INTRODUCTION TO THE PAPERBACK EDITION

THE LAST *Generation of the Roman Republic* was conceived, composed, and revised in Berkeley in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Turbulence and turmoil took prominence in those years, a period of high passion, political strife, moral outrage, ideological conflict, and occasional violence. The atmosphere crackled with tension. The university served simultaneously as staging-ground for dissent, target for spleen, and center for contention. Friction and stress were everywhere evident, dispute and heated debate the standard order of the day. The discord went well beyond liberals vs. conservatives; it involved generational battles, racial differences, cultural and counter-cultural claims, the incipient women's movement and was fueled by issues like civil rights, the Vietnam War, ethnic demands, and a pervasive sense of alienation.

All of this inescapably had an impact upon the inception and evolution of *LGRR.* Yet an equally remarkable feature of the time, far less conspicuous or dramatic, provided stimulus for its orientation: the stability and endurance of institutions in the midst of upheaval. The events of the late 1960s and early 1970s, to be sure, left their mark and wrought important changes or accelerated developments in the university, the community, and the broader society. But the continuities, which captured little public attention, had lessons of their own. Traditional patterns of behavior, conventions, and attitudes subsisted through the turmoil with surprising durability. That aspect of events and outcome prompted reflections that issued in *LGRR:* a search for the bases of stability rather than the seeds of tumult.

LGRR therefore has its place in a special time and special circumstances. To revise it in light of subsequent interpretations, criticisms, or second thoughts would bring little advantage to author or reader, and would even compromise

whatever value the book possesses as a period piece. Hence text and notes in this edition remain unchanged.

The subject, however, continues to exercise fascination. A substantial bibliography has accumulated in the two decades since publication of *LGRR,* much of it moving in different directions, applying other emphases, providing variant interpretations, or taking issue with tenets of the book. Neither rebuttal nor apologia would be appropriate here. And space prevents a survey of the vast scholarship that has appeared since 1974. But it may be serviceable to review a small selection of the more important contributions to topics treated in *LGRR* – the gains, advancements, and improvements in our understandings since that time – and to offer some suggestions for the lines of future research.[1]

The role of patronage in Roman social and political life drew attention in *LGRR* and has been much discussed subsequently and fruitfully. N. Rouland's *Pouvoir politique et dépendance personnelle dans l'antiquité romaine* (Brussels, 1979) supplies a far-ranging treatment that traces the institution of clientship in Rome from its purported beginnings through the early Principate. His central thesis projects a breakdown of traditional ties between patron and client in the late Republic. Expansion of the citizenry meant that increasing numbers of persons without links to the established aristocracy put pressure on the political scene. Conventional bonds were further short-circuited by electoral bribery, *popularis* politicking, and the replacement of individual patronage by collective institutions. The earlier networks of clientage largely dissolved in the late Republic, leaving only the display of dependents in one's entourage or their employment as strong-armed retainers to serve as legacy to the Principate. The demise of *clientela,* on this analysis, mirrors the disintegration of the Republic. P. A. Brunt, in the extended essay on *clientela* in *The Fall of the Roman Republic* (Oxford, 1988), 382-442, goes further. Brunt questions the proposition that patronage had much effect at all on the operations of Roman politics. Ascribing this system in its flourishing state to the early or middle Republic is dubious, for the sources are late and unreliable, and testimony to patronage at a political level in the later Republic is conspicuously skimpy. Insofar as the institution existed, on Brunt's analysis, the bonds were loose, supposedly hereditary ties were unenduring, patrons could not reckon on clients' loyalties in the political arena, and overlapping connections render insupportable the hypothesis that individual houses of the nobility owed positions and influence to the control of familial *clientes.* This sustained assault on Gelzer and his *epigoni* has exhibited the fragility of constructs that interpret Roman politics as dependent upon a network of mutual obligations.

The debate, however, too often confines itself to the realm of politics. Links

[1] This endeavor was much facilitated by the assistance of Judy Gaughan, Michael Ierardi, Cecilia Peek, and Beth Severy, who have earned considerable gratitude.

