Introduction

BOUNDARIES AND TERRITORY

The Pyrenean frontier of France and Spain is one of the oldest and most stable political boundaries in western Europe: it has not shifted location since France annexed the province of Roussillon and part of the Cerdanya valley in 1659–1660. Twentieth-century theorists consider the French–Spanish boundary a "fossilized," "cold," or "dead" boundary, since it has rarely presented cause for major international contention.[1] Today, the official boundary of France and Spain has none of the political significance of the many contested borders throughout the Third World, or even the United States–Mexican boundary, to mention only the most newsworthy. Yet the reports of its "death," in the sense of the French–Spanish boundary's permanent lack of controversy, have been slightly exaggerated. The rights of fishermen near Hendaye, the protests of Roussillon wine-growers opposed to the entry of Spanish wines, and disputes over territorial competence in the repression of Basque terrorism are among the issues that continue to occupy the press and the foreign offices of Spain and France. For some, Spain's 1986 entry into the European Common Market may have re-

1. For example, J. Brunhes and C. Vallaux, *La géographie de l'histoire* (Paris, 1921), 353; M. Foucher, *L'invention des frontières* (Paris, 1987), 128; for a typology of classes of tension in border areas, see R. Gross, "Registering and Ranking of Tension Areas," in *Confini e Regioni: Il potenziale di sviluppo e di pace delle periferie* (Trieste, 1973), 317–328.

vived echos of Louis XIV's claim that "the Pyrenees are no more"; for others, 1993 means a Europe without boundaries; but the reality of the Spanish-French boundary in the Cerdanya suggests otherwise.

Still, border disputes in the Pyrenees are not the catalysts of military conflagrations or diplomatic entreaties as they are at other boundaries; and it is this relative "fossilization" of the boundary that requires explanation. That the Spanish–French boundary in this century has become less of a source of political tension than others in Western Europe, such as the Rhine, is due in large part to shifts of European geopolitical concerns. But the explanation also lies in the dual appearance of an undisputed boundary line and an accepted opposition of nationalities in the borderland. This book is concerned with the historical development of these two structural components of the nation-state—a national community within a delimited state territory—as they took shape in one section of the French–Spanish borderland between 1659 and 1868.

The dates are derived from the history of the political boundary itself. By the Treaty of the Pyrenees in 1659 and its addenda the following year, the French crown acquired the province of Roussillon and a portion of the Cerdanya valley. Political geographers call this the "allocation" of the boundary, the first step in a three-stage process of "allocation, delimitation, and demarcation."[2] The delimitation and demarcation of the Pyrenean border occurred more than two centuries later, when between 1854 and 1868 the Spanish and French governments agreed in the Treaties of Bayonne to mark an imaginary border line by posing officially sanctioned border stones. The French–Spanish boundary between 1659 and 1868 may have been stable, in the sense that no territories were exchanged between the two states. Yet in 1659 it was a boundary defined by the jurisdictional limits of specific villages. Much would happen before it became a delimited boundary defining national territorial sovereignty.

Modern definitions of territorial sovereignty focus on political boundaries as the point at which a state's territorial competence finds its ultimate expression. States are defined by their exclusive jurisdiction over a delimited territory; and the boundaries of territorial competence

2. These distinctions are shared by such disparate approaches as P. de Lapradelle, *La frontière: Etude de Droit International* (Paris, 1928); and S. B. Jones, *Boundary-Making: A Handbook for Statesmen, Treaty Editors, and Boundary Commissioners* (Washington, 1945).

define the sovereignty of a state. A recognized authority on international law, Charles de Visscher, wrote that

> the firm configuration of its territory furnishes the state with the recognized setting for the exercise of its sovereign powers. The relative stability of this territory is a function of the exclusive authority that the state exercises within it, and of the co-existence beyond its boundaries of political entities endowed with similar prerogatives. . . . It is because the state is a territorial organization that the violation of its boundaries is inseparable from the idea of aggression against the state itself.[3]

