Introduction

Memory forms the fabric of human life, affecting everything from the ability to perform simple, everyday tasks to the recognition of the self. Memory establishes life's continuity; it gives meaning to the present, as each moment is constituted by the past. As the means by which we remember who we are, memory provides the very core of identity.

What does it mean for a culture to remember? The collective remembering of a specific culture can often appear similar to the memory of an individual—it provides cultural identity and gives a sense of the importance of the past. Yet the process of cultural memory is bound up in complex political stakes and meanings. It both defines a culture and is the means by which its divisions and conflicting agendas are revealed. To define a memory as cultural is, in effect, to enter into a debate about what that memory means. This process does not efface the individual but rather involves the interaction of individuals in the creation of cultural meaning. Cultural memory is a field of cultural negotiation through which different stories vie for a place in history.

This book is about how cultural memory operates in the United States in the 1980s and 1990s. It examines cultural memory's role in producing concepts of the "nation" and of an "American people" and explores how individuals interact with cultural products. Cultural memory is produced in the United States in various forms, including memorials, public art, popular culture, literature, commodities, and activism. It is generated in the context of a debate over who defines
cultural memory, what counts as cultural memory, and, indeed, what cultural memory means.

As a study in cultural memory, this book focuses on two primary events: the American participation in the Vietnam War from 1959 to 1975 and the AIDS epidemic, which emerged in the United States in the early 1980s. These are both events of trauma in which many lives have been lost and attempts to find meaning have been fraught with grief. They have resulted in tremendous social upheaval and have disrupted definitions of family, gender, morality, and the nation. As a result, they have produced very rich kinds of memories and memory debates.

American political culture is often portrayed as one of amnesia, and the media seem complicit in the public’s apparent ease in forgetting important political facts and events. However, this definition of American culture is highly superficial, relying on evidence of memory in traditional forms and narratives. It is the central premise of this book that American culture is not amnesiac but rather replete with memory, that cultural memory is a central aspect of how American culture functions and how the nation is defined. The “culture of amnesia” actually involves the generation of memory in new forms, a process often misinterpreted as forgetting. Indeed, memory and forgetting are co-constitutive processes; each is essential to the other’s existence.

A desire for memory has often made it appear fragile and threatened when it is actually fluid and changing. The instability of memory is not specific to postmodern times, and it does not offer evidence of the past’s insignificance; however, it is what makes memory both political and subject to debate. The changeability of memory raises important concerns about how the past can be verified, understood, and given meaning. Yet it is important not to allow discussions of memory to bog down in questions of reliability. Memory is crucial to the understanding of a culture precisely because it indicates collective desires, needs, and self-definitions. We need to ask not whether a memory is true but rather what its telling reveals about how the past affects the present.

I define cultural memory specifically through its distinction from both personal memory and history. It is a field of contested meanings
in which Americans interact with cultural elements to produce concepts of the nation, particularly in events of trauma, where both the structures and the fractures of a culture are exposed. Examining cultural memory thus provides insight into how American culture functions, how oppositional politics engages with nationalism, and how cultural arenas such as art, popular culture, activism, and consumer culture intersect.

**Cultural Memory**

I use the term “cultural memory” to define memory that is shared outside the avenues of formal historical discourse yet is entangled with cultural products and imbued with cultural meaning. Hence, the AIDS Memorial Quilt—a collection of quilt panels, each bearing the name of someone who has died of AIDS—is both a device through which personal memories are shared and an object seen by its makers to have cultural meaning. Employing the term “cultural memory” thus allows me to examine how, for instance, popular culture has produced memories of the Vietnam War and how these film and television images have moved between cultural memory and history. The self-consciousness with which notions of culture are attached to these objects of memory leads me to use the term “cultural” rather than “collective.”

I therefore want to distinguish between cultural memory, personal memory, and official historical discourse. I am not concerned in this book with memories insofar as they remain individual. Yet when personal memories of public events are shared, their meaning changes. When individual possessions are left at the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington, D.C., they become a part of cultural memory. When they are then placed in a government archive, they acquire both aesthetic and historical meaning. However, the very nature of these objects, in particular their often cryptic quality, prevents them from fitting neatly into traditional narratives of historical discourse.

