INTRODUCTION: A GERMAN DREAM?  1

1 WORKING GUESTS: GASTARBEITER AND GREEN CARD HOLDERS 21

2 OUR SOCIALIST FRIENDS: FOREIGNERS IN EAST GERMANY 65

3 IS THE BOAT FULL? XENOPHOBIA, RACISM, AND VIOLENCE 105

4 WHAT IS A GERMAN? LEGISLATING NATIONAL IDENTITY 149

5 RELIGION AND DIASPORA: MUSLIMS, JEWS, AND CHRISTIANS 193

6 PROMOTING DIVERSITY: INSTITUTIONS OF MULTICULTURALISM 241

7 AN IMMIGRATION COUNTRY? THE LIMITS OF CULTURE 285

8 LIVING IN TWO WORLDS? DOMESTIC SPACE, FAMILY, AND COMMUNITY 331

9 WRITING BACK: LITERATURE AND MULTILINGUALISM 383

10 A TURKISH GERMANY: FILM, MUSIC, AND EVERYDAY LIFE 425

EPILOGUE: GLOBAL ALREADY?  469

Chronology 497
Glossary 513
Bibliography 517
Filmography 543
Internet Resources 553
List of Credits 555
Index 561
WORKING GUESTS
GASTARBEITER AND GREEN CARD HOLDERS
THE MILLIONTH GUEST WORKER, 1964. Amid banners, dignitaries, and flashing cameras, Armando Rodrigues de Sá balances awkwardly on his welcome gift after a two-day train trip from Portugal to Cologne-Deutz. West Germany’s financial newsweekly greets him with the following words: “Señor Rodrigues, welcome to the Federal Republic. . . . You shall be made as comfortable here as possible, as any guest should expect. . . . Now off to the fight, Torero!”
WE BEGIN THIS VOLUME with documents tracing the turbulent itinerary of foreign labor recruitment in West Germany from the postwar era to the present. Though Italian seasonal workers had been employed in the southwestern province of Baden-Württemberg since 1952, recruitment on the federal level began in January 1956. Our first text is a 1955 contract between Italy and West Germany “in the spirit of European solidarity” that would place Italian laborers for a maximum term of nine months. Members of the center-left Social Democratic Party objected to the program, claiming that the government should reduce domestic unemployment before hiring foreign labor power. Many questioned whether the postwar German infrastructure was prepared to house, transport, and provide basic services for the 100,000 new recruits expected in 1956.

Despite the plan’s detractors, the “guest-worker initiative” evoked a progressive vision of pan-European mobility, foreshadowing many of the transnational features of 1990s labor policy. The contract idealized a flexible, multifunctional laborer who, in contrast to unionized domestic wage earners, could be transplanted to new sites and milieus with ease. This mobile Italian worker would benefit from a symbiotic relationship with the capital-rich, labor-poor West German economy, while continuing to support family members in Italy. The logic of the contract precludes classical immigration by assuming the recruits would neither desire nor need permanent civic membership in the host country. This pro-European, transnational outlook among the contract’s negotiators led them to ignore the concrete manifestations of the nation-state: borders, passport controls, xenophobia, and restricted visas.

In the late 1950s, as industry leaders dubbed Italian recruitment a success, the Labor Ministry began to explore similar possibilities beyond the European Economic Community, which then had only six member states. Texts such as “The Verona Bottleneck” (1960) and “The Turks Are Coming” (1961) announce the recruitment of Spanish, Portuguese, and Turkish workers. In these articles, government spokespersons and journalists question the prudence of expanding the guest-worker program beyond the European Economic Community. A 1961 press release from the Confederation of German Employers’ Associations suggests that West Germany should consider expanding its economic aid to Turkey instead of expropriating that country’s labor power.
Like the recruitment contract with Italy, several of the documents in this chapter exemplify the more “performative” artifacts of early labor migration—informational pamphlets, sociological and demographic research studies, and invitations for labor placement. For example, “How the Turkish Worker Should Behave and Defend His Character in a Foreign Country,” a Turkish-language pamphlet distributed by the Istanbul-based Turkish Labor Placement Office in 1963, advertises West Germany as an anticommunist, nationalist country that values hard work above all. Recruits, it suggests, should honor and reflect the virtues of the Turkish Republic and its Ottoman predecessors at all costs. Another text, from 1973, “Invitation for Labor Placement,” notifies the addressee of his pending placement in Western Europe and instructs him to present himself for transport at a specific date and time.

Other texts document the public image of immigrants in these early years—whether as caricatures, homesick displaced persons, or future citizens. Giacomo Maturi’s 1961 lecture at a nationwide meeting of employers advanced a culturalist theory of guest-worker productivity, suggesting that mental and emotional differences between German and Italian workers required two distinctly different managerial approaches in the workplace. Conny Froboess’s popular 1962 song, “Two Little Italians,” illustrates this exoticized nostalgia, picking up on the romantic image of the homesick Italian worker.

Though the nine-month “rotation principle” was supposed to be one of the structural mainstays of labor migration in West Germany, it had been all but abandoned in practice by the mid-1960s. A 1965 text, distributed by the Nuremberg-based Federal Labor Placement Office and entitled “Support for the Foreign Employee,” took initial steps to acknowledge the permanent nature of immigrant cultures in West Germany. This text asks politicians and citizens to support “coexistence” initiatives, occupational advancement, and cultural programs for guest workers.

A further group of texts index a corpus of political journalism in West Germany that critiqued the inequities and political foibles arising from the guest-worker program. These texts reveal the persistence of a fundamental ambivalence in the mainstream press about the sustainability of temporary, rotation-based labor. “Big Welcome for Armando sa Rodriguez” (1964) reports on an official reception ceremony for the country’s 1 millionth guest worker. Later articles, including “Come, Come, Come!—Go, Go, Go!” (1970) and “Recruitment of Guest Workers Stopped” (1973), speak to the living conditions that had arisen from temporary recruitment, including workplace xenophobia and housing inequity. “The Turks Rehearsed the Uprising” (1973) documents a “wildcat strike” at the Ford factory in Cologne, where Turkish autoworkers led a sustained campaign against unfair labor practices and inadequate union representation. Two other texts from the postrecruitment era—Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s “Coalition of the Center”
(1984) and Irina Ludat’s “A Question of the Greater Fear” (1985)—address the exclusionary after-effects of the 1973 moratorium. Ludat’s exposé critiques Chancellor Kohl’s “remigrant incentive” program, which sought to pay immigrants a one-time sum to leave Germany for good.

“The Card Trick” (2000) comments on the federal government’s sudden announcement of a Green Card initiative to attract high-tech workers and suggests that parliamentarians across the political spectrum have bowed to corporate interests, instead of acknowledging immigrant communities’ pleas for equal rights in employment. “The Campus That Never Sleeps” (2000) and “Carte Blanche in Green” (2002) comment on the itineraries of high-tech migrants from India and Eastern Europe and on Germany’s struggle to counter its own IT brain drain to the United States. We conclude this chapter with Fotini Mavromati’s 2005 article “Odyssey into the Promised Land,” which surveys illegal immigration in a Europe that no longer has internal border controls.

The guest-worker program of the 1960s and 1970s brought about the transcontinental shift of millions of families, along with their assets, ideals, institutions, languages, music, and food. No one at the Ministry of Labor in 1955 could have imagined the transnational cultures that would soon emerge from this experiment. A comparative look at the guest-worker program and the Green Card initiative reveals that, in both cases, the federal government relied on similar conceptions for securing flexible, temporary “labor power” to boost German competitiveness in world markets. In surveying Germany’s two major international labor-recruitment programs of the past 50 years, we encounter a number of questions. Can temporary labor programs succeed without systematically exploiting those who participate in them? Could Germany have avoided the xenophobic developments of the 1980s if it had afforded migrant laborers permanent resident status or citizenship? What role did the ideal of a mobile, borderless Europe play in the guest-worker program, even in its early years? As the U.S. government considers implementing bilateral “guest-worker” programs with Latin American countries, what lessons can be learned from the German case?
A HUNDRED THOUSAND ITALIAN WORKERS ARE COMING

First published as “Hunderttausend italienische Arbeiter kommen” in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (December 21, 1955). Translated by David Gramling. The term zone border in this text refers to the border between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, established in 1949.

Rome: Storch and Martino Have Signed the Contract

With a certain celebratory air, Foreign Minister Martino and Federal Labor Minister Storch signed an agreement on the employment of Italian laborers at the Palazzo Chigi on Tuesday. Martino commented, “A new period of fruitful cooperation between the two countries has begun.”

The preamble makes a pledge to the spirit of European solidarity. Italian workers will enjoy the same working conditions as are stipulated for German workers. The agreement was sketched out on July 18, though some details were resolved later by Director Dr. Rudolf Pertz and an advisory panel at the Federal Ministry of Labor. These details were primarily concerned with questions of social services and provisions for workers’ family members. The Italian negotiators did not conceal their contentment with one particular aspect: in contrast to Italy’s labor agreements with other countries, Germany will pay family allowances even when family members remain in Italy. The Federal Ministry of Labor was concerned that Italian workers in Germany could not be housed in as “homelike” a way as would be necessary in today’s times. This problem could, the officials contend, be overcome. But the flow of Italian workers into Germany can only be promoted to the extent that housing is available for them.

In the coming years, a hundred thousand Italian workers are expected, although the German economy could accept many more. Recruitment will begin in January [1956]. All economic sectors will be involved, but primarily the agricultural and building trades, as well as the mechanical industries. Later, when Italian workers have acquired the necessary German-language skills for occupational safety standards, mining positions will be added. A joint German-Italian advisory board will assess and regulate all issues that pertain to the agreement.

The Social Democrats’ Concerns

BONN—December 20. On Tuesday, the Social Democratic faction objected to the plan, claiming that organized recruitment of foreign workers should commence only when the domestic economic market has no more labor power. Such is their position on the German-Italian agreement. Here, the faction is referring to the high level of permanent unemployment in the zone-border regions and is calling on the government of the Federal Re-
public to undertake all possible efforts to bring these unemployed people to
the industrial centers.

Federal Labor Minister Anton Storch responded by pointing out that the
Federal Institute for Labor Placement and Unemployment Insurance in
Nuremberg will only distribute work permits for foreign workers if the for-
eigners have the same working conditions and the same employment pro-
tections as German workers.

State Secretary Sauerborn from the Federal Ministry of Labor spoke to the
concern that recruiting Italians could lead to a destabilization of German
salary standards, alleging that the German-Italian agreement mitigates such
concerns. The costs of recruitment, he continued, would be covered by the
Italian government and by German employers, who would have to pay a uni-
form flat rate to cover travel costs from the Italian border to the German
labor site.

