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THE LENINIST PHENOMENON

THE LENINIST RESPONSE

In both liberal and Leninist regimes (in contrast to peasant-status societies), social action is primarily oriented to impersonal norms.¹ What is particular about Leninist regimes is that impersonality is not expressed in procedural values and rules (i.e., due process), but rather in the charismatic impersonality of the party organization. The novelty of Leninism as an organization is its substitution of charismatic impersonality for the procedural impersonality dominant in the West.

The concept of charismatic impersonality is not readily digested, because it seems to be a contradiction in terms. The reaction to it is likely to be simple rejection, or a redefinition in terms that are more familiar, such as the routinization of charisma. But routinization is not what I am talking about. My focus (at least at this point) is on the unit designated as having extraordinary powers and being “worthy” of loyalty and sacrifice. In Leninism, that unit is THE Party.

As a means of demonstrating that the Leninist party is novel

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1. This does not mean that liberal and Leninist regimes are the only conceivable means of establishing impersonal norms as authoritative action referents and determinants. However, I am impressed by the lack of success most other types of regimes in peasant societies have had in attempting to create a nationally effective set of institutions based on impersonal norms. To argue that Leninist regimes have been successful in this direction is not to argue that all spheres of social life are influenced to the same extent by these norms, that informal behavior based on personalistic norms does not exist, or that the definition and efficacy of such norms is not subject to developmental considerations.

in character, I shall offer a new and operational definition of charisma, contrast Leninism with Nazism, and develop the notion of the “correct line” as a character-defining feature of Leninist organization.

Charisma is not a concept that has suffered benign or any other kind of neglect. Nor should it. Discussion of it continues because it is a central feature of behaviors that recur and are seen as politically and socially significant.

For me there is one striking and defining quality of charismatic leaders. A charismatic leader dramatically reconciles incompatible commitments and orientations. It is in this sense that the charismatic is a revolutionary agent—someone who is able in certain social circumstances institutionally to combine (with varying degrees of success for varying degrees of time) orientations and commitments that until then were seen as mutually exclusive. It is the extraordinary and inspirational quality of such a leader that makes possible the recasting of previously incompatible elements into a new unit of personal identity and organizational membership, and the recommitment of (some) social groups to that unit.

Christ created a new unit—the Church—through his recasting of elements that had before been mutually exclusive—namely, commitment to Judaism as a corporate and parochial ethnic identity and incorporation of the Gentile world. For a significant range of social groups, Christ recast the terms of personal identity and organizational membership. To argue this is not to suggest that historical events did not play a critical role in the evolution of this doctrine and organization. Events after Christ’s death make the importance of historical contingency quite clear.² One does not have to slight history or sociology in order to make the central point: for the comparativist (in contrast to the theologian), Christ’s innovation was to combine in an inspirational fashion elements that had previously been mutually exclusive. He created a new unit of membership.

Hitler did with German nationalism and “Aryanism” what Christ did with Jews and Gentiles. The tension between Hitler’s

2. See, for example, Hugh J. Schonfield, *The Pentecost Revolution* (London: Macdonald and Jane’s St. Giles House, 1974), *passim*.

commitment to German nationalism and “Aryanism” is a defining quality of his movement. Hitler’s orientation was not simply or exclusively to the German nation. Rather, he brought together in ideology and organization (e.g., in the SS) orientations and commitments that had been in critical respects and under different auspices highly conflictual—the exclusivity of ethnic nationalism and racial, supra-ethnic exclusivity.

If this conception of the defining quality of a charismatic leader is correct, one would predict that upon such a leader’s death, his movement would be subject to splits representing the individual conflicting elements the leader had been able to unite. Thus, on Christ’s death, his movement should have split into “Jewish” and “Gentile” factions. It did. The circumstances of Hitler’s death make a parallel observation difficult. But even during his lifetime, one could observe some groupings more oriented to German nationalism (e.g., army factions) and others to a transnational “Aryan” line (e.g., SS members).

