Introduction

E. Valentine Daniel and John Chr. Knudsen

From its inception the experience of a refugee puts trust on trial. The refugee mistrusts and is mistrusted. In a profound sense, one becomes a refugee even before fleeing the society in which one lives and continues to be a refugee even after one receives asylum in a new place among a new people. The process of the breakdown of trust may range from a breach of faith between ethnic communities in a multiethnic nation that were once committed to upholding a multiethnic democratic state in the abstract as in Sri Lanka (see Daniel and Thangaraj this volume) to events far more immediate, as when a Cambodian girl unwittingly betrays her grandmother to the Khmer Rouge by telling her captors that she had read stories to her, revealing thereby her grandmother's literacy and, ergo, making her into an "enemy" of the people, deserving extermination (Sheehy 1987). The event or set of events that triggers a person's decision to become a refugee is the radical disjunction between this person's familiar *way-of-being* in the world and a new reality of the sociopolitical circumstances that not only threatens that way-of-being but also forces one to *see* the world differently. The crisis that precipitates the refugee status is at once personal and social, and therefore it is a crisis that pursues the refugee well into his or her life in the country in which he or she seeks asylum. Such crises of being are invariably accompanied by the erosion of trust.

By "trust," we do not intend a largely conscious state of awareness, something akin to belief, but rather its opposite: something more akin to what the French anthropologist Pierre Bourdieu called "habitus" or what Martin Heidegger called "being-in-the-world." In the best of all possible worlds, at the point of a refugee's reincorporation into a new culture and society, trust is reconstituted, if not restored. The real world, however, is not the best of all possible worlds. And in the real world, whether one is a refugee or not, trust will—no, it must—coexist with mistrust. Unlike life under "ordinary" circumstances, or more correctly, under circumstances over which one exercises a certain measure of control, in the

life of a refugee, trust is overwhelmed by mistrust, besieged by suspicion, and relentlessly undermined by caprice. One may ask why "mistrust" too, like trust, is not part of a habitus, an aspect of being-in-the-world. Indeed, as Eftihia Voutira and Barbara Harrell-Bond point out, mistrust is a cultural value in many societies. But there is a difference. The distinction lies, we believe, in the measure of mistrust's magnitude in the experience of a refugee: not only does mistrust push itself onto the surface of a quickened consciousness but the agitated state of awareness that it creates bars it from settling back into a state of comfortable and largely unconscious comportment with the surroundings of its world. By contrast, where mistrust is a cultural value, available for invocation into conscious ideology or normative recitation, such a comportment is commonplace.

Furthermore, the capacity to trust needs to be underwritten by the capacity to tame chance, especially the chance of being hurt. This capacity is not an individual matter but a gift that a cultured society[1] gives a person. In refugee experience it is this capacity that is rendered powerless; individuals and groups have little else to do than to flee. It is this escape from violence that Aristide R. Zolberg, Astri Suhrke, and Sergio Aguayo (1989) have constructed as the central feature of the refugee experience. As political scientists, their study has highlighted violence emerging from the abuse of power, mainly state-centered power. In our more anthropological collection, we attempt to look at the consequences of the abuse of power from another aspect, the aspect of the collapse of culturally constituted trust.

TRUST AND THE SEMIOTICS OF CULTURE

We hold with Marjorie A. Muecke (1987:274) that "the experience of the political refugee is profoundly cultural because it compels refugees as individuals and as collective victims/survivors of massive chaos to resolve what Max Weber ([1915] 1958) identified as the problem of meaning, the need to affirm "the ultimate explicableness of experience." By culture, we do not intend to refer to something essential and fixed but rather to a creative activity of symbol making and symbol sharing. Culture is fundamentally dialogic, that is, a logic that bridges the gap of understanding that exists between individuals or groups. That culture, by definition, entails more than one individual goes without saying. But a dialogue involving two individuals is only a metonymic moment in culture. Cultural dialogic in its unlimited sense entails symbolic worlds in communicative interaction with each other. The logic in question is not a perfectly systematized one but rather contains within it both a certain measure of redundancy (ergo, systematicity and predictability) and a certain measure of the uncertain, the indeterminate, the novel, and the creative. Culture entails active agreement and disagreement. As the Russian semiotician Mikhail Bakhtin (1986:142) observed, this "stimulates and deepens understanding, makes the other's word (and world) more resilient and true to itself, and precludes mutual dissolution and confusion." Culture, in other words, is a

process: it is forever emergent. This process can flourish or it can be stifled. When it flourishes, it yields meaning. When it is stifled, it is stifled by one of two processes, which may be formally defined in terms of hyperinformation, on the one hand, and hyperredundancy, on the other.