2

DECLARATION OF ACCORD BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
ITALIAN REPUBLIC CONCERNING THE RECRUITMENT AND PLACEMENT
OF ITALIAN WORKERS IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

The government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the government of
the Italian Republic,

Guided by the desire to promote and deepen relations between their peo-
uples in the spirit of European solidarity, to benefit both countries, and to
strengthen the existing ties of friendship between them; in the endeavor to
achieve a high employment rate and to utilize productive potential to the
fullest; and with the conviction that these efforts serve the common interests
of their peoples and promote their economic and social progress, have
reached the following Accord concerning the recruitment and placement of
Italian workers in the Federal Republic of Germany.

Section I: General Provisions

Article 1: (1) When the government of the Federal Republic of Germany
(herewith referred to as Federal Republic) determines a demand for work-
ers, which it wishes to fulfill through an in-sourcing of workers with Italian
citizenship, it will notify the Italian government as to which occupations or
occupational groups and to what approximate extent there is a need for
workers. (2) The Italian government will notify the Federal Republic whether there is a possibility of accommodating this demand. (3) On the basis of these communications, both countries will agree to what extent, in which occupations or occupational groups, and at what point the recruitment and placement of workers of Italian citizenship in the Federal Republic shall be undertaken. [. . .]

Section II: Recruitment and Placement

Article 6: The Italian applicants must provide the following identifying documents to the German Commission:

- a certificate providing the results of an examination of their occupational and health qualifications;
- a personal identification card with photo;
- a certificate issued by the respective mayor, stating that the holder has no criminal record;
- an official certificate of their marital status. [. . .]

Section IV: Support, Wage Transfer, and Workers’ Families

[. . .] Article 15: In accordance with the relevant German foreign exchange regulations, Italian workers can transfer their entire earned income back to Italy.

Article 16: (1) Italian workers who wish to arrange for their family members to join them can apply for a promissory note for a residence permit for these family members from the Foreigner Police by providing official documentation that there is sufficient living space for the family members. The authorities will prudently consider the applications and render a decision as soon as possible. [. . .]

Section VII: Final Provisions

[. . .] Article 22: The terms of this Accord do not countervene more favorable international regulations governing free movement of workers between European countries, but are nonetheless binding for the Federal Republic of Germany and the Italian Republic.

Article 23: This Accord will come into effect on the day of its signing. It is binding for one year and will be automatically extended each year if it is not discontinued by either government at least three months before its expiration date.

Signed in Rome on December 20, 1955, in two copies, German and Italian, whereby the provisions are binding in both languages. [Signatories were Anton Storch, Federal Minister for Labor for Germany; Gaetano Martino, Minister for Foreign Affairs for Italy; and Clemens von Brentano, Ambassador for the Federal Republic of Germany in Rome.]
3
THE VERONA BOTTLENECK
First published as “Engpass Verona” in Der Spiegel (April 27, 1960). Translated by David Gramling.

In recent days, that perennially restless search through Europe’s economic hinterlands, aiming to drum up fresh reserves for West Germany’s rural-flight-stricken labor market, came to a successful conclusion at the Bonn Foreign Ministry. The Foreign Bureau’s State Secretary, Dr. Albert Hilger van Scherpenberg, signed a document in Bonn that will open up employment opportunities for Spanish workers in the Federal Republic; the director of his department, Ministerial Director Dr. Friedrich Janz, signed a second agreement that provides for the recruitment of Greece’s unemployed for West Germany.

Bonn has been engaged in a labor-power search since 1955, when West Germany’s labor market began to strain against its mere 500,000 unemployed (2.7 percent of those able to work). Since then, the number of unemployed has sunk to 255,000, or 1.3 percent.

West Germany thus boasts the world’s lowest unemployment rate. Even the United States, the classic land of affluence, cannot produce a rate under 3 percent, even in boom times. Theo Blank’s labor-market specialist, Dr. Rudolf Petz, explained, “The German labor-power deficit will become chronic in the next half decade.”

It was also Petz who paved the way for the first agreement with Italy in December 1955, which sought to fill vacant positions with imports. In 1956, 15,608 Italians came over the Alps; in 1958, it was 24,047, and last year [1959] 45,000 Italians signed a German work contract. The majority of these import workers stay for a season, mostly in well-paid building trades.

In accordance with Petz’s ordinance, the Federal Institute for Labor Placement and Unemployment Insurance (in Nuremberg) established two German recruitment centers—in Verona and Naples. Neither recruitment office can complain that business is slow. This year already, 15,184 Italians have committed to the Federal Republic. The German labor offices have also reported an additional cohort of 29,200 from Naples and Verona.

At the recruitment centers, the unemployed are examined by a doctor for their health status, and then presented to a commission, which instructs the potential recruit to demonstrate a few moves on the lathe or scaffolding—if they have indicated that they hold a trade qualification—in order to deter frauds and cons from making their way into West Germany. Upon approval by the commission, the seasonal emigrants receive a signed contract from their future employer and are brought to a mass residence hall to be freighted north the next day in a special transport train.

Before the new employee even sees his new West German employer, he must hand over 60 marks to the Federal Institute for transport costs at the
border. This process does not always benefit the employers; driven by homesickness, every fifth Italian aborts seasonal labor in the initial period. Today, seven of eight hired laborers honor their work contracts in West Germany until they expire.

Though this labor traffic was promising at the outset, the capacities of the Italian recruitment office were quickly exhausted. Verona sends 300 to 350 Italians daily; Naples sends 150. It will take the 29,200 requested laborers a good 10 weeks to reach their assigned site.

It was not for this reason alone that Petz and his colleagues began to look around at other European labor markets. Against Bonn’s will, the Italian labor bureaus are attempting to send their labor power as more than mere place fillers for the highly industrialized Federal Republic; they are also seeking to strengthen the legal standing of these seasonal emigrants as well.

For example, the director of the department of “social issues” at the Brussels-based EEC Commission, the Italian Giuseppe Petrilli, prepared a draft for a European regulation that would ensure unrestricted freedom of mobility for laborers during the 12-year EEC transition period. The draft would stipulate that foreign laborers from any of the six member countries within the EEC would have to be granted a labor permit within three weeks’ time, if the position vacated cannot be filled by a domestic applicant within this period.

## 4

**CONFEDERATION OF GERMAN EMPLOYERS’ ASSOCIATIONS**

**THE TURKS ARE COMING**


Alongside the recruitment of workers from Italy, Spain, and Greece, the hiring of Turkish workers will soon begin, according to the Federal Employment Agency’s recent announcement. On the basis of a provisional arrangement with Turkish government authorities, in cooperation with the Federal Employment Agency and the Turkish Labor Administration, workers will be recruited in Turkey and transported to the Federal Republic. Recent news reports may have already suggested that German authorities had this intention; nevertheless, the announcement of the realization of these plans is somewhat surprising. For one thing, the reservoir of manpower from previous countries of recruitment has hardly been exhausted; moreover, countries belonging to the EEC should have a certain priority over countries not yet included in the recruitment of workers. In addition, Turkey numbers among those countries in need of development aid, and in this respect, it is
not entirely unfair to ask if it is sensible to deprive a country like Turkey, which is dependent on its manpower for the continued expansion of its economy, of those very workers. Certainly, one has to make sure that these workers are not needed back home at the same time. For the practical implementation of a collaboration between the Federal Employment Agency and the Turkish Labor Administration, a provisional agreement was signed. It provides for the following: effective as of July 15, 1961, a German liaison office in Istanbul will handle the placement of Turkish workers suitable for the Federal Republic.

For the time being, placement will be restricted to the regional labor bureau districts of Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine–Westphalia, and Hamburg, which already employ a considerable number of Turkish workers, and where there is already experience with hiring Turkish workers. Because the German Federal Railway is interested in hiring a large contingent of track and loading workers, this restriction does not apply to contracts with the German Federal Railway. For the time being, however, companies can make hiring requests for Turks at the employment offices only if they are orders for male workers not specified by name. For unskilled and semiskilled male workers, who are available in as large a number as anyone might want, only orders for larger groups (at least 25 workers) will be accepted. Beyond that, presumably, it should be possible to place qualified workers in the textile industry; metalworking industry; food, drink, and tobacco industries; shipbuilding; building trades; mining; as well as quarrying and brick making. Here, though, it should be noted that though qualified Turkish workers have a certain amount of professional knowledge and experience, their practical training is not as systematic as that which is customary in the Federal Republic. For every Turkish worker requested—subject to final approval by the governing board of the Federal Employment Agency—companies must pay a lump sum for expenses in the amount of 120 German marks—corresponding to the amount for recruitment in Greece—and a travel supplement of 30 German marks, coming to a total of 150 German marks. The German liaison office in Istanbul will routinely inform the employment offices about placement prospects as soon as it receives a comprehensive overview of the manpower supply. It is recommended that interested employers turn to the employment office in their area for further information.

GIACOMO MATURI

THE INTEGRATION OF THE SOUTHERN LABOR FORCE AND ITS SPECIFIC ADAPTATION PROBLEMS

First published as “Die Eingliederung der südländischen Arbeitskräfte und ihre besonderen Anpassungsschwierigkeiten” in Ausländische Arbeitskräfte in Deutschland (Düsseldorf: Econ, 1961), 121–27.
Many of the difficulties in the integration of foreign labor power in the German economy originate in the differentness of these southern people. These are psychological difficulties, which cannot always be resolved by adapting these people to the German mentality and German forms. These difficulties can only be mastered by getting to know the eccentricities of these foreigners. They arise primarily when one tries to handle these people like Germans. It is only when one knows foreignness that a right-minded negotiation with them is possible, in which case the difficulties cease to exist, or are not that bad after all. They are only new manifestations that one must take into account; they can even be useful for the business milieu. [. . .]

The roots of these differences lie in the climate, in the landscape, in the historical development, in the culture and education, and in the societal structure of these peoples. The depth and momentousness of these factors show that it is impossible and irrational to demand a quick and total adaptation.

*The Influence of the Climate on Life Rhythms*

The southern climate demands and enables a different life rhythm than here in the north. Life is livelier; it is less strict and regulated. Without affecting actual productive potential, the climate has an effect on people and demands a different daily schedule, conditioning the distinct habits of these people, in private as well as in business life. Labor takes place in a different way than in the northern countries; it does not have the haste and the tempo that is common here. These people are no less willing to work or capable of work. This fact needs no further proof, because everyone praises the industriousness and the joy in working evident among the Italians. The legend of lazy Italians is, after all, a thing of the past. The overtly negative aspects can also be attributed to the climatic influences; it is also true, nonetheless, that southerners have another understanding of work.