This idea of territorial sovereignty and the inviolability of political boundaries owes much to modern political nationalism. In the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, territories and boundaries became political symbols over which nations went to war and for which citizens fought and died. Frederick Hertz, writing in 1944, evoked the political and ideological definition of territory as the codeword of political nationalism:

> The idea of the national territory is an important element of every national ideology. Every nation regards its country as an inalienable sacred heritage, and its independence, integrity, and homogeneity appear bound up with national security, independence, and honour. This territory is often described as the body of the national organism, and the language as its soul.[4]

This ideologically and politically charged idea of national territory is the final expression of territorial sovereignty as it developed historically in the west. Although the Greeks and Romans had their own ideas of territoriality, and the later middle ages witnessed the appearance of "a new limited territorial *patria*," such premodern conceptions of territory differed greatly from the tenets of modern nationalism.[5] This book is not about political nationalism as it developed in the later nineteenth century, but about its presupposition: the idea of national territorial sovereignty from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century. It considers the emergence of the notion of territory in the eighteenth century, the

3. C. de Visscher, *Theory and Reality in Public International Law*, trans. P. E. Corbett (Princeton, 1957), 197–198; see also his *Problèmes de confins en droit international public* (Paris, 1969).

4. F. Hertz, *Nationality in History and Politics: A Psychology and Sociology of National Sentiment and Nationalism* (London, 1944), 150–151.

5. On the emergence of territorial identity in the Classical world, see J. Armstrong, *Nations before Nationalism* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1982), esp. 14–53 and 93–128; on the territorial state in later medieval Europe, see E. Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology* (Princeton, 1981), esp. 232–272.

ways in which the French Revolution gave a national content to territorial sovereignty, and the politicization of territory in the nineteenth century. Unlike recent studies of the "invention of territory," it does so by focusing on the evolution of political frontiers and boundaries.[6]

Political geographers, following conventional usage, generally distinguish "boundaries" and "frontiers." The first evokes a precise, linear division, within a restrictive, political context; the second connotes more zonal qualities, and a broader, social context. Though the linear/zonal distinction draws its connotations in English from the American experience of the western frontier, similar distinctions are made in most modern European languages, where they too are colored by particular historical experiences.[7] The fact of this dualism has often misled theorists into perceiving an evolutionary movement, necessary and irreversible, from a sparsely settled, ill-defined zone toward an uncontested, nonsubstantial, mathematically precise line of demarcation. Such was the model that nineteenth- and early twentieth-century theorists of the frontier adopted, including the father of modern political geography, Friedrich Ratzel.[8] Applied to the historical experience of state formation in Europe, and in particular to the paradigmatic example of France, the model fails to explain much of anything. As a schema, it ignores two critical dimensions of political boundaries: first, that the zonal character of the frontier persists after the delimitation of a boundary line; and second, that the linear boundary is an ancient notion. As a historical description, the model falls dramatically short of the evidence.

On one hand, the persistence of a zone after the delimitation of the

6. See P. Alliès, *L'invention du territoire* (Grenoble, 1972). After critically assessing the notion of territory in contemporary legal thought (pp. 10–19), Alliès focuses on the construction of the administrative institutions of territorial sovereignty, tracing the development of a "homogenous space" of bureaucratic power in Old Regime France. See also J. Gottman, *The Significance of Territory* (Richmond, Va., 1973); and *Territoires,* no. 1 (Paris: Ecole Normale Supérieure, 1983).