Meaning, Information, and Hyperredundancy

In the technical sense derived from communication theory, information and redundancy occupy the poles in a continuum. In structural linguistics, absolute information is absolutely syntagmatic. For example, an ever-unfolding series of numbers that defies all predictability as to what number will turn up next is such a purely syntagmatic chain. Where information cannot be related to something preexisting (i.e., made into at least a partially redundant form) meaning cannot exist. Such common experiences described in ordinary language as "culture shock" or "sensory overstimulation" are states entailing hyperinformation devoid of redundancy, making one sigh in exasperation, "What next!" In accounts of initial experiences in concentration camps and other such settings of extreme uncertainty and unpredictability, we see humans caught in such a state of hyperinformation, unable to give meaning to their experiences. Primo Levi's description of the newcomers' first traumatic experiences of arriving in Auschwitz and their inability to create a decipherable world serves as an apt example of such a state. He remarks,

> In conformity to that simple model which we atavistically carry within us—"we" inside and the enemy outside, separated by a sharply defined geographic frontier— . . . one entered hoping at least for the solidarity of one's companions in misfortune. But the hoped-for allies, except in special cases, were not there; there were instead a thousand sealed-off monads, and between them a desperate hidden and continuous struggle. (1988:23–24)

When each monad presents itself as distinct and unpredictable we have a total collapse of meaning as a result of hyperinformation. But these same monadic formations that emerge in camps are also capable of destroying meaning from the opposite end. On this extreme, meaning is negated when predictability becomes absolute and no information is forthcoming: one monad becomes just like another. In a thoroughly regimented camp (not unusual in refugee experiences), where blueprints for behavior are offered and enforced by well-meaning caseworkers, a state of hyperredundancy is created. In keeping with such a hyperredundant context is the belief of refugee relief organizations and workers that all refugees, merely by being "refugees," are to be treated as "equal" (read, "identical") regardless of their vast variations in personal background, motives for leaving, reasons for escape, and plans for the future. That is, individual identities and continuities, sustained by unique biographies, are systematically neutralized, once again making for meaningless existence.

If caseworkers present highly systematized, rule-governed, and therefore hyperredundant social orders into which refugees are expected to be socialized, many

refugees imagine, either independently or in reaction to the ones presented by the caseworkers, social orders of their past in equally frozen and unreal terms. The freedom to change, modify, and equivocate is the very sign that the work of culture is functioning freely. The petrified social orders mandated by caseworkers or imagined by refugees under conditions of confinement signify a crisis in culture wherein past and present remain as rigid as they are disparate, connected only by a chasm of despair.

Meaning (and, therefore, culture) is sustained by bringing about an optimal balance between the extremes of redundancy and information. Where meaning prevails, culture flourishes. Meaning links what is traditional with what is new and the past with the future. As noted by Bruno Bettelheim (1986) and Levi (1988), the most successful survivors in the Nazi camps were those able to link their present to the past as well as to the future. This was as true of Communists as it was of the deeply religious Jehovah's Witnesses. "Sorrow, in them or around them, was decipherable, and therefore did not overflow into despair" (Levi 1988:118)—decipherability itself being dependent on continuity and continuity dependent on a certain measure of redundancy. The various stages in the refugee's life cycle, which threaten life with radical discontinuity, are stages in which "trust" is placed on trial. The vindication of trust depends on the creation of meaning and the survival of the cultural process. For this to happen, the refugee must be free to seek information when hyperredundancy has made life meaningless and to seek redundancy when hyperinformation has made life equally meaningless.

A refugee must be free to choose to provide information and must feel assured that the information provided will not be given a meaning that could be used against him or her. In refugee camps, rehabilitation centers, and countries of settlement, refugees feel that they have no control over how caseworkers, government organizations, or strangers use the information they have provided. Much of the success of caseworkers as well as government policies regarding refugees pivots on this fulcrum of trust. Psychosocial workers who probe and obtain information that is likely to be quite dear and personal receive along with this information the added responsibility of not turning it into a weapon of oppression. For a simple act such as assigning a psychiatric label to a set of behaviors and recording it on a refugee's chart (without regard to the cultural embeddedness of the label in question and its inappropriateness to the culture of the refugee at hand) could turn out to be precisely the kind of weapon that justifies the refugee's mistrust. It could lead to the postponement of an individual's date of release or even the denial of asylum. In the case of the former, the logic underlying the labeling deems that those demonstrating signs of severe personal problems should remain in the camp until they are better prepared for life in the country of asylum—a reasoning that may be more the cause of the problem than the cure (see Knudsen 1988:122–141).