*The Southerner’s Idea of Labor*

Southerners are more conscious than others that they do not live to work but work to live. They are, after all, the heirs to the ancient Roman and Greek societies that regarded handiwork as slave labor and saw life’s ideal as an *otium*—meaning liberation from material handiwork—in order to devote oneself to the greater values of life. They carry themselves with a distinct sense for the truly human aspects of life, because they do not really need to give themselves over to a hasty industriousness in order to drive away boredom. They value many things much more than financial affluence and the
comfort of technology. Moreover, their deeply religious, sometimes fatalistic sense for life leads them to undervalue many external things.

The beauty of the landscape, the mild climate, the clear blue sky and sea on the heavenly coasts are not inconsequential for them, in that they encourage a more contemplative and nature-bound way of living.

The pressure of work and income has, however, become great among these people of late. This fact is evident in their desire for overtime and their thrifty intentions to send as much money back home as possible. But one may not forget the conventional attitude of these people toward material labor if one wants to understand this or that particular manifestation. Their lack of hardiness and reliability, which is cause for complaint here and there, can certainly be understood from this point of view. [. . .]

The Psychological Differences between Germans and Southerners

The southerner wants to be dealt with in a very personal manner; he does not want to be a number. He needs warmth, sympathy, open and affectionate friendship, as well as recognition for work performed. Equality of rights and compensation is not sufficient for him; he is receptive and looks for a smile from his boss or employer.

The German, in contrast, is cold and objective; he is usually honest, just, and shies away from playing favorites, but he smiles too infrequently. For the southerner, he is not human enough. The tone one finds in the businesses here, particularly in construction work, is too tough and raw for southerners and sometimes appears almost brutal to them. These people are not exactly sensitive but they do tend to react more quickly. Even their voices sound different, particularly when they are fighting. They are impulsive and sometimes violent, but this behavior is only their passions coming to the surface. [. . .]

Most German employers are happy with the performance of these newly recruited foreigners, but the latter are too often conceived of only as labor power, as an economic factor, not as people. This perception does not mean that too little is being done for them; many firms even provide housing and supplies for them. But the human contact is missing. Coworkers also do not do much to foster intimacy with these people, to understand them. Foreign labor power is certainly not merely “foreign workers” anymore, but these people are still not perceived as full humans; they are isolated. Families living in the area also tend to avoid contact with these people as much as possible. There are no free rooms to rent for them; they are not wanted.

One should greet them, invite them in, receive them warmly, in order to introduce them into the new society. The economic problems of immigration should not overshadow the purely human problems. Inclusion in the economy demands inclusion in society. [. . .]
CONNY FROBOESS

TWO LITTLE ITALIANS

First released as “Zwei kleine Italiener” on Conny’s Party (Electrola: EMI, 1962). Translated by Tes Howell. Born in Berlin-Wedding in 1943, Froboess became a teenage idol by 1958, with halcyon tunes like “Pack Your Bathing Suit” and “Oh, It’s a Snowball Fight!” (1951). “Two Little Italians,” a German chart topper, was the high point of her singing career. It was also Germany’s entry for the 1962 Eurovision Song Contest.

A journey to the South
is for others chic and good,
but the two little Italians
would rather be at home.

Two little Italians,
dreaming of Napoli,
of Tina and Marina,
who’ve long been waiting for them.

Two little Italians
never forget their home,
the palms and the girls
on the beaches of Napoli.

Two little Italians,
a familiar sight at the station;
they leave every night
on the train to Napoli.

TURKISH LABOR PLACEMENT OFFICE

HOW THE TURKISH WORKER SHOULD BEHAVE AND DEFEND HIS CHARACTER IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY

First published as “Türk İşçisi Yabancı Ülkede Nasıl Davranmalı, Nasıl Benliğini Korumalı” by the Turkish Institute for Labor and Labor Placement (1963). Reprinted in Fremde Heimat: Eine Geschichte der Einwanderung aus der Türkei, Aytac Eryilmaz and Matilde Jamin, eds. (Essen: Klartext, 1998), 64. Translated by David Gramling. Each worker recruited from the Turkish Republic between 1961 and 1963 received the following Turkish-language pamphlet introducing the German culture and economy.

The Federal Republic of Germany is a nationalistic state. The Germans living there are nationalist and anticommunist, just like us. But even there, some harmful people will slip in among our workers and spread all sorts of propaganda to isolate them from their nationality and religion, luring them
into the merciless, scarlet trap of communism, seeking to infect them with poisonous ideas. They will attempt to alienate our workers from the work they are doing with promises of money and women, and try to deceive them by saying that they will find them better jobs. But more importantly, if encouraged, they will defame our homeland, our government, our state, our regime, and our glorious army and will attempt to lure you away from your straight path. To this end, they will take advantage of your drunken, tired, and weary moments to insinuate themselves among you. When you sense that someone like this is present, remove him from your social circle immediately. There are some among our colleagues whose will is weak. Do not leave them to their devices. Notify our consular officials.

Should you have friends who may be ensnared by the lies of communist radio programming, remind them of the realities of the situation.

So you are able to receive news from your homeland in a timely way and hear the türkü folk songs that you miss, our Ministry for Press, Publishing and Radio is currently making Turkish programming available via radio and shortwave frequencies.

Do not cause trouble or fight with our allies and friends among the Germans, with your own countrymen in Germany, or with other foreigners who have likewise come to make their livelihood. Each time such occurrences appear in the newspapers, the reputation and fame of Turkishness are denigrated. Because German women love the heroism of the Turk, they will behave cheerfully and politely toward you. Do not misunderstand this friendliness. You must regard the honor of these people with whom you are now living just as you regard your own honor. One thing that will elicit the most negative of reactions and is not kindly looked upon in Western countries is to aggravate a woman in any way or to attempt to establish intimacy with her in a way she does not want.

Family bonds in Germany are held sacred, just as they are in Turkey. Looking improperly at a married woman will not be forgiven. If you are married yourself, do not do anything that would cause you to forget your loyal spouse patiently awaiting you at home.

Every Turkish worker living in a foreign country must also not forget that our heroic ancestors, who went as far as Vienna and the shores of the Danube, never infringed upon the honor of others. When they took a bunch of grapes from a deserted vineyard, they left behind appropriate payment at the base of the vine, and if they took a fig from a tree, they tied a small purse of money to the branch. To this day, no Turk is considered as thieving, honorless, unjust, or mischievous. You will also not bring such labels upon yourself.

Germans are known throughout the world as a hardworking nation. They do not play around once work has begun and do not disobey the words of their superiors. German employers request workers from us because they
have heard and know from experience that Turks are hardworking and discipline loving. Do not soil the Turks’ reputation. Work like bees, be cautious, be quick to learn what you do not know. Do not deviate from the order of the workplace. Begin work on time; end on time. Do not seek medical leave unless it is especially necessary. Do not resist your supervisors or employers. Choose a trusted colleague from among you to be a spokesperson so that your rights will be represented and so that your wishes and complaints will be appropriately heard by the employer. Seek mediation from the agents at what is called the workers’ council at German workplaces and become a member of the unions. If you have tried all of these venues and you continue to believe that you are in the right with regard to a complaint or request that has not been resolved or responded to, appeal to the nearest German Labor Placement Office or notify our labor attaché in Bonn in person or by letter. More labor attaché positions will be established soon. For now, you can explain your situation to the consulate in your region. Our consulates will try to do everything in their power to be of assistance to you. But they also will have some expectations of you.

8

BIG WELCOME FOR ARMANDO SA RODRIGUES

First published as “Grosser Bahnhof für Armando sa Rodrigues” in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (September 11, 1964). Translated by David Gramling. In September 2004, a conference took place at the Cologne-Deutz train station in commemoration of Rodrigues and the 500,000 workers from Portugal and Spain who had come there by train.

The Federal Republic Receives Its Millionth Guest Worker

Cologne. The millionth guest worker to arrive in the Federal Republic was ushered in with a “big welcome” on Thursday upon his arrival in Cologne-Deutz—not without betraying a little embarrassment and perplexity toward the honors bestowed upon him. After a 48-hour train ride, the 38-year-old carpenter, Armando sa Rodrigues, from the Portuguese village Vale de Madeiros, was suddenly surrounded by a flock of reporters and television cameras, boisterous marching music, and the reception committee of the Federal Republic’s Association of Employers, which hailed him as its “millionth.”

Rodrigues arrived in the second of two special trains delivering 173 guest workers from Portugal and 933 from Spain. Rigidly and with an almost affectless facial expression, he stood under a banner with the words “The German Association of Employers Greets the 1,000,000th Guest Worker” amid the flash of cameras and spotlights. Even the news that the two-seated moped standing next to him was his welcoming gift could not conjure a smile from his face. After some hesitation, the gaunt man in blue worker’s pants gave
some information about himself. He did not know how long he intended to stay in the Federal Republic. Nonetheless, he plans to have his wife, his 15-year-old son, and his 11-year-old daughter come join him.

During the short celebration—the greeting podium was flanked with the flags of Portugal, Spain, and the Federal Republic—a representative of the Employers’ Association welcomed the millionth foreign employee and his newly arrived colleagues. “Without the additional work of foreigners, our economic development in recent years would be unthinkable,” he stressed. Their efforts were, he continued, all the more formidable, considering the difficulties of adapting and reorienting to a foreign, highly industrialized world, despite differences in mentality, the change in climatic conditions, and the linguistic difficulties. It was, he said, the task of the German businesses and their workers to help them overcome these integration difficulties.

This “millionaire” is not uncontroversial; there are conflicting statistics about the number of guest workers in the Federal Republic. As recently as Wednesday, the president of the Federal Institute for Labor Placement and Unemployment Insurance, Anton Sabel, expressed doubts as to whether a million foreign guest workers were indeed working in the Federal Republic. According to his statistics, only 970,000 foreigners were accounted for on September 30. Most of the foreigners working in the Federal Republic, about 31 percent, come from Italy. Spain and Portugal come in second, with 15 percent each. Recruitment from Portugal has only recently begun. Thus far, 3,500 Portuguese are working in the Federal Republic. About 20 percent of all foreign guest workers in the federal territory are women.

9

FEDERAL LABOR PLACEMENT OFFICE

SUPPORT FOR THE FOREIGN EMPLOYEES


All sides seem to be in agreement that the economic growth of the Federal Republic of Germany will continue in the foreseeable future. However, according to the statistics of various federal bureaus, the number of Germans capable of working, a group whose growth rate has begun to slow in recent years, will decrease by several hundred thousand by the year 1970 due to natural population developments and the lengthening of school-attendance requirements. In order to acquire the necessary supplemental labor power and to replace the foreign employees who are returning to their homelands, recruitment countries will remain the main source of this labor power.

In the Federal Republic of Germany, a large number of foreign employ-
ees will work here for an extended duration. It is thus necessary to provide assistance to these foreign employees on as broad a basis as possible, in order to facilitate and accelerate the adaptation process. [. . .]

