I Concepts and General Problems

The controversy over the ancient Greek economy
Political history is a time-honoured invention; it originated, of course, with the Greeks. Economic history, on the other hand, is a discovery of the nineteenth century. Now it would be wrong to say that before this time economic questions in the history of antiquity had failed to attract attention, since already in the eighteenth century one finds studies of detail on such matters. In 1817 August Boeckh published his great work on the political economy of the Athenians, *Die Staatsbaushaltung der Athener*. Yet all these works exercised no immediate influence on historians of antiquity. Economic history remained for some time a separate sphere, not yet integrated into general history. Thus one of the greatest historians of Greece, George Grote, could write a *History of Greece* (which appeared in London from 1846 to 1856) in which economic questions, although they were not entirely missing, occupied only a very limited space and were not subjected to any systematic enquiry. And yet Grote, an influential businessman in the City, was in a good position to appreciate their importance, even though he may only have apprehended them through the distorting lens of English liberalism. But in the long run the problem of how the new economic dimension was to be integrated into the history of Greece could not fail to arise.

The first general attempt came towards the end of the nineteenth century and is associated with the names of the great German philologist-historians Eduard Meyer, K.J. Beloch and Georg Busolt (especially Eduard Meyer). Some German economists of the nineteenth century had constructed theories which were designed to summarize in broad outline the economic evolution of man through the ages, and for this purpose they
made use of the concept of stages of development through which
the history of mankind was supposed to have progressed. Thus
one of them, Karl Bücher, in his book *Die Entstehung der
Volkswirtschaft* (The Origins of National Economy), which
appeared first in 1893 and was subsequently reissued several
times, identified three stages in economic evolution, ‘closed
household economy’ (*geschlossene Hauswirtschaft*, a concept
which he borrowed from a predecessor, Karl Rodbertus), ‘city
economy’ (*Stadtwirtschaft*) and ‘national economy’ (*Volks-
wirtschaft*). In his mind these three stages corresponded roughly
to the three great divisions of history: ‘closed household economy’
corresponded to antiquity, ‘city economy’ corresponded to the
Middle Ages and ‘national economy’ corresponded to the modern
world. Bücher’s scheme, a mere abstraction characteristic of the
great syntheses of the nineteenth century, could not stand up to
scrutiny, least of all as far as antiquity was concerned. Ed. Meyer,
and following him the other German historians, set out to destroy
it and substitute a more ‘realistic’ view of the ancient Greek
economy. Their avowed intention was to write a history of
Greece which would be more ‘modern’ than those written till
then, and from this point of view the economy was destined to
find at last its due place in a history of ancient Greece. To be sure,
the aim was an entirely reasonable one, but it led them straight to
a different error. Just as their conception of the political history
of Greece was distorted by the contemporary German pre-
occupation with the problem of national unity, so too the picture
they drew of Greek economic history was a more or less faithful
replica of the economic development of modern Europe. The
concepts and terminology of contemporary economic history
were applied by them more or less literally to the Greek world.
According to them, as early as the eighth century, the Greek
world witnessed a considerable development of industry and
commerce, production and exchanges of a capitalist kind
expanded, and a monetary economy came into existence. Already
then the old economic regime based on the land was doomed, the
old landed aristocracies were replaced by moneyed aristocracies,
and the landowners gave way to ‘industrialists’ and traders. The
political history of Greece was then reinterpreted in the light of
the alleged economic revolution and its presumed social conse-
quences. Greek states were credited in their political behaviour
with commercial considerations of a very modern kind. These
historians had no scruples in drawing parallels, whether real or imaginary, with the history of modern Europe. 'In the history of Greece', wrote Ed. Meyer, 'the seventh and sixth centuries correspond to the fourteenth and fifteenth in the modern world, the fifth corresponds to the sixteenth.' One could not be more explicit. K. Bücher responded as best he could to the attack of the Greek historians; he had no trouble in pointing out numerous gaps and weaknesses in the theories of his opponents, who relied on a highly subjective use of ancient sources. But this did not corroborate his own interpretation of the ancient economy.

Clearly the discussion had been wrongly approached and so made a bad start. One may even say that it has never quite overcome this false start, all the more so as the prestige and authority of the German historians has often succeeded in imposing a view of the Greek economy which is surely untenable. And yet responsibilities were shared. The fundamental mistake made by both Bücher and Meyer as well as all their respective disciples consisted in the very terms in which the discussion was approached. The problem was forced (and has long continued to be forced) into the straitjacket of a simple alternative: was the Greek economy modern or primitive? Quite apart from value judgments implicit in such a formulation, which consciously or not, could affect one's point of view, both sides in the controversy started from the premiss that economic evolution was a unilinear process which in theory followed a regular curve (although in practice it need not be strictly continuous). In studying the Greek economy the task was therefore to determine what point on the curve it had reached and, according to the answer one gave, one described the Greek economy as having been modern, primitive, or as having reached only an intermediate stage. The fundamental question of deciding whether or not it was possible to study the Greek 'economy' in isolation and with the use of concepts created for the modern world was not even raised. Whereas the discussion ought to have centred first on concepts, the procedure was as if it was all only a question of facts: study economic facts and everything was solved. As the facts clearly invalidated the theory of Bücher, the 'modernists' were able to believe that the controversy was settled in their favour.

