Introduction

“And so you remained silent for twelve years,” remarks the Japanese visitor to Martin Heidegger in a quasi-factual dialogue, as they discussed the linguistic problems broached by Heidegger’s habilitation work on Duns Scotus (1915) and a subsequent lecture course, which antedated the publication of his magnum opus in 1927, *Being and Time* (= BT). Well over a half-century has passed since Heidegger virtually exploded upon the larger philosophical scene with the publication of BT, achieving with it an international acclaim and notoriety which has not really waned over the intervening years. The difficulty in comprehending this classic of twentieth-century philosophy has since become legendary—“like swimming through wet sand,” remarks one perceptive commentator. The fact that Heidegger published absolutely nothing in the decade preceding BT compounded the difficulty immensely, so much so that one was forced to regard this complex work as something that sprang full-grown, like Athena, from the head of Zeus. Herbert Spiegelberg’s description of BT, “this astonishing torso,” which alludes especially to the absence of its projected Second Half, can be applied as well to its initial “fore-structure,” the dearth of publications before 1927.

This at least described the situation of the reader of BT for decades. That situation is now rapidly changing. After a half-century of having absolutely nothing but hearsay regarding the decade of publication silence between Heidegger’s habilitation work and his masterwork, we will soon be faced with a wealth of documents which promise to show us how this great work came into being. Heidegger’s *Gesamtausgabe* (Collected Edition), launched a year before his death on May 26, 1976, has from the start included editions of previously unpublished lecture courses from his Marburg period (1923–28). Thus, the initial draft of BT em-
bodied in his course of SS 1925, “History of the Concept of Time,” has been available to us in a faulty German edition since 1979 and an improved English translation since 1985. The recent decision by Heidegger’s literary executor to publish the earliest of the Freiburg lecture courses (1919–23) will serve to steadily fill in much of the rest of the gap.

However, for the long-felt desire for an unbroken overview over this hitherto uncharted stretch of Heidegger’s way to BT, such “original sources” are not enough. For one thing, some of these are missing. Instead of the early Heidegger’s original text, a student transcript of a course in SS 1919 has had to be published, and the same will be done for the all-important course of WS 1920–21 on the phenomenology of religion. For another, the editorial principle of an Ausgabe letzter Hand (a “last-hand” edition: in practice, a deadhand edition), instituted two years after Heidegger’s death, yields editions made from course-manuscripts as Heidegger last left them, making no distinction between the course as it was presented at the time and material added afterwards, sometimes years later, which thus serves to distort the public chronological record of Heidegger’s actual development. Furthermore, the same editorial principle sometimes makes editors hesitant to draw from student transcripts—clearly not of Heidegger’s now nearly infamous “hand” but rather of his voice, as he departed from his prepared text to clarify his points—even to fill in obvious gaps in meaning in Heidegger’s own manuscripts. Finally, even with an optimal editorial policy, the publication of the separate courses in the Collected Edition would still provide only a disjointed picture. Heidegger’s teaching was an integral part of his development toward BT, but only a part. The published courses are not enough for a truly unbroken overview of this developmental history, which should also include, for example, important seminar exercises whose transcripts will probably never be published. And it turns out that two of the most pivotal documents in this development are, so to speak, “extracurricular.” Finally, philosophically pertinent evidence for such a Story can also be drawn from Heidegger’s correspondence and various university “acts” and documents, which are just beginning to come to light.