Given the lack of qualified personnel, businesses are increasingly directing their efforts to training those foreign colleagues who are capable of an apprenticeship or continuing education. Foreign employees are already foremen and hold other advanced positions at many work sites. Professional-development opportunities sponsored by the unions are also open to foreign employees. However, they do not tend to take advantage of this opportunity. It should be observed that most foreign employees are not strongly interested in professional training outside the factory milieu. They shy away from the financial costs and effort that are necessary for an apprenticeship. The acquisition of the German language is the intractable root cause for this reluctance. [. . .]

Efforts toward a greater mutual understanding between foreign employees and the German population have been supported through press, radio, and television programming. The media have been given the task of bringing mutual clarity to both sides through objective reporting. Newspapers and magazines from the homelands are available to foreign employees. There are also special newspapers and magazines in their mother languages. The distribution of these kinds of newspapers is partially supported by the federal government, as is the case with the Italian workers’ newspaper *Corriere d’Italia*, the Greek *I Eliniki*, and the Turkish *Anadolu*.

Unfortunately, efforts toward a greater mutual understanding have been destroyed by sensational reports in some papers and magazines that represent foreign labor in the public sphere. The faults of a handful of foreign employees are grandly touted, reports of ostensible discrepancies in the provision of social services are published without being closely investigated, and the emphasis is placed on those aspects that ensure a negative overall impression. [. . .]

Given the current economic developments, the German population will need to come to terms with the idea of living together with a greater number of foreign workers. Efforts toward a greater mutual understanding should be maintained and fostered for this reason. In particular, developing tactics for clearing up misunderstandings and dismantling prejudices is an integral aspect. Assistance programs should be streamlined and their base broadened. In order to accomplish this task, it is necessary that all private and bureaucratic institutions of the federal government, the federal states, and municipalities work together. Our support work must proceed on the knowledge that foreign employees are cooperating to uphold the economic growth of the federal government and its tax base and that these workers should be supported in the development of their personal sphere by all means necessary.
COME, COME, COME!—GO, GO, GO!

First published as “Komm, Komm, Komm—Geh, Geh, Geh” in Der Spiegel (October 19, 1970). Translated by David Gramling. The national weekly news magazine Der Spiegel published this report as part of a series on underprivileged minorities in West Germany.

On the village green in the community of Gülnow in the Duchy of Lauenburg in Schleswig-Holstein, Red Cross workers are heating up 10,000 knackwursts. Next to the goulash pot, a lamb side is sizzling on a spit. Some 120 Greeks are supposed to feel at home here. Social worker Gerda Fink from Stormarn is laying out sacks for a potato-sack race, saying in an admonishing tone, “We have to do something for these people.”

At the main train station in Stuttgart on track 11, government functionaries in black are waiting for Zvonimir Kanijr, 32, from Voca Donja in Yugoslavian Croatia. President Dr. Karl-Otto Fritze from the Provincial Labor Office of Baden-Württemberg presents the man with a pocket radio upon his arrival and commands, “We must not think of these people as a disturbing element.”

At the foreigner counter of the Stuttgart Provincial Bank headquarters, Adriano Piccolini works every day from 8:30 to 6:00. As a bank clerk, he is supposed to teach his countrymen and women how to maintain a savings account. Department Director Rudolf Köhler from the Württemberg Provincial Bank says, “We cannot just allow these people to carry thousands of marks around in their jacket pockets.”

At the information kiosks of West German department stores, hostesses hand out nutrition pamphlets in four languages (Italian, Spanish, Greek, and Turkish) with tips on men’s socks and laxatives, bottled capers, and blood sausage (Spanish: salchichón de sangre y gelatina salada). Business Director Albert Oink from the Karstadt department store in Hamburg demands, “We must help these people to shop.”

“These people”—fed in Gülnow by the Inner Mission and encouraged to participate in potato-sack races, given gifts by the state in Stuttgart, and shepherded around Hamburg department stores—are guest workers. Zvonimir Kanijr from Yugoslavia was the 500,000th—in Baden-Württemberg alone. There are currently 1.95 million of them in the Federal Republic.

There are 1.5 million men and 500,000 women; among them are 424,500 Yugoslavians, 381,800 Italians, 353,900 Turks, 342,200 Greeks, 171,000 Spaniards, and 44,800 Portuguese. According to the German Industry Institute in Cologne, the number will be 2 million by the end of the year: 1 out of 10 workers in West Germany.

For a long time, these workers have belonged to the “typical imagery of a modern industrial state,” as Assessor Rolf Weber from the Federal Union of German Employer Associations says. In Cologne-Weidenpesch, the Ford
Company built barracks for its laboring guests. Volkswagen built a whole village for them across from the factory gate called “Castel Lupo” (Wolfsburg). The Nuremberg Federal Institute for Labor has been administering the affairs of these 8.3 million people since 1959, building “makeshift spaces, cooking stations, photo labs, and hobby centers.”

Public institutions have been offering services to guest workers for a long time now: radio stations with programs in the home language, the Bundesbahn railway company with special trains. No fewer than 180 institutions have begun to work with guest workers: 6 federal ministries, as well as the Salvation Army, 11 provincial labor ministries, the Union of Women Friends of Young Girls, the German Alliance of Unions, and the Frankfurt-based Foreigners’ Brotherly Service.

_FAZ_ coeditor Karl Korn dubs guest workers “potential conduits of understanding and communication,” who are now a constitutive part of the West German milieu: the gesticulating, parlaying Italians who bring a breath of Calabria into the Hansiatic train station halls, the dandified Turks who have changed out of their Anatolian footwear into fancy duds with white leather ornaments; all the foreigners, called “salami breeders,” “macaroni munchers,” “Spagnols,” “camel drivers,” “mutton munchers,” and “spaghettis” in the colloquial language of the people. [ . . . ]

Guest workers in Germany are not guests at all. They are not given any gifts; they do not enjoy any special status; they are only invited to join in the production process. They are allowed to work—and protecting this privilege is indeed a German tradition.

“Foreign workers” was what they called the more than 1 million foreigners who sold their labor power in the time of the kaisers: on the lands of Pommeranian farm estates and in the mines of Rheinish heavy-industry sectors. The “Yearly Report of the Prussian Industry’s Oversight Officers” from 1908 registered a “larger reserve of domestic labor power than usual, because the jobs are, for familiar reasons, filled by foreigners—Italians, Poles, and Bohemians.” The familiar reason: the foreigners’ willingness to sacrifice themselves to the most difficult work for the lowest wages.

Such social disparities are not to be forgotten when considering the development of civilization and progress within Western industrial nations, as the French philosopher Claude Lévi-Strauss believed. To the Lévi-Straussian formula of historical exploitation—“first slavery, then bondage, proletariat, colonialism”—a group of Cologne-based analysts added two contemporary posts: “forced laborers and today’s guest workers.”

Within six years, the Nazis brought back at least 5.3 million civilians and 1.5 million prisoners of war to Germany. Armed with the spoils _rapoti_ and _dawai_, they forced tens of thousands of Soviet citizens into the German war industry. Deportees from Poland, Belgium, and France worked on German
fields. They were, according to the publisher Wolf-J. von Kleist, “people of stigma . . . valued as labor hands, yet meanwhile the object of astonished disbelief when they recognized what a bicycle was or knew how to turn the right knobs on the transistor radio.”

The fact that the “camel drivers” and “mutton eaters” of today are often categorized as uncivilized or dumb signifies a continuity in this minority discrimination. But today these pigeon-holed, devalued people come of their own free will and are called “guest workers.” This “switch of concepts,” writes the Cologne-based psychology professor Edeltraud Meistermanns-Seeger, “which led to the discontinuation of ‘foreign,’ to the euphemism ‘guest,’ and ultimately to the neutral label ‘foreign employee,’ is a sign of uncertainty and ambivalence, best understood in the context of the repression of problems associated with the previous period of forced labor.” [. . .]

11

TURKISH LABOR PLACEMENT OFFICE

INVITATION FOR LABOR PLACEMENT

First published as “Einladung zur Arbeitsvermittlung” by the Istanbul Branch Office of the Turkish Labor Placement Office, 1973. Reprinted on www.domit.de. Translated by David Gramling. This form letter represents the administrative portal through which workers were screened and scheduled for labor migration to Germany. This invitation would have been one of the last sent, given that Willy Brandt announced the recruitment moratorium on November 22 of the same year.

Istanbul Branch Office
July 2, 1973

First and Last Name of the Invited Party: Ismail N________:

1. According to our branch office records, it appears that it is your turn to be placed abroad.
2. Please present yourself without fail on the day and at the hour indicated below; doing so will result in the preselection of your application.
3. If you are unable to appear at this appointment, please note the instructions on the reply form attached in this communication (Form no. 49/A). Please check one or more of the reasons that would prohibit you from appearing at the indicated appointment time. Mail this reply form in time for it to reach our branch office by July 5, 1973, at the latest. (Mail delays will not be considered as valid grounds for exception.)
4. Enter your signature on the reply form and include this as a separate attachment. Mail it in an envelope with 200 kurus postage.

For men: If you are younger than _____ years of age, you need not appear. If you have more than four children under 18 years of age, you also need not appear.
For women: If you have more than four children under the age of 18, you need not appear. If you have a child younger than 12 months old or are pregnant, you need not appear.

If you are unable to read and write, you need not appear.

Branch Office, Department of Applications for Foreign Employment

Please appear on: July 9, 1973
at: 8:30 a.m.
at: 1st Floor, Room 8

Recruiting country: Germany
Type of work: Carpenter

FRIEDRICH K. KURYLO
THE TURKS REHEARSED THE UPRISING

First published as “Die Türken probten den Aufstand” in Die Zeit (September 7, 1973). Translated by David Gramling. From August 24 to August 30, 1973, Turkish autoworkers at the Ford plant in Cologne staged a strike and sit-in against the wishes of the German Alliance of Unions as well as their own umbrella union, IG-Metall.

Some Background to the Wildcat Strike at Ford

“We sat in the foreman’s office and hid under the desks as the Turks made their way through the warehouse.” Even now, fear seems to linger in this worker’s body. He was a witness to the most consequential strike among guest workers in the Federal Republic to date. For seven days, around 2,000 Turks took to the barricades at the Ford factory in Cologne. They stopped their work on the auto manufacturer’s conveyor belts.

The Turks’ wildcat strike began after the management fired 300 of their countrymen and women for returning late from vacation.

This layoff was, however, just the straw that broke the camel’s back. The angry men who blocked production day after day felt provoked by other unfair labor practices as well. They decried the work conditions, demanded higher compensation, and complained of discrimination by their German colleagues.