A fresh start was needed to emerge from the impasse, and to the great German sociologist Max Weber belongs the credit for the initiative which led to a better understanding of the position
held by the 'economy' in Greek history. From the outset Weber rejected the false alternative 'modernism or primitivism' to which historians had attempted to confine the discussion (and yet the alternative continued to be invoked subsequently). He approached the subject from the angle of institutions and laid stress on the particular characteristics of Greek history; his aim was to define the ancient Greek city as opposed to the medieval city. The Greek city was an aristocracy of warriors – or even of sailors – and a city of consumers, whereas the medieval city was a city of producers. A craftsman in fourteenth-century Florence, a city which exercised its sovereignty over the countryside (contado), was a citizen in so far as he belonged to one of the arts, and he exercised his share of sovereignty through the art of which he was a member. There was nothing comparable in Athens; ironmongers, potters and shopkeepers, even if they were citizens (which was not always the case), did not owe their citizenship to their craft but to the fact that they were born from a citizen and the daughter of a citizen, and were duly registered and recognized in their phratries and demes. Weber emphasized particularly the role of war in Greek history: Greek democracy, a political club of the citizens, would redistribute to its members the fruits of war – tribute, land and so forth. These ideas of Weber were taken up and further developed by Johannes Hasebroek in two works, Staat und Handel im alten Griechenland, and Griechische Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftsgeschichte bis zu den Perserkriegen, the former being the more important work from the theoretical point of view. Following the example of Weber, Hasebroek shifted the discussion away from the forms and range of economic activity to the links between the economy and the political life of the Greek city. According to him there could be no question of economic policy in the modern sense in the Greek cities (mercantile policy, competition for outlets, etc.), because there was no national commerce or industry in them as a result of the considerable role played by outsiders, whether free or unfree, in economic activity, and by definition these had no access to political power in the cities. The citizens reserved for themselves a monopoly of land ownership, and the other economic activities (commerce, manufacture, etc.) were to a great extent left to outsiders. In so far as Greek states showed any interest in economic problems, they sought only to secure imports of materials and commodities essential for the life of the city: citizens mattered
only as consumers, not as producers. Otherwise the state was concerned with its revenues, and these were catered for by means of taxes on economic activity or quite simply through war and foreign domination in its various forms.

One can see where the genuinely new and positive contribution of Weber and Hasebroek lies. What they did was to lift the discussion from the level of facts and economic forms in the abstract to that of the relationship between the economy and the institutions of the Greek city: there could be no valid study of the Greek economy outside the framework of the city.

One might imagine that the work of Weber and Hasebroek freed the discussion once and for all from the impasse which had been reached. Unfortunately this has not quite been the case. Hasebroek’s works created a stir and gave fresh impetus to the controversy between ‘modernists’ and ‘primitivists’ (a controversy which now was, or ought to have been, superseded). Hasebroek was open to criticism through excessive schematism, some questionable assertions and gaps in his knowledge. But this did not mean that one could brush aside the essential terms of his and Weber’s analysis, and yet this is what has often happened. Though there has been progress since Hasebroek in our detailed knowledge of the Greek economy, the fundamental problems have been frequently neglected, and no comprehensive theory has been put forward to replace Hasebroek’s in a study of the ancient Greek economy. At times scholars even proceed as though the controversy had not even taken place and the position of Ed. Meyer and his disciples were still tenable.

One must however mention here the work of the Hungarian–American historian and anthropologist Karl Polanyi as occupying a special position, for although Polanyi was no specialist in the ancient Greek economy and did not attempt to put forward a theory designed to apply specifically to Greek history, his ideas mark an important step forward in the approach to the study of the economy in societies other than those of the modern world, and they can provide us with a useful starting point for a number of general considerations.

In his study of the position occupied by the economy in human societies Polanyi drew a very clear distinction between modern and other societies. In modern societies, the economy has ‘freed’ itself and become ‘dismembered’. It has become a sphere of its own and can therefore be studied in isolation, with the help of
concepts which have been created for it alone: the economy is a sphere which obeys its own laws. In other societies, by contrast, and in particular in ‘primitive’ and archaic societies, the economy is always more or less ‘embedded’ in society and all its institutions; it is not a separate sphere, experienced and organized as such by that particular society. It cannot therefore be studied in isolation; it has no fully independent existence and its functioning will constantly be under the influence of social factors of a non-economic kind which are alien to it. It follows that to study the place occupied by the economy in a society of this kind one cannot apply the concepts and terminology of modern economies, for these apply only to the world for which they have been created.

To replace modern economic concepts in the study of other societies Polanyi put forward four schemes by reference to which one might understand the circulation and distribution of goods in such societies: reciprocity, redistribution, exchanges by means of trade, and household economy. One need not attach absolute significance to these four schemes or try to apply them systematically to Greek history, though they may be able to shed light on particular aspects of it.

On the other hand, the distinction drawn by Polanyi between economies which are autonomous in relation to society and economies which are more or less embedded in society is a fundamental one. It brings out explicitly the underlying trend of the Weber–Hasebroek analysis, namely the impossibility of studying the Greek economy in isolation and without reference to the social and institutional framework of Greek history. One may therefore apply Polanyi’s distinction to the Greek world to see how the Greek economy was embedded in society, and what consequences follow for the study of the subject.

The economy in Greece is embedded in society
One fact which must be noted at the outset is that the very concept of ‘the economy’ in the modern sense is untranslatable in Greek, because it simply did not exist. The Greek word oikonomia does not mean the same as our word ‘economy’, although the latter is of course derived from it. It means ‘management of the household’ (the oikos) in its broadest sense (domestic economy, one might say), and not only in its strictly economic sense. It can also mean ‘management, administration, organisation’ in a more
general sense and be applied to different spheres; thus one may talk of the ‘oikonomia of the affairs of the city’, and that is the origin of our expression ‘political economy’. There are two extant treatises of the fourth century both entitled Oikonomia, one by Xenophon and the other in three separate books, perhaps the work of three different writers of the Aristotelian school. In the work by Xenophon the subject under discussion is the management of the family estate and the role of the head of the oikos. The strictly economic part is concerned with the running of the rural estate: agriculture is praised and sharply contrasted with other forms of economic activity – such as manufacture – which are said to be unworthy of a gentleman. One will find in Xenophon’s work a discussion of agriculture and technical advice is provided, but one will also find a discussion of how the head of the oikos ought to treat his wife and slaves. In other words, Xenophon’s work does not include a study of the different forms of economic activity in general, but only of agriculture, and under the heading of Oikonomia many non-economic functions are included, because they derive from the role of the head of the oikos: economic and non-economic functions are fused together in the same person without it being possible to distinguish between them [see no 4]. The same is true of Book I of the Aristotelian Economics, which in fact often echoes the work of Xenophon. Book III takes up in greater detail one of the themes sketched in Book I, that of the relations between husband and wife [see no 1]. Book II is a collection of fiscal expedients – one might even say stratagems – whereby rulers, generals and cities tried to extricate themselves from economic crises or sought to increase their revenues. The collection is preceded by a brief introduction in which the author distinguishes four types of ‘economy’ – royal economy, satrapal economy, political economy and private economy. He is not dealing with economy in the modern sense, but simply with budgeting. The author’s approach is in any case extremely pedestrian: the principle common to all these forms of ‘economy’ is that ‘expenditure must not exceed income’. In this spirit the author then goes on to collect those fiscal stratagems that seem most interesting to him and likely to be of future use [see no 91].

