Chapter One

Change Without a Blueprint

J. Michael Quinlan, federal director of prisons, was a worried man. Eight days into a major riot, there were no signs that the situation was about to ease or that more than one hundred hostages would be released unharmed. The prisoners’ cause, meanwhile, was gaining ground. They had rigged a public address system on top of the prison walls to broadcast their demands and talk to relatives. Prisoners’ wives and mothers huddled in tents just outside the penitentiary, not far from the families of the hostages. Neither group wanted violence. A busload of prisoners’ relatives had just arrived in Washington, D.C., to intercede with the attorney general on behalf of those inside.

More vexing to federal officials were the rioters’ demands. Everyone agreed that conditions inside the prison were intolerable and that many had been detained for years without due process. Neither of these facts, however, sparked the rebellion. Rather, the prisoners revolted when they heard they would be released, in order to be sent out of the country. The receiving nation’s government had assured U.S. authorities that no reprisals would be taken against the deportees, which made the latter’s attitude even more extraordinary.

Quinlan had a trump card in his favor should the impasse turn to armed violence, and that was the solid support shown by the public for the government and against the rebellious foreigners. That support was apparent everywhere—everywhere, that is, but in one city. There the rioters’ demands not to be deported struck a responsive chord. Previously dismissed as “scum,” the prisoners,
with their sorry living conditions and their endless sentences, had elicited little concern in the past, but when they declared that they would rather die than go home, their compatriots in Miami claimed them as their own. While the rest of the country prayed for the safety of the hostages, in this one city the masses and the rosaries were performed for the sake of the captors and their plight.

For Quinlan and his men, time was running out. Public patience was wearing thin as day after fruitless day of negotiations passed, making the authorities look ever more impotent. Then the rioters voiced a new demand: they wanted to see someone who would vouch for their safety after they surrendered. They did not ask for the attorney general of the United States or any other important Washington official; rather, they requested an obscure priest from the place where the masses were being said in their behalf.

Monsignor Agustín Román, auxiliary bishop of Miami, is an unpretentious little man. White-haired, with a slight frame, he was an incongruous figure next to the burly prison officials. His presence, however, accomplished what the federal authorities had been unable to. Román’s message to the rebelling Mariel prisoners in Oakdale and in Atlanta began “Dear brothers,” and ended with a plea that they demonstrate to the world “Christian good will.” Behind the pious rhetoric, the message said this: You belong to us and we will not abandon you. A few hours later, the 1987 Mariel prison riots were history.¹

Appeals by the downtrodden to fellow ethnics are not uncommon—ethnic group sympathies, after all, often flow in directions contrary to those of the mainstream. Yet events after 1987 demonstrated that Miami was indeed unique in the extent to which contrasting worldviews existed and were superimposed on each other.

On January 24, 1990, former policeman William Lozano stood before a packed Miami courtroom awaiting sentence on two counts of manslaughter. A month earlier, he had been convicted of shooting and killing Black motorcyclist Clement Lloyd and his passenger in a desolate street of the Overtown ghetto. Lloyd had disobeyed an order to stop and raced in the direction of the officer, who felled him with a single shot. The event triggered two nights of arson and looting, put down only by massive police force and the mayor’s promise that justice would be done. When Lozano received a
seven-year sentence for manslaughter, the community breathed a sigh of relief—no rioting this time. Black Miami was reassured that police killings would no longer occur with impunity. Clement Lloyd’s relatives complained about the light sentence but pronounced themselves satisfied about the verdict. As one of them put it, “At least Lozano is a known criminal now.”

To protect himself from the vindictive mood of Black Miami, Lozano hired one of the city’s best criminal attorneys. As his legal debts mounted, the now unemployed policeman appeared to have reached the end of the rope. He had one advantage, though. Among his fellow Colombians and much of the Latin population Lozano was seen, if not exactly as a hero, at least as a victim and scapegoat. His first public broadcast over Miami Cuban radio netted $150,000 in contributions; subsequent appeals produced substantial amounts as well. The fact that Lozano was “a known criminal” did not seem to lessen him in the eyes of his fellow Latins. Thanks to their contributions, he was able to retain a high-powered defense team.

