

INTRODUCTION

by Richard Schacht

Nietzsche was concerned with morality, value, humanity, knowledge, and the development of our ways of thinking about these matters throughout his career. It was only in the second and final decade of his productive life, however, and indeed only in the last half of it, that he came to a clear realization of how problematic they all are and undertook to address them in the light of this realization. His post-*Zarathustra* works (and notebooks) may be considered his final and most significant attempts to come to terms with these matters. These writings show the lines along which he was thinking about them, and how far he got.

Nietzsche's post-*Zarathustra* writings are as richly suggestive as they are provocative for philosophers and others concerned with these issues today. Had he stopped with *Zarathustra*, that extraordinary work together with his previous writings would have sufficed to earn him a prominent place in the intellectual history of the late nineteenth century. What he went on to do in the few years that remained to him has made him one of the most important figures in the history of modern philosophy, and a looming presence in contemporary philosophical inquiry.

All the concerns mentioned at the outset came together in *On the Genealogy of Morals* (*Zur Genealogie der Moral*), written in the middle of this brief but remarkable final period, and published in 1887. It had been a dozen years since Nietzsche had written anything in an "essay" style, and this is his only later work written in anything approaching that style (with the partial exception of *The Antichrist*). He had *Zarathustra* behind him, and had published *Beyond Good and Evil* (his "Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future," as its subtitle proclaims) the year before. He also had just written the "fifth book" added to the first four "books" or parts of *Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft* (*The Gay Science*) in the expanded edition of this work that appeared in the same year as the *Genealogy*. And he further had just com-

pleted the series of reflective retrospective prefaces to many of his other pre-*Zarathustra* books (which he had decided to reissue) in the stocktaking year of 1886.

It was at this point that Nietzsche went on to write the three “essays” and preface of which the *Genealogy* consists. Ahead of him lay less than two more years of active life, in which he pursued (in his notebooks) and then abandoned the project of a comprehensive work he planned to call *The Will to Power: Attempt at a Revaluation of All Values* (as he tells us in the Third Essay of the *Genealogy*), and then in a final astonishing burst of productivity completed *The Case of Wagner*, *Twilight of the Idols*, *The Antichrist*, and *Ecce Homo*. The *Genealogy* thus came at a crucial juncture, and is in many respects the high point of this last period of his philosophical activity. To borrow some of his own imagery, if the time of *Zarathustra* was his “great noon” (as he himself suggests), when the sun of his intellectual life reached its zenith—following its ascent in the period of *Daybreak*—then the time of the *Genealogy* might be thought of as his “golden afternoon,” when that sun’s light was no longer dazzling but was still strong (perhaps the best time of day for seeing things clearly), before it cast its last rays in the hours of *Twilight*, and soon thereafter gave way to night.

More prosaically, in the *Genealogy*, along with the virtually contemporaneous fifth book of *The Gay Science*, we encounter the philosopher whom Nietzsche became at the height of his powers and maturity. Here we find him attempting to do at least some of the things he had come to be convinced needed doing in order to pursue the reinterpretive and revaluative tasks of the kind of “philosophy of the future” he had called for and sought to inaugurate in *Beyond Good and Evil*. As he had recognized in his retrospective prefaces of 1886, and as he observes in his preface to the *Genealogy*, his earlier thinking had already been on the way to his thinking here, and is of no little relevance to it. There also are significant connections between what we find him doing and saying here and what he went on to undertake and maintain in his final reckonings with Wagner, Christianity, and the other “idols” he considers in his next and final spate of books. The *Genealogy* may thus serve well as both a focal point and a point of departure for the consideration of much of Nietzsche’s thought.

But what is it that he attempts to do here? His announced topic is “*die Moral*”—not necessarily “morality” as such and in general, but in any event several purportedly different and basic types of moral schemes, and certain phenomena associated with them. His announced project in this book is “genealogy”—and more specifically, the “genealogy” of these moral types and associated phenomena. Yet his interest is not merely to understand them, but further and more importantly to use the understanding of them as a springboard to the comprehension of a good deal more. But of what? and how? And how is “genealogy” supposed to help? Indeed, how is it

supposed to work? How does it relate to the two basic tasks of Nietzsche's kind of philosopher—(re)interpretation and (re)valuation? What light is shed by what Nietzsche does in the three "essays" making up this book on these tasks themselves?