At Ford, what has been simmering just below the surface at many factories appears to have forced its way into the public eye for the first time. The guest workers, this new German proletariat, wanted something better. The fact that it happened here in Cologne is no coincidence. In this metropolis on the Rhine, the problems of guest workers have become evident in an intense way, in residential conditions as well as in the workplace.

Foreigners, primarily Turks, tend to live in prewar buildings from the 1870s between Ring Street and the railway tracks near the city center. Most
Germans moved out of these buildings long ago; the noise of traffic comes in day and night. The sanitary facilities of these tenements are generally inadequate, and sun hardly makes its way into the backyards.

The Turks’ workplace appears much more inviting at first glance, but even there, one can sense their second-class social status. Nonetheless, the union representatives at Ford allege that “they are working at the same rate as us; they are receiving the same wage for the same work.” But in reality, the 12,000 Turks are a large, disadvantaged minority among the staff of 32,000 workers. The language barrier bars them from accessing better wages. As a rule, Turks do monotonous, dirty, and uncomfortable work—like removing screws in very hard-to-reach spaces—work that does not require a common language and understanding with one’s neighbor. With a little teamwork, the Germans and the few German-speaking Turks can make up to 2 marks more per hour.

A number of internal production-rate differences cement this inequity. There are many difficult jobs that are simply not done by Germans anymore, jobs that have been entirely given over to foreigners. The productivity standards for those jobs are, without a doubt, guest-worker standards.

Unions and workers’ councils, which are supposed to represent the interests of all employees, are hardly able to provide assistance. In many ways, language difficulties stand in the way of trust and cooperation. The union functionaries cannot speak Turkish. The management’s interpreters are often considered extensions of the power of the management, and justifiably so.

Last year, it appeared as though no Turk would be able to remedy this lack of representation. Their countryman Mehmed Ozbağçı was elected to the workers’ council staff. But what was the reaction of the workers’ council, which was run by an absolute IG-Metall majority? It refused to accept Ozbağçı into the tight circle of at-large members. Ernst Lück, the chair of the workers’ council, complained that “this man did not know German and did not even have a workplace constitution on hand.”

Since then, Ozbağçı has had to do the work of a workers’ council member as well as his work on the assembly line. Turkish colleagues support him financially so that he can sustain this double duty. Along with Ozbağçı, four other Turks and an Italian, all IG-Metall members, have become workers’ council members. The percentage of guest workers on the workers’ council is now 12.7 percent, whereas their share of the overall company workforce is 53.1 percent. These numbers disprove the claim that guest workers have equal representation in the Cologne Ford factory.

The layoff of 300 Turks then turned simmering unrest into open rebellion. Most are allowed no vacation, unlike their German colleagues. They often have to travel days to reach their home villages to settle rent claims and debts, and once there, they frequently encounter tumultuous family issues such as inheritance disputes. But neither the workers’ council nor their German colleagues have much interest in or understanding of such situations.
One German worker says, “There are lots of them who take so much extra
vacation that they run out of money and don’t have anything left to eat.”

Meanwhile, Turks feel that they are being unjustly treated. They fear hav-
ing to overcompensate for the absence of those who have been fired from the
assembly line, where they claim the pace is too fast and allows for too few
breaks. The strike could be avoided no longer.

Then, who else took over the coordination of the strike but leftist ex-
tremists. It remains unclear whether they intentionally weaseled their way in,
as in the case of the Brechnjew unrest in Bonn. The university student Dieter
Heinert maintains that he had learned some Turkish before taking the job
at Ford. Moreover, the charismatic Turkish agitator Sulaiman Baba Targün
(30) began work at the factory only four days before the strike broke out.

The strikers’ demands—a cost-of-living bonus and a 13 percent wage in-
crease, long-time goals of the workers’ council—generated solidarity among
many German workers with their Turkish colleagues. But the solidarity was
soon overshadowed by misunderstanding and fear—and was finally crowded
out by enmity and hate.

This strike was not a German strike. It fostered resentment about the for-
eigners’ rabble-rousing. “You should just send all of them away,” said many;
such were the most harmless commentaries on this Turkish impertinence. In
a mass counterdemonstration condemning the event, the German employ-
ees defeated the foreigners’ strike. When police commandos arrested the ag-
itators, vigilantes moved in, saying “One should just give them a good beat-
ing; then it will be all over with.”

The ultimate gain of the strike—a cost-of-living bonus—benefited the
Germans as well. As for the Turks, only a repeal of some layoffs was promised.
The management and IG-Metall in Cologne declared they have learned a les-
son from the strike and are going to take a close look at their guest-worker
policies. It is high time for it.

13

RECRUITMENT OF GUEST WORKERS STOPPED


No more guest workers will be recruited from countries outside the European
Community from now on. At this time, about 2.6 million foreigners are working
in the Federal Republic. Of those, 23 percent are Turks, 20 percent are
Yugoslavians, 18 percent are Italians, 11 percent are Greeks, 8 percent are
Spanish, and 20 percent are from other countries.

BONN, NOVEMBER 23. The Federal Institute for Labor in Nuremberg can no
longer accept any foreigners into the Federal Republic and West Berlin for
the time being. A declaration to this effect came from Federal Labor Minis-
ter Walter Arendt on Friday, with the consent of the Federal Cabinet at the
Institute. The Labor Promotion Act entitles the federal labor minister to take
such measures. Arendt made it known in his declaration that the intention
was to stem the employment of foreigners as a precautionary measure. For
those who are already working in our country, there is, he reports, “no rea-
son for serious concern. However,” added the federal labor minister, “we can-
not rule out the possibility that the energy shortage might lead to some em-
ployment risks.”

European Community countries, particularly Italy, are not affected by this
measure.

According to paragraph 19 of the Labor Promotion Act, those foreigners
who are not German in the sense of article 116 of the Basic Law must acquire
a permit from the Federal Institute for Labor in order to enter into employ-
ment, “as long as no diplomatic agreements stipulate otherwise.” These
permits will be distributed in individual cases according to developments in
the labor market. Because the work permit is limited to two years and may
also be restricted to certain vocational sectors, businesses, and economic
branches, or districts, the Federal Institute for Labor reserves the right to in-
tervene in and manage the employment of foreigners.

These options have been invoked sporadically in the past to the benefit of
certain economic branches or districts, but it has not generally been per-
ceived as restricting the employment of foreigners. In the past few months,
however, there have been more and more attempts to counteract the “con-
centration” of foreigners in certain cities and the consequently excessive de-
mands on the infrastructure. The Federal Ministry of Labor stresses that, in
the future, the control measures included in paragraph 19 of the Labor Pro-
motion Act will be enacted throughout the labor market. Considerable effort
has been made to not appear dramatic when referencing foreigners in these
control measures, because, according to the undersecretary responsible, “it
is the natural implementation of legal measures in light of labor market con-
ditions.”

The discontinuation of foreign labor placement affects 60,000 current
placements that were distributed after September 1, 1973, under the new
1,000-mark placement surcharge. (The placement surcharge for EC citizens
is 60 marks.) [ . . .]
David Gramling. Kohl delivered this speech before the Bundestag on October 13, 1982. His first campaign for West German chancellor was bolstered by his protectionist position on “foreigner politics.” The following excerpt marks a rhetorical turn in the federal government’s policy on future immigration.

[...] The third focal point of our urgent program for the upcoming elections is foreigner politics.

The coexistence of a great number of people of a different mentality, culture, and religion alongside Germans demands effort from all sides—state and society, foreigners and Germans. This task requires patience and tolerance, realism and humanity.

The federal government’s policies for foreigners will be guided by three basic principles.

First: Integrating the foreigners living with us is an important goal of our foreigner politics. Integration means not the loss of one’s own identity but rather the most frictionless coexistence possible between foreigners and Germans. Integration will be possible only if the number of foreigners living with us does not continue to increase. It is crucial to avoid an unbridled and uncontrolled immigration.

Second: The federal government will continue the recruitment moratorium and restrict the number of new family members coming to West Germany, and it will do so precisely in the interest of the children, who have a right to their own family. The government will work within the Association Agreement [with the Turkish Republic] to avoid another immigration wave.

Third: The foreigners who would like to go back to their homeland must be assisted in doing so. Every person has the right to live in his homeland. Foreigners in Germany should be able to decide freely, but they must decide if they want to return to their country or stay here and integrate.

The federal government will establish a working commission focused on the realization of this program, including representatives of the federation, states, and municipalities, who will present their suggestions and recommendations at the beginning of the coming year.

We will do everything to prevent abuse of the right to asylum. [...]
The End Result of Encouraging Immigrant Workers to Return to Their Native Country

It almost looked like a state visit on September 10, 1964, at the Cologne-Deutz train station: the train arrived from Portugal; the country’s national hymn was playing; city officials were waiting on the platform. The red carpet treatment for Armando Sa Rodrigues, the 1 millionth “guest worker” in the Federal Republic. He received a moped, flowers, and a certificate.

Twenty years later at the Frankfurt Airport: suitcases, boxes, bags, and a stifling crowd at the Turkish travel-agency counters, lines in front of the Federal Border Guard’s office. Stressed officials stamp border-crossing certificates and invalidate the residence permits in Turkish passports. For charter-flight passengers, this stamp means bidding a definite and irrevocable farewell to Germany.

This time, officials stay far away from the event, and the politicians in distant Bonn celebrate the law encouraging immigrant workers to return to their native countries as a demonstration of “our successful policy.”

Upon taking office, Chancellor Helmut Kohl promised to halve the number of foreigners living here. A joint federal/state commission, under the direction of Friedrich Zimmermann, was to submit proposals on the topic, but a coalition dispute has prevented the federal interior minister from getting started.

Then the administration reached into the drawers of its predecessors and found the draft for a law encouraging immigrant workers to return to their native countries, which—slightly modified—was adopted on November 29, 1983. “Our assistance accompanies those returning home,” declared Federal Labor Secretary Norbert Blüm at the time.

With the window of opportunity restricted to just eight months, the law provided “remigrant incentives” of 10,500 German marks for unemployed or partially employed foreigners. Most importantly, the law offered Turks and Portuguese the opportunity to immediately access the contributions they had made to their pension funds.

Shortly before the law’s adoption, headlines declared in the press, “Half want to go home” and “A third want to leave today.” Then in July, after the eight-month mark had passed, officials announced: “Three hundred thousand foreigners left the Federal Republic through the remigrant incentives program.”

Today, one year later, it is still unclear how many foreigners have actually taken advantage of the law’s provisions and how many were thus induced to leave. This same conclusion was reached at a recent Friedrich Ebert Foundation conference entitled “The New Immigrant Policy in West Europe.” Unofficially, those in Bonn speak more moderately on the topic.
Two questions arise: Have the expectations associated with the law been fulfilled? And do targeted repatriation measures offer an adequate “solution to the foreigner problem”?