To be sure, caseworkers do not constitute a monolithic lot. The reasons that make them choose their vocation are complex. Some are impelled by impeccable

altruism and a desire to help, some find fulfillment in wielding power over the lives of helpless others, and some consider themselves servants of the countries of asylum they represent. And sadly, the demands of states and state interests—even when channeled through the United Nations—exert a stronger force on the daily duties of the average caseworker than do humanitarian interests. Add to the burden of the caseworkers who are overwhelmed by their case loads the myriad national and international bureaucratic microstructures that, once again, are primarily beholden to states' interests, and one ends up with caseworkers who are reduced to information-gathering and information-dispensing functionaries. They become men and women who have no real opinions of their own, and the information they gather does not inform them.

Information provided by a refugee must not only *not* be used to oppress but if trust is to be restored, it must also be rendered meaningful. Transit camps and locations of resettlement are contexts wherein the need to create meaning and recover the cultural process becomes acute for refugee and "stranger" (whether a caseworker or a native of the new country). The meaning-making process is not one that can be brought about by the refugee or the "stranger" in isolation; it is the product of collaboration between the two. In particular, the refugee needs to be a full participant in the formulation and reformulation of culture in this context. The question that confronts us then is, how is this collaborative venture of making meaning and enhancing the cultural process to be facilitated?

Several anthropologists working with refugees have found that one of the important components in the recovery of meaning, the making of culture, and the reestablishment of trust is the need and the freedom to construct a normative picture of one's past within which "who one was" can be securely established to the satisfaction of the refugee. The refugee's self-identity is anchored more to who she or he was than what she or he has become. In the context of rehabilitation in Western countries, as an extension of the valorization of an egalitarian ideology, agents of the host country seek to level down each refugee to a common denominator, an ideal-typical refugee, and neutralize differences so as to provide each refugee not only with a fresh start but also with an equal one. "Individualities" constructed in oral autobiographies are deemed irrelevant by many caseworkers, whereas for the refugee this is the foundation on which a meaningful world may be rebuilt.

Adverse forces that beat on the self-identity of refugees come also from fellow refugees, from "one's companions in misfortune" (Levi 1988:23). Ironically, fellow refugees are more capable of and effective in making one's past irrelevant and dubitable than are social workers. What are the interests served by such actions on the part of refugees themselves, and what are their effects? How do these processes figure into the refugee experience of trust and the loss of culture? These are questions that several chapters in this collection, especially John Chr. Knudsen's, address.

Refugees and the "National Order of Things"

The appeal for research that sheds light on the cultural dimension of the refugee problem is not intended to make a case for a romantic preservation or restoration of a lost way of life. The understanding of culture as a process precludes such romanticism. On the contrary, the cultural argument does recognize that the refugee has to live in a world of new social, political, linguistic, economic, and other realities. No understanding of or prescription for the refugee problem will be sound without the recognition of this fact. But these are realities to the construction of which the refugee is fully capable of contributing—and contributing richly, as history has shown only too well. But there is one reality that merits interrogating and therefore relaxing. This is the reality that Liisa Malkki (1992) calls the "national order of things." With far-reaching implications for rethinking identity, Malkki exposes the irony of our contemporary world: awash with refugees, on the one hand, and shackled to the national order of things, on the other. If the two are ironically linked, they are also complementary, the one phenomenon sustaining the other. Refugee and host are equal believers in national identities. The rub is that the host's nation and national identity are perceived as being intact and the refugee's in tatters. And there are myraid ways in which the haves lord it over the have-nots in this particular context, creating a state of affairs hardly conducive to fostering trust. There is a way for the host to meet the refugee halfway. This would be to realize that "identity [including the host's] is always mobile and processual, partly self-construction, partly categorization by others, partly a condition, a status, a label, a weapon, a shield, a fund of memories, . . . a creolized aggregate" (37). One's national identity is no less creolized. Such a realization is a significant step toward putting the refugee at ease, the first step toward what will and must come in its own time and way, the denationalization of the refugee's identity. The halfway meeting calls for the corresponding denationalization of the host's own smug nationalized identity. This is a theme that T. Alexander Aleinikoff and E. Valentine Daniel and Yuvaraj Thangaraj pick up, albeit on different registers, in their chapters in this volume.