of patronage, viewed as moral responsibilities and social relationships, had wider impact outside the purely political scene. There is evidence to be exploited in this regard. As a fine example one can cite the new work by E. Deniaux, *Clientèles et pouvoir à l'époque de Ciceron* (Rome, 1993), which explores in exhaustive detail the corpus of Ciceronian letters of recommendation. They disclose a broad range of associations, reaching into a variety of social levels and involving mutual accommodations that stretch well beyond the stage of high politics. The relative absence of the explicit term *cliens* (generally shunned for obvious reasons of tact), as Deniaux rightly observes, does not in any way signal the demise of the institution. The persistence of patronage networks between Republic and Empire, associating Roman *nobiles* with persons not only in the city but in diverse communities and regions of Italy and the provinces, is amply documented by R. Saller, *Personal Patronage in the early Empire* (Cambridge, 1982). These were not largely means of winning votes, if at all, but, as A. Wallace-Hadrill argues in *Patronage in Ancient Society* (London, 1990), 63-87, a vehicle for social integration and the extension of control from center to periphery. The massive study of J.-M. David, *Le patronat judicaire au dernier siècle de la republique romaine* (Rome, 1992), among other things, illuminates the role of the orator as *patronus,* not just in a limited judicial sense but in the wider social meaning as protector and advocate of established clients, carrying out the obligations of *fides,* reinforcing mutual bonds, and keeping alive a patronage model that goes back to early Roman history – thus, a significant continuity between present and past. The institution served as a vital means to exhibit the distinction of the *patronus* and the allegiance of the client. Future research will profit from skirting the old debate about clients as instruments of politics and instead focusing on practices like *salutatio* and *adsectatio* as displays of the *patronus's* prestige, social status, and beneficent image.

Predominance of the *nobiles* in high office remains an unassailable fact. Dispute over definition of the term has borne little fruit and makes little difference (see the inconclusive arguments of Brunt, *JRS,* 72 [1982], 1-17, and L. Burckhardt, *Historia,* 39 [1990], 80-84). None can gainsay the pattern that men of consular descent, whether near or far, dominated access to the top magistracies. The quantitative analysis of K. Hopkins and G. Burton in K. Hopkins, *Death and Renewal* (Cambridge, 1983), 31-119, has shown that the oligarchy was no impenetrable caste, that new men could enter the ranks of the privileged, and that the prominence of individual families varied over the generations. Nevertheless, the principal continuities prevailed. Even on the findings of Hopkins and Burton, two-thirds of the consuls in the last two centuries of the Republic had immediate consular ancestors. Furthermore, the Republic's final two decades show that more than 80 percent of the consuls had forebears in that office, a statistic reaffirmed in the most recent survey by E. Badian, *Chiron,* 30 (1990), 371-413. The electoral power of the elite can be illustrated from still another

direction: the frequency with which defeated candidates from its ranks attained office in subsequent campaigns, a point made in the final work of the great scholar T. R. S. Broughton, *Candidates Defeated in Roman Elections: Some Ancient Roman "Also-Rans"* (Philadelphia, 1991).

How to account for this persistent success? *LGRR* laid stress on "familial ties, connections, wealth, and aristocratic heritage" (p. 133). Current opinion casts doubt upon the strength of inherited bonds and obligations, as discussed above. More attention has now been paid to the claims of the populace, the need to promote popular interests, and the influence that the *populus Romanus* could exercise upon electoral results. A provocative series of articles by F. Millar gave special weight to the "democratic element" in Roman political culture – the importance of publicly appealing to the needs of a broad constituency in order to assure positions of leadership: *JRS,* 74 (1984), 1-19; *JRS,* 76 (1986), 1-11; *JRS,* 79 (1989), 142-149. That feature plays a central role in P. J. J. Vanderbroeck's *Popular Leadership and Collective Behaviour in the Late Roman Republic, ca. 80-50 B.C.* (Amsterdam, 1987), especially 161-173. If one could not win the backing of the electorate through advocacy of its causes, there was always the avenue of bribery. Evidence for the practice accumulates in the late Republic, and increased numbers of laws on *ambitus* attest to its greater conspicuousness. For some it became a determinant factor in electoral outcomes: J. Linderski, *AncWorld,* 11 (1985), 87-94. In the recent interpretation of A. W. Lintott, *JRS,* 80 (190), 1-16, bribery represents an alternative to conventional patronage or indeed a form of patronage itself, a liberating force for the electorate, which could now market its votes. Bribery was objected to more on moral than on political grounds when it became too institutionalized, thus interfering with the association between grandee and beneficiary. A. Yakobson, *JRS,* 82 (1992), 32-52, takes the case to a still further level, arguing that even the *comitia centuriata,* generally regarded as a bastion of privilege, gave considerable scope to the voice of the commons, thereby rendering meaningful the practice of *largitio* to the *plebs* as a route to the election of senior magistrates. The trend of these studies has been salutary and productive, shaking the complacency of earlier scholarship on the smooth and untroubled hold by the *nobiles* on the electorate.