This book has as its aim just such a full and reliable story of Heidegger’s development from 1915 to 1927, on the basis of the most complete documentation that can be mustered, including student transcripts, correspondence, and university documents. It is basically a Book of Genesis of a great classic, perhaps the most important, of twentieth-century philosophy. It seeks to relate the in-depth philosophical story which would track the discovery and development of the conceptual constellations that constitute the early Heidegger’s response to the problems posed by
his hermeneutic situation in those formative years. It is a conceptual story, a *Begriffsgeschichte*. It would establish why and how the various conceptual Gestalts take shape and are sometimes undone and replaced or reshaped, eventually finding their place within the fabric of BT. But it is also a story of conceptual threads severed only to be picked up later, leads and projects totally abandoned, author’s intentions left unfulfilled or modified for other purposes, dead ends encountered along the way. These too should be noted, in order to offset the retrospective distortions that accompany the fact that we already know how the Story ends, namely, in BT itself. For part of the Story is that BT itself is a failed project, and that Heidegger then returns to earlier insights left unpursued in order to begin again. This is the real meaning of his self-professed and much discussed “turn.” The Story should therefore conclude—at this stage it will not, for practical reasons—by going beyond BT in order to assume a larger perspective upon the decade that preceded BT, to assess its significance for Heidegger’s entire thought, to determine whether, for example, it already contains in *ovo* everything essential that came to light in the later Heidegger’s thought.

There is, at any rate, a certain rawness and freshness of first discovery in those early works of the Ur-Heidegger circa 1919, when he first found himself, when he first became *Heidegger*, and before those newly discovered ideas underwent a kind of scholastic complexification in BT itself. That is in part why the conceptual genealogy imparted by this Story should help to throw light on the still opaque concepts and contexts that continue to baffle readers of BT, by providing the historical axis of interpretation as an approach to this systematic work. This is in fact the interpretative approach recommended by the old Heidegger himself, who at the end of his life coined the motto, “Ways—not Works,” for his Collected Edition, and from his early years insisted that the systematic cannot be understood without the historical dimension of philosophy.

There is more than one good reason why this Story should be a *conceptual* history, sensitive especially to the emergence and development of the fundamental concepts and conceptual schemes that enter into BT. Heidegger’s peculiar genius and forte lies in his ability to expose the “root” concepts that “seed” a field of study. This uprooting “deconstruction” is, more often than not, followed by their replacement with new conceptual *τόποι* of Heidegger’s own making, as the traditional categories are displaced by existentials in BT. From the very beginning, Heidegger’s entire way is marked by this traffic of concepts: the category problem in Duns Scotus, his doctrine of the transcendentals of being, how it is “said in many ways” through categorial intuition, the formally indicative “concepts” which try to catch experience in its incipience and latency, the search for the fundamental concepts of the West emerging from
their pre-Socratic roots. “In the end, the business of philosophy is to preserve the force of the most elemental words in which Dasein expresses itself” (SZ 220).

And yet, as helpful as this might be, we would still have but a shallow and static doxography if we were to be satisfied merely with the parade of interlocking concepts emerging in rapid succession at different points along the way, for example: the historical I (1919) to factic life experience (1920) to Dasein (1923), its movement as motivated tendency (1919) to passionate action (1924) to thrown project (1926), its temporal structure as retention-protention (1919), appresentation (1925), and ecstatic schematization of horizons (1927). Thus, Appendix D, which summarizes the chronological rise and sometimes the fall of Heidegger’s basic concepts at this time in a Genealogical Glossary, should be used with a bit of caution. A true conceptual history must probe below this doxographic surface to the motivating problem situations which prompt these concepts and the hermeneutic situation of inherited presuppositions which shape them. Once again, it is Heidegger himself who notes the “searching” character of his concepts and points to the need to “work out” the question itself from the interrogative situation which prompts it, in order to ensure that the very “terms” of the question themselves become transparent to us. Beyond the litany of rapidly changing concepts, therefore, there is the motivating unity of the problem situation to which they are a response. The question then is whether this situation itself still remains constant as it becomes clear and develops, like a “guiding star,” or whether it too is subject to dimming or disappearance and, as a consequence, radical displacement by another.