Definitions of cultural memory beg the question of what constitutes personal memory. Does some kind of purely individual memory exist? All contemporary theories of personal memory are influenced by the work of Sigmund Freud, specifically his contention that the
memories of all experiences are stored in the unconscious. Though one cannot automatically access all of one’s memories, in Freud’s view they remain present within. Indeed, Freud believed that many psychosomatic illnesses and physical symptoms result from the reassertion of repressed childhood memories. This hypothesis depends on the concept that memories accumulate and are often inarticulate. Many of Freud’s assertions about repression of memories and their inevitable if unintelligible accumulation have been the subject of serious disagreement. In recent years the concept of repression has been the focus of a particularly volatile debate over recovered memories of incest and abuse. However, Freud’s work is an important source for thinking about memory’s changeability—in effect, its unreliability. Freud examined the rescripting of memories in “secondary revision,” the relationship of memory and fantasy, and the role of screen memories in blocking out other memories. Indeed, he provided twentieth-century debates about memory with compelling images of both the fragility and the endurance of memory.

Many theorists consider the idea of shared or collective memory antithetical to that of personal memory. Maurice Halbwachs, one of the most influential philosophers of collective memory, believed, in opposition to Freud, that all personal memory was socially produced. Halbwachs wrote that individuals often recall and rescript their memories through the recollections of others. Unlike Freud, who envisioned a vast reservoir of memory in the unconscious, Halbwachs saw individual memory as fragmentary and incomplete, something guided by the script that collective memory provides. His work has been highly influential in destabilizing the definitions of individual and collective remembrance.

Cultural memory can be distinct from history yet, I would argue, is essential in its construction. It is unwise to generalize about the practice of history-making; the profession of history encompasses a broad array of methodologies, many of which are critical of traditional historiography. History can be thought of as a narrative that has in some way been sanctioned or valorized by institutional frameworks or publishing enterprises. One cannot say that history comprises a single narrative; many histories are constantly under debate and in conflict with each other. However, each of the events dis-
cussed in this book can be said to have a history. The history of the Vietnam War, for instance, consists of conflicting narratives, but there are particular elements within those stories that remain uncontested, such as the war’s divisive effect on the United States.

Moreover, history-making adheres to specific codes about the nature of shared reality and the communicability of experience. History has often been seen as standing in opposition to memory. Indeed, writes Pierre Nora, “History is perpetually suspicious of memory, and its true mission is to suppress and destroy it.”  

However, Nora’s concept of memory is highly nostalgic. I would posit cultural memory and history as entangled rather than oppositional. Indeed, there is so much traffic across the borders of cultural memory and history that in many cases it may be futile to maintain a distinction between them. Yet there are times when those distinctions are important in understanding political intent, when memories are asserted specifically outside of or in response to historical narratives.

Traditional history has a paradoxical relationship to the body of the individual who has lived through a given event—the Vietnam veteran, the Gulf War veteran, or the person with AIDS. The survivors of recent political events often disrupt the closure of a particular history; indeed, history operates more efficiently when its agents are dead. Yet the survivors of historical events are often figures of cultural authority and values.

This book examines the process of history-making as it relates to cultural memory—insofar as memory objects and narratives move from the realm of cultural memory to that of history and back. In analyzing the process of history-making, I will draw on the work of many historians for whom the materials of history reside in archives, textual remains, and oral histories. However, I am primarily concerned with questions of the popularization of history, specifically how histories are told through popular culture, the media, public images, and public memorials—how cultural memory engages with historical narrative in this public sphere.

Personal memory, cultural memory, and history do not exist within neatly defined boundaries. Rather, memories and memory objects can move from one realm to another, shifting meaning and context. Thus, personal memories can sometimes be subsumed into history,
and elements of cultural memory can exist in concert with historical narratives. For instance, survivors of traumatic historical events often relate that as time goes on, they have difficulty distinguishing their personal memories from those of popular culture. For many World War II veterans, Hollywood World War II movies have subsumed their individual memories into a general script. Because of these kinds of boundary crossings in what is remembered, true distinctions between personal memory, cultural memory, and history cannot be made.