On June 25, 1991, two and a half years after the shooting, the Third Florida District Court of Appeals threw out Lozano’s sentence and ordered a new trial. The original judge had dismissed all motions for a change of venue with the argument that in this metropolitan area of two million people an impartial jury could be found. The appellate court disagreed. The people of Miami were in fact too sharply divided over Lozano’s fate—some ready to lynch him, others providing financial support for his cause—to leave space for a fair trial.²

Since its beginnings at the start of the century, American urban sociology has focused on a few themes that repeat themselves with uncanny regularity. Stripped of their academic garb, these themes reflect the perennial preoccupations of the urban citizenry: Who really rules? How can local elites be made more accountable to their fellow citizens? What explains the plight of ethnic minorities? How can conflict be resolved? Students of urban life have attempted to provide answers to these and other questions and, in the process, have created a rich imagery of what the American city is all about. It is useful to review some of these images, for they form the backdrop against which the above events and those de-
scribed in the following pages can be understood. Their significance is not that they help account for the course of events in Miami, but precisely that they fit the story so awkwardly.

Community Power

The question "Who rules the city?" has led to an elaborate literature and to the development of complex methods for understanding the true character of urban power. Spearheaded in the 1940s and into the 1960s by such scholars as Floyd Hunter, Robert Dahl, and C. Wright Mills, the basic controversy centered on whether the "business class" was the sole arbiter of local decision-making or whether other groups also had a say in urban affairs. Crucial among the latter were public officials, often elected on the voting strength of ethnic minority blocks. Were such elected officials part of the "real" power structure, or were they merely window dressing to cover the actions of the true movers and shakers? "Pluralism" and "elitism" became the accepted labels in this long-running controversy.³

More recently, the elitist position has expanded to embrace analysis of the urban "growth machine." Proponents of this view, notably Harvey Molotch and John Logan, portray the growth machine as a confabulation of property capitalists bent on profiting from their control of urban amenities and scarce urban space. Techniques include manipulation of zoning ordinances and other tricks to render empty land valuable or to redefine the use of built spaces. Hence it is not "business" in general, but the business of creating profits out of locational advantage, that determines the pattern of urban growth.⁴

Locals and Cosmopolitans

In a 1946 report to the U.S. Senate, C. Wright Mills raised a related issue, namely whether cities suffered when their economies became dominated by outside interests. Mills denounced footloose corporate capitalism that extracted resources but provided little to the community in return. In lieu of "branch" capitalism, Mills proposed to the Congress a program to revitalize local business on the theory that community-based enterprises were more egalitar-
ian and more responsive to local welfare. Critics called Mills’s position retrograde; the growth of the American economy, they said, required the emergence of powerful multicentric corporations, and they produced an array of studies to demonstrate that corporate executives could be just as civic-minded as locals, and often more effectively so.\(^5\) With variations, this debate between advocates of “cosmopolitan” versus “local” economic control endures today.

**Ethnicity and Assimilation**

It was ethnicity, however, that emerged as the fundamental leitmotiv of American urban sociology. Indeed, it could not have been otherwise, given a citizenry molded by successive waves of immigration, each different in many ways from earlier ones. The themes of social power and social class on which Hunter, Mills, and other classics focused became increasingly intertwined with those of race, language, and culture. The fundamental controversy about ethnicity was whether racial and cultural markers were tied to class position and hence disappear with upward mobility or whether they represent a separate and autonomous dimension of social structure. The first position was eloquently argued by W. Lloyd Warner and his associates on the basis of their massive study of “Yankee City” (Newburyport, Massachusetts). Writing in the 1940s, Warner captured the differences that he and his students observed in social prestige and social recognition in a sixfold classification of “class.” Classes in Yankee City ranged from the white Protestant “upper-upper” elite and mostly white “lower-upper” professionals to the largely ethnic “upper-lower” strata of factory workers and the “lower-lower” skid row population.\(^6\)