This conceptual genealogy and flow constitute the philosophical core of our Story. But in order to relate this Story, at this early stage of research in this area, it was necessary to correct many a factual error in the BCD—Biography, Chronology, and Doxography—of this hitherto relatively uncharted stretch of Heidegger’s Way. These three intertwining strata have since Theophrastus constituted the minimal philological aids necessary for any reliable record of the story of philosophy. But in our case, they have fallen into disrepute in part because of the negative attitude toward philology assumed, in a wrongheaded imitation of the Master, by the over-seers of Heidegger’s Collected Edition. Thus, in addition to its central interpretative philosophical thrust, this book incidentally also fills the need for a reliable record of these subsidiary factual threads of our Story. Regarding the doxographical thread, for example, Otto Pöggeler recently remarked: “Regrettably, even today there is still no reliable overview of Heidegger’s early lecture courses based on the extant student transcripts and Heidegger’s manuscripts.” This book, in its Story and Appendixes, will seek, to the extent that this does not ob-
secure its central interpretative thrust, to fill this especially glaring lacuna in Heidegger scholarship.

But of course we want more than just to set the doxographical record straight: We wish to enter each course, seminar, or written text as its own conceptual universe not only with the doxographical questions, “What does it say?” and “What is its basic intent?” but also with the intertextual questions of “Where does it come from?” and “What does it lead to?” dictated by our genealogical and diachronic concerns. The synchronic pause is conceptually essential, and so lengthy, especially at the critical turning points in the Story. But synchrony is often “bracketed,” as necessary, to do a diachronic framing of certain key concepts, like ex-sistence and angst, in order to examine them backwards and especially forwards into BT, at the tender early spot at which something new develops. The strands into BT are thus explored directly into BT long before we reach that terminal stage of our Story. And because we are first telling a Story, where BT itself will turn out not to be the goal but just one more way station, we shall never find the time to gather the strands together even at that particular central station. The Story to that extent does presuppose some familiarity with BT itself. But even those who are quite familiar with BT will find, I believe, that approaching it by way of this genealogical track makes us look at its passing landscape in a way that is quite different, traveling against the grain of many an old interpretation.

The temptation is always great in such a philosophical account to interject an excess of “interesting” biographical details in order to keep the story line “light and lively.” And the question of the relation between Life and Thought has become especially acute of late in the “case of Heidegger.” But the critical reader should perhaps not be too quick to judge as philosophically irrelevant, say, the repeated allusions to Heidegger’s difficult writing style which led, among other things, to his being denied a university appointment and to his having an article rejected for publication. This biographical infrastructure is in fact fraught with philosophical (or, more precisely here, “metaphilosophical”) significance. Take, for example, the seemingly bland and straightforward statement of biographical fact of our opening citation, “And so you remained silent for twelve years.” The “And so” takes us to the very heart of Heidegger’s philosophy: his naming of a topic for himself which had traditionally been regarded as “ineffable,” his early struggles to develop a hermeneutics to express this topic at first on the basis of the phenomenological principle of “self-showing” intuition, thus his development of the linguistic strategy of “formal indication” out of the context of the Aristotelian-scholastic doctrine of the analogy of being and Lask’s “logic of philosophy.” This is but one instance in our tale, insofar as it resorts to philo-
sophical biography, in which it strives to pay close attention to a much-discussed and still unresolved general question in the metaphilosophy of the historiography of philosophy: What exactly are the revelatory and intrinsic links between the life and the thought of a thinker? The question applies especially to a thinker who prided himself on the ontic “roots” (Boden) of his ontology, taking pride in the claim that he was the first in the history of philosophy to declare openly the inescapable need for such roots.