These are only some of the questions needing to be raised and considered with respect to Nietzsche's efforts and concerns in this pivotal but strange and perplexing book. These questions also lead well beyond the *Genealogy* itself, in many directions. Its importance to the understanding of the "mature" Nietzsche's thinking is obvious; but its import is not. Making sense of it involves bringing a sense of his larger enterprise to bear upon it as well.

Hence the present volume of essays. The idea of such a volume grew out of a symposium held in 1987 (to mark the centenary of the *Genealogy*'s publication), under the auspices of the North American Nietzsche Society, at the Pacific Division meetings of the American Philosophical Association, at which earlier versions of some of these essays were presented. Other essays subsequently were invited and selected, in an attempt to make the volume richly diverse in the perspectives and interpretations brought to bear upon Nietzsche's thinking. Some of them have been published elsewhere previously; but the majority of them were written specifically for this volume.

While Nietzsche's *Genealogy of Morals* is the general focus of this volume, the essays written and selected for inclusion here do not all focus directly upon it. Some do, while others bear upon it by way of a consideration of features of Nietzsche's thought more generally. Similarly, while Nietzsche's title suggests that his topic is the "genealogy" of "morals," he restricts himself neither to "genealogy" nor to "morals." The following essays all relate to aspects of what he undertakes to do in the *Genealogy*, but the aspects selected differ, and they are sometimes considered in relation to what he does along these lines elsewhere.

The contributors also differ markedly in their own philosophical orientations, and in their appreciation of what they find in Nietzsche. The volume thus exemplifies the point Nietzsche often makes in terms of "different eyes" and differing "prospectives," both to reject the notion that there is one and only one right way in which to view and interpret something, and to suggest how the understanding of something can best be enhanced. Many different approaches to his thinking are taken here with respect to the matters he discusses in the *Genealogy*, and many different interpretations and assessments are offered. One cannot possibly simply agree with all of them. But one can profit by availing oneself of all of them in order to transcend the confines of narrower perspectives upon what he is doing, and to expand the interpretive resources at one's disposal in one's own attempt to make sense of him and deal with him.

The essays in the first half of the volume deal in various ways with Nietzsche's thinking with respect to the announced topic of his *Genealogy*: "morals"—morality, moralities, and associated phenomena such as pity, cruelty, and *ressentiment*. These essays thus explore aspects of what could quite appropriately be called his moral philosophy and psychology. The first several of them deal with what he himself at times refers to as his "immoralism." Nietzsche's stance with respect to the sort of thing that goes by the general name of "morality" is perhaps second in notoriety only to what he has to say about God and Judeo-Christianity, and is even more disconcerting in the eyes of many moral philosophers associated with the traditional and contemporary mainstream of the discipline. Philippa Foot's essay is a case in point, and expresses deep reservations about Nietzsche's treatment of morality even as it attempts to acknowledge the challenge he poses. It therefore sets the stage very nicely for the rest of the volume, by prompting the question not only of whether Nietzsche does justice to morality but also of whether Foot does justice to him. The essay that follows by Maudemarie Clark pursues the "immoralism" issue, but with a rather different intent, and to different effect.

Arthur Danto's essay is one of several (David Hoy's and a previous essay of Frithjof Bergmann's are others) that appeared some years ago and helped to stimulate further consideration of what Nietzsche is up to in his *Genealogy*. Danto sees a kind of "moral terrorism" in Nietzsche, but discerns something more positive as well. Kathleen Higgins likewise suggests both that "poisons" are at work in Nietzsche's thinking here and that the upshot need not be as harmful as this might lead one to expect.

Richard White's essay goes further in the direction of seeking to discuss a fundamentally positive intent in Nietzsche's juxtaposition of "master" and "slave" moralities, with a view to what might lie beyond his critique. Frithjof Bergmann takes a different approach to the significance of the "master/slave" discussion, using it as a starting point for a consideration of what he suggests to be a basic and important difference between Nietzsche's approach to ethics and that of many philosophers (like Foot) in the analytic tradition.

Robert Solomon offers a much more critical interpretation of Nietzsche's use of the "master/slave" model and an assessment of the phenomenon of *ressentiment* very different from Nietzsche's. Like the next several authors, Solomon tempers his appreciation of Nietzsche's thinking, considering it to be deficient and in need of modification in important respects. Rüdiger Bittner also focuses upon Nietzsche's account of *ressentiment* and argues for the need to modify it to render it more plausible and satisfactory.