Lenin took the fundamentally conflicting notions of individual heroism and organizational impersonalism and recast them in the form of an organizational hero—the Bolshevik Party. His “party of a new type” was just that: a recasting of orientations that remained conflictual but were no longer mutually exclusive.³ Lenin’s innovation was to create an organization and membership effectively committed to conflicting practices—command and obedience with debate and discussion; belief in inexorable laws of historical change with empirical investigation of social development; heroic action with a persistent concern for the scientific and sober operation of an economy and society; and an emphasis on individual revolutionary heroism with an emphasis on the superordinate impersonal authority of the Party, itself the central heroic actor and focus of emotional commitment.

The manner and extent to which these different elements have been institutionally combined have varied significantly in the developmental history of the Soviet and Soviet-type re-

3. “Democratic Centralism” was for Lenin what “Nazi Germanism” was for Hitler and “Gentile Messiah” for Christ—i.e., a recasting of mutually exclusive elements into a conflictually based but practically effective new paradigm of membership and action.

gimes.⁴ Yet crucial as the variations are, any attempt to grasp their significance depends on an appreciation of the central element in Lenin's innovation: the conflictual but effective recasting of charismatic-heroic and organizational-impersonal orientations in the form of a party in which heroism is defined in organizational, not individual, terms.

To argue that the novelty of Leninism as a political form is that it effectively recasts the mutually exclusive elements of individual heroism and organizational impersonalism is not to say there have not been historical precedents; nor is it to say that such an institutional amalgam of charismatic and modern orientations is constantly weighted in the same fashion. Religious organizations such as the Jesuits and Benedictines and military organizations such as the U.S. Marines are in certain respects instances of charismatic impersonalism. And as I have suggested at several points, Leninist regimes weigh and define charismatic and modern orientations quite differently over time. What is distinctive about Leninism as an instance of charismatic impersonalism—that is, as an institutional amalgam of charismatic and modern orientations—is that both these orientations are central to its definition. This contrasts with religious organizations whose secular-empirical orientations are ideally subordinate to non-material, supernatural rationales. This argument obviously does not apply to a military organization, such as the Marines, that combines heroic orientations and technical-secular ones. However, the central place of war as a defining orientation for such an organization differentiates it from a Leninist party. To be sure, the revolutionary commitments of a Leninist party can be seen as comparable—and at certain points identical—to a war orientation. However, the Party's equally strong commitments to industrialization, scientific development, and economic planning as more than adjuncts to a war mission suggest an organization of a different order.

The difference among these types of charismatic-impersonal organizations, then, is by no means absolute, but it is significant.

4. I outline a model with static and dynamic features to account for the variations in chapters 3 and 5.

As suggested, it lies in the greater consistency that characterizes the place and role of modern elements in the Leninist amalgam. In ideal terms, these elements are less ad hoc, less instrumental, and more central to Leninism as a form of charismatic impersonalism.

To sustain an argument that Lenin's innovation as a charismatic leader was to create a political organization whose defining feature was charismatic impersonalism, one must come to grips with two outstanding and central "challenges" from Soviet history. The most obvious challenge to the argument presented here is Stalin's personal charismatic role from the time of the Seventeenth Congress in 1934 through 1953. However, there is a prior challenge, and that is the personal charisma Lenin possessed vis-à-vis his Bolshevik followers.

More than anyone, Robert Tucker has convincingly outlined the features of Lenin's personal charisma. In Tucker's words, "to be a Bolshevik in the early years was not so much to accept a particular set of beliefs as it was to gravitate into the orbit of Lenin as a political mentor, revolutionary strategist, and personality."⁵ The Bolshevik colony in Geneva "proved to be a group of people who regarded themselves as Lenin's disciples and were worshipful in their attitude towards him. Although he was then only 33 years old, they habitually referred to him as the 'Old Man' (*starik*), thereby expressing profound respect for his Marxist erudition and his wisdom in all matters pertaining to revolution."⁶ Lenin's charismatic status was, of course, enhanced and confirmed by his personal role in the October Revolution. Tucker makes a very strong case for what he terms the "leader-centered movement."

Without denying the significance of Lenin's personal charisma or the extent to which Leninism was and remains a movement with a strong leader orientation, I feel Tucker's argument is somewhat misleading. This is not because he fails to recognize elements in Lenin's behavior that are inconsistent with personal charisma, but rather because Tucker does not system-

5. Robert C. Tucker, ed., *The Lenin Anthology* (New York: Norton, 1975), p. xiv.

6. *Ibid.*

atically relate Lenin's personal qualities to the defining features of the party he created.