Since the economy in the modern sense never was for the Greeks an autonomous category, one should not expect to find any genuine economic thought or analysis in Greek writers
(although there has sometimes been a temptation to do so)\(^13\). What has often been labelled economic analysis usually turns out to be common-sense observations on economic activity or even has nothing to do with economic analysis proper. This does not mean that the Greeks failed to grasp the importance of economic factors in history (this would be manifestly untrue), it means only that these factors were not experienced in their own right as strictly economic ones. They existed only in relation to other factors which seemed to the Greeks to have greater importance. For Greek historians there was no such thing as economic history, but only political history. Thus Thucydides in the opening chapters of his *History* outlined the stages in the evolution of the Greek world from its primitive origins up to his own time, and in this scheme economic factors play a large part:

Without commerce, without freedom of communication either by land or sea, cultivating no more of their territory than the exigencies of life required, destitute of capital, never planting their land (for they could not tell when an invader might not come and take it all away, and when he did come they had no walls to stop him), thinking that the necessities of daily sustenance could be supplied at one place as well as another, they cared little for shifting their habitation, and consequently neither built large cities nor attained to any other form of greatness\(^14\).

Yet subsequently Thucydides gives very little space to economic factors in the history of his own time. For him true history and its analysis exist only at a higher level, that of politics. As soon as one has got beyond the primitive stage of economic development, economic preoccupations cease to be decisive and can be relegated to the background. In other words, economic history comes into play only when political history is not yet possible. Thucydides’ point of view is indicative of the place that the Greeks attributed to the economy in the scale of values. One may say that any economic analysis of Greek history will inevitably lead up to political analysis and merge with it.

For all his differences from Thucydides, Plato’s reasoning is similar. It is necessity that brings about the development of the elementary city\(^13\), but as the edifice is built up it appears that the fate of the economy is to be brought under control. The producers
are radically separated from the warriors and the philosophers. Conversely, when Plato describes the decline of the city in Books VIII and IX of the Republic, one sees gold playing an ever more important and pernicious part [see no 105].

What one may henceforward refer to conventionally as the ‘economy’ was not for the Greeks a separate sphere. To use once more the terminology of Polanyi, the economy was embedded in society in its widest sense. ‘Economic’ matters were constantly under the influence of factors and considerations which nowadays we might describe as ‘non-economic’. Consequently economic analysis will lead up not only to political analysis, but also to ethical analysis and the study of values in general.

‘Non-economic’ factors and economic activity
In mentioning in this way the ‘values’ which conditioned the Greeks’ approach to questions which nowadays we describe as ‘economic’ it is not intended to pass judgment on their importance a priori. They are a result as much as a cause, but the study of these values and intellectual habits provides a convenient starting point.

Among the mental habits which influenced the economic behaviour of the Greeks there comes first the fundamental distinction one comes across frequently in the classical period between different occupations [see nos 3, 4, 5, 12]. Some were considered to be alone worthy of a gentleman, others inferior and hence fit only for the lower social classes, outsiders or slaves. In this hierarchy of occupations agriculture almost always held a place of its own at the top of the scale and was sharply distinguished from other economic activities. For most the ideal was represented by the landowner, free, independent and capable of providing for himself. The earliest literary sources, Homer and Hesiod, are already familiar with the conception of agriculture as one of the foundations of civilized life [see no 30], closely connected with sacrifice, cooking and family life.

At the bottom of the scale one finds the other forms of economic activity, trade and all the so-called ‘banausic’ occupations which implied manual work. These occupations were pronounced unworthy of a gentleman. In practice a man’s social status might have exercised a decisive influence on his occupation; conversely one will often find that manufacture, trade, etc., were (at least to
some extent) left in the hands of the lower classes or outsiders.

The artisan might, however, be called the hero of Greek history, but he is a secret hero. There is not a single one of the material creations of Greek civilization which does not bear his mark: the architect of the Parthenon was an artisan (and not an engineer) just as much as the sculptor of the Chryselephantine statue of Athena. The writings of Plato, who excluded artisans from the governing functions of the city, teem with metaphors from the crafts and tributes to the work of artisans. What is more, it has been shown that in Plato’s cosmology the demiourgos who builds the world makes use of all the techniques of artisans known in Plato’s time, with at the top the techniques of metallurgy. Plato, like Xenophon, placed agriculture well above the crafts, and yet it is the inferior parts of ‘creation’ which are due to agricultural techniques, and the word which denotes the material world (chora) is the word used to denote the countryside and cultivated land. This said, it remains true of the whole of classical antiquity that while the work of the artisan was admired, he was neglected or down-graded as a person [see no 11]. And what is most important, there never was, except in the constructions of some theorists like the town-planner and philosopher Hippodamus of Miletus, any such thing as a category of artisans.

The word demiourgos itself had two different meanings in different parts of the Greek world: in Athens, for example, it was used for the artisans and these were generally men of humble status. In other states, on the other hand, in the Peloponnese and in central and north-western Greece [see no 54], it was applied to the chief magistrates, who were men of high social status [see also no 28]. In the classical city technical functions and political functions did not depend on each other; rather, they were two different spheres which did not overlap. In Athens citizens, metics and slaves were to be found doing the same kind of work: but only the citizen had access to political power. In the organization of the city’s space there were, to be sure, quarters which corresponded to economic functions (quarters for the various crafts, a commercial harbour, etc.); but there were no quarters reserved for metics or slaves.