THE ESSAYS

In the collection of essays that follows, anthropologists, literary critics, a psychiatrist, a geographer, a philosopher, and a legal scholar discuss the idea contained in the title of this volume, relating it to their own work with, among, or on refugees. In his opening chapter, John Knudsen describes the Vietnamese crisis of refuge, brought to international attention by the "boat people." In the boats, in transit camps, and later in countries of asylum we find these refugees making strategic adjustments to cope with profound uncertainties about life, culture, and trust. He argues that with the radical breakdown of relationships of trust, culture—in its dynamic everydayness—yields to anxiously calculated adjustments to rapidly and

unpredictably changing realities, on the one hand, and to the memorializing of a past moral order and a tradition represented in "still-life" images, on the other. In short, when a community has little to put its trust in in the present and the future, an essentialized (but lost) "culture" is summoned to compensate for the absence of a trust-driven cultural life. While members of the older generation are the most zealous in trying to "retrieve" such a culture in their narratives, it is the younger ones who are most torn between the need to get on with life in a new world of trust and culture making and the need of their parents to hold onto an essentialized cultural past—a past that the young can only ambivalently imagine and suspiciously narrate. Knudsen wonders further about the propriety of the researcher's part in the making and breaking of the narratives in question.

Marjorie Muecke has worked closely for many years with Cambodian (Buddhist) refugees in Seattle. Her chapter shows us how "trust" is both gendered and culturally inflected. Besides being a moving account of the almost impossible burden that women, especially young nubile women, have to bear in proving their trustworthiness throughout the brutal travails of being a refugee and later, it is a telling indictment on refugee studies in general, which have failed to appreciate the distinctive experience of women refugees. "Being a refugee," Muecke tells us, "puts Khmer women at risk of self-mistrust on two accounts: first, the impossibility, when outside the traditional cultural bounds of Khmer society, of upholding the womanly ideal of being 'virtuous,' and second, their separation from children." Neither of these applies to men.

Stuart Turner has done extensive work with refugees who are victims of torture. On their bodies and psyches torture victims carry the insignia of state violence. Paradoxically, in their flight from violence, it is to another state, albeit a new one, that they must turn for refuge. Unfortunately, these states, especially those of the first world, meet the refugee with further displays of state power and violence, even if the latter takes on only bureaucratic and judicial forms. Turner laments the fact that in some first world countries refugee organizations offer help only to those who have already obtained legal status. Does the sufferer have to be legalized in order for his or her pain to be recognized as such? He further comments that as long as therapeutic work is directed to the individual, ignoring the wider context of community, state, and broader social issues, the likelihood of restoring trust is minimized. This sober advice, especially since it comes from someone whose professional ideology is individual centered, cannot be taken lightly.

The authors of the next four chapters are literary critics who remind us not only that those interested in expressive culture, including the literary critic, have invaluable insights into the refugee experience but also that the enormity of the problem imposes on a much wider set of professionals and scholars the burden of having to critically reflect on its nature and alleviation. Mary N. Layoun leads with an analysis of refugee narratives with a special focus on the novels of the Greek writer Dido Soteriou. Layoun finds in refugee narratives, not so much a nostalgia

for a past when all was well and a trust-driven story prevailed, but a claim to "having known better even then" that the master story was suspect. What is both more threatening and more promising is the creation of a "critical community" through these narratives whereby a "moral claim" is made as to what the future "should or perhaps would be if the story (and its telling) were different." For in these narratives one finds not only the prefiguring of a future for the refugees but also the potential of "a radicalizing force on the indigenous population."