Martha Nussbaum directs her attention to Nietzsche's treatment of suffering and pity, and very helpfully places it in a long ethical tradition going

back to the early Stoics. While making good and reasonable sense of it, however, she also expresses reservations about it even when properly understood. Ivan Soll in effect approaches the same problem from the other end, taking Nietzsche's unsettling discussion of cruelty as his point of departure. Spreading his compass to include Nietzsche's extension of this discussion to the phenomenon of asceticism, Soll seeks to show how all of this is related to Nietzsche's psychological concerns.

The next two essays follow Nietzsche into several of his most interesting case studies of the kind of moral psychology he seeks to develop (in addition to that of "slave morality") in the *Genealogy* and subsequently. Sarah Kofman examines asceticism as Nietzsche uses the case of Wagner to illuminate it, and offers a fascinating illustration of the power of Nietzsche's moral psychology to shed light on this complex and perplexing phenomenon. Yirmiyahu Yovel looks in a different direction, at anti-Semitism, attempting both to lay to rest the idea that Nietzsche himself exemplifies it and to show that he actually provides an analysis of it that is as illuminating as it is severe. In the final essay of the first part of the volume, using Nietzsche's treatment of the supposed phenomenon of willing as an example, Bernard Williams makes a case for "following a distinctively Nietzschean route towards the naturalization of moral psychology."

The essays in the second half of the volume deal with "genealogy" and its relation to philosophy, as Nietzsche conceives of them and engages in them in the *Genealogy* and related works. David Hoy's essay relates Nietzsche's "genealogical method" to its Humean cousin, and so contributes to the understanding of the extent to which it does (and does not) depart from the classical modern tradition. Alexander Nehamas examines the "genealogy" of the *Genealogy* in relation to Nietzsche's strategy in his early *On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life*, and then considers what it means to approach and construe morality "genealogically."

This is Alasdair MacIntyre's concern as well, in the next essay (the second of his 1988 Gifford Lectures). MacIntyre goes on to discuss Michel Foucault after providing an interpretation of Nietzschean genealogical analysis as a fundamentally "subversive" mode of thought—about which MacIntyre has deep reservations. Eric Blondel takes a somewhat similar approach, but in a very different idiom and spirit. He too regards genealogy as the key to Nietzsche's kind of philosophy, with which Blondel is considerably more comfortable. Daniel Conway is in basic agreement with Blondel, construing genealogy as a kind of "symptomatology"—with rather radical implications, which he undertakes to draw out and emphasize. Brian Leiter provides an alternative interpretation centering on a key passage in the *Genealogy* itself, leading to a fundamentally different view of Nietzsche's philosophical aspirations.

The next several essays similarly move in the direction of a broader con-

sideration of Nietzsche's philosophical enterprise, as it relates to the *Genealogy* and as the *Genealogy* sheds light upon that enterprise. Gary Shapiro attempts to show that Nietzsche's central discussion of *Schuld* (guilt/debt) is connected in a deep and important way with his thinking about a problem that may be illuminated by a contrasting consideration of Heidegger on Anaximander and the origin of Western philosophy. Bernd Magnus, Jean-Pierre Mileur, and Stanley Stewart take Nietzsche's treatment of asceticism as their key to a reflection both upon the *Genealogy* itself and upon the kind of thinking toward which they see him moving in it. In my own essay I select yet another of the *Genealogy*'s main themes—"the type *Mensch*"—as one of his chief interests here as in his other writings before and after, intimately related to his other concerns with respect to both method and content.

The final two essays have to do with points that may at first seem to be concerned more with form than substance, but which turn out to be well worth considering in thinking about the *Genealogy*'s genealogy, and about Nietzsche's later writings more generally. Claus-Artur Scheier has noticed something that seems to connect the form of the *Genealogy* with its substance in a surprising and interesting way. The last word has been given to David Allison, because the stylistic device to which he draws attention (and which Nietzsche came to employ so effectively) is highly appropriate to the conclusion of this volume—which is most emphatically *not* intended to achieve closure. On such a work as the *Genealogy*, and on the topics considered in it, as on the thinking of Nietzsche more generally, there can be no real, definitive, and final last word.