Yet problems still exist and solutions remain elusive. The composition and quantity of the electorate at any given time have to be considered. The voting structures themselves set severe limits, assuring that only a fraction of eligible electors could exercise that privilege, a point rightly emphasized by R. MacMullen, *Athenaeum,* 78 (1980), 454-457. The implementation of voting rights generally and their meaning for the role of a Roman citizen are discussed in the valuable survey by C. Nicolet, *The World of the Citizen in Republican Rome* (Berkeley, 1980), 207-315. Laws designed to effect electoral reform may not signify an opening of the process to wider levels of society, but rather represent an instrument whereby the elite curbed the influence of *novi homines* who sought to en-

croach upon their nexus of traditional associations; cf. E. S. Gruen, in A. Molho, K. Raaflaub, and J. Emlen, *City-States in Classical Antiquity and Medieval Italy* (Stuttgart, 1991), 251-267. The whole idea of a democratic character in Roman society where the oligarchy enjoyed virtually unchallenged control in political, institutional, and religious life is difficult to defend, as J. North, *Past and Present,* 126 (1990), 3-21, recently reaffirmed. In North's view, the popular will made itself felt only to arbitrate matters in which the oligarchy itself was bitterly divided. The clear consistency with which the electorate returned members of the aristocracy to high office still stands as the dominant datum. It would be productive to investigate this phenomenon not so much through the hold of individual families, but through the projection of the aristocratic image as a collective ideal. That may have had more enduring impact than ties of patronage or distribution of largesse.

With regard to the character and activities of the senatorial class, significant information is now more accessible and serviceable. Two useful works appeared about the time of *LGRR.* I. Shatzman's *Senatorial Wealth and Roman Politics* (Brussels, 1975) sets out the data on the property, other sources of income, and expenditures, where known, for all senators in the middle and late Republic. His findings – that the nobles owned a predominant portion of the available land in the post-Sullan era and also had readier access to other means of securing wealth, thus reinforcing positions of power and authority – have implications for the solidarity and continuity of the privileged order. H. Schneider, *Wirtschaft und Politik: Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der späten römischen Republik* (Erlangen, 1974), supplies parallel information, though not in tabular form, for senatorial possessions, diverse means of enrichment, and the extensive outlays that featured the lifestyle of the elite. In Schneider's interpretative framework, the access to economic power translated into political authority, but also hardened the senate's protection of its own interests and resistance to popular needs or advantage. A third study, that of M. Bonneford-Coudry, *Le senat de la république romaine* (Rome, 1989), provides an exhaustive topographical, calendrical, and procedural examination of the senate's activities. Her detailed analysis also documents fully the deference paid to hierarchy within senatorial ranks, the preponderance of intervention by exconsuls, and their near monopoly in the sponsorship of *senatus consulta.* Bonneford-Coudry's massive work underscores not only continuity in senatorial practice, but also the maintenance of the senate's place in the governmental structure of Rome. Additional support for that stance comes from L. de Libero's *Obstruktion* (Stuttgart, 1992), which approaches the subject from a novel angle. De Libero collects the evidence on senatorial tactics of obstructionism to argue that these maneuvers were part of the *mos maiorum* – conventional behavior built into the structure, a sign of institutional stability rather than disintegration.

The nature of Roman politics continues to provoke debate. Views diverge on

the manner and means whereby aristocratic competition was structured. *LGRR* sought to steer a middle course between an older thesis that divided the senate into contending family factions and the notion that political alignments were momentary, makeshift, and inconsequential. It proposed a complex picture in which familial alliances carried political meaning but came under increasing pressure in the late Republic as they splintered or were reshaped by volatile rivalries, forceful personalities, an expanded citizenry, the posturing of leaders, and the interests of various segments of society.

Subsequent studies have, however, raised doubts about the existence of groups formed on the basis of blood ties, marriage alliances, and mutual obligations. T. P. Wiseman, in *Roman Political Life, 90 B.C.-A.D. 69* (Exeter, 1985), 3-19, prefers a simpler model that has political units built around powerful individuals rather than around family groups or wider alliances. Brunt's broader assault in *Fall of the Roman Republic,* 443-502, denies that any political assemblages cohered on the basis of kinship ties, familial connections, or even the leadership of ascendant individuals. This has parallels with an earlier and influential study by C. Meier, *Res Publica Amissa* (Wiesbaden, 1966), whose views are restated in the introduction to a 1980 edition of his book (see, especially, xxxii-xliii). On Brunt's analysis, marriage ties suggest no political union, criminal trials supply evidence only for private enmities, ambition, or a drive for justice, and the absence of Latin terminology for cohesive factions throws the very concept into question. The senate, therefore, did not divide into competitive segments; and figures like Pompey, Caesar, and Crassus never carried or presumably sought much influence in that body. Nor did they command the consistent allegiance of any collection of followers themselves. Personal advantage prevailed.

This notion of individualism and the evanescence of combines has its limits. Brunt concedes the existence of the *optimates,* a loose collection of *principes* united in a broad commitment to senatorial control of the state. The identity and composition of the *"optimates",* however, remain fuzzy. L. A. Burckhardt devoted an entire book to eliciting the methods and tactics of the *"optimates"* in the political arena: *Politische Strategien der Optimaten in der späten römischen Republik* (Stuttgart, 1988). Yet he can provide no clear criteria for discerning the size, makeup, or organization of this shadowy cluster of personages. In fact, the term *"optimates"* in our texts serves only to register approbation, just as *"factio"* generally designates opprobrium – without signifying any political structure.

