INTRODUCTION

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Emotions do not form a natural class. After a long history of quite diverse debates about their classification, emotions have come to form a heterogeneous group: various conditions and states have been included in the class for quite different reasons and on different grounds, against the background of shifting contrasts. Fear, religious awe, exuberant delight, pity, loving devotion, panic, regret, anxiety, nostalgia, rage, disdain, admiration, gratitude, pride, remorse, indignation, contempt, disgust, resignation, compassion (just to make a random selection) cannot be shepherded together under one set of classifications as active or passive; thought-generated and thought-defined or physiologically determined; voluntary or nonvoluntary; functional or malfunctional; corrigible or not corrigible by a change of beliefs. Nor can they be sharply distinguished from moods, motives, attitudes, character traits.

Some emotions can be induced physiologically, controlled chemically, and are characteristically behaviorally identifiable even when the person is not aware of his condition. Other emotions are strongly intentional in character: a person's beliefs and perceptions, the descriptions under which he views the objects of his attitudes are essential to the identification and the individuation of the emotion. The general description of the objects and behavioral expression of some emotions (e.g., anger) are cross-culturally invariant in origin and expression; others (e.g., Japanese *amae*) are strongly culturally and even subculturally variable. Emotions that are closely associated with pleasures and pains can be mapped on a scale of aversion-attraction to their objects; such emotions (e.g., fear) are often directly motivational because they are ingredient in a person's apprehension of what is to be pursued or avoided. Because

they presuppose beliefs about objective satisfactions, they are thought to be capable of being evaluated for their rationality as well as for their appropriateness. Other emotions (e.g., nostalgia) are relatively motivationally isolated: their connections with a range of appropriate actions are commensurately distant, even when they are normally expressed in characteristic sounds, gestures, or facial configurations. Such emotions are standardly evaluated for their appropriateness rather than for their rationality. Some emotions are relatively easy to change or to correct by changes in beliefs and perceptions. Others are far more resistant to straightforwardly rational correction, evincing such strong conservation that they distort perception and attention. Some emotions are strongly dispositional, explained by and indicative of a person's constitution and character; others are episodic, explained primarily by their immediate contextual causes.

An investigation of the emotions might be thought, then, to produce a taxonomy: a classification of varieties of emotions along a number of parameters, a schematic diagram placing varieties of emotions on a number of scales (passivity/activity, voluntary/nonvoluntary, behaviorally/intentionally defined).[1] But a number of difficulties stand in the way of such an enterprise. The general class, *emotions,* cannot, with its varieties, be contrasted with other classes: *motives* and *cognitive attitudes.* There are, moreover, enormous differences within each emotion-type: some angers are etiologically and functionally closer to indignation than to rage. The problems that beset analyses of the emotions are symptomatic of deeper problems in philosophical psychology. The dichotomies that have been the stock in trade of psychologists and philosophers are highly suspect: these are the working dichotomies between physical and psychological processes, between activities and passive responses, between voluntary and nonvoluntary behavior, between cognition and other psychological activities. What makes the placing of emotions along a schema of these various parameters problematic is that the meanings and force of these dichotomies have themselves shifted. They were terms of art, introduced at very different periods in the history of the subject, to perform quite different functions. The contrast between activities and passive responses, for example, has an extremely muddled history: its place in relation to the contrast between voluntary and nonvoluntary

actions is a matter of substantive disagreement.[2] Behind the debates about whether specific emotions are (for instance) cognitively corrigible stand yet further disagreements about the characterization of cognition and its relation to affect. In short, it becomes clear that a proper account of the emotions requires a revision of the whole map of psychological processes and activities, and of their complex interrelations.

The subject of our study may evaporate as a natural kind, contrasted with other natural kinds. We should have done a large service to further investigation if we succeeded in making that plausible. Naturally this is not the sort of claim that can be demonstrated: at best it can be grounded in detailed discussions of the problems that arise in identifying, explaining, characterizing those various conditions that are commonly classified as emotions. The explosion of a subject sometimes generates considerable light.