An “ethnic,” in Warner’s theory, was someone who by reason of culture or race was outside the community’s mainstream and considered himself or herself or was considered by others to belong to a distinct subsociety. Ethnics concentrated in the bottom rungs of the social structure—the lower middle and lower classes—depending on their work skills and length of local residence. Climbing the social ladder required that one join the cultural mainstream, but even fully acculturated minorities might not prove acceptable to the “upper-upper” brahmins who controlled the prestige hierar-
chy. Warner and Leo Srole identified skin color (race), language, and religion as the fundamental criteria of elite acceptance: the more similar ethnic groups are, along these dimensions, to those occupying positions of prestige and power in the community, the faster their assimilation. Race was the most important factor, followed by language and then religion. The combined operation of these factors within the urban population led to an ethnic class hierarchy that also predicted the expected speed of assimilation. Figure 1 reproduces Warner and Srole’s hierarchy of ethnicity and the consequent pecking order in Yankee City.

In the 1940s and 1950s, it seemed reasonable to assume that all “ethnics” wished to and would follow the path of assimilation. By the sixties, that story had become open to doubt. Several authors pointed to the presence of “unmelted ethnics,” for whom no amount of acculturation appeared sufficient to gain them acceptance into the urban mainstream. Others noted how distinct cultural traits endured through the generations thanks to strong group institutions and the unwillingness of certain minorities to lose their identity. Often such resilient ethnicity was displayed even after a group had moved significantly upward in the economic hierarchy. Focusing on these exceptions, Nathan Glazer, Daniel P. Moynihan, and Andrew Greeley questioned the earlier assumptions and suggested that the American city was not really a “melting pot” where minorities would sooner or later lose their identities and join the mainstream, but rather a “social mosaic” where ethnic-based solidarities persisted across generations.

With the passage of time, the intertwined themes of power, class, race, and ethnicity and the associated controversies came to define how students of urban life thought about the American city. Although the answers given by “pluralists” and “elitists,” “locals” and “cosmopolitans,” and “melting pot” versus “social mosaic” advocates differed, the questions remained consistent: Who really governs? How does outside business control affect civic welfare? Why are ethnic minorities outside the social mainstream? What would it take to change their situation? The search for answers gave rise over time to a methodological repertoire—a tool kit—that researchers carried from city to city and applied in a more or less standardized fashion.
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Researchers approaching modern Miami with the same time-honored ideas and the same methodological tools, however, would be in for a shock. Although the city is in the United States, it does not resemble in the slightest the models of Yankee City and other urban classics. Nor does it fit very well more recent descriptions of a "social mosaic" composed of established ethnic groups that maintain certain elements of their culture under the hegemonic umbrella of a white Protestant elite. In Miami, the fragments of the mosaic are loose and do not come together in any familiar pattern. Consider the following reversals vis-à-vis traditional American urban life:

1. While the "business class" does exercise undisputable control in governing the city, it is composed increasingly of recent immigrants, rather than exclusively of "old" families or corporate "branch" executives. This is particularly true in the case of the "growth machine" created by foreign-born builders and developers.

2. The clash between local and outside corporate control occurs, but in Miami the proliferating local small businesses are owned mostly by immigrants, while the corporate "branch" offices are American-owned. Many of the latter are there not to produce goods for the domestic market but to sell services to other foreigners, often through the mediation of the local immigrant-owned firms.

3. There is no mainstream. The hegemony of the old "upper-uppers" has given way to parallel social structures, each complete with its own status hierarchy, civic institutions, and cultural life. As a result, economic mobility and social standing have ceased to depend on full acculturation or on pleasing the elites of the old class order.

4. The overlap of parallel social systems in the same physical space has given rise to acculturation in reverse—a process by which foreign customs, institutions, and language are diffused within the native population. As a consequence, biculturalism has emerged as an alternative adaptive project to full assimilation into American culture. Opponents of biculturalism, immigrants and natives alike, must either withdraw into their own diminished circles or exit the community.
The existence of these parallel social structures is what underlay the Mariel prisoners' call for Bishop Román rather than Attorney General Meese to act as guarantor of their fate. Their move would have been inconceivable had their coethnics in Miami occupied the role assigned to them by Warner and other classic authors on community power. For that matter, the very fact that Mariel refugees were in American prisons at all is explainable only in terms of the unusual process of change that had overtaken South Florida before their arrival.