The ambiguous role of technical and economic activity in Greek thought can be illustrated by a number of facts from religion. Prometheus the hero was an ambivalent figure: through his inventions he was man’s benefactor, but at the same time he
was the opponent of Zeus. It has been said of Hermes that he was the representative of a social class, that of the traders, but in fact Hermes’ function of protecting trade derived in the first instance from his role as mediator. Hephæistos, the god of technical functions, whose skill was highly praised, notably in Homer, was unlike the other gods a lame and misshaped being. Athena, by contrast, who among other functions was the goddess of feminine skills, escaped from this slur. One might imagine that the same value system did not apply to women as to men, but in any case Athena’s role was a wider one: she represented a particular form of intelligence, prudent and practical intelligence (metis), which is displayed in particular in her connections with seafaring (construction and piloting of the ship), and there is no sign here of any negative judgment on these sides of her activity.39

Besides the hierarchy of occupations, and indeed hardly to be distinguished from it, there existed a hierarchy of modes of acquisition: some were considered legitimate, others were susceptible of incurring moral reprobation, depending on the spirit in which they were resorted to. Here again ethical considerations intervened to counteract the development of strictly economic values. Trade in itself was not necessarily considered good or bad. It was admissible in so far as it aimed at ensuring self-sufficiency by providing those necessities for life which were missing, but no more. But if trade became an end in itself and sought nothing but the highest profit, it was then decried. One finds this point of view already in Homer; centuries later, at the end of the classical period, Aristotle expounds it clearly [see nos 2, 26, 128, 129]. Retail trade was worst of all, since it implied crookedness and deceit: by definition the retail trader sought to sell his merchandise at a price higher than its real value.

By contrast war and politics were perfectly respectable — or at least legitimate — modes of acquisition [see nos 7, 8, 9], and this holds good for every period of Greek history (with certain qualifications, of course).30 The victor in war enjoyed free disposal of the persons and chattels of the vanquished, and this fundamental right was never contested. In fact, war in antiquity remained one of the chief sources of supply for the slave trade. To be sure, war as a mode of acquisition worked only within limits. It is only rarely that wars between Greeks were aimed at the acquisition of territory (wars against non-Greeks were a different case, as will be seen in the ‘colonial’ Greek world); there were
some exceptions, as for example Sparta in the early archaic age, or some Sicilian tyrants in the fifth and sixth centuries. Athens in the fifth century did not annex her conquests; what is more, Athenian settlements abroad were normally garrisons, and imperial colonies like Amphipolis were generally established at the expense of non-Greeks. Even granted these limitations, it would be wrong to imagine that every war was undertaken in an acquisitive spirit. It would be even more dangerous to state that wars in Greece had 'economic causes'. The causes of wars were often to be found at a political level. But once war had been declared, no one ever challenged the legitimacy of acquisition through conquest. One may say that in ancient Greece one often reaches economics via war, but could hardly say that one reaches war via economics. For example, the conflicts between Greeks and Persians probably did not have 'economic causes'. On the Persian side there was the will for power and domination, on the Greek side the will to preserve political liberty. But subsequently these conflicts could easily assume economic aspects as well. The Athenian general Cimon, for instance, enriched himself and his fellow citizens on plunder from the territory of Persia. No one at the time would have thought of criticizing him for this, whereas had he turned to trade in order to build up his fortune, it would have been a different story.

Another series of important facts in the study of the economy in Greece concerns work. The first point is that the unified concept of work as one of the great functions of man which falls into a multiplicity of different forms was unknown to the Greeks. Where we identify amidst many forms of human activity one single great function productive of social values, namely work, the Greeks only saw a multiplicity of different occupations (the status of which might vary considerably, as has been seen), and did not establish a single connecting link between all of them. They even at times opposed one type of occupation (agriculture) to others (manufacture, trade, etc.) [see nos 4, 5].

Another point is that work as such never acquired for the Greeks any positive value of its own. One may search in vain through Greek literature for traces of a genuine ideology of work. Of course, work was for most people an unavoidable necessity, but for all that it did not acquire any intrinsic value. Hesiod in the Works and Days never tires of preaching to his brother Perses the need for work in order to a void penury [see no 10], but he does
not rise from this to a positive evaluation of it. In any case Hesiod takes for granted the existence of servile labour as a supplement to the work of free men.

Another distinction must be mentioned, and once more it is of a moral kind. Work in itself need not be considered either good or evil. What mattered as much or more were the conditions under which work was carried out. In the modern world a man’s labour has become distinct from his person: it is a saleable commodity which he can sell to others without this implying, in theory, any subjection on his part. In the Greek world, by contrast, this distinction was unknown: to work for someone else meant to subject oneself to one’s employer. And ‘the condition of the free man is that he does not live for the benefit of another’. The free man, if he had to work, wanted therefore to work for himself, not for someone else. One will see later the results of this way of thinking on the organization of manufactures in Athens (Chapter 5).

In sum, what we call the productive spirit was unknown to the Greeks, whereas it is characteristic of the modern world, though within limits. One may note in this connection some limitations in the Greek conception of the division of labour. In many Greek writers there are ideas which may superficially recall the modern theory of the division of labour. But looking at these more closely one realizes that they have nothing to do with division of labour in the modern sense, i.e. they are concerned not with an increase in production, but with an improvement in the quality of the goods produced through greater specialization [see no 6].

Should one see in all these ideas nothing but the reflection of aristocratic prejudices and dreams of reactionary philosophers? To deny to these ideas any influence on Greek history, one would need to demonstrate the existence of a rival value system, formulated by the lower classes or for them, which rejected aristocratic values and substituted in their place the values of work and economic activity. In practice there are only few traces of such a value system: one might think of the role played in the fifth century, in Herodotus for example, by the theme of the ‘first inventor’, a culture hero, whether an individual or a group, who has liberated mankind from bondage thanks to a discovery which might be that of a technique. And yet, even in this period which has often been compared to that of the modern ‘Enlightenment’, an invention once made did not appear susceptible of progress
and development: as a whole the aristocratic values were not challenged.

