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INTRODUCTION

THIS BOOK is about authority. Its first part deals with the formation of structures of authority in medieval history. Its second part deals with the transformation of these structures beginning in the sixteenth century. A concluding chapter deals more briefly with the problems of state-building in the twentieth century.*

This study of the historical foundations of authority begins in Part 1 with a discussion of the religious bases of royal authority in Western, Islamic, and Chinese civilizations. Subsequent chapters deal with kingship and aristocracy in Japan, Russia, Imperial Germany and Prussia, and England, from roughly 500 A.D. to the sixteenth century.

Kings have ruled human communities from the beginning of recorded history. Through the rule of kingship, political traditions were established which have influenced mankind to the present. The English parliament, German political fragmentation, or Russian autocracy long antedate the development of modern societies. Every country develops its own culture and social structure, but once the basic pattern of institutions is formed under the circumstances of early kingship, it is difficult to change. In order to understand the modern world, one must take into account the traditional practices of a nation and their unique elaborations. Japan, Russia, Germany, and England have always been very different societies, and the formation of their political traditions helps to explain these differences.

At the same time, technical innovations (such as printing or the modern computer) can spread to every country, just as social and economic developments (such as European overseas expansion in the sixteenth century or the industrial revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries) cut across national lines. However, as each country encounters sweeping developments of technology and social change, it must adapt them to its own history and long-established practices.

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This study combines an understanding of a country's historical particularity with its participation in a general movement of history.

The *principle* of hereditary monarchy was challenged only some two centuries ago. Since then, governments in one country after another have ruled their communities in the name of the people. Part 2 of this study deals with the transformation of authority as the rule of kings was replaced by governments of the people. In our time, not only democracies but military regimes, dictatorships, and even constitutional monarchies are legitimized by claims of popular mandate. Indeed, other ways of justifying authority have become inconceivable. The leaders and ideas of this great movement toward a popular mandate as it has developed from the English and French revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to the present are the subject of Part 2.

England, France, Germany, Japan, and Russia are today among the most industrialized nations of the world. Historically, these countries represent successive turning points from the medieval to the modern world. Each development—the revolutions of seventeenth-century England, the French revolution, the English industrial revolution, the reform movements in Germany and Japan during the nineteenth century, and the Bolshevik revolution in the twentieth century—had an effect on the next development and on the rest of the world. Together they provide a scenario of the "modern revolution."

My study advances five main themes:

1. The authority of kings depended on religious sanction as well as on internal and external struggles for power. In the course of long and varied histories, royal authority was centralized, expanded, and eventually destroyed. From ancient times, kingship was constituted in divergent ways, and the unity or integration of traditional societies seems largely mythical. Although kingship was sacrosanct and endured for long periods, the authority of any one king was always in jeopardy and had to be manifested continuously to remain effective.

2. Kings governed their realm with the aid of magnates or notables to whom they delegated authority. Aristocratic governance depended on the terms and circumstances of that delegation, which over time helped to form the character of the aristocracy. Though royal supremacy and aristocratic dependence was the norm, the centralization and decentralization of authority varied in practice. If it was true of kings that they delegated authority but wished to control its exercise, it was true of aristocrats that they accepted such authority but sought to make it autonomous. This tension between central authority and local government must be continually managed but is never resolved. Part 1 of this book contains four case studies of this "management" over time.

3. Authority in the name of the people only gradually became an alternative to the authority of kings. Established practices of royal au-

thority were undermined by the commercialization of land and govern-
ment offices, and by the increasing role of educated commoners in high
places. The countries considered here already had fully formed political
structures by the time they advanced to popular sovereignty. Each of
the countries had several educated elites which hoped to catch up with
developments abroad through state action and intellectual mobilization.
Under these conditions, specific educated elites advanced ideas con-
cerning the reconstitution of authority in the name of the people.

4. The countries examined here undertook the reconstitution of
authority in their early modern periods. Authority in the name of the
people has proven as varied in practice as the authority of kings. In each
case, the institutionalization of popular sovereignty showed the effects
of the way in which the authority of kings was left behind. In turn, each
institutionalization created a model which other countries adapted for
their own ends.