First, a definition: “remigrant incentives” are one among various measures stipulated in the law to encourage immigrant workers to return to their home countries and constitute a one-time payment of 10,500 marks (plus 1,500 marks for every child).

Last year’s report that 300,000 foreigners have left this country through “remigrant incentives” was erroneous. Rather, exactly 13,716 foreigners have left, of whom 94.2 percent possessed a special work permit. With this permit, they would have been entitled to extended unemployment benefits if they had chosen to remain in Germany. As a result of their departure, the German Federal Labor Office will save approximately 330 million marks.

Bonn also dressed up the balance by including those who left after requesting restitution of their pension funds. Previously, remigrants could always reclaim their pension contributions (instead of drawing a pension in Germany), though only after a two-year waiting period, which was and is still an important buffer. But because Bonn’s success statistics include all repayment claims since the inception of the remigrant law, the recently approved claims of some 30,000 Turks already living in Turkey have also been paid.

In contrast to the situation with “remigrant incentives,” far more than Bonn’s early estimate of 55,000 foreigners have filed claims for premature restitution. However, no one knows the exact number, explained Elmar Hönekopp from the Institute for Labor Market and Occupational Research at the Ebert Foundation conference. According to Hönekopp, the institute counted approximately 100,000 applications, some 40,000 fewer than the government alleged a year ago. Because only the employee contributions were reimbursed without interest, the government saved 4 billion marks of otherwise future pension payouts abroad, a sum that is now helping to safeguard German pensions.

For Elmar Hönekopp and Ursula Mehrländer, who works in the Research Institute of the Ebert Foundation, these statistical confusions are mere embellishments that raise fundamental concerns about the law’s effectiveness. Encouraging foreign workers to return home may indeed have influenced their date of return, but it hardly affected the total number of remigrants. Since 1966, an average of 300,000 foreigners have returned to their home countries every year; last year [1983], when the law went into effect, only 55,000 more returned. The reason for the decrease of the foreign population is not this law but rather the drastic drop in the number of foreigners coming to Germany.

Due to the various restrictions in the law’s original language, the most crucial of which are its time restrictions and narrowly conceived population groupings, the law was not suited to promote the return of a greater number
of foreigners. It is logical that a foreign worker who has lived in Germany for 20 years would need some time to consider the government’s proposition. The federal government, however, demanded they decide and leave within four weeks—otherwise there would be “aid” deductions of 1,500 marks for every additional month.

The unspoken desire to use this foreigner policy to free up jobs for unemployed Germans was not fulfilled. Anyone leaving the country with “remigrant incentives” following bankruptcy or a company closure—and this situation constituted the majority of cases—does not free up a job. And the positions of those who quit and went home on their own were difficult to fill. Whether hired in fish processing or in the slaughterhouse, the Germans sent by the Employment Office usually threw in the towel shortly after taking the job.

To cite another case, German replacement workers were not sufficiently qualified for the positions at the Howaldtwerke-German Dockyards. The Foreigner Office in Kiel reports that HDW was seeking Turkish welders who, because of their specialization in welding techniques for submarine construction, could not be replaced at such short notice.

At the Ruhrkohle AG in Duisburg, the largest employer of Turks, there were shortages as well. When 2,700 Turkish miners left the company, this disadvantaged the German personnel: overtime and lower chances for early retirement.

Incidentally, the area between the Rhine and Ruhr basin was the regional center of the remigrant carousel. According to the Institute for Labor’s calculations, most applications for “remigrant incentives” came from the iron, steel, mining, and energy industries. This fact is hardly surprising, because firms such as Hoesch, Thyssen, Mannesmann, and others used the Bonn model for their operational personnel policies. They supported legal regulations promoting “melting pots” and “assimilation,” which consequently led to staff reduction.

IAB calculations prove the connection. In 68.7 percent of all applications, the remigrant award was paid subsequent to company closures; this case held in 98.5 percent of mining applicants and in 96.5 percent of iron and steel applicants.

Take Hüttenheim, for example: reporters descended upon the area in droves after 900 Turks were “encouraged to move on” and “sent home with incentives” in one concentrated action by Mannesmann’s executives, the workers’ council, and the Labor Office. It was a serendipitous convergence of the remigrant law and business strategy; the firm could list the “incentives” and the restitution of pension funds next to the operational severance payments on their corporate reports. The Turkish fathers “became docile by the dozens,” argued workers’ council member Mahler, though he did not mention that the employee advocate and German personnel had intervened.
When the Mannesmann management excluded only Turks from the early-retirement program, consequently blocking the path to retirement for a number of Turks over 55, the employee advocate put up minimal resistance. Faced with the alternative of leaving the firm with or without compensation, the Turks finally signed this “offer to foreign fellow citizens” from Mannesmann and the federal labor minister, consequently ensuring their own untimely departure.

Even the Labor Ministry’s secretary of state Vogt had to conclude recently that the return of foreign workers has opened up few jobs for Germans. Most jobs vacated by foreigners—according to Vogt at a press conference—have fallen victim to downsizing.

One must ask why Chancellor Helmut Kohl, speaking to the CDU’s employment committees in Saarbrücken, kept attributing the high unemployment rate to the fact that there are “still too many jobs taken by guest workers”—a statement largely unnoticed by the press.

An investigation into the political effects of this remigrant law yields four important discoveries:

First: The premise of “remigrant incentives” was a structural constraint—namely, the real or imminent loss of one’s job.

Second: The law’s temporal restriction was meant to force a decision by foreign employees.

Third: The “remigrant incentives” forced the foreign employee and his/her family to leave the Federal Republic permanently, even if resettlement in the home country later proved to be impossible.

Fourth: The good publicity the government received for these “incentives” did not acknowledge the premise that restitution claims were based on employees’ own contributions and labor over the years. Instead, the notion prevailed that these payouts were “rewards,” gifts to unemployed foreigners. Consequently, the law also fueled prejudices and violence against foreigners and intensified the social constraints for foreign families.

Felix Rodriguez, a Spanish pastor, paraphrased this dynamic: “When a foreigner’s fear of staying here outweighs his fear of returning home, then he will ‘voluntarily’ go home.”

Immigrants’ fear of a future in their home countries is still greater. More than 4 million foreigners continue to live in Germany, and politicians know that targeted remigrant measures, in the best-case scenario, increase the number of those returning home only slightly.

As the Ebert Foundation conference tried to demonstrate, programs that encourage foreign employees to return home have primarily symbolic meaning because they lead proponents of tough policies on foreigners to believe in active negotiation. At some point, however, this line of reasoning will exhaust itself and its stopgap character will become evident. Then, three possibilities will remain:
The first would be the intensification of the returnee program through large-scale, forced repatriation. Despite current debates about a stricter stance on the foreigner law, this outcome is improbable. International considerations, interstate treaties, and economic factors hardly provide options in this regard. Already, the damage done by the remigrant law is a perennial burden on relations between southern European countries and the Federal Republic. These countries were not consulted prior to the law’s implementation.

The second possibility would be to recognize that the indisputable contemporary problems among foreigners will not be resolved by sending some away but must be dealt with here instead. According to Ursula Mehrländer of the Ebert Foundation, recognition of foreigners as “permanent immigrants” or “migrants” must occur. The Hessian government is formulating it more cautiously; Interior Minister Horst Winterstein declared in Parliament, at the request of the CDU/CSU, that “fundamental considerations” precluded the “remigrant incentives” from becoming the cornerstone of their foreigner policy. According to Winterstein, “The children born and brought here will stay here, as they have little or no connection to their parents’ country of origin.”

The third possibility is the most probable at present: we continue talking about remigration. We can do so by looking at the “Draft of a Law on Reintegration Aid for Residential Construction for Returning Foreigners,” which the Parliament is still discussing but which is supposed to become law on January 1, 1986. According to the draft, remigrants can create a savings account with a building and loan association in their home country without penalty if they simultaneously commit to going home within four years after the loan disbursement.

The haggling over numbers has begun: the law, according to the government, could be used by 185,000 foreign building-and-loan clients (among them 130,000 Turks). The parliamentary speeches are already being written. On the topics of home construction and German-Turkish friendship, Norbert Blüm claimed, “This will last forever and remind all generations that their fathers and grandfathers once worked in Germany. Could this not be a contribution to the friendship between our two countries?”

If this policy continues to be promoted, the conflicts will continue to intensify. And there is no sign that the trend will be reversing any time soon.
In with the Foreigners: Why the Boat Is Suddenly Not So Full Anymore

How quickly times change. For over 10 years in this country, everyone from the neo-Nazi to the parents’ group spokeswoman, from Schönhuber to Schily, has been singing the same tune in this country: Germany could not, despite its best intentions, take in any additional immigrants. The boat is full, the pain threshold finally reached. Those who contradicted this maxim were seen as so-called do-gooders or, worse, as hopelessly delusional.

Then the report blew in on Tuesday afternoon that the computer industry’s leading representatives are warning of imminent ruin: if they do not recruit at least 250,000 employees from abroad, their chances in future markets will be dim. Reactions from the unions and the Ministry of Labor ranged from indignation to dismissal, and the chancellor, who clearly seeks yet again to say what everyone wants to hear, pulls the Green Card out of the hat for the “best of the best.”

The employers’ goal is to compensate for highly trained workers, who are leaving narrow, globally withdrawn Germany for California, by offering young Eastern European and Middle Eastern specialists comparably favorable conditions and thus the chance of a lifetime.

Union functionaries are already scared; they fear that a majority of their members could soon become openly hostile to foreigners. And the federal government is still dodging what has long been overdue: fundamentally questioning the work-permit requirement, in all its forms that contradict national and international law.

Herein lies the actual explosive force of the debate on high-tech guest workers: non-German employees, provided that they are not EU citizens or do not have an unrestricted residence permit, need a work authorization or a work permit. The Bureau of Labor grants only temporary permits—if at all—and limits this practice to certain industries, mostly involving what is justifiably labeled dirty work.

Worse yet, the “work-permit requirement” presumes a job-placement agreement with the Bureau of Labor, which means that the potential employer and his non-German employee commit to supporting the bureau by finding an employment-seeking German within at least four weeks. Since the oil crisis in the 1970s, there has been a freeze on recruitment of foreign workers. The so-called Exception Guidelines for the Freeze on Recruitment are implemented so restrictively that they allow for few exceptions and in specific industries only—for example, agriculture or construction—ultimately leading to the familiar side effects of extremely low wages and inhuman working conditions.

While the German political party representatives are demonstratively displaying their disgust for right-wing party demagogy and pointing the finger
at Austria on election days, politicians and lawmakers from Schily to Stoiber have created a situation in which almost only Germans may work in Germany.