During the past few decades Nietzsche has at last begun to receive the attention he deserves in the English-speaking world, owing in part to larger developments in both American and French philosophy. Several rather distinct styles of Nietzsche studies have emerged along the way, reflecting the differing philosophical sensibilities of those coming out of the modern "analytical" tradition and its earlier and more recent alternatives. It remains to be seen what will become of these differences. While they are not what they used to be, the divergences remain real and substantial, as do the differences of interpretation and appreciation among those whose basic philosophical orientations and styles are rather similar. Yet these divergences are no more to be lamented than are the differences. Both are only to be expected where Nietzsche's thought is concerned. Such divergences of perspective and approach, moreover, contribute more to understanding Nietzsche than any one way of dealing with him can. Indeed, it may well be that the opening up of philosophy itself to these different ways of proceeding is far healthier and more fruitful than the enthronement of any "one way." That certainly would be Nietzsche's view of the matter.

FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE (1844–1900)

A BRIEF LIFE IN A PRELUDE AND FIVE DECADES

Prelude: Early childhood (1844–1849)

Firstborn of a Lutheran minister and his wife, living in a small provincial town in what is now eastern Germany.

The precocious youth (1849–1858)

Bright, serious boy of many talents (musical as well as scholastic), left fatherless at five, raised in an adoring all-female household.

The brilliant student (1858–1869)

Classics student excelling in his studies, first at an elite boarding school and then at the universities at Bonn and Leipzig; aspiring composer and fine pianist; discovers Schopenhauer and meets Wagner.

The rebellious professor (1869–1879)

Prodigy in classical philology, a professor at Basel at twenty-four; unconventional interests and writings antagonize his colleagues; an avid Wagnerian (still composing himself); cultural critic becoming a philosopher, while struggling with academic life and debilitating illnesses.

The nomad philosopher (1879–1888)

Pensioned retiree at thirty-four; plagued with recurring severe health problems; alienated from academic life and nearly everything else; living alone in Swiss and Italian boardinghouses—and proceeding from “free-spirited” reflections to *Zarathustra*, and on toward a “philosophy of the future” and a “revaluation of all values.”

The insane invalid (1889–1900)

Mere shell following a complete physical and mental collapse (probably of syphilitic origin) in early 1889—at the age of only forty-four; a decade of empty madness before the final curtain.

CHRONOLOGY

- 1844 Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche is born on October 15 in Röcken, in the Prussian province of Saxony.
- 1849 Father dies (at the age of thirty-six).
- 1858–1864 Attends the classics-oriented boarding school Schulpforta. (Plays the piano and composes on the side.)
- 1864 Enters Bonn University to study classical languages and literatures.
- 1869 Associate professor of classical philology (before even completing his Ph.D.) at the Swiss university at Basel.
- 1870 Full professor at Basel. Enlists as a medical orderly in the Franco-Prussian War, contracting serious illnesses.
- 1872 First book *The Birth of Tragedy* appears (and is met with scholarly derision)—his only major classical studies publication.
- 1873–1874 Publishes the first three *Untimely Meditations*, including the essays *On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life* and *Schopenhauer as Educator*.
- 1876 Writes a fourth *Meditation* in homage to Wagner, but his enthusiasm for Wagner cools.
- 1878 The first volume of *Human, All Too Human* (638 aphorisms) appears. Wagner sends him *Parsifal*, and their estrangement deepens.
- 1879 Resigns (with pension) from his position at Basel, incapacitated by his health problems. Begins spending his summers in the Swiss Engadine region, and his winters in northern Italy, living in boardinghouses.
- 1879–1880 Writes two sequels to *Human, All Too Human*, subsequently published as the two parts of its second volume (another 758 aphorisms).
- 1881 Publishes *Daybreak* (575 more aphorisms). Alternative periods of depression and exhilaration. First summer in Sils Maria, where the idea of “eternal recurrence” comes to him.