5. England, France, Germany, Japan, Russia, and China have par-
ticipated in a worldwide movement of nationalism and of government
by popular mandate, though each country has done so in its own way.
My account attempts to show that nationalism has become a universal
condition in our world because the sense of backwardness in one's own
country has led to ever new encounters with the "advanced model" or
development of another country. I wish to show that the problems faced
by each modernizing country were largely unique. Even the countries
which had been building their political institutions for centuries had to
cope with unprecedented problems in the process of modernization.
Today, new states looking for analogues or precedents in other coun-
tries have more models to choose from than ever before, but their his-
tories and the earlier development of other countries have hardly pre-
pared them for the tasks of state-building.[1] As the concluding chapter
suggests, this process of historical models and their demonstration ef-
fects continues to the present, and I cannot see an end to its further
ramifications.

THE AUTHORITY OF KINGS

The major societies of the world before the era of European ex-
pansion overseas (roughly before 1500) had some features in common.
More than 80 percent of the people lived on the land, close to the sub-
sistence level. Population was checked by frequent wars and epidemics
but nevertheless increased slowly. There was some development of tech-
nology, of urban centers with specialized crafts, and of a considerable
military establishment. The population generally produced at a level
which allowed rulers to maintain relatively large political units by means
of exploitation and taxation.[2] These societies were marked by a concen-

Frederick I Barbarossa, Henry VI, and Frederick of Swabia in 1185
The central figure, Frederick I, Holy Roman Emperor of the German Nation from 1152 to 1190, holds the imperial staff and globe. The globe or orb is surmounted by a cross which symbolizes the domination of Christianity over the world. These insignia were used by the German emperors from 936 until the dissolution of the empire in 1806. Frederick's son Henry, who succeeded him in 1190, wears an unadorned crown but is placed to the emperor's right. A second son, Frederick Duke of Swabia, who was not in the line of succession, wears only an embroidered cap. (Forschungsinstitut für Kunstgeschichte, Bildarchiv Photo Marburg)

tration of wealth, status, and authority in the hands of the governing class, which comprised between 1 or 2 percent of the population but appropriated at least one-half of the society's income above bare subsistence.[3] To us, widespread inequality may suggest unremitting coercion and continuous, latent rebellion. But for many centuries, the vast mass of people acquiesced in the established order out of religious awe, a desire for peace and security, and the inability to unite in a common political action.[4] In those earlier times, the rule of the privileged few appeared to the many as if it were a force of nature; it was to be enjoyed when it was benign and endured when it was not. And where wars and feuds were common, rulers could protect and thus benefit the people over whom they ruled.

For millennia, rulers rested their claims on divine sanction; other grounds of rule such as tradition or law also required and received their warrant from the divine. A deity or spirit was believed to sanctify rule, and the rights of the ruler could not be questioned, lest sacrilege jeopardize the welfare of all. But since the authority of kings required holy sanction, based on the prevailing religious institutions, consecration of rule entailed political liabilities in the relations between the king and the religious functionaries.

The exercise of royal authority also depended on the balance of power among the members and most important retainers of the royal house. In theory, the ruler owned the whole realm, but in practice the territorial possessions of the royal house were the main source of revenue and of favors in peace and war. These possessions were scattered, and the realm as a whole was governed through various forms of delegated authority. Rulers were typically torn between the need to delegate authority and the desire not to lose it. They were frequently driven to appeal to the personal loyalty or consecrated obligation of those to whom they had delegated authority in order to buttress their own position. The internal balance of forces was also influenced by alliances or conflicts with outside powers, a condition greatly affected in early times by the absence of stable, clearly defined frontiers.

All three factors—religious sanction of royal authority, internal contentions over the distribution of authority, and intrusion of outside powers—helped to shape medieval governance.