7. On the French distinction of *frontière* and *limite,* see L. Febvre, "*Frontière*: The Word and the Concept," in P. Burke, ed., *A New Kind of History: From the Writings of [Lucien] Febvre,* trans. K. Folca (London, 1973), 208–218; and D. Nordman, "Des limites d'Etat aux frontières nationales," in P. Nora, ed., *Les lieux de mémoire: La Nation,* 3 vols. (Paris, 1986), 2: 50–59; and his "Frontiera e confini in Francia: Evoluzione dei termini e dei concetti," in C. Ossola, C. Raffestin, and M. Ricciardi, eds., *La frontiera da stato a nazione: Il caso Piemonte* (Rome, 1987), 39–55. On the Spanish distinction of *frontera* (or *marca*) and *limite,* see A. Truyol y Serra, "Las fronteras y las marcas," *Revista española de derecho internacional* 10 (1957): 107; and J. M. Cordero Torres, *Fronteras hispanicas: Geografía e historia* (Madrid, 1960).

8. Febvre, "*Frontière,*" 212, citing F. Ratzel, *Politische geographie* (Paris and Munich, 1903); C. Vallaux, *Le sol et l'état* (Paris, 1910), chap. 10; and J. Brunhes and C. Vallaux, *La géographie de l'histoire* (Paris, 1921), 344 et seq.

boundary has long been noted by jurists and students of international law. The zonal character of the frontier is a political construction of each state independently and of two contiguous states together. The zone consists in the distinct jurisdictions that each state establishes near the boundary for the purposes of its internal administration—thus a military zone, a customs zone, and so forth. And the zone represents the area where contiguous states realize policies of international cooperation and friendship, or *bon voisinage*. Although forms of international cooperation often precede the delimitation—as was the case in the Pyrenean frontier—they are codified and given stature in international law as part of the delimitation proceedings.[9]

On the other hand, the concept and practice of a linear boundary is an ancient—perhaps the most ancient—part of the frontier, one that long preceded modern delimitation treaties of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Techniques of delimitation were known to the Greeks and Romans, and the Treaty of Verdun in 843 involved 120 "emmisaries" who worked more than a year to determine the boundaries of the parcels distributed to the three heirs of Charlemagne.[10] Historians once argued that the medieval polity in France had no conception of precise territorial boundaries. The division of Verdun remained without significance, it was claimed, not only because of the complete absence of topographical maps, but also because the extensive fragmentation of authority and the growth of feudal jurisdictions soon became the rule in western Europe.[11] More recently, medieval historians have recognized that the extension of feudal relations from the tenth to the thirteenth centuries did not mean the disappearance of questions over boundaries. The territorial extent of a *seigneurie* could be largely ignored, but it could also be precisely delimited, especially in areas where the seigneurie took shape within the limits of the ancient gallo-roman divisions, or *pagi*. Moreover, the kingdom's boundaries were in general

9. Lapradelle, *La frontière,* pt. 2; I. Pop, *Voisinage et bon voisinage en droit international* (Paris, 1968).

10. On the "primitive" and "sacred" character of linear boundaries, see Lapradelle, *La frontière,* 18–19; and A. Van Gennep, *The Rites of Passage,* trans. M. B. Vizedom and G. L. Caffee (Chicago, 1960), 15–25. On Roman and Greek conceptions of the linear boundary, see M. Foucher, *L'invention des frontières* (Paris, 1987), 63–96; and Lapradelle, *La frontière,* 20–25. On the Treaty of Verdun, see R. Dion, *Les frontières de la France* (Paris, 1947), 71–85.

11. For example, R. Doucet, *Les institutions de la France au XVIe siècle,* 2 vols. (Paris, 1948), 1: 16; Lapradelle, *La frontière,* 29–31; and G. Dupont-Ferrier, "L'incertitude des limites territoriales en France du XIIIe au XVI siècle," in *Académie des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres: Comptes Rendus* (Paris, 1942), 62–77.

well-defined, marked by stones, rivers, trees, and sometimes man-made trenches, even if these borders were often disputed.[12]

Yet in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the political boundaries between kingdoms were fundamentally similar in kind to feudal limits within the kingdom. Only in the later thirteenth century did the two become different. The word "frontier" dates precisely from the moment when a new insistence on royal territory gave to the boundary a political, fiscal, and military significance different from its internal limits. The "frontier" was that which "stood face to" an enemy. This military frontier, connoting a defensive zone, stood opposed to the linear boundary or line of demarcation separating two jurisdictions or territories. But from the sixteenth century onward, and especially in the later eighteenth century, the two words tended to overlap; and the notion of delimitation became one of finding the *limites de la frontière,* the "boundaries of the frontier."[13]