What, finally, was the Greek definition of wealth and poverty? For us wealth and poverty refer to two extremes which do not overlap: one is wealthy if one has more than is necessary to live an 'honourable' life, one is poor if one has less than this minimum. Consequently there are many between the extremes who are neither wealthy nor poor. The criterion is not the need for work in itself, but whether one has attained a certain standard of wealth: one may be wealthy and work, or one may be poor and idle. The Greek definition was quite different: the two categories did not correspond to two extremes, on the contrary they touched each other and could even overlap. The criterion was not a given standard of wealth but the need for work. A Greek was wealthy if he could live without having to work, poor if he did not have enough to live on without working. From this point of view the majority of people in Greece were 'poor' since they had to work. In addition, the Greeks drew a distinction between the poor man and the beggar who was completely destitute and was forced to live off the generosity of other people. Very often moral qualities were attached to notions of wealth and poverty: wealth was generally considered a 'blessing' and a precondition for the development of human virtues, whereas poverty was a 'misfortune', which corrupted man and made him incapable of virtue [see nos 18, 113]. All this brings one back to what was said earlier on the absence of any positive evaluation of work: leisure and the absence of need for economic activity represented a very widespread ideal.

Admittedly, one must be careful not to generalize too much and suppose that these ideas applied with equal force to every period and every place in Greek history. There was first some evolution in time. Thus it has been pointed out that the unfavourable verdict against manual work which is well known in the classical period does not seem always to have been so strongly pronounced. It has been emphasized that in Homer the heroes do not shrink from manual work as such. The explanation for this apparent evolution in ideas lies once more, it would seem, in the conditions and spirit in which the work was carried out, and here again the criterion of self-sufficiency and personal freedom came into play. Odysseus could without shame set his hand to work, because in so doing he was trying to preserve his economic self-
sufficiency. By contrast, an artisan in the classical city was in any case dependent on others; he could not be self-sufficient as the free peasant could, and was therefore in some way inferior to him.

A distinction should also be drawn between different Greek states. The same ideas did not exercise a comparable influence in states as different in their structure and mentality as Athens and Sparta. In Sparta the rejection of economic activity in any form whatever was complete as far as the Homoioi (the Peers), were concerned [see no 56]. That was an extreme case, and one may contrast with it a different climate of ideas in Athens and some degree of acceptance of technical skill, though one must still define clearly the limits within which this evolution took place (see Chapters 4 and 5).

But one must also avoid the opposite excess which consists in seeing in these ideas nothing but aristocratic prejudices or philosopher’s utopias which had no real influence on Greek history. For one thing these ideas are found far too frequently for them to be devoid of any significance and, as has been seen, aristocratic values were by and large not seriously challenged. For another it is easy to establish frequent connections between the utopias of philosophers and historical reality. Both Plato and Aristotle, for example, would have debarred artisans from citizen rights in their ideal states, although they admitted that they were indispensable to the material existence of the state [see no 5]. That was precisely the situation in some Greek states. ‘In Thebes’, writes Aristotle, ‘there was a law that no one who had not kept away from the agora for the last ten years might be admitted to office’ (that is to say who had traded there or practised a craft) [see also no 4]. Similar in spirit, though often obscure in its detail, is a fragmentary inscription from Cyrene dating from the late fourth century, in which a constitution is laid down for the city under the supervision of Ptolemy. The possession of full civic rights is restricted to those with a minimum property qualification of 20 minae, and various political disabilities are imposed on those practising certain trades; these include (lines 43–5) exclusion from all magistracies of men employed by the city as doctors, teachers, instructors of archery, horse riding and fencing, and heralds of the prytaneion, and (lines 48–50) exclusion from the office of strategos of anyone carrying on financial activities, or who had worked in the stone quarries or was a merchant or ‘entered the palace of Ptolemy
because he carried on a banausic trade. We are dealing here not with a philosopher’s utopia but with historical reality. Nor are we dealing with some remote archaic period, for this is already beyond the classical world and at the start of the Hellenistic age.

**Slavery in Greece** [see nos 12, 14, 15]
So far no mention has been made of slavery in Greece except indirectly. But from what has been said above on negative judgments on manual work, on the absence of an ideology of work, on the ideal of leisure and the role of war in the life of the Greek states, it will be clear why servile labour should have appeared to the Greeks to be the unavoidable precondition of civilized life. To account for the institution of slavery, one must, of course, also bring other factors into play, though here again it is difficult to draw a clear dividing line between causes and results. For one thing there was the relative stagnation of techniques which made it impossible to bring about an increase in production except through recourse to servile labour. This stagnation was in part linked with the absence of the notion of progress as we know it. To be sure it would be wrong to say that the very notion of progress was unknown to the Greeks. The Greeks in the classical period were well aware of the fact that their civilization had started from modest origins and had gradually risen to a higher level (the opening chapters of Thucydides are an excellent illustration [see nos 7, 53, 55, 107]). In this evolution a positive contribution was ascribed to the development of certain basic techniques. It was thanks to his technical skill that man had been able to create civilization. But progress in the past did not automatically mean the possibility and need for progress in future. Once a certain level of civilization had been reached, technical progress lost its worth and genuine values were transposed to a different level. Some form of progress, both technical and economic, was the precondition for the existence of civilized states, but was not the purpose of their existence.

In addition, the acceptance of the inequality of mankind was a fundamental premis of Greek history, and one that was never seriously challenged in practice. What is more, Greek history even intensified inequalities by developing simultaneously the notion of the free citizen and that of the chattel slave who was
bought on the market (even though one might subsequently bring up his children at home) and who (in theory, at least) had no rights at all. To our way of thinking there is a flagrant contradiction between the freedom of some and the servitude of others. But the Greek point of view was different: the freedom of some could not be imagined without the servitude of others and the two extremes were not thought of as contradictory, but as complementary and interdependent.

It is to be expected, therefore, that one should find servile labour in one form or another at every period of Greek history, and that no one should have seriously questioned the need for it. Already in Homer and Hesiod the existence of servile labour is a self-evident assumption, and it remained so throughout the history of antiquity. In the classical period, during the early fourth century, an invalid in Athens, pleading for the maintenance of the pension paid to him by the city, says to the jurors: 'I have a trade, but it is only of slight help to me; as it is, I have difficulty in carrying it out myself, and I am not yet able to procure someone to take it over from me.' Elsewhere Xenophon writes in his Memorabilia: 'Those who can buy slaves so as to have companions in their work.' Clearly, for the average Athenian in the classical period nothing seemed more natural than to wish to pass on to slaves part at least of one's work. Utopias here reflected historical reality. One example may suffice (quite apart from Plato and Aristotle [see no 14]). In the Ecclesiazousai of Aristophanes, the women seize power and a regime of common ownership of property is set up. When asked by Blepyros 'Who will cultivate the land?', Praxagora answers simply: 'The slaves' (line 651) [see also no 13].