Until the revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, European rulers assumed that the general population would quietly allow itself to be ruled. Popular uprisings were regarded as violating the divine order and were suppressed by force. Kings, aristocrats, and magnates of the church made claims against one another. In these conflicts, each manipulated appeals to the transcendent powers without fear of seriously undermining the exclusive hold on authority they all enjoyed. The general populace was excluded from the political arena. If some

questioned this practice, it was without much effect. However, this questioning spread in the early modern period, first in the religious sphere during the Reformation and subsequently in the political sphere in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The good fortune of the few became a matter of controversy. In *The Social Contract,* Rousseau wrote that "the strongest are still never sufficiently strong to ensure them continual mastership, unless they find means of transforming force into right, and obedience into duty."[5] In France during the eighteenth century, it became more and more difficult for people to distinguish authority from oppression, or right from might. The old religious appeals lost their force; secular appeals on behalf of the status quo were of little avail. The right to rule by and for the few had come into doubt.

Throughout history, the weak had appealed to the deities or other higher powers to bear witness to their suffering. On occasion they had challenged the strong to live up to their own pronouncements. But with the Reformation, the persuasiveness of the ruler's old appeal to divine sanction was irreparably weakened. And since the French revolution, the right to rule has come to depend increasingly on a mandate of the people.

AUTHORITY IN THE NAME OF THE PEOPLE

The French revolution marked the end of an era in which the ruling few monopolized political life. Since 1789, political transactions have become increasingly public. In modern society, unless measures are taken to prevent it, rulers and ruled alike must advance their claims in public and hence with an eye to the public reactions that are likely to follow. *Vox populi, vox dei.*

The Western idea of authority in the name of the people owes something to classical Greek and Roman ideas of what it means to be a citizen in the community. At one time, the Greek city-state and the Roman republic practiced a type of governance in which all male heads of households actively participated in political decision-making for the entire community. This has appealed strongly to the Western imagination. Despite its known association with oligarchic rule, slavery, and conquest, and despite the many centuries during which it lost all political significance, the classical idea of citizenship helped to inspire the leaders of the French revolution.

The idea of popular sovereignty also has roots in the role which consent played in Germanic tribes. This role became known to Roman observers in the first century A.D. The tribes were governed by chieftains who ruled with the aid of a council of elders. Such chieftains succeeded one another on the basis of hereditary claims, provided that their accession to the throne was confirmed through an act of acclamation by the leading warriors of the tribe. During the fourth and fifth centuries A.D.,

these practices affected the Roman empire directly: Successive emperors were elevated to the imperial throne by the acclamation of frontier armies largely composed of Germanic warriors. As the settlement of Germanic tribes in the Western parts of the Roman empire became stabilized, the relation between the ruler and his warriors was transformed into the contractual obligations between lord and vassal. Hence, the idea of a contract between rulers and ruled has very early antecedents.

The idea of popular mandate owes something to the Christian belief that all men are equal before God. This idea makes rulers and ruled alike part of one community. As baptized members of the church, *all* have access to the sacraments, and all are subject to divine law. Such equality prevailed in the early Christian communities but declined during the long supremacy of the Catholic church, for the pope and through him the whole hierarchy of the priesthood stood in the direct line of apostolic succession. The church alone was the consecrated vessel of divine grace. With the coming of the Reformation, the beliefs of early Christianity were revived, and emphasis shifted from the hierarchic conception of the church to one centering on the Bible as the repository of the divine word. Thus, the Protestant idea emerged that every believer stands in direct relation to God. Some Protestant denominations came to redefine the Christian community as a "brotherhood of all believers," in which responsibility for spiritual welfare was shared alike by all baptized members of the congregation.

Authority in the name of the people also came to the fore in the municipal communities of Western Europe in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. However, the major modern development of popular mandate dates from the English and French revolutions in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The idea of popular sovereignty has had its greatest impact since that time. Participation by the public in national affairs has widened; the earlier dichotomy between rulers and ruled has become blurred. Noble birth and inherited wealth have ceased to guarantee authority. At the same time, nation-states have emerged with frontiers that are clearly defined and relatively stable.

THE GREAT SOCIAL AND INTELLECTUAL TRANSFORMATION

The fifteenth and sixteenth centuries witnessed a great transformation of European societies. Preconditions of this transformation date back to the growth of towns in the tenth to twelfth centuries, when urban communities developed their economies rapidly and achieved political autonomy. But the turn from the authority of kings to government by popular mandate had its more immediate social and intellectual antecedents in the decades around 1500.