Employers in all branches of industry have bemoaned the consequences of this policy behind closed doors for years, especially because the specialized knowledge of many government officials is not nearly as strong as their ideological stubbornness when it appears necessary to protect the fatherland from the tide of foreigners. Personnel managers of large international firms are often told that German sinology students could in principle be just as successful in conquering the Far Eastern market for mobile-radio networks, for all one really needs is the right linguistic knowledge. Or a video technician who, due to his dark skin and lack of a work permit, must work as a bartender because the authorities, cashing in on popular clichés, clearly do not want to cause trouble.

The outcry of the information industry belies a policy that in the past few decades has not only declared the walling off of the German labor market beyond all party lines but has also flagrantly pursued it, despite all enthusiastic insights into the “inevitability of globalization.” Years ago, the French government had to recognize that the biological working hypothesis, according to which the body politic repels everything foreign, led only to its own lasting detriment: young African elites made a grand detour around the colonial motherland.

One perhaps more comparable process of recognition appears to be starting in Germany, aside from the notorious attacks. There is an interesting question here: will the result be an ideological dispute among factions, in which hopeful candidates for the German version of Haider may prove their demagogical suitability? Or is this the beginning of a serious discussion about the social and political implications of a new market that ignores nation-state borders?

The alignment of employee rights with the market’s unrestricted freedom is at the top of the agenda. After all, the “red-green card” issue could serve as an introduction to Asian conditions in which, for working migrants in high- and low-tech sweatshops, the privilege of being shamelessly exploited is coupled with the subsequent pressure to leave the country as quickly as possible after the work is done.

The unions have a choice: either they move decisively into the right-wing camp with their fixation on German jobs for Germans, or they join their Italian and French colleagues, for whom even the representation of illegal workers has long been a given, in seeking a critical analysis of non-German workers and the German workforce and developing from that a contemporary conception of internationalism. […]
How enthusiastically young people in Bombay work on the computer—and why the Berlin Green Card government leaves them so indifferent

Bombay, the end of July [2000]. By the time Ramashish was 18 years old, everything had happened for him already. He had been accepted at the Indian Institute of Technology, and since then, nothing has or will come between him and moving up. Now he is 21, and the world is his oyster. Well, not exactly—yet. Actually, he and several other colleagues possess not much more than an idea. But it might catapult him directly into the Olympus of the computer industry.

The room from which the seven young men intend to launch their conquest of the world has scummy walls, wobbly cubicle dividers, and the temperature is more than thirty degrees Celsius. The only things that look in good shape here are the computers. But Ramashish is extremely confident. In one year at most, he says, his Internet firm will be a success, even if he cannot exactly divulge what the firm is going to offer. The idea is priceless, however: the young men have to wait until it is ready before they can tell the press exactly what it is.

Would he go to Germany if he were offered a good job? A short silence, then laughter. Ramashish looks as if someone had just made him an indecent proposal. Europe? People might go there for vacation but definitely not to work. The best of the best of the computer sector are found in America, definitely not in Germany. And now this whole discussion about the Green Cards. He does not understand what it is about exactly, but the feeling of not really being wanted in Germany is omnipresent here. But this hostility is not the only concern: how would he fare with the language, with the food? “We just know too little about Germany, industrially and culturally.” Ramashish leans back, “No, if I had to go anywhere, I’d go to the USA.” And then, in a tone that allows for no further questions, he says, “But man, we’re in the hot spot right here.”

200,000 Applicants

Whoever makes it to this hot spot first has to go through the “minefield,” as they call this boulevard blanketed with bird droppings. Thousands of crows inhabit the trees just behind the main door to the Indian Institute of Tech-
nology in Bombay. Here they make the race to the world of elites into a dirty business. But what is a little bit of bird droppings compared to what applicants must go through to get into this campus? The acceptance exam at the six IITs—in Delhi, Kharagpur, Chennai, Kampur, or Guwahati, along with Bombay—is one of the most difficult in Asia. Even to participate in test preparation, one must already have passed one exam. For up to three years, the applicants ready themselves for the test, and each year only 2,500 out of 200,000 are accepted. “The Chosen,” they call themselves, who have succeeded. The Selected.

The IIT perceives itself as a “production center for the brightest minds in the land,” as a producer of “leadership material.” So says IIT Director Ashok Misra, and this is exactly what everyone here has internalized. On the 220-hectare campus 30 miles outside of Bombay, an “atmosphere of intellectual agitation” prevails, as the magazine *Outlook* described it. What counts here is intelligence, talent, and leadership qualities. Learning from the heart is frowned upon. And one’s best friend is one’s worst competitor. [. . .]

“Whatever the IIT graduates in Silicon Valley can do, the students here can do as well,” says [Deppak] Phatak. For him, it’s an issue of giving students the confidence to feel that they don’t need to go to America in order to achieve something. Too many, he says, have gone, stayed, and never come back. That is the good thing about the “Children, Not Indians” (“Kinder statt Inder”) slogans in Germany: “with Germany, we don’t have to worry that our elite is going to disappear there.” [. . .]

Two floors below Director Phatak’s office, there is a crowd in front of the job-placement office. The firms Veritas, Tata Consulting Service, and Cisco Systems have their application tests there. In the office itself, firms have hung up posters with prophecies from the beautiful new dot-com world, messages like “Step into the cyber era,” “The world is smaller, the market is bigger,” “You too can be a part of an unbelievable success story,” or “We offer a career, not just a job.” Texas Instruments, Amazon.com, Sun Microsystems, Cisco, McKinsey—large employers are fighting over the next generation here. “These firms buy the brains of the IIT students; they know that these people are the ones who can learn anything,” says Ashok Misra. But he cannot remember a German firm ever having done on-campus recruiting. It is astounding: didn’t Germany want to drum up some Indians with its August 1 initiative? “It seems that Germany should put more effort into presenting itself in a positive way,” says Misra. IIT students are used to people fighting over them: “Our students know what they are worth. World-class firms pay to become the first to come and recruit them.” Almost all have a job even before they have finished their studies. Or they have their own firm.

In the IIT, time flows only in one direction: what counts is the future. And in that sense, everything is possible for these students and for this country. [. . .] “Everyone here in IIT knows that he will have a great career, why should
we not be optimistic?” says Ramashish. “But we want to use our knowledge in our own society. Why go to Germany?”

“We are far too motivated to work less,” say Ramashish and his friend in the computer room.

18
BERND HOF
SCENARIOS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF LABOR-FORCE POTENTIAL IN GERMANY
First published as “Szenarien zur Entwicklung des Arbeitskräftepotenzials in Deutschland” in Politik und Zeitgeschichte (August 2001). Translated by Tes Howell. Since 1973, Hof has been project manager at the Institute for German Economics in Cologne, researching structural change in the German and European labor markets. In 2001, he was appointed professor of empirical economic research at the International School of Management in Dortmund.

I. Preliminary Remarks
There is an established tradition in Germany of predicting the future development of employment potential. The first wave of potential scenarios came in the second half of the 1970s, when all the notable economic-research institutes were addressing the challenge of several high-birthrate years, which drastically increased the labor force in the years between 1977 and 1987. At the time, they predicted that weak economic growth would lead to intolerably high unemployment rates and that the number of unemployed would climb to 2 million or 3 million in the 1980s. The media broadcast horror stories, and most did not want to believe that something like this could really happen. We have known for some time that high unemployment did occur in the course of the 1980s and that in the former West German states, unemployment numbers actually exceeded 3 million, even though this did not take place until 1997. [. . .]

V. Migration: From the Guest Worker to the New Citizen
Foreign migration has shaped the population as well as the job market since the early 1960s. One thing is clear: without immigration, the population figures in the Federal Republic would already have been declining by 1972. Had there been no immigration in the past 30 years, only 54.7 million people would now be living in the former West German states—fewer than in 1960. Germany would not only be economically poorer but culturally [poorer] as well.

The updated result of a previously published retroactive projection shows that, regardless of how the immigration history in the Federal Republic of Germany is configured, the gap (which until 1999 had grown to 12.2 million people) between both population curves with and without migration reveals
the deep divide between the population’s actual experiences and political declarations to the effect that Germany is not an official immigration country.

The Federal Republic is undoubtedly experienced in immigration. But it must abandon the old guest-worker concept based on the principle of rotation and clearly and decisively adopt the concept of the “new citizen” with concrete opportunities for permanent residency. This change in orientation is urgently needed, for the migration numbers of the past will eventually overstrain every institutionalized integration plan promoting linguistic, academic, educational, and technical development. If Germany wants to elevate integration to an actual agenda, and at this point there really is no alternative, the turnstile at the borders must be replaced by transparently monitored entrance doors. Here one can learn from classic immigration countries. Comparing the migration totals in Germany to those of the United States or Canada clearly demonstrates this necessity. In the 1970s and 1980s, for every 80 people leaving Germany, there were only 100 immigrants arriving. In this sense, Germany was a pit stop on the way to other countries. The circumstances marginally improved in the 1990s. The situation in the United States was different: for every 100 immigrants entering the country annually, only between 22 and 26 left. These ratios apply to Canada as well.

The application of ratios to the migration totals in Germany is possible with the statistical measure of so-called migration efficiency, which correlates the migration balance with the migration volumes. For Germany in the 1990s, this approach would have meant that in order to reach an actual migration balance totaling 1.9 million people, only 2.4 million immigrants would have been necessary, not 7.3 million. This former figure is based on the situation of immigration countries that provide concrete opportunities for permanent residency. Such would also be a model for Germany.

For when one inserts an annual long-term migration balance of 300,000 people into the computation scenarios for Germany, a net increase of 385,000 migrants results based on the North American migration efficiency, as opposed to 1.2 million according to previous trends in Germany. Every integration plan would necessarily fail in the latter case, due to high costs as well as social-acceptance problems.

The Canadian experience after the introduction of an immigration law in the late 1970s proves that migration movements are alterable in this sense. The ratio of emigrants to immigrants has also noticeably improved, from 56 out of 100 to 22 out of 100.

Potential Effects of Immigration and a High Birthrate
If future computations are meant to be more than just numbers, then an increase in the resident population is necessary; the following four insights support this claim:
In a society with a steadily declining and subsequently aging population, the structure of relations changes. This pattern affects the solidarity between young and old as well as social-support systems.

The assimilating society accentuates the rules of social coexistence and expects them to be externally transparent. This action provides clarity for immigrants.

The assimilating society is aware that immigration can trigger anxieties within its native population.

Continuous immigration places greater demands on the capacity of the individual to allow for difference. This situation requires tolerance.

Consequent to these insights, the prediction focuses on institutionalized integration, primarily in the educational system. Migrants will eventually become new citizens.