I am indebted in many of the formulations of this book to the works of Michel Foucault, whose philosophical writings on knowledge, power, and the modern state reveal both the constructive process of histories and the voices from archives and unlegitimated sources that tangle with history’s stories. Foucault termed these “subjugated knowledges,” knowledges “that have been disqualified as inadequate to their task or insufficiently elaborated: naïve knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity.”\(^5\) Foucault was interested in the “low-ranking knowledge” of the psychiatric patient or the nurse, for instance, rather than that of the medical institution. I take him to be speaking ironically in using the term “naïve”; indeed, it seems that he felt these kinds of unrecognized knowledges were crucial to understanding the past. He also spoke of “popular memory” as a form of collective knowledge for those who don’t have access to publishing houses or movie studios. Memory was a political force for Foucault: “Since memory is actually a very important factor in struggle (really, in fact, struggles develop in a kind of conscious moving forward of history), if one controls people’s memory, one controls their dynamism.”\(^6\)

It is with respect to this issue, the political nature of memory, that I want to both build on Foucault’s work and distinguish this project from his. Foucault was highly influential in provoking historians to rethink the process of history-making. His formulation of subjugated knowledges made explicit the political nature of what gets to count as knowledge of the past. In this book I attempt to apply these understandings to recent events in American history and to examine the political nature of memory as it has been produced and shared in these contexts. Making an AIDS Quilt panel for someone who has
died of AIDS may be a personal act of remembrance; it is also a political act.

However, I would like to distinguish the concept of cultural memory from the romanticization of popular memory implicit in Foucault’s definition. Indeed, most of his work interweaves complex questions of resistance and conformity. Cultural memory may often constitute opposition, but it is not automatically the scene of cultural resistance. As I have noted, cultural memory is often entangled with history, scripted through the layered meanings in mass culture, and itself highly contested and conflictual. Although cultural memory unquestionably is produced at the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington, D.C., its forms are highly varied, ranging from reclamation of concepts of sacrifice and honor to profound opposition to the codes of war. There is nothing politically prescribed in cultural memory.

Memory and Forgetting

This book is based on the premise that memory is a narrative rather than a replica of an experience that can be retrieved and relived. It is thus an inquiry into how cultural memories are constructed as they are recollected and memory as a form of interpretation. The degree to which memories are “faithful” to original experiences is difficult to ascertain. What we remember is highly selective, and how we retrieve it says as much about desire and denial as it does about remembrance.

All memories are “created” in tandem with forgetting; to remember everything would amount to being overwhelmed by memory. Forgetting is a necessary component in the construction of memory. Yet the forgetting of the past in a culture is often highly organized and strategic. Milan Kundera has said: “Forgetting is a form of death ever present within life. . . . But forgetting is also the great problem of politics. When a big power wants to deprive a small country of its national consciousness it uses the method of organized forgetting. . . . A nation which loses awareness of its past gradually loses its self.” Though Kundera speaks of the “organized forgetting” propagated, for instance, by an occupying state, cultures can also participate in a “strategic” forgetting of painful events that may be too dangerous to keep in active memory. At the same time, all cultural memory and all
history are forged in a context in which details, voices, and impressions of the past are forgotten. The writing of a historical narrative necessarily involves the elimination of certain elements. Hence, the narrative of the Vietnam War as told in the United States foregrounds the painful experience of the American Vietnam veteran in such a way that the Vietnamese people, both civilians and veterans, are forgotten. This effacement is in part the result of the narrative process—the political reinscription into American history of the disruptive story of a war lost. A desire for coherence and continuity produces forgetting. Hayden White has written that the “value attached to narrativity in the representation of real events arises out of a desire to have real events display the coherence, integrity, fullness, and closure of an image of life that is and can only be imaginary. The notion that sequences of real events possess the formal attributes of the stories we tell about imaginary events could only have its origin in wishes, daydreams, reveries.”\(^9\) The desire for narrative closure thus forces upon historical events the limits of narrative form and enables forgetting.