A related question at the interface of biography and philosophy arises especially from the old Heidegger’s autobiographical statements. We are here treated repeatedly to the story of his boyhood years in the gymnasium and the gift of Brentano’s dissertation on “the manifold sense of being in Aristotle,” which has triggered a small industry of articles analyzing this text in its relation to Heidegger’s thought. Such work demonstrates the eagerness of scholars for reliable biographical clues to Heidegger’s development more than the actual relevance of Heidegger’s selective reading of his own life to the main lines of his thought. Why this attempt in his old age to revive the ties with his Catholic past, his early relationships with Father Conrad Gröber and the Thomistic philosopher, Carl Braig? Why do we hear absolutely nothing about those dark war years of 1917–19, about which almost nothing is presently known, when he broke with his Catholic past and clearly emerged as a “free Christian” in his first postwar lecture courses? At any rate, Heidegger’s own autobiographical statements, which of course cannot be ignored, must themselves be carefully weighed, counterbalanced, and so corrected against all the archival evidence that can possibly be mustered. This is what I have sought to do here, in order to establish a reliable, complete, and relatively uninterrupted story of this entire period of Heidegger’s development. It has dictated the correction and demystification not only of the autobiographical Heidegger but also of Heidegger’s literary executors, who have established a track record of factual misstatement and chronological distortion in the composition of their Collected Edition, as well as of the more nebulous constellation of tenacious anecdotes from diverse quarters, for example from the literary genre of “Conversations with Heidegger,” which have fused together over the years to give us the Legend of Heidegger. Particularly in the area of autobiography and reported “table talks,” the authority of the old Heidegger has been found to be insufficient and at times even contradictory, thus hardly above question, contrary to the natural tendency to accept that authority.6

In view of these tasks of completion and correction, the appeal to Theophrastus is by no means so farfetched. For the state of Heidegger scholarship at the “BCD” level is still very much like that of our factual knowledge of the Pre-Socratics. An accurate and reliable reconstruction
of the problematic *situs* or conceptual *tópos* out of which Heidegger develops his ideas requires a background knowledge of the elements of *βίος*, *χρόνος*, and *δόξα* which constitute that situation. By way of an introduction, an example from each arena of philosophy’s BCD which will play a telling if not crucial role in our Story may suffice:

**Biography.** We have it from the old Heidegger that it was his “theological provenance” which put him on the path of thinking (US 96/10). But we also have a much more immediate expression of the concrete direction in which this provenance was taken in the early Heidegger’s personal letter to Karl Löwith on August 19, 1921: “I work concretely and factically out of my ‘I am,’ out of my intellectual and wholly factic origin, milieu, life-contexts, and whatever is available to me from these as a vital experience in which I live. . . . To this facticity of mine belongs what I briefly call the fact that I am a ‘Christian theologian.’” The entire letter is in fact an application of Heidegger’s own philosophical “hermeneutics of facticity” to himself and so testimony to Heidegger’s own sense of the intrinsic importance, rooted in his own philosophy, of the biographical element in the autochthonous “hermeneutic situation” out of which a philosopher speaks.

**Chronology.** Comparison of the published *Ausgaben letzter Hand* of the Collected Edition with extant student transcripts uncovered a number of chronological distortions which such “last-hand” publications introduce into the public record of the early Heidegger’s development. The most important of the resulting chronological corrections in turn produces a different setting for the genealogy of one of Heidegger’s best-known concepts. Contrary to the impression given by the published editions, Heidegger was sparing in his use of the language of existentialism then in vogue until the very last draft of BT. His resistance to the popular jargon was breached not for existentialist but for “formally indicative” reasons, by his discovery at the last minute of the “ecstatic-horizontal” structure of temporality, thus etymologically connected with “ex-sistence,” in part perhaps through his reading of Aristotle’s *Physics*.

**Doxography.** This ancient art of establishing what a philosopher actually said comes into play here in correcting error-ridden editions and filling in the gaps left by the Collected Edition. I shall, for example, provide an extensive paraphrase of Heidegger’s course of WS 1920–21 on the phenomenology of religion based on student transcripts, in view of the fact that there are no plans at present to publish this course, since the manuscript of the course from Heidegger’s hand has not been found. Extant but unpublished transcripts of Heidegger’s seminar exercises are also sometimes important in bridging certain gaps in the public record of development. But in a letter to Löwith shortly after the appearance of BT in 1927, Heidegger warns his student during these first postwar
years of development toward BT that “the work cannot be judged simply by what was said in the lecture hall and the seminar exercise. . . . To tell the truth, I am not really interested in my development, but when the matter comes up, it cannot be put together simply from the sequence of lecture courses and what is only communicated in them. This short-winded consideration forgets the central perspectives and impulses at work both backwards and forwards.”8 The search for clues to Heidegger’s development must accordingly be extended to the then private record, to Heidegger’s correspondence and personal notes, for example. Especially important for the Story of this development are certain major documents which were privately circulated at the time and are now belatedly beginning to come into the public arena: the review of Karl Jaspers’s Psychologie der Weltanschauungen, first drafted in the summer of 1920 and published in 1972; the Introduction to a projected book on Aristotle written in October 1922 in support of Heidegger’s candidacy for a chair at Marburg and Göttingen, recently discovered in Göttingen in its entirety; “The Concept of Time,” the lecture to the Marburg Theologians in July 1924 and the longer journal article of November 1924 with the same title, which amounted to the very first draft of BT, but was never published in that journal because of problems with its length and style.