One might think that, at least in principle, all this could be bypassed. We could take some range of emotions as central, abstract and analyze the functioning of the variables that seem to explain them, and construct our analysis to develop a general theory. If the theory does not readily apply to cases for which it was not expressly designed, those cases can be classified as nonemotions and left for analysis elsewhere. Or else charges of self-deception can be brought into play: the errant or anomalous cases could be claimed really to conform to the theory, appearances and first-person denials to the contrary. Rather than being explained, they are explained away.

As long as we are quite clear about the reconstructive and legislative character of such an enterprise, careful not to confuse the surgery necessary to elegant theory construction with Procrustean butchery, there is no harm in this. After all, splendid theories have emerged from a carefree disregard of the muddles that come from staying too close to the descriptive ground. Precisely because our vocabulary *is* in disarray, it might be thought fruitful to abstract from common beliefs and characterizations, moving as sharply as possible toward a technical or even formally constructed terminology. The difficulty is, however, that legislative analyses often also present themselves as simply and straightforwardly descriptive. They therefore tend to be taken as being in a polemical disagreement with other theories that began with quite different cases as central for their analyses and constructions, focusing on quite

different sorts of questions, going in a different direction from a different starting point. But such alternative accounts need not conflict at all, any more than a Beethoven variation on a theme from Mozart conflicts with a Brahms variation on the same theme (let alone a Brahms variation on a theme from Haydn). A theory that takes fear as the central example of emotion will take a quite different form from one that abstracts from regret or nostalgia as central cases. Conflicts between the two theories may appear to be profound; but they will be largely perspectival and verbal.

Without legislating against legislative theories, these essays are enterprises of another sort. They attempt to describe and preserve the phenomena, presenting distinct approaches to the emotions, raising questions that do not claim to preempt the field. The authors are committed to remaining close to the descriptive ground, even at the cost of elegance and simplicity. An adequate account of the emotions requires research in quite different fields. It is too early to construct a unified theory, even too early for a single interdisciplinary account of the approaches whose contributions are required to explain the range of emotional conditions. The vocabularies of neurophysiologists, psychologists, anthropologists, biologists, and philosophers have not been uniformly or consistently established in a reliable form. Even workers within a single discipline often turn out, on close examination, to be talking at cross purposes. At this stage, we still need to become informed of the work in a number of fields which can illuminate problems in our own, even when such work cannot directly be applied to solve these problems.

All too often, philosophers take strong stands on issues without informing themselves of the results of relevant empirical investigations: and all too often empirical researchers remain naive about the assumptions built into their conceptual apparatus. It would be an advance to formulate and to distinguish some questions and to collect and compare work from different fields.

This anthology presents papers from several disciplines. All the essays presuppose the rehabilitation of the emotions. They take it for granted that emotions are not irrational feelings, disturbances, or responses to disturbances. They also take it for granted that emotions are not merely proprioceptive states, identified and individuated by introspective insight or by a physiological description.

The authors assume that emotions play an important part in our lives, that having an emotion can not only be functional but also informative. Recent strategies of philosophers arguing that the emotions are not intrinsically irrational (or arational) concentrate on showing that the emotions can themselves be evaluated for their rationality: the beliefs they presuppose can be judged true or false, validly or invalidily inferred.[3] Most of the papers in this volume construe the reconciliation of the emotions and rationality more broadly, without reconstructing the intentional component of an emotion as a judgment in propositional form.

The best way to characterize the essays is give an account of the various questions they address. In "Sensory and Perceptive Factors in Emotional Functions of the Triune Brain," MacLean reports research into the respective functions of the three layers of the brain, discovering that "Although the three brain types are extensively interconnected and functionally dependent, there is evidence that each is capable of operating somewhat independently." He discusses the correlation of various sorts of emotional disorders with lesions in specific parts of the brain, with spatiotemporal disorientation, and with characteristic sensory and perceptual disorders.

In "The Sociocultural, Biological, and Psychological Determinants of Emotion," Averill analyzes some of the ways in which the plasticity of the biological determinants of emotion allow for social and individual specification and formation. Influenced by early Darwinist theory and the seminal work of Silvan Tomkins, Averill is interested in the adaptive advantages of the expression of the emotions to communicate environmental dangers and benefits, and to form bonds among group members.

In "Biological and Cultural Contributions to Body and Facial Movement in the Expression of Emotions," Ekman maps the facial configurations that express specific emotions, investigating patterns that are culturally invariant even when there are cultural and conventional variations in the contexts and proprieties of expression, as variations in their significant symbolic functions.