A different approach to this issue can be recommended. More scholarly energy needs to be applied to an examination of how the Roman aristocracy defined itself and endeavored to promote its solidarity rather than to reanalyzing the mechanisms of friction and division. An admirable start in that direction has now been made by N. Rosenstein, *Imperatores Victi: Military Defeat and Aris-*

tocratic Competition in the Middle and Late Republic (Berkeley, 1990). Although his book deals largely with events prior to the period of *LGRR,* Rosenstein exposes a fundamental feature of the aristocratic mentality: the setting of limits to aristocratic competition, both to assure a fairly wide distribution of *honores* among the political class and to reaffirm the collective interests of that class. He deftly exploits the remarkable phenomenon that defeated commanders pursued political careers with a success rate comparable to that of victorious ones. Such evidence suggests that the ruling elite not only shielded their own members from the consequences of defeat, but presented the image of a unified aristocracy with competent leadership stretched throughout its ranks. Further probes of the bonding values would be welcome.

Criminal trials played a conspicuous role on the public scene of the late Republic. Well over one hundred cases made their way into the extant record during the period under scrutiny—and doubtless many more went unreported. The *iudicia publica* gained widespread attention as highly visible arenas for contests among the influential, the aggressive, the aggrieved, and the aspiring. *LGRR* presented a plethora of motives that prompted battles in the courts: major public issues such as the debate over the *senatus consultum ultimum,* the implications of the Catilinarian movement, or the efforts to restore stable government after the disorders of the mid-50s; intense political contests between Pompey and his detractors; attacks and counterattacks involving allies and opponents of the "triumvirs"; private enmities, familial quarrels, and feuds between houses; personal obligations that influenced lineups for prosecution or defense; the ambitions of the young to reach the limelight by putting their talents on show in a judicial setting. A combination of such incentives and objectives normally characterized criminal trials, which provide a rich harvest of information on the political climate—and also exemplary of the continuities that run through the period.

The subject regularly stimulates discussion. D. F. Epstein, *Personal Enmity in Roman Politics, 218-43 B.C.* (London, 1987), expresses discomfort with complexity (pp. 101-102). His treatment finds a preponderance of private motives and a centrality for *inimicitia* in criminal trials, a useful reminder of how frequently this element recurs. But the examination is highly selective for the cases of the Republic's last generation. David, in his *Le patronat judicaire,* rightly discerns a multiplicity of motives that drove Romans repeatedly into the courts: pursuit of personal or familial feuds, protection of clients, establishment or enhancement of reputation, the inducement of tangible rewards, the carrying out of obligations to more powerful personages. But David's extensive analysis goes well beyond the search for motives. He details the social constraints and the social demands that governed appearances at the bar, as well as the different pressures that influenced types of behavior, styles of presentation, and expressed attitudes,

gestures, and symbolic acts in judicial contests. A noteworthy distinction between the backgrounds of accusers and those of defendants (the former almost always of lesser status) gives important insight into the role played by the expectations of society: eagerness for advancement on the one side, exhibit of prestige and patronage on the other. David further usefully reminds us that the benches of both prosecutor and defendant swelled with supporters and advocates – a means to demonstrate solidarity and strength, that the physical setting of trials encouraged the indirect participation of the broader public, and that even the proximity of monuments underlined the civic meaning of the trials and their continuity with the past. Here again, symbolic features and the display of status afford avenues for further research. Material on judicial activity in the late Republic is now more readily at hand than before. David supplies a most valuable prosopography of all the persons who appeared in judicial cases in the last century and a half of the Republic, providing full testimony, discussion, and rich bibliographical notes. A most serviceable complement to David's assemblage of data appeared independently: a comprehensive listing of trials, organized by case rather than by individual, and with far more attention to legal matters, in M. C. Alexander, *Trials in the Late Roman Republic, 149 B.C. to 30 B.C.* (Toronto, 1990). These will be advantageous springboards for future work.

The role of the populace has drawn increasing attention and a sharper focus in recent years. To what degree did the needs of the commons divide public sentiments, stimulate *popularis* activity, and generate resistance in the nobility? L. Perelli's *Il movimento populare nell' ultimo secolo della repubblica* (Torino, 1982) portrays a relatively consistent contest between champions of popular interests, however sincere or insincere their motives, and a conservative opposition, at least from the time of the Gracchi. This was no simplistic class struggle in Marxist terms, nor was it a mere battle between reformist and reactionary wings of the senate. A range of issues, recurrent and serious, helped to define a popular movement that reflected genuine stirrings in the *populus Romanus:* increase in the power of assemblies and tribunes, a broadening of the electoral system, extension of the franchise, food subsidies, distribution of land and colonial settlements. Perelli's analysis extends to identification of a complex constituency for this popular tide: a principal base in the dislocated and underemployed rural dwellers, augmented by an urban component that consisted not so much of the "proletariate" as of shopkeepers, small merchants, indebted workers, freedmen, and migrants from the countryside without previous ties to the nobility. The dichotomy of *optimates* and *populares* applies then not to political parties but to divergent positions on the desirability of reform to meet the needs of various groups and levels of society. The "triumvirs" rode the popular tide for a time – Catiline only partially and temporarily, Caesar more consistently, and Clodius more intensely. A clear and vivid picture emerges. But the reductive schematism tends to flatten out frictions within the ruling orders themselves. That drawback