Yet the conception of a linear political boundary as it appeared in the early modern period was not identical to the border line that slowly emerged after the seventeenth century. Peace treaties of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries sometimes included provisions for the delimitation and demarcation of boundary lines, but the Old Regime state was something less than a territorial one. The French monarchy continued to envision its sovereignty in terms of its jurisdiction over subjects, not over a delimited territory, relying on the inherited notions of "jurisdiction" and "dependency" instead of basing its administration on firmly delineated territorial circumscriptions.[14]

Thus the Treaty of the Pyrenees of 1659 named the Pyrenees Mountains as the division between France and Spain, and further stipulated that commissioners were to meet to define more precisely which were the Pyrenees. The commissioners used the word "delimitation" and claimed to seek the "line of division," but they resorted to ideas of "jurisdiction" and "dependency" when dividing up the villages of the

12. J.-F. Lemarignier, *Recherches sur l'hommage en marche et les frontières féodales* (Lille, 1945); P. Bonenfant, "A propos des limites médiévales," in *Hommage à Lucien Febvre: Eventail de l'histoire vivant,* 2 vols. (Paris, 1953), 1: 73–79; and B. Guenée, "Des limites féodales aux frontières politiques," in P. Nora, ed., *Les lieux de mémoire: La Nation* 2: 11–33.

13. B. Guenée, "Les limites," in M. François, ed., *La France et les français* (Paris, 1972), 57–64; Febvre, "*Frontière,*" 210–211; and Foucher, *L'invention des frontières,* 104–110.

14. Febvre, "*Frontière,*" 213–214; and Lapradelle, *La frontière,* 35–37; the notion of "jurisdiction" is explored more fully below, chap. 1.

Cerdanya. Only in 1868 did the Bayonne commissioners "delimit" the boundary by establishing an imaginary border of two national territories and "demarcate" the division by means of boundary stones.

The history of the boundary between 1659 and 1868, then, can hardly be summarized as the simple evolution from an empty zone to a precise line, but rather as the complex interplay of two notions of boundary—zonal and linear—and two ideas of sovereignty—jurisdictional and territorial. The two polarities can be found at any given moment in the history of the boundary, although the dominant but hardly unilinear tendency was the collapse of separate jurisdictional frontiers into a single territorial boundary line. The French Revolution gave to the idea of territory a specifically national content, while the early nineteenth-century states politicized the boundary line as the point where national territorial sovereignty found expression.

NATIONS AND NATIONAL IDENTITY

The creation of the territorial state constituted one component of the modern nation-state; the emergence of national identity formed another. According to received wisdom, modern nations were built from political centers outward and imposed upon marginal groups or peripheral regions in a process of cultural and institutional "assimilation" and "integration."[15] National identity, in this view, is the expression of cultural unity and national consciousness consolidated within the political framework of a centralized state. The paradigmatic experience is, of course, the French one. Though an older generation of scholars saw in the French Revolution a formative period in the creation of French unity, more recent scholarship suggests that France only became a unified nation at a surprisingly late date. For only during the early Third Republic (1870–1914) did the French state create the road and railway

15. Examples include K. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality* (Cambridge, Mass., 1953); K. Deutsch, "Some Problems in the Study of Nation-Building," in K. Deutsch and W. Foltz, eds., *Nation-Building* (New York, 1963), 1–16; C. A. Macartney, *National States and National Minorities* (Oxford, 1934); and R. Bendix, *Nation-Building and Citizenship* (New York, 1964). On the resistance of mountain regions to "the establishment of the state, dominant languages, and important civilizations," see F. Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II,* trans. S. Reynolds, 2 vols. (New York, 1966), 1: 38–41; and C. Levi, *Christ Stopped at Eboli,* trans. F. Frenaye (New York, 1947), 37–38.