Rorty and de Sousa analyze the causal functions of the intentional components of the emotions, arguing that they form organized patterns of attention and focus, rather than beliefs in propositional form. This is one of the reasons that the correction or

change of emotions involves restructuring habits of perceptual or conceptual organization and salience.

The papers by Norton and Rey place the attribution of emotions in the more general context of psychological theory. Morton discusses the psychological theories implicit in the attribution of psychological traits, the ways in which emotions are located within a person's general character structure, suggesting that emotions are identified not only by their causal history but also by their place in a system of clustering and contrastive traits.

Rey suggests that by focusing on the psychological effects of our constitutions and social histories, a study of the emotions could solve some of the problems of functionalist theories whose identification of psychological states by their causes, effects, and roles leaves them open to the charge of being too broad and too intellectualistic. An adequate account of the emotions should provide constraints for functionalism.

Marshall analyzes the objects and causes of complex emotions, asking whether complex emotions can have multiple and distinct causal histories without thereby fracturing into several conjoined emotions. Greenspan argues that some cases where fracturing does occur—cases of ambivalence or contrary emotions with the same object—need not involve irrationality, as cognitive conflict presumably would.

Solomon explores the relation between a person's characteristic range of emotions and his conception of what is essential to his identity. Strongly influenced by Sartre, Solomon claims that a person's choice of his emotions constitutes a choice of self-identification or definition. He takes emotions to be voluntary judgments, ways of seeing or interpreting one's modes of being in the world. In a new appendix, he sets more stringent limits on his account of the voluntary character of psychological states.

In his account of self-deceptive emotions, de Sousa investigates the ways we acquire our emotional repertoires from early "paradigm scenarios." Since we also learn the meanings of terms that refer to emotions from such paradigm scenarios, identifying the cognitive component of emotions requires understanding their formation. De Sousa analyzes some strategies for evaluating and changing the "ideological" force of emotions.

In "On Persons and their Lives," Wollheim examines the ways

in which the affective interpretations and reconstructions of memories influence—and are in turn influenced by—a person's conception of the unity of his life, his sense of its forming a whole. Experiential memory, affective interpretation, and personal identity are mutually constitutive.

Stocker attacks the divisions standardly drawn between emotions and other psychological activities, arguing that emotional dispositions are not only presupposed by but also are expressed directly in intellectual investigations. The sharp distinctions between cognition, connation, and motivation prevent our understanding how emotions and character traits direct inquiry, their style entering into the determination of the outcome.

Like Stocker, Matthews is interested in breaking down the distinction between emotions and other sorts of cognitive and interpretive attitudes. He investigates the ways in which at least some emotions are characteristically ingredient in, and expressed by a person's posture, words, thought, rituals of behavior. He holds that such rituals not only express but compose the character of some religious feelings and attitudes.

Isenberg, Taylor, Baier, Neu, Tov-Ruach, Rorty, and Blum investigate particular sets of emotions and emotional attitudes. They raise the questions: In what does the emotion consist? What are the characteristic thoughts, anticipations, causes, and objects of the emotion? How is it related to neighboring and opposing attitudes? What range of attitudes—especially attitudes toward oneself—does it presuppose and express? What sorts of behavior and actions are characteristic of the emotion? How are particular instances evaluated as appropriate or inappropriate, rational or irrational? Can the emotion be evaluated for its moral force, and moral arguments advanced for strengthening or redirecting the emotion? To what extent and how can a person control or correct such attitudes?

Scruton discusses the cultural transmission of patterns of emotions, particularly through poetic and literary works that come to form our descriptions of events. By being embedded in our perceptions of states of affairs, emotions form our judgments and expectations of appropriate actions.

NOTES

1. See J. de Rivera, "A Structural Theory of the Emotions," *Psychological Issues* (1977).

2. See H. Frankfurt, "Identification and Externality," *The Identities of Persons,* ed. A. O. Rorty (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1976); G. Marshall, "On Being Affected," *Mind* (1968); I. Murdoch, *The Sovereignty of the Good* (London, 1970).

3. See the articles by Bedford, Pitcher, Thalberg, Pears, Kenny, and Wilson listed in the Bibliography.