Freud’s work has been particularly significant in problematizing the concept of forgetting. He was primarily interested not in why memories were retained but in what they were hiding. He was struck, for instance, by the phenomenon of infantile amnesia—that we remember nothing from our infancy—and by the fact that childhood memories are so often of exceptionally ordinary and “indifferent” material. The idea that these memories may actually have displaced more charged and emotional memories led him to the concept of a “screen memory”—that is, one that substitutes for other memories that are too painful or disturbing to retrieve.\(^{10}\) In Freud’s formulation, forgetting is an active process of repression, one that demands vigilance and is designed to protect the subject from anxiety, fear, jealousy, and other difficult emotions. The concept of a screen memory is particularly useful in thinking about how a culture remembers. Cultural memory is produced through representation—in contemporary culture, often through photographic images, cinema, and television. These mnemonic aids are also screens, actively blocking out other memories that are more difficult to represent.

The question of memory’s accuracy hovers around the issue of
forgotten. Does it matter whether we remember “correctly”? Certainly it does. Yet memory is notoriously unverifiable. Even a photographic image is subject to interpretation about what it actually proves. The original experiences of memory are irretrievable; we can only “know” them through memory remains—images, objects, texts, stories. Saying that memory is changeable does not imply that it is only constructed through the agendas of the present. Rather, it shifts the discussion of memory, in particular cultural memory, away from questions of truth and toward questions of political intent. I do not know how many of the stories in this book about the Vietnam War and AIDS are actually true. I am concerned rather with the impact they have once they are told. What memories tell us, more than anything, is the stakes held by individuals and institutions in attributing meaning to the past.11

Technologies of Memory

Cultural memory is produced through objects, images, and representations. These are technologies of memory, not vessels of memory in which memory passively resides so much as objects through which memories are shared, produced, and given meaning.

Memory is articulated through processes of representation. Andreas Huyssen writes:

Re-presentation always comes after, even though some media will try to provide us with the delusion of pure presence. Rather than leading us to some authentic origin or giving us verifiable access to the real, memory, even and especially in its belatedness, is itself based on representation. The past is not simply there in memory, but it must be articulated to become memory. The fissure that opens up between experiencing an event and remembering it in representation is unavoidable. Rather than lamenting or ignoring it, this split should be understood as a powerful stimulant for cultural and artistic creativity.12

It is the tension between the representation of memory and the experience of an event, Huyssen argues, that inspires artistic engagement with a notion of the past.

The cultural memory of the events I discuss in this book—the Vietnam War, the AIDS epidemic, the Kennedy assassination, the
Challenger explosion, the police beating of Rodney King, the Persian Gulf War—has been produced through a range of cultural products—public art, memorials, docudramas, television images, photographs, advertisements, yellow ribbons, red ribbons, alternative media, activist art, even bodies themselves. These are technologies of memory in that they embody and generate memory and are thus implicated in the power dynamics of memory’s production. Foucault wrote about “technologies of the self, which permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality.” In Foucault’s formulation, technologies are social practices that are inevitably implicated in power dynamics. They are also practices that people enact upon themselves. In this sense, the embodiment of memory (and its perceived location in objects that act as substitutes for the body) is an active process with which subjects engage in relation to social institutions and practices.

The memorial is perhaps the most traditional kind of memory object or technology. Both the Vietnam War and the AIDS epidemic have generated memorials, albeit unusual ones. The design of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial has been the subject of intense public debate and participation; the AIDS Memorial Quilt is an unusual refiguring of the traditional family quilt. These two innovative memorials have emerged at a period of time when modernism had pronounced the form dead. They share a memory culture with memorials of the Holocaust and with several innovative museums—including the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, which opened in 1993—that attempt to present artifacts of the past in the context of memory’s complexities.

Through the sharing of memory at the Vietnam Veterans Memorial and within the AIDS Quilt, individuals participate in giving meaning to the past. Although the quilt travels, it can be said to embody within it a location, or site, of memory; indeed, it is often perceived as the place where survivors can find and speak to the AIDS dead. At the same time, the Vietnam Veterans Memorial has come to symbolize the location of American memory of the war in the nation’s capital. Both attest to the fact that memory is often per-
ceived to be located in specific places or objects. As Pierre Nora writes, “Memory attaches itself to sites, whereas history attaches itself to events.”

Although the memorial and the quilt provide evidence of the continued importance of place in cultural memory, it can also be said that the camera image constitutes a significant technology of memory in contemporary American culture. Camera images, whether photographs, films, or television footage, whether documentary, docudrama, or fiction, are central to the interpretation of the past. Photographs are often perceived to embody memory, and cinematic representations of the past have the capacity to entangle with personal and cultural memory. Just as memory is often thought of as an image, it is also produced by and through images.