In contrast, in a study entitled "The Great Headmaster," Edmund Wilson describes Lenin in terms that are quite literally coincident with those I have used to describe his Party. The core of Wilson's description is contained in the following passage:

Though he [Lenin] was susceptible . . . to very strong personal attachments which survived political differences . . . [he] could no more allow these feelings to influence his political action than the headmaster can allow himself to be influenced in the matter of grades or discipline by his affection for a favorite pupil.⁷

In a society where personal attachments were an integral part of social organization, Lenin's detachment was culturally revolutionary. Furthermore, this personal detachment was placed in the service of a political organization designed to mirror his own qualities. In this light, Tucker's comments on Lenin's actions as Party leader and in response to the growing cult of his person take on added meaning. According to Tucker, "As supreme leader, [Lenin] did not simply issue commands to the ruling group; he did not rule by arbitrary Diktat. Automatic acquiescence in his position was not expected."⁸ And when Lenin became aware that he was being made the object of a personality cult, he responded negatively. He summoned one of his aides in the Council of People's Commissars and asked:

What is this? How could one permit it? . . . They write that I'm such and such, exaggerate everything, call me a genius, a special kind of man. Why, this is horrible. . . . All our lives we have carried on an ideological struggle against the glorification of personality, of the individual. We long ago solved the question of heroes.⁹

Lenin's reference to the "question of heroes" should not be treated casually. There is a sense in which both Leninism and Nazism emphasize the heroic ethic. It is not in the appreciation of heroism that Leninism differs from Nazism; it is in the des-

7. Edmund Wilson, *To the Finland Station* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1953), p. 391.

8. Tucker, *Lenin Anthology*, p. lvi.

9. *Ibid.*, p. lx.

ignation of the heroic agent. For Lenin, the Party is hero¹⁰—not the individual leader. The fact that Lenin possessed personal charisma is not as significant as the way in which he defined charisma and related it to the organization he created. As an individual, he combined forceful charismatic certainty with a genuine and persistent emphasis on empirical and impersonal modes of investigation and interaction. His party was created (so to speak) in his own image. And that image was distinctive in its novel recasting of elements—heroism, arbitrariness, and absolute certainty, along with impersonal discipline, planning, and empirical investigation.

One might well remark that perhaps there was a novel recasting of such elements during Lenin's lifetime, but certainly not afterwards—not during the period of "high" Stalinism from the 17th Party Congress in 1934 through 1953. As an observation, this remark is valuable; as a conclusion, it is superficial. In fact, an examination of Stalinism is the best way to point out the differences between Nazism and Leninism and single out the defining features of Leninism.

Certainly the formal similarities between Stalinism and the Nazi regime are striking and by no means all superficial. The cult of personality that surrounded Stalin (and that has at times surrounded other Leninist leaders) was in a basic respect every bit as intense as that surrounding Hitler. Even more significant than the cult of personality was the Stalinist "cult of cadres," captured in the saying "The cadres decide everything." Under Stalinism, the Party and regime organization might be viewed as no more than an aggregation of hierarchically ordered heroes—again quite like Nazi organization. These consequential similarities do indeed allow for and call for comparison. However, the comparison itself reveals a character-defining difference between Stalinist Leninism and Nazism that is more important than the similarities.

In a relatively (and inexplicably) ignored article on factionalism in the Nazi Party, Joseph Nyomarky has spelled out the

10. A study examining heroism as an integral component of Leninism's conception of the cadre, the Party itself, the idealized character of the working class, and its images of postcapitalist society would be of great value.

difference between Stalinist Leninism and Nazism quite well. Nyomarkey is intrigued by the fact that in Nazism there does not appear to have been the same incidence or type of factionalism that appears in Leninism. His explanation is that there are two types of movements—charismatic and ideological. In a charismatic movement (i.e., Nazism), “the leader claims authority because he incorporates the idea in his person,” while in an ideological movement (i.e., Stalinist Leninism), “the leaders will claim authority on the basis of the dogma, and will always represent themselves as its representatives.”¹¹ Nyomarkey goes on to argue that in an ideological movement, it is the “dogma which ultimately holds the group together and which lends authority to the leader . . . [and] the dogma which can give rise to various interpretations which can in turn become the bases of factional conflicts.”¹²