Muhammad Siddiq observes that with the establishment of the state of Israel, "Palestinians became a 'refugee nation' " and every Palestinian's individual life became a token of the collective historical experience of the Palestinian people. It was left to the poet and the novelist to reinscribe through the metaphor of individual lives in Palestinian narratives "national allegories." Siddiq reminds us that most of these narratives are carried forth in an oral tradition and most that are committed to writing are written in Arabic. It is in this context that Siddiq finds it painfully ironic that in a comment on Edward Said's book, *After the Last Sky: Palestinian Lives,* Richard Poirier writes, "It is Said's great accomplishment that thanks to this book, Palestinians will never be lost to history." To believe that only that which is written will survive is bad enough but to predicate the survival of an entire people's history on a book written in English, the colonialists' language, is elevated cheek. Siddiq's contribution belongs to a new genre of scholarship committed to revealing through translation a far richer corpus that is lost to translation, enticing thereby an indifferent world to step into a richer world—resilient, resourceful, and heroic—of which we know so little. This chapter also serves two more general functions. First, it makes us reflect on our ignorance of the lives and histories and cultures of refugees other than the Palestinians of whom we know even less. Second, it speaks to the refugee in all of us, the stranger within. We do not have to accept all the formulations of a postmodernist theoretician and cultural commentator such as Jean Baudrillard to realize that at the turning of this century, each one of us is vulnerable to becoming a construct, a work of inference, a statistic and an artifact of so-called information, a simulacrum;[2] just like a refugee.

Jeffrey M. Peck looks at the new Germany and its struggle with old prejudices that persist in its popular and commodity cultures. German exclusionary logic constructs fine gradations of differences and foreignness whereby a place for the "true" German can be secured and preserved. From his chapter, not only do we learn about Germany or Germans but we also learn about a certain xenophobia that is lodged in the soul of all European nations. Germany becomes the exemplar of this xenophobia because it, more than any other European nation, has had to come to terms with its recent history in which such dark fears had had even darker consequences and has had to atone for these consequences by instituting the most liberal immigration laws of any nation in Europe.

Michael M. J. Fischer brings this set of chapters to a close by making a case for "starting all over again"—for looking at refugees not as an archaically fixed category but one that has itself been caught in the new kinds of population shuffles

that characterize our postmodern world, for taking into account how refugees represent themselves, especially in and through the media whenever they have access to it. The medium that is Fischer's primary interest is film; his secondary interest, the novel. In both instances he invites us—by introducing several well-analyzed examples—to take note of the difference between these representations of refugees and those of the dominant media such as television newscasts. Fischer helps us appreciate refugees not only as victims but also as human beings with admirable resilience who leave to the generations that follow not merely a sense of passivity and dysfunction but in and through their expressive forms, a sense of identity and purpose.

The title of Beatriz Manz's chapter, "Fostering Trust in a Climate of Fear," is, if anything, an understatement of the enormity of the problem as well as of the hope contained in the experience of Guatemalan Indians. Even though the twentieth century is marred by violence of unprecedented scale, this century's other characteristic, change, again unprecedented in its rapidity, gives us the illusion that everything, even violent events, will pass. A side effect of this illusion is inaction and apathy. This is why Manz's account of five hundred years of suffering endured by Mayan Indians, brought closer to home in the late twentieth century by those known as Guatemalan refugees, is so profoundly disturbing. Where "punishment is arbitrary, irregular, and often fatal" and where "the rule of law is nonexistent," Manz writes, "there does not have to be a radical moment of disjunction . . . but rather a deepening of the lack of trust and estrangement."

If the challenge faced by Guatemalan refugees is to get the world to pay attention to an atrocity that has lasted almost five hundred years, the Palestinians' challenge is to prevent the world from forgetting an atrocity that has lasted almost fifty years. Nearly 2.5 million Palestinians—almost 50 percent of their population—live in camps in Lebanon and elsewhere. In her chapter, which is the most acute analysis of the sociocultural geography of trust in this collection, Julie M. Peteet finds that the Palestinians were displaced from a place where they felt they belonged to a space that was alien and alienating. The place and space in question pertain at once to both an exterior and an interior landscape. Place, in this usage, emphasizes a way-of-being in the world and space, a way of seeing the world. Being signifies a mode of surrender to a field of forces—political or sentimental—that one basically trusts and therefore can let be and get on with the act of living. It allows the suspension of ever-anxious vigilance. Seeing signifies its opposite: a living against the grain, a refusal to lose sight of the conditions of one's existence, a resistance to being called a "refugee." The generation that actually remembers the homeland and "the year of the disaster"—the name given to 1948—is being replaced by the children who know only the camps. But the new generation, through the rich memorialization by narrative, literature, and action, has resisted the total conversion of space into place. Empowered by this resistance, hope of recovery is nurtured.