It is in fact only in the last several years that the three most pivotal documents that mark the three giant leaps forward, the three Ur-sprünge (original leaps, or leaps from the origin), toward BT have in fact come into the open. These three critical junctures where the development makes an abrupt surge forward in fact mark three different geneses of BT, ranging from the remote to the proximate. They offer us, as it were, three different magnifying lenses or prisms through which this still opaque systematic masterwork can be viewed along its historical trajectory. In the language of the maxim which the dying Heidegger affixed to his Gesamtausgabe, BT can now be viewed through these prisms not as a work but as a way. In brief, the three geneses are: BT as a topic, as a program, and as a text.

Accordingly, a full doxographic record, chronologically corrected and set straight, naturally divides the course to BT into three phases marked by three major academic events of breakthrough in Heidegger’s early career:

Part I. War Emergency Semester 1919 (KNS), when the returned “veteran” becomes Edmund Husserl’s assistant and advocates a radicalized phenomenology understood as a pretheoretical science of origins differing from any other (i.e., theoretical) science. For its subject matter is not an object at all but the already meaningful “stream of life” in which each of us is already caught up. How to approach this topic without “stilling the stream” (Paul Natorp’s objections to phenomenology), how
to articulate this non-objectifiable “something” (Es) which contextualizes (Es wellet) and temporalizes (Es er-eignet sich) each of us? With this response to the double question of the accessibility and expressibility of the immediate situation of the individual, traditionally regarded as ineffable, Heidegger has in fact named his lifetime topic. (Das Ereignis, the event of “properizing,” will become the old Heidegger’s very last word for archaic Being, Seym.) The courses of 1919–21 constitute an initial phenomenological elaboration of this topic in the hermeneutic language of life-philosophy and in continuity with the young Heidegger’s project of a phenomenology of religious experience. [Chapters 1–4]

Part II. Die Aristoteles-Einleitung, October 1922: This version of an Introduction to a projected book on Aristotle, written to secure a chair at the University of Marburg, concentrates for the first time the interrelations familiar to us in BT as the double task of 1) a fundamental ontology based on an analysis of the “human situation” (Dasein) and 2) a concomitant deconstruction of the history of ontology aimed at retrieving the Greek conceptuality of that situation rooted especially in λόγος, φύσις (especially its κύνηγις), and ἀλήθεια. The project of BT thus takes shape in 1921–24 against the backdrop of an unrelenting exegesis of Aristotle’s texts, especially Nicomachean Ethics Z, from which the manifestly pretheoretical models for the two Divisions of BT, the τέχνη of ποίησις for the First and the φρόνησις of πράξις for the Second, are derived. (The νοῦς of these two more practical dia-noetic virtues—as well as of the two theoretical virtues—is in BT replaced by the “lighted clearing” [Lichtung] of ecstatic temporality, in marked contrast with the “eternal” νοῦς in Greek philosophy.) [Chapters 5–6]

Part III. “Der Begriff der Zeit” (July 1924), the talk to the Marburg theologians, inaugurates the writing of the three drafts of BT: 1) the hermeneutic draft, the article likewise entitled “The Concept of Time” and rejected by a budding young journal, seeks to found the problem of historicality raised in the Dilthey-Yorck Correspondence; 2) the phenomenological-ontological draft, the course of Summer 1925 on the “History of the Concept of Time,” is introduced by an extensive exegesis of Husserl’s Sixth Logical Investigation and for the first time analyzes Dasein as the being which questions being; 3) the Kantian more than the “existentialist” draft, reflecting the last-minute development of the temporal apriori as an ecstatic schematization of horizons. [Chapters 7–9]