The history of population provides a simple index. In the period between 1000 and 1340 A.D., the population of Europe more than doubled, reaching at least 80 million. During the next century and a half wars, famines, and especially epidemics struck intermittently with such severity that by 1500 the total European population was still 80 million. Thereafter, the causes of catastrophic death remained but became less virulent, with the worst type of epidemic, the plague, disappearing in the seventeenth century. By 1600 Europe probably had 105 million and by 1700 about 115 million people. The growth of population was a main factor in the commercialization of land, labor, and capital, the rapid development of towns, and European expansion overseas.

Before 1500, authority and inequality were linked. Men of wealth and noble birth exercised the functions of government. They had a monopoly over political matters which was challenged in Western Europe only by the church. The people provided services, and if they rebelled they were put in their place. After 1500, however, this rigid bond between authority and inequality loosened. Commoners made inroads on the bastions of privilege through trade, the secularization of learning, and the rise of secular professions in government employment. It became more difficult to contain these social and economic changes in the old political framework after the great reformers challenged the spiritual monopoly of the Catholic church, for that challenge emphasized the spiritual worth of the individual and hence made it easier to question political monopolies which denied the rights of man.

The decades around 1500 witnessed not only economic growth, European expansion overseas, and the Reformation; they also witnessed the rise of Humanism, the invention of printing, and the early development of modern science. The number of educated people increased, as did the number of those whose livelihood depended on teaching, writing, or some other intellectual vocation. The stage was set for a rapid diffusion of ideas.

In one country after another, intellectual elites formulated ideas in conscious response to what they learned from abroad. The belief in government in the name of the people spread during and after the seventeenth century. As countries achieved a breakthrough to authority by popular mandate, they provided models which were imitated, transformed, or rejected by the latecomers to the process of nation-building.

WHAT IS MODERNIZATION?

It is easiest to define modernization as a breakdown of the ideal-typical traditional order: Authority loses its sanctity, monarchy declines, hierarchical social order is disrupted. Secular authority, rule in the name of the people, and an equalitarian ethos are typical attributes of modern

society. The eighteenth-century writers who reflected on this transformation were among the first to articulate the contrast between tradition and modernity.[6]

To the theorists of the day, the division of labor appeared as a key factor in this transformation. In his *Essay on the History of Civil Society* (1767), Adam Ferguson attributed the progress of a people to the subdivision of tasks; his discussion formulated a way of looking at modern society which has since become commonplace. The division of labor increases the productivity of those who specialize, and hence the wealth of their country. Private ends and lack of conscious concern for public welfare ironically yield public benefits.

Ferguson portrayed society as divided into a leisured ruling minority and a working majority. Members of the higher class are bound to no task and are free to follow their whims. At the same time, Ferguson suggested that those who eke out a mere subsistence are degraded by the "objects they pursue, and by the means they employ to attain" those objects. Production, he said, is increased as a result of such degradation. In his view, the economic ends of society are best promoted by mechanical arts requiring little capacity and thriving best "under a total suppression of sentiment and reason."[7]

Karl Marx used the insights of Ferguson's work as a guide for action. Marx believed he had discovered the "laws of capitalist development"; knowledge of these laws would help reorganize society to better meet human needs. He also believed that the time was ripe for radical reorganization. Capitalism would spread everywhere and create the preconditions for its own overthrow.

Max Weber wanted to preserve what men valued in the Western cultural tradition. This was one reason why he looked to the religious and ethical beliefs bound up with the capitalist mode of production. His discovery that purely materialistic striving also had spiritual roots made him skeptical of interpretations of the modern transformation which emphasized the division of labor alone. But he was also convinced that the imperatives of capitalist production and bureaucratic organization would suppress the individual and obliterate much cultural diversity.