Roland Barthes once wrote that the photograph had, in fact, replaced the monument: “Earlier societies managed so that memory, the substitute for life, was eternal and that at least the thing which spoke Death should itself be immortal: this was the Monument. But by making the (mortal) Photograph into the general and somehow natural witness of ‘what has been,’ modern society has renounced the Monument.” Barthes’s statement reveals a nostalgia for the so-called tenacity of earlier forms of memory; he wrote it before the resurgence of memorial culture in the 1980s. Memorials such as the Vietnam Veterans Memorial and the AIDS Quilt demonstrate that the monument/memorial has not been replaced by so much as it has demanded the presence of the image. People often leave photographs at the memorial and incorporate them into the quilt panels. The image, it would seem, remains the most compelling of memory objects.

It is evidence of the complexity of American culture in the late twentieth century that memory is produced not only through memorials and images but also through commodities. Marxist theorists such as Theodor Adorno alleged that the “hollowed out” objects of commodity culture could be imbued with any meaning. He and others defined the emergence of commodity culture as a kind of cultural forgetting. However, from the perspective of the 1990s, the dismissal of commodities as sources of cultural meaning no longer seems a viable option. We live in a society in which commercialization and marketing tactics are so pervasive, in which the boundaries of art,
commodity, and remembrance are so easily traversed, and in which merchandise is so often grassroots-produced that it no longer makes sense, if it ever did, to dismiss commodities as empty artifacts. These trends are particularly evident in the context of the AIDS epidemic, in which nonprofit service organizations raise money to support people with AIDS by marketing red ribbons, T-shirts, books, buttons, posters, coffee mugs, and other objects. These commodities inevitably tend to reduce AIDS to a slogan or a package, but they are nonetheless part of a broader context of AIDS education and its politics of representation.

Finally, I take the term “technology of memory” to mean not only memorials, objects, and images but the body itself. Throughout history, the body has been perceived as a receptacle of memory, from the memory of bodily movement, such as walking, to the memory of past events in physical scars, to the memory of one’s genetic history in every cell. In the final chapter of this book, I discuss how biomedical discourse defines the immune system as a system of memory, remembering, for instance, the viruses it has previously encountered.

The presence of bodies is essential to the production of cultural memory. Survivors, be they Vietnam veterans, people with AIDS, or others who have lived through traumatic public events, testify through the very presence of their bodies to the materiality of memory. The body of a disabled veteran standing at the memorial speaks volumes about the war’s cost. The empty clothing sewn into the AIDS Quilt speaks loudly of the absence of the bodies of the AIDS dead. Survivors stand at the juncture of cultural memory and history, their bodies offering evidence of the multiplicity of memory stories. However, the discourse of survivors is not strictly one of resistance. Although the body of a wounded veteran at the memorial may testify to the war’s cost, his presence may also be intended to reinforce the precise codes of honor and sacrifice in war that resulted in his injury.

Cultural Memory and the Nation

The debates over what counts as cultural memory are also debates about who gets to participate in creating national meaning. When people participate in the production of cultural memory at sites such
as the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, they do so both in opposition to and in concert with a concept of the nation. Cultural memory can thus be seen to work in tension with what Lauren Berlant has termed the “national symbolic.” She writes that the national symbolic “transforms individuals into subjects of a collectively held history. Its traditional icons, its metaphors, its heroes, its rituals, and its narratives provide an alphabet for a collective consciousness or national subjectivity. . . . This pseudo-generic condition not only affects profoundly the citizen’s subjective experience of her/his political rights, but also of civil life, private life, the life of the body itself.” The national symbolic is the capacity of a sense of nationalism to affect one’s subjectivity pervasively.

Cultural memory is a means through which definitions of the nation and “Americanness” are simultaneously established, questioned, and refigured. For instance, when the AIDS Quilt is displayed on the Mall in Washington, D.C., it both resists and demands inclusion in the nation. Laid out in the most symbolic national place of the United States, the quilt form evokes a sense of Americana, yet it also represents those who have been symbolically excluded from America—drug users, blacks, Latinos, gay men. The Washington Mall is the site of a particularly circumscribed narrative of nationalism in its white monuments, yet it is also the primary location of national protest. Thus, the Vietnam Veterans Memorial gains a particular meaning from its location on the Mall; it is a place where artifacts of both patriotism and protest are left.