Three intertwining phases groping their way to BT, toward a hermeneutics of the Fact of life (1915–21), deconstructing Aristotle’s ousiological ontology by way of his anthropology (1921–24), and redrawing the classical question of being directly out of the temporal dynamics of the human predicament (1924–27). Despite the first two drafts, BT itself,
composed in its major lines in a single month, in March 1926, constitutes a massive step forward in its innovations. Perhaps too far forward, Heidegger will eventually conclude. He later observes that “perhaps the fundamental flaw of the book BT is that I ventured forward too far too soon” (US 93/7). The seeds of self-destruction are thus planted in BT itself. A full genealogical account of BT can be claimed only after we have also traversed the steps leading to its demise, the sequel to the Story of the genesis of BT. Γένεσις καὶ φθορά belong together, they are equiprimordial. This tale of foundering must be left to another occasion. The Genesis Story traverses a far less known path, where much of the evidence is yet to be published. And without this Genesis Story, the story of the foundering of BT cannot really be told in the fundamental conceptualty that it requires. That is why I have belabored the initial halting steps toward BT, perhaps more exhaustively than some readers would wish. I did so with the growing conviction that these “juvenilia,” as the old Heidegger came to regard them when the question of their publication was posed, for all their rawness and crudity perhaps contain the key to all of Heidegger. At the very least, they certainly throw a great deal of light on the later Heidegger’s development by demystifying much of its mystagogic language into more ordinary terms. This may seem a surprising statement to make, especially in view of the initial bafflement that the book BT posed when it first appeared. We have indeed come a long way in our understanding of what Heidegger is really up to.

My way of telling this Story is thus deliberately “bottom-heavy,” dwelling as it does on Heidegger’s first fumbling steps toward his insight. Perhaps a genesis story is by its nature slow to start, slow at least in carefully deliberating its start. Slow to come to its climax which, when it comes, is there all too abruptly. A rather unpopular “ontic” ideal of narrative sexuality in this impatient age of sitcom “quickies.” The reader is forewarned, and may want to adjust according to his or her own desires. But there is also a documentary reason for its deliberate pace. In addition to the need to deal in depth and detail with the most pivotal documents, studded with “firsts” and “for the first time,” there is the need to inform the reader in some detail concerning unpublished documents which may not be published in the near future, or at all. The course of WS 1920–21 is a case in point, where the autograph is missing, and a handy edition of the five extant student transcripts is not acceptable to an “edition of the last hand.” In such cases, I have provided a relatively complete English paraphrase to bring the reader abreast.

This is a good point to inform the reader of the BCD Appendices. (To accentuate the methodology of fact-gathering sketched above, there is deliberately no Appendix A.) The goal of Appendix B is to establish the precise titles of the courses, seminars, and lectures held by the teacher
Heidegger at the time that he gave them, say, on the opening day of the semester, which is not always the same as the title pre-announced in the university catalogue, or the title bestowed upon them by the GA-executors. Its indispensable starting point is the initial list authenticated during Heidegger’s lifetime through the scholarly efforts of William Richardson, who composed it strictly from university catalogues. For our present purposes, however, from the standpoint of the more factually biographical criterion being applied throughout this book, this list, which has served us well over these many years (even the administrators of Heidegger’s Collected Edition at first relied upon it almost exclusively!), now stands in need of correction. Appendix C provides a bilingual chronological documentary of the events leading to the premature publication of BT, where the facts once again serve to supplement and correct as well as confirm the well-known anecdote told by the old Heidegger. The galley-by-galley story of the internal composition of BT is moreover one more aid in coming to regard BT itself as a “way” instead of a Work rendered almost sacred by being frozen in time, as Great Books are wont to become. Appendix D combines doxography with chronology in trying to establish the precise time frames in which the early Heidegger conceived, applied, and, at times, abandoned some of his key concepts. As a by-product of our tale, this record of development may also be of use to translators of Heidegger, for example, in the vexed question of whether his terms can be rigidly translated in a strict one-to-one fashion. This Genealogical Glossary also indicates how rapidly Heidegger developed in this period, casting off one conceptual scheme after another, but always in conversation with the tradition in which he found his ground, and so his ground concepts.