Admittedly, towards the end of the fifth and the beginning of the fourth century there emerged tentatively a line of thought which denied any fundamental differences between Greeks and barbarians and asserted that slavery was nothing but a mere convention which could not be justified on a theoretical level. Aristotle in Book I of the Politics set out to refute this point of view and sought to demonstrate that on the contrary the antithesis between masters and slaves was a fact of nature, and that just as some were masters by nature others were born to be slaves. Aristotle's argument was anything but watertight; yet slavery continued to be accepted as before, even when it could not be logically justified.
Social history
From what has been said, it is clear that there can be no question of writing an economic history of Greece as one might do with the modern world, nor with the same concepts – and besides, there is the inadequacy of the available source material, on which more will be said below. But what of social history?

The problems one meets in the study of Greek social history are of the same kind as those which concern economic history, and to some extent they are connected. Just as there are dangers involved in trying to apply modern economic concepts, so too one must ask how far concepts developed for the study of social history can really be applied to ancient Greece. Just as there was a ‘modernizing’ period in the study of Greek economic history, so there was a ‘modernizing’ period (or rather, tendencies) in the study of Greek social history. Modern representations of social classes and class struggles were applied more or less literally to Greece, with the result that Greek social history was turned into a faithful replica of Europe after the industrial revolution. The extreme point on this line was reached not by the German historians mentioned above (Ed. Meyer and others) but by R. von Pöhlmann in his *Geschichte der sozialen Frage und des Sozialismus in der antiken Welt*. Marxist theories on class struggles formed the starting point of the enquiry. Although the writer protested that it was not his intention to modernize the history of antiquity, it is clear that that was precisely the mistake he made (see the useful Appendix to the 3rd edition by Fr. Oertel). Pöhlmann based his reconstruction on a modernizing conception of the Greek economy, according to which it belonged to the modern capitalist type, with all the political and social consequences which followed. Since this conception was certainly false, Pöhlmann’s interpretation of Greek social history lapsed with it. But should one therefore abandon modern concepts of social classes and class struggles in the study of Greek social history?

One preliminary point is that just as there was no autonomous ‘economic’ category for the Greeks, similarly there was no independent ‘social’ category. One may therefore expect a priori that Greek social history will merge into political history, just as is the case with economic history.

The question of the place occupied by class struggles in ancient society, and in particular the role played by slaves in these struggles is a serious one which needs to be approached with
great caution. Admittedly, there is no definition of a ‘social class’ which would command general assent, but modern concepts and controversies revolve around three fundamental representations. The first is essentially empirical: a social class is a group of men who hold a more or less defined place in the social scale, e.g. the upper classes, middle classes, or lower classes. English-speaking writers have, as is well known, refined and elaborated these distinctions, multiplying subdivisions, much in the way that Sir Arthur Evans and his followers, after adopting a threefold classification of ‘Minoan’ finds into Early, Middle and Late Minoan, then subdivided each period into three (Early Minoan I, II, III, etc.), as though universal history automatically followed the ternary rhythm of a speech by Cicero. In addition, Marxism introduced two concepts which have played a fundamental role. A class is defined, on the one hand, by reference to the position it occupies in the relations of production: is it the class which produces, or does it enjoy the benefits of production without taking part in it directly? Here, in Marx’s view, lay the opposition between the working class and the bourgeoisie. Marxism then also introduced a further concept, that of class consciousness: community of interests, development of a common vocabulary and programme, and the putting into practice of this programme in political and social action. These last two concepts (that of class in itself and class for itself) do not overlap. Marx was able to say without contradicting himself in a passage in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1852) that French peasants are a social class because ‘their style of living, their interests, their culture’ (one may add, their place in the relations of production) ‘set them in opposition to the other classes of society’, and also that because of their fragmentation, they had no more connection with each other than potatoes in a bag, and thus were not a class.

But what of the world of ancient Greece? Should one take literally the opening words of the Communist Manifesto: ‘The history of all human society, past and present, has been the history of class-struggles. Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, baron and serf, guild-burgess and journeyman – in a word, oppressor and oppressed – stood in sharp opposition to each other.’ In other words, there are two questions here: is class struggle characteristic of ancient Greece? Does the axis of this struggle go through the opposition between slave-owners and slaves? The answer is not easy. If one opens the greatest work of
reflection on political, economic and social facts handed down to us by ancient Greece, namely Aristotle’s *Politics*, one notices that from the beginning of his work the philosopher lays down as a fundamental principle the separation between the slave, who is defined as an ‘instrument’ — as is natural in a world of artisans — and the master: ‘... certain beings are destined from birth, some to obey, others to command’\(^{39}\). Aristotle calls the first ‘slaves by nature’. But later, when considering the movement of Greek society, and in particular in Book V the phenomenon of *stasis* (internal disorders in the cities), he is constantly reasoning in terms of class struggles, with each of the rival groups aiming at governing by itself the whole of the city. Indeed one will find in the second part of this book that there is no lack of ancient sources which vividly express violent class feelings, on both sides of the struggle. But these two facts do not overlap and are far from coinciding with modern representations of class struggles. In particular one will search in vain for the place held by different groups in the relations of production as a criterion of ancient class struggles. There was of course nothing approaching what we call a ‘working class’, but most important it is not their place in production which separates social groups. An Athenian citizen, working with his hands on the same site or in the same workshop as a metic or a slave (whether his own or someone else’s) was separated from his working companions by a social gulf. No common struggle brought them together (and no competition brought them into conflict — over wages and employment, for example). To be sure tasks that were thought inferior or physically exhausting (and in the first place mining work) tended to be more or less exclusively in the hands of slaves, but this did not by any means imply the growth among slaves of a common consciousness. In Athens a miner, a stone-cutter, a policeman, and even in some cases what we might call a higher civil servant, could all be slaves, but they shared no other demand in common apart from freedom; they did not aim at replacing the governing group in society, still less did they aim at establishing a ‘classless society’ of the kind which the modern bourgeoisie imagined it would bring about when its struggles had brought it to power, or of the kind which is demanded by socialist ideology.