Cultural memory reveals the demand for a less monolithic, more inclusive image of America. For this reason, it has often intersected with contemporary battles over identity politics and political correctness. Questions of who is sanctioned to speak of particular memories are often raised, and issues of difference and exclusion from the “imagined community” of the nation come to the fore.

Concepts of America vary a great deal and are used with different intents by many different people. Yet I think it important to take note of those moments when people perceive themselves to be participants in the nation. One of the ways in which this happens is through the media. When Americans watch events of “national” importance—the Persian Gulf War, the Anita Hill/Clarence Thomas
hearings, the explosion of the Challenger—on television, they perceive themselves to be part of a national audience regardless of their individual political views or cultural background. Citizenship can thus be enacted through live television.

In the same way, participation in sites of cultural memory also involves the perception of the nation as an audience. When the makers of the AIDS Quilt go to Washington, D.C., they see themselves as communicating to the nation. When people leave personal artifacts at the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, they often see themselves as speaking to the dead before the nation. These forms of participation are contingent on the idea that the nation is listening.

The Vietnam War and the AIDS Epidemic

The Vietnam War and the AIDS epidemic are the two events in the late twentieth century through which the concept of the nation has most powerfully been called into question. Although this book touches on several other incidents of national importance, such as the Kennedy assassination, the Challenger explosion, the Rodney King beating, and the Persian Gulf War, it focuses on the Vietnam War and AIDS precisely because these are the two distinguishing markers of what America means at this particular moment in history. Both have seriously disrupted previously held popular beliefs about the United States, and both have irrevocably altered the country’s image in a global context. Although AIDS may be cured and its meaning will change, such developments likely would not affect the AIDS narrative as it has been scripted so far—the virus that both exposed divisions and created new communities in American society. John Erni writes: “The power of the AIDS narrative resides in its relative independence of the material events of AIDS. A drug or vaccine which kills the virus can hardly kill the stories that are told about and around it. Once, a friend remarked about a different crisis with a strangely familiar parallel: ‘It is unthinkable of a world without AIDS, just as it is unthinkable of an America without a Vietnam.’ ”

Both the Vietnam War and the AIDS epidemic have profoundly affected the experience of nationality. America is inconceivable without them.
How the Vietnam War and the AIDS epidemic have been remembered and commemorated is indicative of their respective moments in history. The Vietnam War marks the beginning of the end of the Cold War. It follows on the historic upheaval of the civil rights movement and intersects with the rise of the feminist movement. It has refigured the image not only of American technology and global power but also of American manhood and its relation to the feminine. It has irrevocably altered the image of the American veteran. The AIDS epidemic emerged in the United States at a moment when the gay and lesbian movement was at a new height, when understandings of marginalism and identity politics were acute, and when the religious right began gaining political power and waging a culture war around morality and art.

The production of cultural memory around these two events is thus historically situated and specific, and important generational differences exist regarding their impact. My generation witnessed the Vietnam War from a temporal distance, too young to have been directly affected yet old enough to be fascinated with it and to partake of the nostalgia for the intensity of its time. The year the war ended for the United States I was eighteen, caught between what is now called the “Vietnam Generation” and the generation born during the war. The images of the Vietnam War were everywhere when I was growing up, but the war itself was at a comfortable remove.

I am also part of the generation for whom the AIDS epidemic is a primary crisis, an event that has shaped notions of loss, helplessness, empowerment, morality, and responsibility. AIDS is very present for my generation and for the generation born during the Vietnam War; indeed, it defines in many ways our self-image, be it one of activism, condemnation, defiance, social responsibility, or anger at previous generations. For this generation, the Vietnam War is irrevocably tied to AIDS. AIDS activists compare the epidemic to the war and liken AIDS activism to antiwar activism. These two events are also allied through the fact that Vietnam veterans were among the first to die of AIDS and that many young people died in Vietnam and many more continue to die of AIDS.

It is because these are traumas that they have been so prominent in producing cultural memory. Friedrich Nietzsche once wrote that the oldest and most enduring psychology on earth was that of