Competing Discourses

Social facts are not self-intelligible. Their interpretation depends on the cognitive frames in which they are placed, and these in turn are products of prior social interactions. Common meanings are arrived at when relevant audiences agree to stress certain aspects of a given phenomenon and interpret them on the basis of shared past experience. Existing "frames" of what American urban life is like, including those elaborated in the sociological research literature, prove to be of limited utility for rendering events in South Florida understandable. These events represent social change without a blueprint; because they led precisely to the fragmentation of previously held consensual views, it is not surprising that several competing discourses emerged to explain them, each with its own distinct shades of meaning and moral tone. Only in such a context would it be conceivable for William Lozano, convicted felon, to solicit and obtain support from a wide segment of the very city where his alleged crime was committed.

To approach developments in Miami, we first make use of W. I. Thomas's concept of "definition of the situation," a term that highlights how subjective perceptions of reality can influence reality itself. In our view, definitions of the situation comprise (a) a frame of reference embodying one or more generalized ideas and (b) an "object" that is interpreted in terms of those ideas. Different objects are interrelated by reference to the common frame, giving rise to a perspective, or "discourse," in which apparently disparate aspects of reality are integrated into a meaningful interpretive whole. The difference between Miami and most communities studied by sociologists in the past is that in Miami even everyday
events—not to mention more explosive conflicts between social classes and interest groups—are not necessarily assessed within a common frame of reference, but may be inserted into different, mutually unintelligible, interpretive frameworks.

At present, several perspectives sufficiently broad to provide a coherent account of life in this metropolitan area are identifiable. The most common ones may be labeled the “Anglo cultural reaffirmation,” the “Cuban or pan-Latin success story,” and the “Black double marginality” discourses. By way of illustration, the following excerpts of statements made by community leaders in interviews, addressing four frequent “objects” of debate in Miami, may be taken as typical of each discourse. The statements are drawn from interviews, conducted between 1983 and 1988, with approximately sixty of the most prominent business, political, and religious leaders in the city as a complement to a large survey of the recently arrived immigrant population in the area.11 Three of these “objects”—Miami’s “major problem,” language, and interethnic relations—were posed as questions to all respondents; the fourth—the Miami Herald—emerged spontaneously in several conversations.

**Miami’s Major Problem**

Native white business executive, former chairman of a large local corporation (interviewed in 1987):

You have two levels, one is what is going to happen to the nation as a whole over the next fifty years when the Hispanic population may become over fifty percent of the population; and the other level is the short-term impact of Hispanics in a city like this one. You deal with perceptions because you don’t really know what percentage of the population is making the noise, but you hear the noise, the major noise, the dominant noise, and you are beginning to hear more and more that the Cubans are not interested in integrating into American society, and if that is the case, then that has to be the number-one problem in Miami.

That is a problem because there isn’t a great deal in Caribbean and Latin American cultures that’s going to add anything to democracy at all. And I think there is a good chance that it will detract from it. Cubans really value economic freedom, but there are other freedoms they don’t value.
Cuban businessman, owner of a local factory, emigrated in the early 1960s (1986):

Our most serious problem in Miami is the devaluation of South American currencies because in this city there has been created a large current of business with Central and South America; many properties were built, many apartments were sold, apart from the exports. The devaluations in Venezuela, Mexico, and Brazil paralyzed economic activity in Miami. At the same time, construction of apartments for all those South Americans who wanted to own something here stopped. This is our most serious problem today. Until currencies regain their value and economic tranquility returns to those countries, Miami—which is the key link between the United States and Latin America—will continue to suffer.