More recently, theories of modernization have focused on the necessary and sufficient conditions for this great transformation. Once the prerequisites of modernization are acquired, the change toward a modern society appears inevitable. This categorizing approach has tended to replace both Marx's and Weber's concern with historical factors, probably in the hope that a causal analysis based on the isolation of dependent and independent variables would facilitate the management of social change.[8]

In my view, Marx was right to anticipate worldwide repercussions of capitalism and to see a revolutionary potential in its spread. But he

was wrong in confining this potential to the economic sphere and to the increasing class struggle in developed capitalist societies. I believe that the chances of revolution increase wherever the new industrial way of life and ideas of popular sovereignty disrupt an old social order. Thus, society is ripe for revolution in the *early* phase of industrialization and democratization, however protracted that phase may be. The term *modernization* is applied best where nonindustrial ways of life and hierarchic social orders are threatened by industrial ways and egalitarian social norms.[9]

UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT

The division of labor is a cause of change especially in economically developing societies, but it is not the only cause in all societies. Historically, many agricultural societies have had little division of labor yet have proved open to change, for example, through the infusion or development of religious ideas.

Naturally, observers were impressed—and rightly so—by the role the division of labor played in the economic development of all Western European societies, especially of England. Since the modern industrial revolution had *begun* in England, other countries followed the English model when they began to develop their own industry. But they wanted to follow the *latest* English development to which they could gain access, not the English practices of the 1760s with which English industrialization began. Countries were, therefore, less and less able or willing to repeat each other's development.

Nor were they likely to become the same kind of society as a result of successful industrialization. Continued political and cultural differentiation is the more likely outcome. The "demonstration effect" itself prevents societies from repeating one another's development, and so tends to prevent industrial societies from converging culturally and institutionally. In *Medieval Cities,* Henri Pirenne showed how this demonstration effect worked in the past. The merchant and craft guilds of a few cities used force (in the eleventh century) to win recognition of their independent jurisdiction from feudal overlords. A good many other rulers took the hint and negotiated a settlement with their own towns before armed conflict occurred.

But these events took place prior to the modern revolution in communications. With the invention of printing in the fifteenth century, ideas spread more quickly. The growth of an educated public provided an audience for writers and artists. This development coincided in turn with the rise of modern science. In each country, the "great transformation" encouraged the growth of an elite which was sensitive to the

new ideas developed elsewhere and ready to apply them at home. Countries became examples to one another. Nevertheless, what appeared highly desirable from the point of view of progress often appeared as a danger to national independence or self-respect. Every idea taken from elsewhere can be both an asset to the development of a country and a reminder of its comparative backwardness—both a challenge to be emulated and, whatever its utility, a threat to national identity. The period since 1500 has also been the period of rising nationalism.

The contemporary world has made us familiar with the tension between progress and national identity. Each country must cope socially and politically with the disruptive impact of ideas and industrial practices taken from abroad. Its ability or inability to do so depends on its own history, on the cumulative peculiarities of each affected civilization. Old societies that become new states look back on centuries of historical experience involving a mixture of languages, economic patterns, and religious beliefs. This is the base from which they must master the impact of the "advanced world." The advanced countries of today have had their own periods of underdevelopment and of responding to the "advanced world" of their day, and they still struggle (as all countries must) with the unresolved legacies of their several histories.

PRESENTATION AND TYPES OF EVIDENCE

To bring the large themes set forth in this introduction together in one book, I have divided the discussion into two parts—the authority of kings and movements toward a mandate of the people. The cultural formation of political institutions dates back to an early time, since the religious consecration of royal authority took place in the distant past. This early formation of political institutions foreshadowed the emergence of government in the name of the people, and this long-run effect can be studied by following the development of each country's aristocratic culture forward into the early modern period.

The countries considered here are arranged in a triple sequence from West to East (in Chapter 2), from East to West (in Chapters 3 through 6), and again from West to East (in Chapters 9 through 13), though in the interest of chronology I have placed the discussion of Japan before Russia in Part 2. One reason for the arrangement is to begin with what Western readers will find relatively familiar. A second reason is that I wish to present the "modern revolution" in its chronological sequence. A concluding chapter deals briefly with twentieth-century problems of building nation-states.

This study draws much of its evidence from social and political history. It differs from inquiries in economics, sociology, and psychology,

which frequently examine the record of human behavior for the hidden forces which cause that behavior. Such inquiry into underlying structures has been a dominant theme in recent intellectual history. Marxists and Freudians are at one in their attempt to discern the underlying cause of manifest discontents, even if they differ in what they purport to find. Some anthropologists and psychologists have turned their attention from behavioral studies to the analysis of myths in searching for the underlying constants of the human condition. And some sociologists and political scientists engage in a search for universals when they analyze the functional prerequisites of all social and political structures.