exists as well in Schneider's *Wirtschaft und Politik,* a fuller but even starker presentation of conflict between the privileged class and the oppressed poor—a picture repeated in his broader study, *Die Entstehung der römischen Militärdiktatur: Kriese und Niedergang einer antiken Republik* (Köln, 1977). P. Garnsey, *Famine and Food Supply in the Greco-Roman World* (Cambridge, 1988), 198-217, underlines the vulnerability of the *plebs* to grain shortages produced by warfare, piracy, natural calamities, or speculation. Their plight also prompted political struggles and popular advocates, as well as persistent conservative reaction. For Garnsey, any efforts by conservatives to alleviate the situation can only have been designed to deter radical measures and upheaval. Cf. also G. Rickman, *The Corn Supply of Ancient Rome* (Oxford, 1980), 48-58, 166-175.

Vanderbroeck provides a more intricate reconstruction in his *Popular Leadership and Collective Behavior.* He discerns levels of leadership reshaped in the late Republic to mobilize popular opinion and to galvanize collective action. Vanderbroeck meticulously examines the variety of means through which popular sentiments might be elicited and expressed, the forms of communication between the elite and the commons, the symbols and images employed, the organizational structures, and the strategies. A fundamental shift took place in the late Republic, on Vanderbroeck's assessment: vertical ties between patrons and clients loosened as a consequence of population increase, and the slippage of previous channels of intimate communication led to the emergence of a "public clientele" that looked to popular leaders—a more independent, more diverse, and more volatile collectivity. At the same time, however, and most interestingly, Vanderbroeck recognizes that this transformation occurred within a traditional structure. Popular leaders shared the ideology of their peers and produced no innovations in the existing power relations. They employed conventional slogans and built on preexisting organizations. Even the shift in patron-client bonds retained the expectation of mutual responsibilities, only increasing the distance between leader and constituency, and elevating the traditional relationship to a broader, national level. The spokesmen of the *plebs* had no revolutionary aims but rather sought to enhance their own prominence within the conventional structure. Whatever one makes of Vanderbroeck's thesis, his appendix, which assembles all instances of collective behavior in the late Republic, with summary description, sources, and outcome, provides an eminently convenient resource. The recent study of the *plebs* by B. Kühnert, *Die Plebs Urbana der späten römischen Republik: ihre ökonomische Situation und soziale Struktur* (Innsbruck, 1991), dispels some common misconceptions and offers some salutary reminders. The *plebs,* as she rightly recognizes, constituted no monolithic mass; it comprised individuals engaged in a diverse range of occupations and differentiated by socioeconomic conditions, including some who might have attained substantial wealth. She reargues with conviction a number of useful points that have had inadequate acknowledgment in the literature: that the city contained relatively

few refugees from the countryside, that the proportion of *libertini* among the *plebs urbana* may have been exaggerated by some scholars, that indebtedness was not a significant problem among urban dwellers, and that neither grain distributions nor bribery nor a combination thereof could have sufficed to sustain the welfare of the *plebs.* Although none of the positions is altogether novel, Kühnert supplies a compact and cogent discussion.

The most effective mobilizer of the *plebs,* of course, was P. Clodius Pulcher. He is now receiving his due as scholarly treatments continue to multiply. Perelli recognized the comprehensive character of his *popularis* program. Vanderbroeck regards him as the most efficient organizer of popular opinion, the one Roman political innovator who created effective channels of communication between a leader and his public clientele. A more detailed, though often speculative, analysis of Clodius's mechanisms for structuring and activating his followers to deliver maximum impact in civic affairs appears in J. M. Flambard, *MEFRA,* 89 (1977), 115-156. The subject obtains fuller study in H. Benner, *Die Politik des P. Clodius Pulcher: Untersuchungen zur Denaturierung des Clientelwesens in der ausgehenden römischen Republik* (Stuttgart, 1987). On Benner's hypothetical reconstruction, Clodius modelled the structure of his popular retinue upon the military *clientelae* of dynasts like Marius, Sulla, and Pompey. The argument is designed to account for the marshalling of what one might characterize as paramilitary forces, constituted for the purpose of organized violence.