Slaves, or at least those one calls ‘chattel-slaves’, did not therefore constitute a class, though this did not prevent them from being, as was understood by Aristotle, the ‘instruments’ without
which the Greek city would simply have been inconceivable. Aristotle's formulation is well known: ‘If every instrument could do its own work when ordered to, or through anticipation, like the legendary statues of Daedalus or the tripods of Hephaistus, which the poets say “enter the company of gods of their own movement”40, if thus shuttles could weave and quills play the cithara themselves, then master craftsmen would have no need of assistants nor masters of slaves41.’ But the point is (and one generally forgets to mention this) that Aristotle is not opposing here only masters and slaves. It is true, however, that there is one group of ‘slaves’ which displays characteristics which brings it close to a modern social class: the Spartan Peers (Homoioi) were not themselves producers, but lived off the agricultural production of the Helots. These had common demands which were expressed in permanent revolt (see Chapter 4), but another factor of differentiation must be introduced. Since the conquests of the bourgeoisie modern social classes are characterized, if not by their mobility in practice, then at least by their legal permeability. A workman’s son or a workman can in law become a bourgeois. With the exception of one special category on which there is no need to dwell here (that of the mothakes who were said to share in the education of the young Spartiates), the Helots could not legally become fully fledged Spartiates. One must therefore reject completely the conception often expressed according to which the struggle between masters and slaves was the manifestation of class struggle in antiquity, just as one must reject the parallel conception, born of the modern struggle for the abolition of colonial slavery42, which sees in classical slavery the corrupting agent of Greek society. On the contrary it made that society possible by guaranteeing the freedom of the citizen43.

Once one has eliminated the opposition between masters and slaves as a fundamental ingredient of class struggles in the Greek world, what then were the essential characteristics of these struggles? They are twofold, and inseparable. In the first place the antagonism was not to be found between groups holding different places in the relations of production but, roughly speaking, between the propertied and the non-propertied, with ownership of land as the main form of wealth. In practice the antagonism was for most of the time between a wealthy minority and a more or less impoverished majority, though it must be noted, as Aristotle pointed out, that the essential criterion was not that of
numbers but that of wealth. The terminology used by the Greeks to designate these two opposed groups is remarkably rich [see no 18]: on one side one finds the aristoi, esthloi, eugeneis, epieikeis, gennaioi, gnorimoi, kaloikagathoi, chrestoi, charientes, belitstoi, etc., to designate the wealthy minority; on the other the plethos, demos, ochlos, kakoi, deiloi, ponerosi, cheirous, etc., to designate their opponents. There is no point in trying to find an exact shade of meaning for each of these words; in practice they are synonymous and interchangeable. The colouring of these words, and therefore their origin, will not escape notice: the laudatory words are kept for the minority, and most of the words used for the majority are pejorative. It will also be noted how moral qualities are implicitly attributed to social classes: positive qualities are the privilege of the wealthy minority (cf. above on wealth and poverty).

The antagonism between the propertied minority and the non-propertied majority was fundamental in Greek class struggles; yet by itself it was not sufficient to set in motion conflict between organized groups. And here the second essential characteristic comes in: class struggles could be expressed between citizens only through their belonging to the state (or the possibility of belonging to it) and the possession of political power which this implied. There were wealthy and destitute men outside the citizen body, but no antagonism between them could take shape for the simple reason that they had no access to political power. This partly accounts for the lack of participation of slaves as a group, in cities such as Athens, in social and political conflicts between citizens. Conversely, it helps to explain the active role which groups like the Helots played in conflicts in Sparta, precisely because to some extent they were part of the state (or at least could claim to be).

From what has been said one would not expect that struggles between citizens revolved purely around specifically economic issues, and in fact political demands and economic demands often formed a single inseparable whole. The constitution of Greek states tended to reflect the social composition of the citizen body and the way in which wealth was distributed among its members [see no 19]. A political revolution therefore often meant simultaneously a social revolution. But without wishing to play down the political aspect of struggles between citizens one may still attempt to isolate the strictly economic factors involved. It should be emphasized that, in contrast to the modern world, economic
demands were never concerned with working conditions and salaries, since, as has been seen, there was no working class and no labour market. Nor were there any protests on the part of the poor citizens against the competition which slave labour might have represented. Already in the archaic age the revolutionary slogans were cancellation of debts and redistribution of land. Positive economic demands always concerned either the redistribution for the benefit of the citizens of the surplus of the city’s wealth [see nos 20, 111, 115], or, and especially, the redistribution of landed property, which was almost everywhere in the Greek world the exclusive preserve of the citizen body (see Chapter 5). Ownership of land was very often the foundation of the citizen’s rights; but the relationship could be reversed, and membership of the citizen body become the justification for the claim to ownership of land, all the more so as it was agreed that among citizens (and not only in democracies) the notion of equality ought to operate to some extent (its interpretation in practice was obviously controversial) [see no 114]. There was therefore a certain logic behind the slogan of redistribution of land. The tension between citizens found its expression at the economic and social level in the tension between the great landowners and the small independent farmers. The great achievement of the classical period (the ‘Greek miracle’, one might say) was to have made possible the rise of the peasants within the city: the peasant became, at least in certain cities, a full citizen, a phenomenon unknown to history before the Greeks. When during the fourth century and for a variety of reasons (see Chapter 7) the ideal of the peasant-citizen began to lose ground both in reality and in ideology, the classical polis then started on its decline. It was also then that the slogan of redistribution of land reappeared in Greek history with increased violence.

The antagonism between the propertied and the non-propertied among the citizens was much the strongest and most important of the divisions which split the citizen body, but it was not the only one. As will be seen, Aristotle was quite conscious of this [see no 114], as were many other Greeks as well.