Black community activist, director of a social service agency in Liberty City, the major Black area of South Florida (1987):

The real problem in 1987 is that the Blacks have not concluded that they must take control of their destiny. That's the real problem now. But that was not the real problem in 1964. Then, the problem was to remove the shackles of segregation. You had to go through that process in order to get to where we are in 1987. . . . Now, having gone through that process, the final lap is to put everything in perspective, and to ask ourselves what are we going to do about it, because all they have done since 1619 has not been in our interest, but theirs. In order to take charge of its own destiny, this community must simply, selfishly become unabatedly pro-Black.

Case in point: there is something special about Blacks and Revlon beauty care products. We find out that Blacks buy over fifty-one percent of all the beauty care products made in the country. . . . If we are the main consumers in that industry, then the appropriate response is for us to become major producers of that which we consume.

Language

Jewish lawyer, director of the regional branch of a major national Jewish organization (1986):

This is a community like a volcano. . . . A major issue concerns the tensions between native Americans and Hispanics. The focal point is language. There is a very strong "English Only" movement or variations of it. In twenty-five years, close to three hundred thousand Cubans have come here, and many have done very well. The fact is that they have taken over the city both in terms of numbers and economic presence. This has
created a lot of resentment and bitterness in some circles. I think the popularized statement that typified the tension was the bumper sticker that read, "When the last American leaves Miami, please take the flag." That represents the middle- and lower-middle-class feeling about what happened here.

Native white business executive (quoted above with regard to Miami's major problem):

What happens is that in an open store there will be two or three women talking in an incomprehensible language, and people, I think, sometimes just get tired of being surrounded by Spanish. More importantly, there are many, many times when the Cubans know that the people in the room with them don't understand. Like my wife and her hairdresser: she speaks Spanish entirely while she is working on her hair. My son is an absolute linguist, he speaks Portuguese and Spanish fluently. He learned while he was in Rochester, New York, not while he lived in Miami, Florida. It is popular there to be bilingual; it isn't popular in Miami.

Cuban civic activist, head of a multiethnic community organization, emigrated in the early 1960s (1986):

Language has great importance because if an individual owns a store whose clients come from Latin America, he will need bilingual employees. During Christmastime, ninety percent of the stores advertise for bilingual employees. To a person who does not know the language, this situation represents an economic problem because he knows that, unless he knows Spanish, he would not compete successfully in the labor market. This problem is especially important in the Black community, which has the greatest number of unemployed. The young Black knows that it would be much more difficult to secure a job if he does not speak Spanish.

Black owner of a major business in Liberty City, active in the local chamber of commerce (1987):

There is also a growing number of Cuban-owned businesses in Black neighborhoods but they don't hire Blacks. For example, I was in a drugstore a couple of weeks ago and there was a black Cuban lady at one of the cash registers. I went to her and she didn't even want to talk to me. I thought to myself, "Talk to me, if I'm going to leave my money here, you ought to learn how to speak English." They come in our areas, they take our jobs, they take our dollars, and don't even have the decency to learn the language!
Change Without a Blueprint

Interethnic Relations

Native white attorney, partner in a large local law firm (1987):

The problem of Blacks in Miami is very serious. But my feeling is that the Black population is so relatively small in number that I am not sure it’s on anybody’s agenda. . . . The number of Hispanics is so overwhelming that the contest is over. I mean there is competition, there is tension, there is concern in the Black community. But Cubans are so well entrenched, so large in numbers, that it’s not an issue anymore.

Now, there is another big problem worth investigating: the concept of giving in the Latin community. One of the problems that FIU [Florida International University] has had is that [former president] Wolfe couldn’t raise any money. So what did we do? The power structure and the Cubans said, “Let’s go get ourselves a good old Cuban boy.” Let’s see whether old Maidique [Cuban-born, U.S.-educated president of FIU], President Mitch, can demonstrate that he can raise dollars from the Latin community. If he can’t raise dollars, in my book he’s failed.

There is a lot of work that needs to be done in teaching the concept of philanthropy within the Latin community. The Cubans have been here over twenty years, they have made great economic strides, the kids play football and baseball, they go to the operas, they do all these things; why not give more to the community?