Looking toward the job market, the computation is based on the elements of active guidance in consideration of the labor market. Immigration of exclusively unqualified workers remains a risky strategy for Germany. Underlying this claim is the presupposition that global controls—in tandem with an immigration policy commensurate with middle-term job-market demands and a long-term perspective—will lead to a successful immigration program. Starting from the higher migration efficiencies, an annual increase of 192,000 people until 2010 yields the previously mentioned totals, an increase of 256,000 until 2020, and after that, 385,000 people per year, based on the expected labor shortage. [. . .] In combination with an increasing employment capacity, the following results can be deduced from the aforementioned phases:

- In phase 1, the labor pool will rise to 41.6 million people until 2010 as a result of migration and increasing employment capacity. This number is 1 million more than in the year 2000. Without migration, the level of this employment variant would have been 40.4 million in 2010. This estimate makes clear that the labor pool is less likely to relieve the job market in the coming decade. Under these conditions, a job-market improvement would have to come from the demand side via a continuously dynamic employment trend.
- After 2010, the decline of the labor pool can no longer be intercepted by means of migration; therefore, the job-market result will benefit in phase 2. In these 20 years, migration will slow the process of national negative growth by 4.8 million people. This development will provide a baseline of 35.8 million workers in 2030—only 5.3 million fewer than in 2010.
- In phase 3, the labor pool will shrink to 32.5 million people despite migration. If a boost in the birthrate were to prevail, stabilization at 35.4 million workers would be possible in phase 3.
This perspective would mean a decisive advantage for Germany. Compared with the status quo, the path to the knowledge society would be eased by a young labor force, as the comparison of current age structures with those of the year 2050 demonstrate. Migration and an increase in the birthrate considerably strengthen the secondary growth and midlevel positions for the available personnel resources. Increasing labor participation, in contrast, intensifies the aging trend.

Conclusion
The double dimension of this demographic change—a noticeable decline and progressive aging of the labor force—jeopardizes conditions in Germany. Migration directly counteracts both of these unpreventable tendencies. The potential effects of a rise in the birthrate will bear out only in time. [...] The notion that migrants should continue to come to Germany may appear misguided in light of increasing social burdens. In the long term, Germany must address this problem conceptually. Otherwise, new disappointment could soon set in—similar to the one that followed Adenauer’s attempt to console the forward-thinking social-policy makers in the late 1950s: “People always have children.”

19
MARC BROST
CARTE BLANCHE IN GREEN
First published as “Freikarte in Grün” in Die Zeit (March 30, 2002). Translated by David Gramling.

The Green Card is a success. It attracts labor power that cannot be found among the domestic unemployed.
It is 467 kilometers from Bratislava to Munich—or 51,000 euros. This amount is how much Ondrej Kelle earns as a programmer in the Bavarian capital; the 31-year-old Slovakian came to Germany for the job in August 2000. Ondrej came with a Green Card, just as 2,138 other foreign immigrants in Munich have done. He was the first.

For about two years previously, his employer had been looking for an IT specialist who was as proficient with Microsoft Windows programming as with the Internet and who could develop interfaces between the two worlds for the firm-specific editing system. “About 50 or 100 people worldwide can do what he does,” says Armin Hopp, a director of digital publishing and Ondrej’s boss. They found him over the Internet, where a colleague from Munich had become acquainted with the Slovakian. Just at that moment, the federal government closed the deal on the new Green Card, the special work and residence permit for computer specialists from outside the EU. Then
everything went quite fast. “Within 24 hours, I had my visa,” says Ondrej Kelle. “I was able to begin working the next day.” His employer produces software for people who want to learn foreign languages at home, and since Kelle has been there, the programmers have been improving their language skills as well. English is spoken at work.

**German Job Seekers in the Lurch**

More than 11,000 foreign immigrants have moved to Germany with a Green Card since August 2000—more than expected. Most come from Eastern Europe. Lately, however, few Green Cards are being distributed. The demand for foreign specialists among employers has decidedly “cooled off,” says Jürgen Rohrmeier, a member of the administration at the personnel consulting firm Kienbaum Executive Consultants. The crisis of the New Economy has fully gripped the labor market: there are only a few new jobs; in fact, positions are now being cut. High-tech firms that were looking hopefully into the future only a year ago have long since pulled in the reins. Even immigrants with Green Cards have not been shielded from the crisis. In Munich, for example, every tenth foreign computer specialist has changed jobs. Now newspapers are reporting that more and more Green Card holders are unemployed.

This kind of reporting galvanizes those who are critical of immigration for foreign IT experts. Why, they ask, do we continue to recruit immigrants if they are just going to be unemployed? And why don’t we just take domestic workers who are looking for jobs anyway?

Erich Blume hears such questions often. When he gives answers, he quickly talks himself into a rage. “There is no such thing as high unemployment among Green Card holders,” says the chief of the Labor Bureau in disgust. “Whoever makes these claims is intentionally making false claims.” Throughout the country, about 1 percent of the immigrant IT specialists are out of work. “After two to four weeks, most have found a new position,” says Blume. If anyone is being hired during the crisis, it is the highly trained specialists who are getting a free job—Green Card computer specialists, for example. They are always ready to start anew in another part of the republic; they are working far away from home no matter what.

Computer specialists are modern nomads: they offer their knowledge where they are needed, and they move on when there is a better job somewhere else—or a better-paid one. “I came because of the job, not because of Germany,” says Ondrej Kelle. That statement sounds egotistical, but others also profit from this fact nonetheless. Across the country, every Green Card holder has created 2.5 new jobs at his workplace, says Labor Bureau Chief Blume, because employers can then expand.

The question remains, why could this strategy not work with domestic
labor? Some 20,000 German computer experts are still looking for a job, says the Federal Union of Employer’s Associations. Yet these experts are not the ones who are currently needed. Behind the concept “IT specialist,” as it is understood in the Labor Bureau and as it is used in official statistics, any number of factors linked to the market in the broadest sense are obscured. There are experts for complex calculation devices and cellular-telephone programmers, specialists for machines, and specialists for the software. Only the last are needed, however. And there is also the age of the unemployed to be considered. Seventy percent of computer experts in the proper sense who were seeking a job in Munich in March 2000 were older than 55. The numbers are similar throughout the country.

The problem for the older people is not their age but the qualifications that relate to it. The unemployed over 55 are often programmers of the older type: “highly qualified people who do not, however, have the qualifications that employers currently are seeking,” says Blume. The software market is, after all, growing at a raging pace.

Many More Hurdles for Foreigners

[...] Ondrej Kelle has been a professional programmer for 10 years now and threw away his university study to do so. The Slovakian knows that there is not much time for him to earn a lot of money. Soon his abilities will be obsolete as well.

“Of course, here and there, a Green Card holder returns frustrated to his homeland,” says consultant Rohrmeier. The language barriers might have been too great; the conceptions among employers and computer experts were too different. Of every 10 immigrant specialists, 6 work in businesses with fewer than 100 workers.

“The Green Card is good but not good enough,” says Jürgen Rohrmeier. Because spouses of immigrants must wait a year before they are allowed to work, integration is difficult for them. Because the various bureaucracies often do not work well together, it takes “days and weeks before the necessary documents are correct,” says Rohrmeier, which was not the case with Kelle and the Munich Labor Bureau. And therein lies the arbitrary issue in the eyes of many employers: because Kelle has no university diploma, he must earn at least 51,000 euros, according to the Green Card statute. If he had a diploma, the employer could pay him less. The federal government wants to avoid such “dumping salaries” and the recruitment of underqualified immigrants. But if Kelle had had more university knowledge and less practical programming experience, digital publishing would never have been attractive to the Slovakian. “The regulations make the workers whom we urgently need more expensive,” says Director Hopp. “That is a joke.”
In a factory in Tangier, women are shelling East Friesian prawns that will then be packed into a cattle trailer and driven back to Europe—for extremely low wages. Many of the young men hanging around the cafés and plazas of the old city are planning their departure to Europe. The black Africans among them already have a long journey behind them. In buses, hitchhiking, and on foot, they crossed the Sahara, fighting their way through to Tangier, the marketplace of refugees. Here, bands of smugglers, called “brokers,” await them, offering passage from Gibraltar to Spain over the strait. This heavily trafficked sea route is about 14 kilometers at its most narrow spot; it divides the first from the third world.

The risky crossing in a dinghy can cost up to $1,500 (U.S.). Those who can afford it also pay 250 dollars for a life vest. Those who choose to undertake the illegal journey to Europe must have succeeded in an already grim and prospectless struggle—with the goal of securing a piece of the middle-class cake. Europe is tempting. Those who want into the promised land must try to enter without a visa or a work permit. These unwelcome foreigners must first set foot in a Schengen country like Italy. Then the rich Central European countries are within attainable reach. The Schengen agreement guarantees that the citizens of its member states may cross its internal borders without passport checks. And Schengen Europe reaches from Helsinki down to the Algarve. Still, this Europe of free mobility has armed itself with highly fortified borders and rigid laws against unauthorized entry. Patrol boats and infrared monitors are prepared to spot illicit border crossers, and biometrical data is collected from all new citizens outside the EU, in accordance with the new Italian immigration law. No revenue is spared for developing an ever more perfect border control or a new technical monitoring device.

In the meantime, the negative headlines about rusted-out boats with more than 800 refugees on board that land somewhere on the Mediterranean have receded from view. This trend has to do partially with the winter weather. Illegal migration has come back into the debate because of the new dispute about visas. As has always been the case, most immigrants come by land routes. A great portion of “illegals” even come over the borders with legal papers and stay long beyond their prescribed residence allowance.

The visa debate overshadows the more important question: whether we need immigration. Demographers, businesses, and the Red-Green federal government are answering this question with a tentative yes, in view of the declining birthrate in Germany. The CDU, however, sees the integration of
the foreigners living here as the priority and laments the looming specter of parallel societies and shadow economies in which criminals and terrorists can thrive. The German Immigration Act does not address those who are already living here illegally. Experts calculate that there are approximately a million people living in Germany without residence permits. They are not welcome but are necessary. They work without social security and health insurance for rock-bottom wages on construction sites, in the restaurant industry, or in the domestic sphere.

In the current debates about travel visas, the prejudicial notion is being advanced that illegal immigrants would take away jobs from federal citizens. A study by the Research Center of Berlin [Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin], however, considers this generalizing assumption of a “danger to domestic wages and employment arising through illegal migration.” The European need for (often seasonal) labor power in the minimum-wage sphere is extensive, and EU states count on illegals to deliver on the economic market. Whoever buys Spanish tomatoes at a decent price is profiting from the shadow economy.

Yet illegal laborers are beyond public control. No state can tolerate this situation in the long run. In countries like Spain, Greece, and Italy, there are consequently ever-new offers for legalization. A pan-European immigration law with a humane set of regulations is nowhere in sight. When the weather warms up again soon, many people will once again undertake the life-threatening Mediterranean crossing.