One of these divisions was that between men and women [see nos 15, 16]45. The classical city of the Athenian type was, of course, a ‘men’s club’ and was characterized by a twofold exclusion: on the one hand that of outsiders (and the slave is the extreme type of the outsider who is deprived of any rights), and
on the other that of women. In this type of city it was inconceivable that slaves could aim at achieving political power: that was a hypothesis which even the fantasy of the comic poets was unable to conceive. As for feminine power, it was not a direct political threat, but belonged to the realm of utopia. How Aristophanes made use of this theme in *Lysistrata* and the *Ecclesiazousai* is well known. But the situation was different in archaic societies, of which Sparta is the best known representative. In those societies, just as political demands on the part of ‘slaves’ of the Helot type were a permanent reality of their history, so too one can see in legend and some traditions the possibility of feminine power emerging (‘gynaecocracy’, to use the Greek word). It is a phenomenon which Aristotle censures in the institutions of Sparta in a passage of the *Politics* where the danger of feminine power is placed on the same level as that of servile power.

Another division is that which existed between young and old; this may represent the reworking of a distant past but it can still be seen at work right in the middle of the historical period [see no 17]. The Greek city, which is usually and rightly considered to be the typical institution of Greek history, was nevertheless of relatively recent origin in the history of the Greek people. The city had in a way been superimposed on more ancient institutions and groupings without obliterating these completely. Age classes are an illustration of this and are found in many parts of the Greek world [see no 129]. Sparta and the Cretan cities show them in their most developed form [see no 57]: age classes played a fundamental role in the organization of society. All Greek states, whether democratic or oligarchic, made use of the principle of seniority in the attribution of political power. Some specific cases are known in Greek history where one can see the antithesis between young and old within the city assuming the dimensions of a direct political conflict, and the city finding itself divided into two hostile groups.

The main sources
It has been stated above that for the Greeks there did not exist any autonomous economic and social categories. One cannot therefore expect to find any specialist literature on this subject among Greek writers. One may mention, however, as having special importance (apart from the historians) the writings of the political
theorists of the fourth century, Plato and Aristotle, and especially the latter’s *Politics*; the treatises on *Economics* mentioned above, which have some affinities with Hesiod’s *Works and Days*, a didactic poem which gives valuable information on the life of a Boeotian peasant around 700 BC; the so-called *Ways and Means* of Xenophon, a pamphlet dating from about 355 BC in which the author suggests a number of remedies designed to rescue Athens from the financial difficulties in which she found herself, and which is a remarkable commentary on the economic mentality of a Greek city in the classical period; Attic comedy; the orators of the late fifth and fourth centuries; and others besides.

Besides literary texts there is the evidence of inscriptions (there are of course no documentary papyri before the Hellenistic period). Useful inscriptions of the archaic age are few, and it is only with the development of the radical democracy in Athens in the middle of the fifth century that the practice of publishing public documents more or less systematically (such as decrees, treaties, etc.) became general. The contribution of inscriptions to social and economic history is considerable. Here too, it is the whole of epigraphic evidence which is liable to provide information. One may mention especially texts on state finances (inventories, accounts of the treasuries of temples, accounts of state expenditure, the so-called ‘tribute lists’ of the fifth-century Athenian empire, legislation on certain economic questions, etc.); treaties with foreign states which included at times some economic clauses; the *Horoi* (stone pillars) found on estates in Attica in the fourth century; many inscriptions relating to metics and slaves; and so forth.

Finally, there is the contribution of archaeology. There is no point in listing here what archaeology has added and may still add to our knowledge of social and economic history; it is enough to refer to a number of recent works. Archaeology may reveal all sorts of facts otherwise unknown: for example, it may tell us something on trade and relations between Greek states, or between Greeks and non-Greeks. It can also confirm, correct and amplify what was already known through literary sources (as for example the activity of the Greeks in Egypt in the archaic period). In general, whatever is unearthed through excavation is liable to fit into a social and economic framework. Among the types of objects which are more specially useful for economic history one
must mention coin hoards and especially vases, though one must be wary of drawing too far-reaching conclusions from the evidence of pottery finds alone, a temptation historians have often succumbed to.

When all these different types of sources, literary, epigraphic, and archaeological are put together, the evidence for Greek social and economic history may seem abundant. And yet one must never lose sight of the limitations of our knowledge. One of the major gaps in the study of Greek economic history is the lack of reliable statistical data, and the consequent impossibility of any detailed statistical approach to the subject. Thus we do not know for sure the exact population figures for Athens in the classical period, let alone other Greek states, and what can be put forward on this subject must remain more or less plausible guesses. In general the classical period is much better known than the centuries which preceded it. The quality and amount of the evidence vary also from region to region. As for Greek history in general, Athens takes the lion’s share in most of the extant sources. It would be foolish to deny the gaps and risks of imbalance which any enquiry into Greek history must face.

Notes


2 The question arose, of course, for the whole of antiquity, but in fact it was chiefly over prehellenistic Greek history that the controversy developed.

3 It is noteworthy that the controversy remained for a long time essentially a German one and with few exceptions was hardly echoed abroad.


5 The contribution of Max Weber is not brought out by Ed. Will, art. cit. above, which may surprise as J. Hasebroek appealed explicitly to the example of Max Weber. Weber’s key works here are *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* II (Tübingen, 4th ed., 1956), pp. 735–822; *Typologie der Städte: die nicht legitime Herrschaft* (English translation by D. Martindale and G. Neuwirth, *The City* (New York, 1966)); and ‘Agrarverhältnisse im Altertum’, in *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte* (Tübingen, 1924), pp. 1–288. Max Weber’s *Agrarverhältnisse* is now available in translation: *The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations*, trans. R.I. Frank (London, 1976). Weber’s characterization of the ancient city was not completely novel; it had, for instance, been strikingly anticipated by Karl Marx, who followed the lead of B.G. Niebuhr on Roman history, but this was in the *Formen* which were only published in 1939; see the English translation with an introduction by E. Hobsbawm, *Pre-capitalist Economic Formations* (London, 1964). On Karl Marx and Greek history see further n 38 below.