The point is crucial. It suggests that even under Stalin, the formal or ideal basis of Leninist party organization, membership definition, and policy formulation was independent from his personal insight. Can it be shown to have mattered? In several ways. First, Stalin had difficulty in establishing a *führer* position, whereas Nazism was defined precisely in terms of the *Führerprinzip*. Second, there is potentially within the Leninist party a legitimate basis for someone like Khrushchev to attack both the “cult of personality” and the notion that “the cadres decide everything.”¹³ A third and even more telling piece of evidence has to do with a character-defining feature of Stalinism itself: the idea of a “correct line.” An appreciation of the place and meaning of this notion in Leninism (and Stalinism as one expression of Leninism) goes a long way in helping to delineate the novelty of Leninism as a distinctive amalgam of charismatic and modern (i.e., impersonal, analytic, and empirical) elements.

At the 16th Party Congress in 1930, Stalin addressed himself

11. Joseph Nyomarkey, “Factionalism in the National Socialist German Workers’ Party, 1925–1926: The Myth and Reality of the ‘Northern Faction,’” *Political Science Quarterly* 80, no. 1 (March 1965): 45.

12. *Ibid.*

13. George Breslauer emphasizes Khrushchev’s critical stance toward the party cadres (*apparatchiks*) in “Khrushchev Reconsidered,” *Problems of Communism* 25, no. 5 (September–October 1976): 18–34.

to the question of leadership. What—he asked—guaranteed that the Party would be an effective political organization? Was it the presence of a great leader? Someone privileged in his insight into the working of history? Stalin answered no. “For correct leadership by the Party it is necessary, apart from everything else, that the Party should have a correct line.”¹⁴ However, in 1930 Stalin had not yet attained the “sultanist” leadership that was to be his after 1934.¹⁵ His comments at the 18th Party Congress in 1939—at a time when his personal mastery of the Party was well established—thus have added importance. Stalin once again turned to the question of leadership and made the following critical statement: “After a correct political line has been worked out and tested in practice, the Party cadres become the decisive force in the leadership. . . . A correct political line is of course the primary and most important thing.”¹⁶

Let us now draw some conclusions about Leninist organization as a novel form of charisma—an instance of charismatic impersonality.

1. Both Leninism and Nazism are in crucial respects instances of heroically oriented responses to the class order developments of Western Europe.
2. Both Lenin and Stalin possessed personal charisma, and, particularly during Stalin’s rule, the leader threatened the Party as the primary locus of charisma.
3. Even under Stalin the emphasis on the leader and cadres—at least in formal and ideal terms—always remained subordinate to the Party as the agent capable of formulating a

14. J. V. Stalin, “Political Report of the Central Committee to the Sixteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) (Bolshevik), June 27, 1930,” in J. V. Stalin, *Works*, vol. 12 (April 1929–June 1930) (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1955; reprinted by Red Star Press, London, n.d.).

15. More properly, “neo-sultanism,” a variant of a neopatrimonial political order in which the leader’s personal (political) discretion is the political system’s defining feature. Max Weber discusses the sultanist variant of patrimonialism in *Economy and Society*, (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), 1: 231–32.

16. J. V. Stalin, “Report to the Eighteenth Congress of the CPSU (Bolshevik) On the Work of the Central Committee,” in *The Essential Stalin*, ed. Bruce Franklin (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1972), pp. 373–74.

correct line, a program separate from the personal insight of the leader.

4. The emphasis on the primacy of a correct line strongly suggests that even when minor or latent, the charismatic impersonalism of the Party is an integral/defining component of Leninism that is constantly available in a formal sense—and intermittently available in a political sense—as a legitimate basis for countering tendencies toward führerism. The 20th Party Congress is the most striking, but by no means the only, illustration of this point.
5. It is misleading to distinguish between charismatic and ideological movements à la Nyomarkey. Rather, one can distinguish different types of charismatic movements, with Leninism being one and Nazism another. The leader is charismatic in Nazism; the program and (possibly) the leader are charismatic in Leninism.¹⁷

The importance of the notion of the correct line in Leninism is that it is not a typical Party program. Instead, it parallels the organizational character of the Party, itself an amalgam of modern and charismatic elements. The “correct line” is simultaneously an analytic and empirical statement of the stages of national and international development, a set of policy guides, and an authoritatively compelling and exclusive ideological-political statement that must be adopted and adhered to.