Cuban businessman (quoted above with regard to Miami’s major problem):

Relations between the different ethnic communities in Miami are normal as in any democratic country. Ethnic differences do not interfere at all in commercial relations. As to community activities, each one works in the place he or she prefers. There are persons who like to work in the United Way; and there is the Liga contra el cancer [League Against Cancer, a charity founded in Havana], which everyone joins to work for a good cause.

Perhaps, the most affected relations could be those between Cubans and Blacks, in the sense that Blacks are less trained as entrepreneurs, but I do not believe that there is an extraordinary friction. Our chief accountant was Black, a great Black, but right now there are no American Blacks working in our company. When we arrived from Cuba and opened our small business, the situation was like this: when a shipment arrived in customs, we would go to a corner and there would be ten, fifteen, twenty Blacks standing waiting for work. We picked them up so that they would
unload our boxes, paid them, and returned them to the same place. Today, you don’t see anything like this. I sincerely believe that, in Miami, the person who doesn’t work is because he or she does not want to. Proof: why are so many Haitians now sewing in our factory?

Black attorney, community activist (1987):

Initially, as the Cubans began to be very competitive, as the new banks tended to be Cuban, as the Cubans began to come into the insurance and traditional financial markets where the Jews had played an important role, the issue was no longer Jews against Anglos but one of the survival of the status quo. . . .

Blacks were left behind. Miami is the only city I’ve ever seen where Blacks don’t own a radio station, or a television station, or a car dealership, or a savings and loan, or an insurance company—anything! Blacks here have not only been manipulated out of the mainstream of the power structure, but, more importantly, they have been manipulated out of the economic mainstream of Miami, and when you’re out of the economic mainstream, you’re out of the political arena.

Black community activist (quoted above with regard to Miami’s major problem):

In those days, I said to Cubans in a speech that there was going to be a time when white folks are going to try to treat you all like niggers. They’re going to put you again in your place as they do with all minority groups. But unlike Black Americans, Cubans had no history of being kept in their place, and as a result, they responded differently. We Black folks were saying to white folks, “Let us in.” Cubans were saying to white folks, “Let us in so that we can take over.” Now, in 1987, you hear whites telling us that we should form an alliance with them to keep Cubans in their place. I say, “I’ve had my experience with you all. Don’t tell me now that you and I can buddy-buddy because you’re trying to keep Cubans from doing what is right for their own.”

*The Miami Herald*

Native white executive of Knight-Ridder Corporation, parent company of the *Miami Herald* (1987):

In our business, which is the publishing business, we made a bet during the 1960s that the normal pattern of immigration that this country had seen over many years when ethnic minorities came in in large numbers
and settled in different sections would not be very different here; that within a reasonable number of years, English would become the dominant language. So we made a bet in 1960 that that would occur here in Miami as a large number of Cuban refugees came in following Castro’s takeover. That didn’t happen as fast as we thought it would. We belatedly started in our business a Spanish edition called *El Miami Herald*. It’s a very expensive proposition for us, but it has helped us gain acceptance and circulation in the Hispanic community. We think that it is important to us and important to them that the *Herald* be available in both Spanish and English. We circulate that Spanish section in conjunction with the *Miami Herald*, so that we believe that, by virtue of having the two together, we’ll eventually move back toward the ultimate utilization of English as the primary language.

Cuban bank director, member of the Cuban-American National Foundation, emigrated in the early 1960s (1989):

The conflict between the Cuban community and the *Herald* reached its peak when, after the resignation of one of the directors of the Cuban-American National Foundation, the newspaper started speculating, without basis of fact, about internal divisions in the organization. We decided to write an open letter. Jorge Mas Canosa [president of the foundation] brought a writer from Washington who wrote the letter in an afternoon, and it was published, as a paid announcement, the following day. The *Herald* never expected that we Cubans would do something like that! There was a meeting in which, in fact, we considered organizing a boycott against the newspaper. Richard Capen, the editor, called to complain, but, faced with the threat of a massive boycott, the newspaper relented and has changed course one hundred and eighty degrees in recent months.