Such a search for structural forces can yield insights into motivation, ideological assumptions, and hidden interrelations. I am indebted to this intellectual tendency. But with so many scholars engaged in searching for underlying structures, there is space for an inquiry which focuses attention on structures that lie more open to view. The roots of historically developed structures, of the culture and political institutions of any present-day society, reach far into the past. In studying these roots, I am striving to free our understanding of the stereotyped contrast between tradition and modernity.

The ideas and actions of those in positions of power or authority are the best documented part of the human record. By comparing societies over long spans of time, and by choosing to look at social structures from the top down, one can take advantage of this extensive material. Major aspects of the social structure can be revealed if those in authority are studied in terms of the disunity and dilemmas they face as they advance their claims to legitimacy.

LIMITATIONS

The countries included in this book are those which I have studied for a number of years. They are among the most industrialized countries of the world and are also those in which the great revolutions and restoration movements have occurred since the seventeenth century. Inevitably there are omissions, and some of these deserve comment.

Small countries like Switzerland and the Netherlands have achieved stable authority structures through federation and the delegation of authority rather than through royalty and conquest. They also provide important models. Modern nation-states like the Americas, Australia, or New Zealand present problems of their own. Unlike England or Russia in their early development, the political institutions of the modern state were available at the time of European settlement; thus these institutions (or parts of them) could be adapted at will under the new conditions.[10] Other states like Italy or Spain were omitted simply because I have not

mastered their historical experience. Perhaps the most serious omissions are those numerous societies in which state- and nation-building must occur under twentieth-century conditions. Some countries of Asia and Africa have had state institutions in the past but today must rebuild them on new foundations. Other countries have emerged from centuries of cultural cross-currents and recent colonial subjection and must begin the task of building an independent state centuries after the task has been completed by all the major powers of the world. I touch on this question in the concluding chapter but am more acutely aware now than when I began that the "new states" of the twentieth century represent novel conditions of political development.

THE PURPOSES OF COMPARISON

In any scholarly discipline, the advance of knowledge depends on specialization. Hence, over the years there has been a drift toward confining overall presentations to introductory courses in the universities. At the same time, most teaching and research has been devoted to specialized topics. The burden of integrating the knowledge received in different specialties often falls on the student. Even if he is willing, he has little assistance in his efforts to encompass different fields of study. The risks of such integration are great, but one must not expect of students what one is unwilling to undertake oneself.

Comparative analysis should sharpen our understanding of the contexts in which more detailed causal inferences can be drawn. Without a knowledge of contexts, causal inference may pretend to a level of generality to which it is not entitled. On the other hand, comparative studies should not attempt to replace causal analysis, because they can deal only with a few cases and cannot easily isolate the variables (as causal analysis must).

In order to preserve a sense of historical particularity while comparing different countries, I ask the same or at least similar questions of very different contexts and thus allow for divergent answers. Structures of authority in different countries do vary; societies have responded differently to challenges prompted by advances from abroad. The value of this study depends on the illumination obtained from the questions asked and from a sustained comparative perspective. Chapters 2, 7, 8, and 14 elaborate the principal questions; these chapters introduce and conclude the two parts of this book.

My approach to social history differs from mere reportage as well as from the more theoretical approaches to comparative studies. To compare, for example, kingship in Western and Chinese civilization, or intellectual mobilization in sixteenth-century England and eighteenth-

century Germany, one must ask questions broad enough for comparison to be possible. Such questions rest on concepts absent from mere reportage. But the concepts suitable for comparisons which preserve a sense of historical particularity are also less comprehensive than the more abstract and systematic concepts of social theory. For purposes of the comparisons here envisaged, a solution is not found by making the concepts either more precise or more comprehensive. On the one hand, concepts become inapplicable to a number of diverse cases as they become more strictly applicable to any one of them. On the other, concepts become inapplicable to any specific case as they become applicable to all cases. Logically, all concepts begin with universals. But once these are stated, it becomes necessary to provide links between such universals and the case materials to be studied, as I try to do in Chapters 2, 7, 8, and 14.

