the events that led to the realization of the European secular nation-state have not taken place, are slow to take place, take place unevenly, or are actively *resisted* as harmful (as for example in Iran by Shiite fundamentalism or in India by Hindu nationalists)? Is it now time to shift from the language of "obstacles" to "development" to the language of active subaltern "resistance" to it?

In trying to sort out these issues, it is relevant to consider that the other side of the Western model of the secular nation-state is its aggressive nationalism and imperialist expansion and penetration into what became its colonial dependencies. Liberal democracies in Western Europe and the United States frequently imposed authoritarian rule abroad, the exploitation of native labor and resources, and the inferiorization, if not erosion, of the cultures of the colonized. Marxists explain these processes in terms of capitalism gaining a new lease on life through colonial exploitation. This inferiorization and threat of cultural extinction in large part lies behind the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, Buddhist "nationalism," Hindu nationalism, and other such reactions, and their retaliatory attitude to Western economic affluence and domination, political supremacy, alleged consumerist values, celebration of sexual eroticism, erosion of family durability, alleged "privatization" of religion and separation of religion from affairs of state, and so on.

THE THREE PHASES OF INDEPENDENCE

Keeping in mind that their political objective was the establishment of nation-states, we may discern three phases in the political history of third world countries like India, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Guyana, and Nigeria, which received their independence soon after the end of World War II. The characteristic issues of each phase are stated in terms of the ideological rhetoric and distinctive labels used by politicians and academic commentators alike. (I do not intend these phases to be taken as discontinuous shifts but merely as showing different emphases.)

The first stage was the actual "decolonization" process itself, when Western imperial powers, following World War II, "transferred power" to local elite groups. Decolonization was preceded and accompanied by violence when, as was the case with Algeria, the colonized fought a "war of liberation." In other colonies, such as Sri Lanka and Burma, the transfer of power was more peaceful, although not entirely without the staging of civil disobedience movements and other forms of resistance, such as, for example, those mounted in India by the Indian National Congress and in Malaya by the communist guerrillas. India underwent the horrific trauma of Partition, the political and economic and social consequences of which continue to have grave costs.

The second phase, spanning the late 1950s and gathering momentum in the 1960s, was characterized by optimistic and even strident claims in the newly independent countries about their objectives of "nation making," strengthening "national sovereignty," creating "national culture" and "national identity," and achieving "national integration." The slogans of the time accented "national" dimensions, and in doing so played down and wished away internal diversity and social cleavages in favor of the primacy of nation-states as the accredited units of the United Nations and the modern world system. Frantz Fanon's book *The Wretched of the Earth,* with its programmatic celebration of "national consciousness," "national culture," and "national literature" in African states newly delivered from the chains of colonialism, belongs to this phase. Fanon proclaimed that "to fight for national culture means in the first place the fight for the liberation of the nation, that material keystone which makes the building of a culture possible."[14] For many intellectuals of South Asian origins, it was Jawaharlal Nehru, in his autobiography and his much-read book *The Discovery of India,* who eloquently preached the promise of Indian nationalism and cultural renaissance wedded to the organizing institutions of the state, a marriage that would deliver social justice, economic growth, and scientific progress.[15]