In the “correct line,” one has a striking contemporary instance of a modern program encompassed and understood in neosacral terms. Clearly, at different points in the developmental history of Leninist regimes, the empirical-impersonal elements have been severely constrained. Gulag, Lysenko, and “Dizzy with Success” cannot, should not, and do not have to be

17. There is a constant tendency in Leninism toward strong executive leaders. This is not the same as a constant tendency toward the emergence of a charismatic leader, as in the case in Nazism, fascism, or war bands. I would argue that it is possible to specify the developmental points at which the emergence of charismatic leadership in Leninist regimes is likely and when there is likely to be an attempt on the part of the Party elite to create a charismatic aura around a leader (a related but different phenomenon than the emergence of a charismatic leader).

ignored to sustain the argument that Leninism is a conflictual, but effective, amalgam of charismatic impersonalism.

Lenin recast the mutually exclusive elements of individual heroism and impersonal modern organization in creating a "party of a new type." This party combined heroism and impersonalism, charismatic arbitrariness (i.e., antipathy toward rational procedures and calculations) and sober empirical examination of social change. No better formal expression of this novel amalgam can be found than the notion of the "correct line." However, the striking differences in the weighting and definition of charismatic and modern elements in the Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev regimes make clear the need for a synthetic statement of the constants and variables in the syndrome of Leninist charismatic organization.

One can identify charismatic and modern imperatives in Leninist parties and regimes. These imperatives are constant and conflictual. They provide for a continuously recognizable identity alongside the historically varying and developmentally related features of Leninist organization.¹⁸ On the charismatic side, there is the concept of the working class, cadres, and Party as heroic elements. In particular, the Party is called on to sacrifice, struggle, and exercise continual vigilance to maintain its purpose and commitment to the realization of historical laws of social development that are conceived in teleological and universal terms. On the modern side, there is a materialist orientation that (with varying degrees of effectiveness but undeniable persistence) calls for an empirical, undogmatic examination of social change and organization, as well as for the collective discussion of social issues.

In contrast to the constant elements of Leninism, there are variables whose identification can explain the changes in the

18. To suggest the existence of organizational constants in Leninism is not to assert their "Platonic" imperviousness to the national and international environments with which Leninist regimes interact. Rather, the emphasis on the existence of organizationally constant imperatives directs one's attention to the types of situations Leninist regimes are likely to avoid, resist, and/or be unwilling/unable to adapt to. For a most impressive analysis of a nation's adaptation within the framework of ideological constants, see Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1955), *passim*.

institutional facade, policies, and ideological emphases that mark the developmental profile of Leninist regimes. Two are of particular importance. The first I term *developmental tasks*. For current purposes, it is crucial to understand that a Leninist elite's adoption of a specific task causes particular types of political uncertainties and, consequently, particular types of regime structures to manage those uncertainties.¹⁹ These regime structures vary in terms of the relative power held by the Party leader and by the Party's central organs, the relative status of the Party vis-à-vis police and military institutions, the distinctive competence of the cadres recruited (i.e., in risk-taking, coercion, or social management), and the status of ideology, from that of partisan empirical instrument to that of a stereotyped or dogmatic conception of reality.

The second variable is the *sociocultural milieu* within which a Leninist party and regime operates. Whether, to what extent, and in which areas a society is primarily status- or class-oriented and organized will significantly shape the way in which Leninist leadership is expressed, policies are implemented, authority is interpreted, and so on.