Clodius, on any reckoning, counts as a central figure in all discussions of violence in the late Republic. Perelli endeavors to absolve him of blame, seeing a resort to force as a reaction to the violence first employed by Clodius's opponents. Benner sees a somewhat reverse development: Clodius gradually abandoned violent tactics after his tribunate and turned to broader methods of courting popular favor. The impact of violence itself has received an important reassessment now by W. Nippel, *Aufruhr und "Polizei" in der römischen Republik* (Stuttgart, 1988). Nippel decisively refutes the common notion that absence of a police force allowed violence to get out of hand and erode the authority of the state. In fact, social and political stability and flexible institutions allowed the structure to discourage and absorb acts of violence without threatening its foundation. Perpetrators of violence could also find justification through appeal to tradition and history. Nippel's intelligent treatment of Clodius is particularly illuminating. The tribune eschewed violence in the passage of his measures, for they stirred widespread enthusiasm among the *plebs.* And the subsequent use of force represented not lawlessness but significant symbolic activity, adopting the forms and rituals of antique folk-justice, an analysis that also sheds important light on the violence of Clodius's supporters after his death. These very findings, however, stand in tension with Nippel's own conclusion that state authority had broken down in the 50s and that Pompey's sole consulship of 52 signified the

collapse of traditional means of maintaining order. The inference remains unproved. And one might still consider the proposition of *LGRR* that the reluctance of the officialdom to stamp out violence acknowledged an outlet for urban dissent that did not threaten the fabric of society.

A far greater threat loomed in the army. The part played by soldiers in weakening the hold of the oligarchy, shifting loyalties from the state to individual commanders, and setting the stage for military dictatorship has long been a staple in interpretations of the Republic's fall. *LGRR* questioned some of the standard presuppositions. The idea of a gradual professionalization of the army since the Marian reforms does not easily meet the facts. Most of the rank and file served only limited terms in the forces, preferring a temporary tour of duty and hoping for some enhancement of economic status after their return. Senior officers, and indeed many junior officers, reckoned time with the military as a stage in one's political career, not an alternative to it. Nor did allegiance to the *res publica* erode while soldiers tied themselves to generals who could promise the benefactions that the state denied them. In fact, even the most successful *imperatores* did not receive—and probably could not expect—enduring loyalties from veterans on the domestic front. Nothing suggests that the soldiery had developed a separatist mentality, let alone that they contemplated toppling the Republic. Even those who crossed the Rubicon responded to appeals on constitutional grounds. Positions taken on these matters in *LGRR* owed much to Brunt's important study, "Army and the Land in the Roman Revolution," subsequently republished in revised form, with updated notes, in *The Fall of the Roman Republic,* 240-280. Brunt argues forcefully that the bulk of military recruits came from the *plebs rustica,* peasants, tenants, and agricultural laborers for whom the acquisition of land after discharge was a preeminent goal, although he perhaps undervalues the possibility that urban dwellers may have had comparable goals. The composition of the post-Marian armies, in Brunt's analysis, did not differ markedly from the past, nor had Rome developed a dual structure of standing armies and emergency forces. Neither personal attachment to generals nor professionalization characterized the late Republican military. Soldiers enlisted to better their economic circumstances, and, in particular, had a yen for land. That reconstruction remains a cogent one.

The subject of the army in the Republic's last generation has sparked no dramatic scholarly turns of late. Two noteworthy German dissertations appeared around the time of *LGRR:* E. H. Erdmann, *Die Rolle des Heeres in der Zeit von Marius bis Caesar* (Neustadt/Aisch, 1972), and H. Aigner, *Die Soldaten als Machtfaktor in der ausgehenden römischen Republik* (Innsbruck, 1974). Each provides a welcome catalogue of actions by the late Republican army outside the battlefield. But the evidence prompts them to divergent conclusions. For Erdmann, the Marian reforms divided army from citizenry. The post-Marian soldiery had be-