We’ve told Capen that it does not matter what the *Nuevo Herald* [the new revamped Spanish edition of the *Miami Herald* created in 1988 after the editors of the earlier version, *El Miami Herald*, resigned over disagreements with the newspaper’s editorial line] publishes because praises to the community which appear there are for Cubans of Calle Ocho [Southwest Eighth Street, the main thoroughfare of Miami’s Little Havana section]. Much more important is what is published in English, which is read nationwide. The *Herald* sometimes plays a double game, publishing articles in English that do not appear in Spanish and vice versa.

Black attorney (quoted above with reference to interethnic relations):
The *Miami Herald* runs a lot of negative stories about Miami. Initially, I think that a few personalities of the *Herald*’s senior management saw the job of the newspaper as to be truthful even if it destroyed the city. They have been extremely misguided. At the same time, they have been a very positive force in Miami. As positive as they can be, they can also be wrong. Traditionally, like all the rest of the downtown primarily old-Anglo establishment, the *Herald* assumed that the Cubans would go away; if they didn’t assume it, they at least hoped they would, and so they ignored them. They must have thought, "They’re here and we have to live with them, but maybe the Castro government will be overthrown and we’ll send them back there.” They didn’t understand that the history of every group that has come to America is that *nobody* ever goes back home.

Different frames, different definitions of the situation. Discourses that do not clash directly, but rather slide past each other as if moving on different planes. Clearly, the arrival of the “three hundred thousand Cubans” over twenty-five years was the key event that ruptured the traditional worldview in this southern American city. But such an interpretation does not suffice. There are more Latins in Los Angeles and New York than in Miami, yet those cities never experienced a similar transformation. There, immigrants “know their place” and do not challenge the established social hierarchy or the fundamental shared definitions. As for Blacks, African-American communities in other cities are neither as powerless nor as militant when they revolt. It is as if the parallel social structures and definitions that were created by the arrival of the Cubans simultaneously pushed Blacks into double subordination and opened space for them to revitalize the discourse about civil and human rights.

Everywhere one turns in Miami, this fragmentation of the old standard frame produces oddities, mostly comic but at times poignant and even tragic: the young Black waitress in the airport bar serving *café cubano* to Canadian tourists; the Carnival of Miami, which is really the old Havana *Carnaval*; the city bracing itself for the next, fully expected riot as a jury debates the fate of a police officer. These everyday facts of life have gained the attention of outsiders who have written insightfully about Miami’s paradoxes. While other large Latin communities in East Los Angeles or the Bronx go unsung and unnoticed, Miami has attracted the attention
of several prominent American literati. Joan Didion, for example, had this to say about the native white establishment in 1987: "This set of mind, in which the local Cuban community was seen as a civic challenge to be determinedly met, was not uncommon among Anglos to whom I talked in Miami, many of whom persisted in the related illusions that the city was small, manageable, prosperous in a predictable broad-based way, southern in a progressive sunbelt way, American, and belonged to them."12 And David Rieff highlighted one of the many local peculiarities: "At the edge of Coral Gables, I noticed a sign advertising, 'The Caballero Funeral Home, Founded 1858.' Miami, of course, did not exist in 1858 and I realized with a start that the owners meant founded in Havana in 1858. It is as if Cuban Miami recapitulates all the particles of prerevolutionary Havana with, of course, the exception of the left."13

Drug running, the periodic Black riots, Mariel, the stark beauty of the city—all have been extensively chronicled in books, articles, films, and "Miami Vice." But after each colorful snippet, the question remains: How did it happen? How could a large American city be transformed so quickly that its natives often chose to emigrate north in search of a more familiar cultural setting? How could an immigrant group, especially one coming from the Third World, reproduce its institutions so thoroughly that a parallel social structure was established? At what point did acculturation in reverse begin? And, perhaps most important, where will this process of change without a blueprint lead?

For answers, one must look back, first at 1980, a year still fresh in people's minds, and then at the deep and unappreciated roots of the city in the Caribbean.