networks, policies of compulsory primary education, and the universal military conscription by which peasants became Frenchmen.[16]

The corollary idea is that peasants become national citizens only when they abandon their identity as peasants: a local sense of place and a local identity centered on the village or valley must be superseded and replaced by a sense of belonging to a more extended territory or nation. In the words of Arnold Van Gennep, the dean of French folklorists, nationhood is "the extension of real or symbolic love felt for the corner of land which belongs to the commune, to an entire valley, an immense plain, the steppe, and the great city like Paris or Vienna."[17] National identity means replacing a sense of local territory by love of national territory.

Focusing on how the nation was imposed and built from the center outward, and claiming that its acceptance meant giving up local identities and territories, this received wisdom denies the role of local communities and social groups in shaping their own national identities. This book argues that both state formation and nation building were two-way processes at work since at least the seventeenth century. States did not simply impose their values and boundaries on local society. Rather, local society was a motive force in the formation and consolidation of nationhood and the territorial state. The political boundary appeared in the borderland as the outcome of national political events, as a function of the different strengths, interests, and (ultimately) histories of France and Spain. But the shape and significance of the boundary line was constructed out of local social relations in the borderland. Most concretely, the boundaries of the village jurisdictions ceded to France were not specified in the 1660 division, nor were they undisputed among village communities. The historical appearance of territory—the territorialization of sovereignty—was matched and shaped by a territorialization of the village communities, and it was the dialectic of local and national interests which produced the boundaries of national territory.

16. H. Kohn, *Prelude to Nation-States: The French and German Experience, 1789–1815* (Princeton, N.J., 1967); E. Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914* (Stanford, Calif., 1976); for critical reviews of Weber's use of modernization theory, see C. Tilly, "Did the Cake of Custom Break?" in J. Merriman, ed., *Consciousness and Class Experience in Nineteenth-Century Europe* (New York, 1979), 17–41; and T. W. Margadant, "French Rural Society in the Nineteenth Century: A Review Essay," *Agricultural History* 53 (1979): 644–651.

17. A. Van Gennep, *Traité comparatif des nationalités: 1. Les éléments extérieures de la nationalité* (Paris, 1922), 144.

In the same way, national identity—as Frenchmen or Spaniards—appeared on the periphery before it was built there by the center. It appeared less as a result of state intentions than from the local process of adopting and appropriating the nation without abandoning local interests, a local sense of place, or a local identity. At once opposing and using the state for its own ends, local society brought the nation into the village.

Benedict Anderson has recently described nations as "imagined communities." The nation-as-community is imagined (in the sense of created and invented, as opposed to fabricated and dissimulated) "because the members of even the smallest nations will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion." The definition usefully corrects the positivist conception of national identity as a product of "nation building," focusing our attention instead on the symbolic construction of national and political identities.[18] Others have emphasized in recent years the importance of distinction and differentiation in the development and expression of ethnic, communal, and national identities. In the French–Spanish borderland, it is this sense of difference—of "us" and "them"—which was so critical in defining an identity.[19] Imagining oneself a member of a community or a nation meant perceiving a significant difference between oneself and the other across the boundary. The proximity of the other across the French–Spanish boundary structured the appearance of national identity long before local society was assimilated to a dominant center. This study develops what might be called an oppositional model of national identity in a particular historical setting: the Cerdanya, divided between Spain and France in 1659.

18. B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (London, 1983), 15. Recent work that brings out the cultural and symbolic dimensions of the nation "imagined" and includes C. Beaune, *Naissance de la nation France* (Paris, 1986); and A. E. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (London, 1986). See also L. Hunt, *Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1984), chaps. 1–3; and M. Agulhon, *Marianne au Combat* (Paris, 1979), which focus on the political dimensions of the nation as a cultural construction; and the contributions to the collective volumes, *Les lieux de mémoire: La Nation* ed. P. Nora, 3 vols. (Paris, 1986), which generally do not.