come a professional force and, as such, no mere tool of individual commanders. Support by the troops for their *imperator*'s political ends came only when he advanced *their* interests. Aigner arrived at somewhat different verdicts. He found no move toward professionalism, nor any developing bonds of clientage between general and soldiers. Men enlisted for purely economic motives, feeling little sense of allegiance either to their commander or to the *res publica*. They eschewed politics, aiming only for enrichment. Both books, while assembling valuable material, incline to reductive analysis. Land assignations and colonial foundations for veterans receive treatment in H.-C. Schneider, *Das Problem der Veteranversorgung in der späteren römischen Republik* (Bonn, 1977). The frequency of such measures in the late Republic implies, as he recognizes, that most soldiers came from the Italian countryside, sought property as veterans, and had not embraced a professional mentality – although a trend toward career service had emerged. The *imperatores* who sponsored or backed land allocations – with the possible exception of Julius Caesar – did so to appease troops and win their adherence for political ends, rather than to provide enduring socioeconomic reform. And, in fact, the land distributions did not notably raise the economic levels of the veterans. Nor indeed did they do much for the social mobility and political involvement of the ex-soldiers, a point reaffirmed now by J. Patterson, in J. Rich and G. Shipley, *War and Society in the Roman World* (London, 1993), 92-112. The analysis is a cynical but sober one. In a recent study, L. de Blois, *The Roman Army and Politics in the First Century* B.C. (Amsterdam, 1987), unfortunately reverts to a number of conventional positions. His reconstruction has professionalism in the ascendant by the first century B.C., not only in the rank and file but in much of the officer corps, with political grandees as commanders who obtained the personal loyalties of their forces. The result was a split both in the ruling orders and, in society at large, between those committed to a civilian existence and the military careerists. In de Blois's formulation, a decline in "political culture" left the citizenry vulnerable to the army as traditional bonds of *clientela* yielded to the ad hoc allegiance of armies to warlords. De Blois cites all the relevant literature – but seems largely unaffected by it.

The question of continuity or crisis holds center stage in *LGRR*. It emerges at the very outset of the period under scrutiny. The death of Sulla, on the conventional view, issued in a decade of challenges to his system, both internal and external, culminating in a number of reforms that ostensibly caused the Sullan settlement to unravel and heralded the breakdown of the aristocratic order. *LGRR* took a different line: the Sullan senate embraced many of the reforms itself, and it adjusted and shifted to address public concerns and respond to challenges; the advocates of change sought to advance within the system, not to overturn it. That analysis found little favor with Perelli, *Il movimento populare*, 159-171, who revived the portrait of the 70s as a battleground between Sullani and *populares*, with Pompey carrying a popular banner to triumph over the Sullan

system. But the sense of broader concord and a more flexible attitude operating within the traditional structure has been acknowledged by a number of recent studies; e.g., T. N. Mitchell, *Cicero: The Ascending Years* (New Haven, 1979), 107-133; J. Paterson, in T. P. Wiseman, *Roman Political Life, 90 B.C.-A.D. 69* Exeter, 1985), 21-43; B. Marshall–J. L. Beness, *Athenaeum,* 65 (1987), 361-378; T. P. Hillman, *Hermes,* 118 (1990), 444-454. Not that one can discern a consensus–especially when Brunt pronounces that in 70 B.C. "the Sullan system was now in ruins" (*Fall of the Roman Republic,* 472). But a more nuanced picture has taken hold in much of the scholarship.

Events leading to the rupture between Caesar and Pompey and the outbreak of civil war have engendered books and articles by the dozens–but surprisingly little in the past twenty years. *LGRR* endeavored to highlight the contingent character of those events. The dynasts were not hurled into contention by inexorable destiny or purposeful calculation. Neither Caesar nor Pompey desired the split, let alone open warfare. Collaboration continued almost to the end of the decade of the 50s, with the break prompted by others than the principals, a feature of standard senatorial infighting rather than a drive for civil war. Propaganda and pretexts overwhelmed reasoned judgment at the end, and mutual distrust sabotaged negotiations. A convergence of unanticipated circumstances occasioned the calamity. Such an interpretation had not previously attracted many advocates, but the time was evidently ripe. Two other works appeared almost simultaneously with, and independently of, *LGRR.* K. Raaflaub, *Dignitatis Contentio* (Munich, 1974), explored with great subtlety the presentations and justifications put forward by the contending parties before and during the war. He too sought to lift blame off the shoulders of the principal antagonists, stressing the reluctance of each to come to blows–although he does place a heavy load of responsibility upon the "Ultras" headed by Cato, who were prepared to push the conflict into conflagration. Raaflaub's analysis, however, underlines the seriousness and meaningfulness of negotiations down to the Rubicon and beyond. Rather than a hardening of positions, he recognizes the remarkable variety of options that remained open down to the end. D. L. Stockton, *Historia,* 24 (1975), 232-259, working from a different angle, reached similar conclusions: tensions between Caesar and Pompey did not rise until late in the game, triggered by unforeseen circumstances in Gaul and misunderstandings in Rome, not by a determined drive for confrontation. The point was more recently reaffirmed by H. Botermann, *Historia,* 38 (1989), 410-430, who directs attention to Cicero's ruminations as late as the end of December 50, sketching several possible scenarios that might resolve the situation short of military conflict. Misapprehensions played a larger role in bringing about civil war than did the intentions of the individuals or the iron grip of events.

The "fall of the Republic" exercises unbroken fascination upon scholars and students alike. The Republic's failings and the reasons for its collapse are repeat-

edly excogitated and analyzed. *LGRR* had a different orientation. Its objective was not to search for the weaknesses that brought about the Republic's fall but to examine the practices and conventions that kept it going for so long. Transformation of the state into a monarchical regime can be laid to the charge of a devastating civil war, rather than to the putative disintegration of institutions and morale in the previous decades.