The refusal of the label "refugee" is even more pronounced in the case of the

Afghans who have lived in camps in Pakistan since 1982. Their self-definition as muhajirin—"those who leave their homes in the cause of Allah"—rather than as refugees found recognition among their Pakistani, fellow Muslim, hosts. The muhajirin leave only to return to triumph over the enemy who had "temporarily" displaced the believers from their rightful home. M. Nazif Shahrani argues that the Prophet Muhammad's *hijrah*—"the migration from the Domain of Disbelief to the Domain of Faith" only to return to reestablish the Faith—serves as a potent paradigm shared by Pakistanis and Afghans and that it is this sharing that has made the long sojourn of Afghans in Pakistan one of the more successful stories of refugee accommodation in the world. Beyond this, it is also a reminder that, despite the first world nations' mixture of self-righteousness and anxious handwringing about the "waves," "droves," and "tides" of refugees, the bulk of the "burden" in providing refuge for those escaping violence is borne by nations of the third world without the help and interference of hysterical headlines so frequently found in the Western press. Based on figures available for 1992, the burden shared by the developed and the underdeveloped countries was heavily weighted against the latter. In a list of the top fifty countries ranked according to the ratio of refugee population to the total population, only the following ten developed countries figure: Sweden (12), Canada (19), Denmark (30), Germany (33), Norway (36), Austria (39), Luxembourg (42), New Zealand (44), and Switzerland (49). In terms of the number of refugees ranked according to the ratio of refugee population to gross national product per capita, the only first world nations that figure in the top fifty are Germany with 827,000 refugees (ranked 42) and the United States with 473,000 refugees (ranked 49). The total number of refugees in the top twenty-six industrialized countries adds up to only 3,747,100. This leaves the countries of the developing world to bear the burden of more than 38 million refugees. Such is the magnitude of the imbalance of burden-sharing.[3]

Eftihia Voutira and Barbara E. Harrell-Bond open their chapter by questioning the assumption in the "founding document" of the conference from which this volume has emerged, the assumption that trust is basic to being human. Based on work in refugee camps in Africa and an understanding of societies and cultures of Africa among which the authors have carried out field research, they submit a thesis that appears to run against the grain of most of the other chapters in the volume. We shall leave it to the reader to work through the narrower understanding of trust critiqued by Voutira and Harrell-Bond and the broader conceptualization of trust as presented in the editors' introduction and the penultimate chapter by Daniel and Thangaraj and take what is valuable from this juxtaposition. This chapter is, however, more than an argument about the place of trust and mistrust in society. It opens a window into the complex factors and interactions that go into the making of a refugee camp: its multicultural and multiethnic composition; its inherent structures of power, hierarchy, and suspicion; and the magnitude of the task faced by helpers and helping agencies as well as the insensitivity with which they try to get the job done.

Daniel and Thangaraj begin with the thesis that (wo)man is a representation or a sign, or even more correctly, a locus of complex sign activity or semiosis. But to be fully human, they argue, is to be able to partake of a culture, where culture is seen as yet another domain of sign activity but a domain that is public, shared, and quasi-conventional. This public domain in which individuals find their place and through which they define their being-in-the-world must be sustained by a certain measure of trust. From this prolegomenon they go on to illustrate through a detailed case study of Sri Lankan Tamil refugees in Sri Lanka and in London how structures of trust are constantly undermined and the means these refugees employ to prevent the erosion of trust, culture, and their humanness.

In the chapter we have chosen to conclude this volume, Alex Aleinikoff clearly spells out what all the other contributors hint at: not merely a big part but an increasingly big part of the refugee problem results from an international regime of refugee law that owes its primary allegiance not to refugees but to states. Even if expressed in humanitarian terms, the bias of refugee law and policies toward controlling the source rather than toward the provision of asylum ends up being "more about 'containment' of migration than about improved protection of refugees." Aleinikoff's radical proposal to remedy this situation is as original as it is timely, and most important, it is not the product of pie-in-the-sky humanitarianism but of years of firsthand knowledge of the legal aspect of asylum seekers' plight. In this the late twentieth century, when nation-states are being ripped apart by internal contradictions, no one can afford not to seriously contemplate the analyses and proposals presented in this chapter of far-reaching consequences. It is a veritable new beginning.

NOTES

1. We emphasize "culture" here so as to distinguish human society from the society of social animals, which is not our concern here.

2. A simulacrum is a construct or a model that has no referent or ground in any "reality" except its own. "A simulation is different from a fiction or a lie in that it not only presents an absence as a presence, the imaginary as the real, it also undermines any contrast to the real, absorbing the real within itself" (poster in Baudrillard [1988:6]).

3. UNHCR, *The State of the World's Refugees 1993: The Challenge of Protection* (New York: Penguin, 1993).

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