The Bibliography is somewhat lean, restricting itself by and large to published works actually cited in the body of the Story. This is also due to the virgin territory being explored, with much of the material still unpublished. In these circumstances, I could entertain the vanity of keeping myself untainted by sources that seemed extraneous, uninformed, or otherwise unripe: “Away with the secondary literature, back to the archives themselves!”

For that very reason, this book has been long in the making. It found its start in 1981 from the need to examine the underlying documents of Heidegger’s course of SS 1925, in order to correct the error-ridden German edition before translating it into English. I wish again to thank Dr. Hermann Heidegger for permission to do so and Walter Biemel for assistance to this end. This first venture into the archives made me see the signal importance of such unpublished material for understanding this most crucial period of Heidegger’s development. I wish first to thank the entire staff of the Deutsches Literaturarchiv in Marbach (first Bern-
hard Zeller, then Ulrich Ott, Directors) for their cooperative spirit and friendly assistance over the years, especially my good friend Joachim W. Storck for sharing his wealth of knowledge of the Heidegger papers throughout the project, and for his advice in locating material accessible in other archives throughout Germany. These archives and personnel are likewise gratefully acknowledged: the Herbert Marcuse Archive in the library of the University of Frankfurt, to begin with, Barbara Brick, who first compiled the papers in Marcuse’s literary estate in 1986, and Dr. Gerhart Powitz, its present administrator; the Erich Rothacker Archive, University of Bonn (Dr. Hartwig Lohse, Library Director); the Paul Natorp Archive, Marburg University (Dr. Uwe Bredehorn); Hessisches Staatsarchiv Marburg (Dr. Inge Auerbach); the University Archive in Göttingen (Dr. Ulrich Hunger); the Engelbert Krebs Archive, the University Archive in Freiburg (Dr. Dieter Speck); Dilthey Forschungsstelle, Ruhr University of Bochum (Fritjof Rodi, Director); the Husserl Archive in Leuven, Belgium (Samuel J. Jellesing, Director); the Rudolf-Bultmann-Archiv at the University of Tübingen (Dr. Friedrich Seck, Chief Archivist), with special thanks to Antje Bultmann-Lemke for access to that portion of her father’s papers pertaining to the early Heidegger, and to Dr. Klaus Müller, European caretaker of these papers, for smoothing the way; in this country, the Simon Silverman Phenomenology Center in the Duquesne University Library (Richard Rojcewicz, Executive Director, and Andre Schuwer, Co-Director). Of the many private archives I consulted, two that were especially important at crucial junctures in the work were the collections in the possession of Ernst Tugendhat (the transcripts of Helene Weiss) and the late Ada Löwith, succeeded by Klaus Stichweh. Scholarly assistance came from colleagues in Europe and America too numerous to mention, but let me especially thank Otto Pöggeler for unwavering support and advice over the long and difficult haul. Tom Sheehan has been generous in sharing the unpublished results of his own “detective” work, done years before I came onto the archive scene and took over where he left off, and in his role as reader of my manuscript. My teacher and advisor in things Greek has been Gerald Hawthorne (Wheaton College). Funding for this decennial project came from numerous agencies: the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, the Fulbright Commission of the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Academic Exchange Service, the National Endowment for the Humanities (Research Materials Division and Travel to Collections), and Northern Illinois University (Graduate School, College of Arts and Sciences, Department of Philosophy). Last but not least, my everlasting gratitude to my wife, Marie, for her patience on the home front, enduring support and supportive endurance in the cycles of preoccupied presence and overseas absence.