A comparable orientation marks the important and much discussed *Res Publica Amissa* by C. Meier, first published in 1966 and reissued in 1980 with a new introduction that rephrased his conclusions in an even more abstract and theoretical form. Meier too endeavors to elicit the structures and conditions that held the Republic together and postponed its demise. Prominent among them was a complex network of mutual obligations and shared commitments to a sociopolitical system that went unquestioned. The very constellation of elements, however, that sustained the Republic, according to Meier, paradoxically, inevitably, and unwittingly worked toward its demise. The reason for this, in Meier's view, was that when crisis came, no one could conceive or contemplate any alternative system to the Republic. The theme of "Krise ohne Alternative" pervades his work. But the "crisis" itself seems to resist clear articulation. Meier's reformulation in 1980 sees its dynamic as a struggle between the oligarchy and the "great individuals." The growing crisis developed without intentions on any side to topple the Republic, for no other constitutional option was even thinkable. The system resisted any serious change. Efforts at reform only hardened it in place. The very idea of a new order never emerged; the upper classes were incapable of imagining it, the lower classes incapable of building it. The old order was destroyed, without ever having been rejected. Meier's paradoxes, even when not fully comprehensible, stimulate productive thinking.

The concept of "crisis" remains elusive, not by any means clarified by Meier's book. Nor indeed, despite its title, by K. Christ's survey of the later republic in *Krise und Untergang der römischen Republik* (Darmstadt, 1979). Christ restates a number of standard interpretations of the Republic's ruin: the incapacity of a city-state to govern an empire, the growth of client armies, the contest between the Sullan oligarchy and the "triumvirs" who aimed to undermine traditional senatorial rule, the radicalization of urban politics by Clodius, the failure of the nobility to resolve the state's social and economic difficulties. The book offers a lucid representation of the *communis opinio* on the problems and deficiencies of the Republic. But the notion of "crisis" receives no real analysis.

Debate proceeded in the journals over whether the Republic suffered a "crisis" or a "revolution," or some combination of the two. The idea of a "Roman revolution," which stemmed from Mommsen and gained wider notoriety from Syme, has now generally and rightly been judged as inapplicable or anachronistic in treating the experience of the late Republic. Yet in various forms it con-

tinues to crop up in discussions. K. E. Petzold, *RSA,* 2 (1972), 229-243, discerned both a crisis and a revolution, the first prompting the second, though without deliberate intent or inevitable result. U. Hackl, *RSA,* 9 (1979), 95-103, shrank from the term "revolution," preferring instead "revolutionary situation"—which does not help much. The usefulness of the term "crisis" is questioned too by K. Bringmann, *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht,* 31 (1980), 354-377. And even the old chestnut, owing its original formulation to Montesquieu, that imperial responsibilities created intolerable burdens for the city-state, seemed an inadequate tool for understanding, as properly pointed out by J. Molthagen, in I. Geiss and R. Tamchina, *Ansichten einer künftigen Geschichtswissenschaft* (Munich, 1974), 34ff. A useful review of opinions can be found in R. Rilinger, *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte,* 64 (1982), 279-306, and in J. Ungern-Sternberg, *MH,* 39 (1982), 254-271. Both revert in modified form to a connection between Roman expansionism abroad and the disruption of internal concord. For Rilinger, the creation of overseas *clientelae* and military *clientelae* upset traditional bonds at home, without the substitution of enduring relationships, thereby loosening the structure. And Ungern-Sternberg postulated that the tremendous power wielded by the Roman nobility over imperial holdings rendered them even more impervious to needed internal reform and change—a recipe for crisis. Imperial expansion also supplies a key element in the analysis of Brunt, *Fall of the Roman Republic,* 68-92. He approves Sallust's verdict that the elimination of foreign danger undermined harmony at home, exacerbating divisions between rich and poor. The senate's neglect of social ills and the claims of the poor spawned disloyalty among the army's rank and file and alienated almost all segments of Roman society. The long shadow cast by the civil strife of the 80s left a legacy of tension from which Rome could not escape. And the string of great military commands by the dynasts issued in civil war and the collapse of traditional authority. These and like propositions have all been adumbrated before. None can claim the status of a definitive solution. And controversy over phraseology like "crisis" or "revolution" sheds little light. The search for explanations of the Republic's fall continues to entice—and to tantalize—the seekers.

The proposals advanced by *LGRR* have hardly swept the field. But many of them have stimulated salutary debate as well as sharp dissent, and some have even survived. As an eminent scholar predicted in a critical but balanced review twenty years ago, "I do not think that G's extensive onslaught will capture the citadel of *communis opinio,* though it will certainly leave its mark on parts of the perimeter." (D. R. Shackleton Bailey, *AJP,* 46 [1975], 436-443). A fair forecast.

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