19. Recent work emphasizing the oppositional character of identities includes R. Grillo, Introduction to Grillo, ed., *"Nation" and "State" in Europe: Anthropological Perspectives* (London, 1980); S. Wallman, "The Boundaries of 'Race': Processes of Ethnicity in England," *Man* n.s. 13 (1978): 200–217; the contributions to A. P. Cohen, *Symbolizing Boundaries: Identity and Diversity in British Cultures* (Manchester, 1986); and J. Armstrong, *Nations before Nationalism* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1982).

THE CERDANYA: BETWEEN FRANCE AND SPAIN

"Beautiful, fertile, and well populated, this land can be compared with any other." So wrote an anonymous but proud inhabitant of the Cerdanya in the early seventeenth century, describing his native land. The "land and county of Cerdaña" may be glimpsed momentarily through his eyes:

> Its shape is in the form of a ship, with its prow to the east and its stern to the west, although it turns a bit south in the form of a half-moon, but without losing its shape. The oars can be likened to the many valleys on all sides. Its length is seven large leagues, from the Tet bridge where the Cerdanya ends and the Conflent begins, to a little below the Arséguel bridge, a league and a half from the Seu d'Urgell. By that point, it is much less wide, with high mountains which can be likened to the sides of the ship.[20]

"A very fertile land," as he reiterated, the Cerdanya produced most of what was "necessary to human life"; indeed, natives and foreigners alike saw the densely populated valley, with its rich alluvial plain, its plentiful rivers, forests, and abundant pastures, as an oasis within the more forbidding ecology of the Mediterranean Pyrenees. (see maps 1 through 3.)

Most of the eighty or so settlements of the Cerdanya are situated at the juncture of the "ship" and its "oars," where a series of perpendicular valleys open onto the main valley floor. Their location assured the inhabitants, who numbered perhaps 8,000 in the early seventeenth century, the optimum use of the ecological resources necessary to the reproduction of their agro-pastoral way of life. The settlements were mostly nucleated villages, although in the southwestern part of the

20. Biblioteca de Catalunya (hereafter BC) MS 184, fol. 1v: "Descripción de la tierra y condado de Cerdaña," n.d., ca. 1610. These limits have varied historically: for the purposes of this study, I have taken the Perxa Pass as the northeastern limit of the valley, thus excluding the villages of Sant Pere dels Forcats, La Cabanasse, and La Llaguna, which nonetheless formed part of the eighteenth-century viguery (*viguerie*) of the French Cerdagne. Although the southwestern limit described by the seventeenth-century text has been generally accepted as the boundary of the canton (*comarca*), the eighteenth-century administrative district (*corregimiento*) of Puigcerdà extended beyond the Arséguel bridge and encompassed the valley of Ribes as well. Concerning the southwestern portion of the valley, this study focuses on the plain upstream from Bellver, roughly that part of the Spanish Cerdaña which became the province of Girona in Spain's administrative reforms of 1833. On the medieval and modern limits of the Cerdanya, see E. Balcells, "Vicisitudes historicas de las comarcas descritas (Alto Urgell, Alto Bergada, Cerdaña, y Andorra)," *Actas del 7e congreso internacional de estudios pirineaicos* (Jaca, 1974), 117–133; on the history of territorial divisions of Catalonia, see P. Vila, *La divisió territorial de Catalunya* (Barcelona, 1979), 27–63.

Map 1. France, Spain, Catalonia

plain—that which became, after 1660, the Spanish Cerdaña—the settlement pattern showed more dispersal.[21] The village communities were corporate groups, associations of "neighbors" (Catalan: *veïns*), with appointed judicial officers or bailiffs (*batlles*) and elected councillors (*syndics* or *consols*), holding land and usufruct rights in common.