- 1882 The year of his intense but short-lived relationship with Lou Salome, which ends badly. Publishes the initial four-part version of *The Gay Science* (342 aphorisms and reflections).
- 1883 The first two parts of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* are written and published. Wagner dies. Estrangement from family and friends; depression. Resolves against living in Germany.
- 1884 Completes and publishes the third part of *Zarathustra*. Breaks with his sister, unable to endure her anti-Semitic, pro-“Teutonic” fiancée Bernard Förster. (She marries him the next year, to Nietzsche’s disgust and distress, accompanying him to Paraguay where he sought to found a Teutonic colony.)
- 1885 The fourth part of *Zarathustra* is written, but is only privately printed and circulated. Condition worsens.
- 1886 *Beyond Good and Evil* (296 aphorisms and reflections in nine parts, plus a poem “Aftersong”) is published. New editions of most pre-*Zarathustra* works are prepared and supplied with prefaces.
- 1886–1887 An expanded second edition of *The Gay Science* is prepared and published, with a new preface and fifth part consisting of 41 additional reflections, and an appendix of poetry, “Songs of Prince Vogelfrei.”
- 1887 *On the Genealogy of Morals* appears, consisting of a preface and three “essays” (of 17, 25 and 28 numbered sections, respectively). Completes orchestral score for *Hymnus an das Leben*. Begins working on *magnus opus*, to be called *The Will to Power*.
- 1888 *The Case of Wagner* is published; and *Twilight of the Idols*, *The Antichrist*, *Nietzsche contra Wagner*, *Dionysian Dithyrambs* (a collection of poems), and *Ecce Homo* are all written. *The Will to Power* project is dropped, in favor of a projected four-part *Revaluation of All Values*. Condition deteriorates.
- 1889 Collapses in early January in Turin, at the age of 44. (Nietzsche never recovers, living his final eleven years in invalid insanity in the care of his mother and sister.) *Twilight of the Idols* is published in the same month.

- 1892 First public edition of the fourth part of *Zarathustra* appears.
- 1893 Sister returns from Paraguay, and—under the name Elizabeth Förster-Nietzsche—assists their mother in the management of her brother's affairs.
- 1895 *The Antichrist* and *Nietzsche contra Wagner* are published.
- 1897 Mother dies, leaving complete control of Nietzsche's care—and of his literary estate—to his sister, who exploits his growing fame and fosters the assimilation of his thought to right-extremist political purposes during the next four decades.
- 1900 Nietzsche dies, on August 25, in Weimar.
- 1901 Sister publishes an arrangement of selections from his notebooks of 1883–1888 under the title *The Will to Power*, and in his name.
- 1908 *Ecce Homo* is finally published (twenty years after it was written).
- 1910–1911 First edition of Nietzsche's collected works is published under the supervision of his sister—including a greatly expanded edition of *The Will to Power*.
- 1935 Sister dies, triumphant in the knowledge that her brother had come to be regarded by Hitler and Mussolini (and many others) as the philosopher of National Socialism and Fascism—a travesty that would plague Nietzsche's reception for the next half-century.
- 1967–1984 Publication of the *Kritische Gesamtausgabe* of Nietzsche's works, *Nachlass*, and letters.

NOTE ON TEXTS, TRANSLATIONS, AND REFERENCES

The now-standard German edition of Nietzsche's writings is the recently completed *Kritische Gesamtausgabe* edited by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1967–1984). *Zur Genealogie der Moral* is to be found in part VI, volume 2 of this edition, along with *Jenseits von Gut und Böse*. Now that a paperback “student edition” of this edition of Nietzsche's writings is readily available, other German editions are seldom used.

The standard English translation of this work is that by Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, published together with *Ecce Homo* (New York: Vintage, 1967). Except where contributors have preferred to use their own translations of the passages they cite, or were working from translations into other languages (for example, French), this is the translation generally used in citations in this volume. (Departures are indicated in the contributors' notes.)

Kaufmann and Hollingdale have translated most of Nietzsche's completed works—in some cases together, in others one of them, in others each of them. They also have jointly translated the collection of selections from Nietzsche's notebooks published in his name under the title *Der Wille zur Macht* (*The Will to Power*). For the most part these are the translations used by contributors in their citations; again, see their notes.

Some contributors identify their citations by providing references to the *Kritische Gesamtausgabe* (indicating volume, notebook, and entry numbers) as well as to the specific works. The primary identification of cited passages is usually provided in the standard manner: in the body of the essays themselves, using the customary acronyms derived from the most commonly used English-language versions of their titles (see Reference Key below), followed either directly by Nietzsche's arabic section numbers (where they run consecutively through the entire work) or first by roman numerals