Comparative studies depend on qualitative judgments and illustrative uses of the evidence. I have relied on the judgments of historians but primarily on my own sense of how much illustrative material is needed to give the reader a vivid impression of the point to be made. In practice, I have found it necessary to make the best judgments I can and then warn the reader, as I do here, that these judgments remain tentative and may have to be modified by further scholarly work or by the judgments of scholars more expert in a given field than I can hope to be.

POWER AND THE MANDATE TO RULE

Authority and inequality are basic dimensions of all social structures. Societies are governed by the few, because the few can reach an understanding among themselves and use that understanding to facilitate decision-making. This is a universal condition of all complex societies; only tribal societies are not governed in this manner. Whether a society is under the authority of a king or under a government in the name of the people, the few will be distinguished from the many. Thus, where authority is present, inequality between rulers and ruled will occur.

This book deals with power and the mandate to rule, that is, the use of force as an attribute of authority and the justifications which attempt to make the use of force legitimate. It may be objected that concern with the purposes of rule and the legitimation of power merely assuage the conscience of the powerful and that force alone really matters. I think this view is mistaken.

Power needs ideas and legitimation the way a conventional bank needs investment policies and the confidence of its depositors. Rulers

are always few in number and could never obtain compliance if each command were purely random and had to be backed by force sufficient to compel obedience. Likewise, banks rely on the confidence of their depositors, which allows them to retain only a small fraction of their assets in liquid funds in order to meet the expected rate of withdrawal by depositors. All is well as long as depositors believe that the bank will cash their checks on demand, and part of that trust depends on a vague knowledge about the bank's adherence to certain accepted business standards. In the nation-state, all is well as long as citizens believe that the government knows what it is about, has the ability to deliver on some of its promises, and has sufficient force to back up its commands when necessary. Psychologically, bank credit and governmental legitimacy rest on an amalgam of convenient commonplaces, inarticulate assumptions, and a willingness to let others take the lead and to leave well enough alone. But once the trust based on such feelings is disturbed, conditions can change quickly. A run on the bank is like a massive challenge to state authority, for each may demonstrate that the bank's and the state's resources are insufficient to withstand such a loss of confidence. Legitimation achieves what power alone cannot, for it establishes the belief in the rightness of rule which, as long as it endures, precludes massive challenges. Thus, the emphasis of this study is on power and the mandate to rule, not on one to the exclusion of the other.

Like the polarities so frequently used in Max Weber's work, one phrase combines the use of force with the belief in legitimacy. As Otto Hintze has stated,

> All human activity, political and religious, stems from an undivided root. As a rule, the first impulse for . . . social action comes from tangible interests, political or economic. . . . Ideal interests elevate and animate these tangible interests and lend them justification. Man does not live by bread alone; he wants to have a good conscience when he pursues his vital interests; and in pursuing them he develops his powers fully only if he is conscious of simultaneously serving purposes higher than purely egotistical ones. Interests without such spiritual elevation are lame; on the other hand, ideas can succeed in history only when and to the extent that they attach themselves to tangible interests.[11]

Thus, wherever power is vigorously pursued and exercised, ideas of legitimacy tend to develop to give meaning, reinforcement, and justification to that power. Conversely, wherever a mandate to rule is to sway the minds and hearts of men, it requires the exercise of force or the awareness that those who rule are able, and will not hesitate, to use force if that is needed to assert their will.

The authority of kings—their power and mandate to rule—often weaken. When that occurs,

Criticism and propaganda expose the *arcana imperii* to the light of common day. Subjects ask if they should obey, and whom, and why. Authority is constrained to plead its case with reasons or impose itself by violence. In either instance it has lost its virtue: for while authority remains itself, it neither argues nor coerces, but merely speaks and is accepted. Upon the complex scene already charged with tense uncertainties, unexpected fresh initiatives supervene.[12]

These initiatives accompany the decline of royal authority and often anticipate its actual downfall. But sacred authority is more easily destroyed than reconstructed, or perhaps one should say that critics of royal authority have seldom been conscious that the new authority they propose requires a sacred foundation as well. These comments anticipate the prominence of inviolate symbols like "the people" or "the nation" in all efforts to reconstitute authority since the decline of kingship.