To summarize: The profile of a Leninist regime at any given point reflects both the interplay of organizational constants—charismatic (heroic) and modern (materialist) elements—and of these constant conflictual imperatives with varying developmental tasks and changes in the sociocultural configuration of the society being acted upon. To point out the complexity of this relationship would be trite. Whether a phenomenon is simple or complex is rarely the crucial consideration. It is whether we can make the phenomenon intelligible. The terms and mode of analysis presented here increase that possibility, if in no other way than by not confusing organizationally constant with developmentally specific elements in the Leninist syndrome.²⁰

19. See chapters 3 and 5.

20. While valuable in other respects, both Richard Lowenthal's "Development vs. Utopia in Communist Policy," in *Change in Communist Systems*, ed. Chalmers Johnson (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970), pp. 83–117, and Robert C. Tucker's "The Deradicalization of Marxist Movements," in Tucker, *The Marxian Revolutionary Idea*, pp. 172–215, contribute to this confusion. (Along with my criticism of these two works, I very readily acknowl-

One highly significant aspect of Leninism as a type of charismatic organization remains to be examined—that is, its status or traditional features. Once this is done, we shall have a more complete grasp of Leninism as an effective institutional substitute in some peasant countries with a nonfeudal legacy for the type of class organization and identification that emerged in nineteenth-century western Europe—a substitute that in certain respects “fits” and in others attacks the institutional and cultural profile of a status society.

To develop an argument about the status or traditional features of Leninist charismatic organization requires a summation and extension of Max Weber’s observations about the relationship between tradition and charisma. According to Weber, charisma and tradition are fundamentally antithetical. Charisma calls for revolution; tradition, for conservation. However, in certain formal respects, traditional and charismatic orientations are similar, given their stress on personal (not abstract) and substantive (not formal) considerations. Both forms of social action are “hostile” to the impersonal-rational calculation that typifies modern organization. In Weber’s words, “the two basically antagonistic forces of charisma and tradition regularly merge with one another; . . . the external forms of the two structures of domination are . . . often similar to the point of being identical.”²¹

Identifying the formal overlap that exists between charismatic and status (or traditional) orientations is an important step in coming to grips with the ability of Leninism to operate effectively in a peasant-status milieu, but it is inadequate alone. Two other aspects of the charisma-tradition relationship—which to the best of my knowledge Weber did not develop—are

edge how much Lowenthal and Tucker have shaped my own interests.) Other influential studies in the field present a unidimensional or “collapsed” view of development in Soviet and Soviet-type regimes—for example, Samuel P. Huntington, “Social and Institutional Dynamics of One-Party Systems,” in *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society*, ed. S. P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore (New York: Basic Books, 1970), pp. 3–48, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, “The Soviet Political System: Transformation or Degeneration?” in *Dilemmas of Change in Soviet Politics*, ed. Brzezinski (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), pp. 1–35.

21. Weber, *Economy and Society*, vol. 3, esp. p. 1122.

highly consequential for a charismatic leader's (or organization's) political effectiveness. First, charismatic leaders or organizations gain entry into the very societies they wish to destroy and transform by possessing traditional features that are formally congruent with certain facets of a peasant-status society. (I enumerate these features below.) A charismatic leader is unlikely to get the majority of a society to adhere to his vision for the simple reason that, by definition, his vision is revolutionary and entails fundamental revisions in the identity and organization of individuals and groups. Yet charismatic leaders have adherents. The standard explanation from Weber through Karl Deutsch has focused on social mobilization and turbulence.²² A society subject to serious disruption, stress, and uncertainty creates a pool of persons available for recommitment. This is a valuable and empirically confirmable point; however, there is more to it. What makes the charismatic effective is not only the availability of socially mobilized clusters, but also the charismatic leader's (and/or organization's) possession of qualities that, at least in a formal or structural sense, are consistent with the defining features of the society to be transformed. It is the possession of these features that gives the charismatic entry into the society he or she wishes to change.

Let us refer to the examples of charisma discussed earlier: Christ lived at a time of great turmoil (i.e., social mobilization) in Israel, but it was his status as a rabbi and student of Mosaic law that made him intelligible to others, gained him an audience, and gave him a toehold in the society he wished to transform. It was Hitler's patriotic participation in the German army in World War I and his credentials as a German nationalist and supporter of the German army that provided him with a base in a society that he wished to transform in ways that many a nationalist would come to rue.

Lenin's case would appear to be more difficult to interpret in these terms. He was by no stretch of the imagination a Russian nationalist (as, in a peculiar fashion, Stalin was). But he did present himself in terms intelligible to a "mobilized" Russian

22. See Karl Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," *American Political Science Review* 55, no. 3 (September 1961): 493-514.