21. P. Vila, *La Cerdanya* (Barcelona, 1926), 97–113.

Map 2. The Cerdanya

These communities maintained a great deal of autonomy in the regulation of their public life, as the seigneurial regime was relatively weak in the Catalan Pyrenees, and the early modern state was a distant entity that interfered rarely in communal affairs.

The village communities were the cells of social life; grouped together, many of them formed more inclusive unities, often within the framework of the perpendicular valleys, such as Carol and Osseja. Resembling the federations or "valley–communities" of the central and western Pyrenees, these associations of villages and hamlets held land, pastures, and usufruct rights in common. Although the County of Cerdanya itself had no property in common, it nonetheless maintained in the early seventeenth century institutional and political expressions of a collective public life. The seventeenth-century description divides the valley into four "quarters" or districts. Each district sent militia levies, money, or provisions as requested by the General Council of Syndics. Representatives of the quarters met regularly according to ancient privileges and maintained the right of imposing a local tax. Elected every three years, the syndics had their obligations and ordinances: "almost like the ancient tribunals of Rome, they care well for the public good."[22] The Cerdanya, in fact, was in the early seventeenth century one of the most unified cantons (*comarques*) in all of Catalonia.

At the center of the plain, situated on a small rise, was the town of Puigcerdà, the political, administrative, economic, and cultural center of the valley. In Puigcerdà sat the royal law courts and administration, all under the authority of the *veguer,* the royal judicial officer in charge of the district. In Puigcerdà resided much of the local ruling class, the nobles, titled bourgeois, and large landowners who were increasingly drawn to the "town." The weekly markets and annual fairs brought peasants from all over the valley to buy and sell livestock and manufactured goods. Religious festivals were also the occasion for peasants to gather in Puigcerdà, where could be found the several churches and monasteries with properties, incomes, and seigneurial jurisdictions over many surrounding villages. Finally, as the principle fortified site in the district, the town afforded protection for villagers and townspeople alike, who found refuge within its walls.[23]

This small, self-contained, and relatively prosperous world was completely surrounded by a ring of mountains. The valley floor lies at an

22. BC MS 184, fol. 3v; S. Galceran i Vigué, *L'antic sindicat de Cerdanya: Estudi socio-econòmic based en la historia inèdita dels segles XIV al XVII* (Girona, 1973), esp. 65–69.

23. BC MS 184, fols. 24v and 26–33: "Descripción de Puigcerdan" by the Dominican monk, Joan Trigall, written in 1603. The most important religious institutions were the Collegiate Church of Santa Maria, who are "seigneurs of many villages with many vassals" and richly endowed with more than 80 benefices; the Augustinian monks of San Francisco; the Preachers of Santo Dominico; and the Nuns of Santa Clara.



Map 3. The Division of the Cerdanya

SPANISH CERDAÑA

1 Alp
2 **Bellver**
3 Bolvir
4 Das
Mossol
Sanabastre
5 Ellar
Olopte
6 Ger
Saga
7 Grus
Riu
8 Guils
Saneja
9 Isobol
10 Lles
Coborriu
11 **Llívia**
Sareja
Gorguja
12 Meranges
13 Montella
14 Musser
Aranser
15 Prats
Sampsor
16 Prullans
Ardovol
17 **Puigcerdà**
Ventajola
Rigolisa
18 Queixans
Les Pereres
19 Talltendre
Orden
20 Urtx
Vilar
Estoll
21 Villalobent
Aja
22 Villec
Estana

FRENCH CERDAGNE

23 Angostrina
24 Bolquera
25 Càldegues
Onzès
26 Dorres
27 Egat
28 Enveig
29 Err
30 Estavar
Bajanda
31 Eyna
32 Hix/Bourg-Madame
33 Llo
Rohet
34 Nahuja
35 Odello
Via
36 Osseja
Valsebollera
37 Palau
38 Sallagosa
Ro
Vedrinyans
39 Santa Llocaya
40 Targasona
41 Ur
Flori
42 Vilanova
43 Carol Valley
Carol
La Tor de Carol
Porta
Porté
Ques
44 **Mont-Louis**