Introduction
The Liberal-Humanitarian Case for the War in Iraq

THOMAS CUSHMAN

What exactly was the war in Iraq? It has alternately been seen as a move to protect the national security of the United States in light of the tragedy of September 11; a preventive war of self-defense against terrorism; a way to foster stability, security, and democracy in the Middle East; a counter to arms proliferation and support of terrorism around the world; an exercise in the expansion of the American empire and protection of American material interests in the region; a war for oil; an illegal act of aggression that has fostered hatred of the United States and helped to strengthen Islamist fundamentalists in Iraq and elsewhere; and a humanitarian intervention and an act of liberation from totalitarianism in the service of human rights and democracy. The debates about the Iraq war have been strident and polarizing at the level of personal and cultural interaction, international relations, and intellectual and political discourse.

This volume consists primarily of essays by leading world political figures, writers, scholars, and activists who supported the war on what might be broadly called liberal-humanitarian grounds; a few authors who did not support the war offer some observations about the political response to it. What unites the authors is a common recognition that, in spite of the inconsistent justifications provided by the United
States and its allies and the conflict-ridden process of social reconstruction, the war can be seen as morally justifiable: Saddam Hussein was a brutal tyrant, a gross violator of human rights, a torturer, a mass murderer, a force of global instability and terror, a threat to world peace and to what John Rawls refers to as the Law of Peoples. For more than three decades, his crimes against humanity, wars of aggression, support of international terrorism, and volatility as a destabilizing force were tolerated, aided, and abetted by world powers and the international community for the sake of political expediency, stability, and material interests. Coming to the rescue and aid of a people who had been subjected to decades of brutality and crimes against humanity is entirely consistent with the basic liberal principle of solidarity with the oppressed and the fundamental humanitarian principle of rescue. The war can be seen as morally legitimate on grounds of basic human rights as embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which is the ethical basis for the international world order. This body of moral principles was ignored by the United Nations Security Council in the case of the Iraqi people in favor of adherence to statutory international law.

Seeing the Iraq war as justifiable on moral and ethical grounds is a distinct minority view within the liberal community. Even Human Rights Watch, which has played a significant role in documenting the heinous crimes of Saddam’s regime, claimed that the Iraq war was not a humanitarian war on the grounds that it was not motivated by the humanitarian concern of preventing genocide (this view leaving unanswered the question, Is prevention of genocide the only legitimate reason for humanitarian intervention?). The arguments by the United States that it was removing a tyrant fell flat against the recognition that the United States had once supported Saddam Hussein in his brutal war against Iran. Moreover, the United States failed to remove the despot after its victory in the first Gulf War; instead, it fostered Iraqi resistance to Saddam but cruelly abandoned that resistance to the brutal retaliation of the Baath regime.

In this respect, though, the international community was hardly any better. The ethical foundations of the international community, as encoded in the International Declaration of Human Rights, rang hollow as the United Nations implemented sanctions against Iraq that only strengthened the brutal regime and allowed the people of Iraq to remain subject to what Kanan Makiya has referred to as the Republic of Fear, denied protection, rescue, and human rights. Much of the resistance to the war was grounded in a critique of American imperial
ambitions in favor of a multilateral consensus forged by the United Nations according to statutory international law rather than moral imperatives. Peace and stability, rather than justice and human rights for the Iraqi people, were the central concerns of those members of the international community who stood against the liberation of Iraq.

In being critical of both the Bush administration’s handling of the war, on the one hand, and the arguments of those who were against the war, on the other, the essays in this volume constitute collectively what might be called a third view. The basic elements of this perspective are a strong liberal commitment to human rights, solidarity with the oppressed, and a firm stand against fascism, totalitarianism, and tyranny. In this regard, the authors constitute part of what Paul Berman, following the lead of the French socialist Leon Blum, refers to as a Third Force of liberal internationalism. Berman articulates a vision of liberal internationalism that sees the current war on terror (and the war in Iraq in his later work, which appears in this volume), as a battle against Islamofascism that is being waged in order to protect the basic values of liberal internationalism: solidarity with the oppressed, the promotion of republican and liberal values, the emphasis on promulgating basic human rights as embodied in the UN Charter, and the promotion of democratic government. Berman calls for

a Third Force different from the conservative and foreign policy cynics who could only think of striking up alliances with friendly tyrants; and different from the anti-imperialists of the left, the left-wing isolationists, who could not imagine any progressive role at all for the United States. A Third Force, neither “realist” or pacifist—a Third Force devoted to a politics of human rights and especially women’s rights, across the Muslim world; a politics of ethnic and religious tolerance; a politics against racism and anti-Semitism, no matter how inconvenient that might seem to the Egyptian media or the House of Saud; a politics against the manias of the ultra-right in Israel, too, no matter how much that might enrage the Likud and its supporters; a politics of secular education, of pluralism, and law across the Muslim world; a politics against obscurantism and superstition; a politics to out-compete the Islamists and Baathi on their left; a politics to fight against poverty and oppression; a politics of authentic solidarity for the Muslim world, instead of the demagogy of cosmic hatreds. A politics, in a word, of liberalism, a “new birth of freedom”—the kind of thing that could be glimpsed, in its early stages, in the liberation of Kabul.

Berman’s vision provides us with a set of basic values of a liberal internationalism that led some to support the war, even if war itself is seen as an imperfect means for social and political advancement. As
Mient Jan Faber notes in his essay in this volume, this kind of liberal
denies him- or herself the choice of standing against the Iraqi people
and the rights they are entitled to according to the international com-
munity’s own fiat, the UN Declaration of Human Rights. The contribu-
tors to this volume represent the voices of a Third Force of liberal inter-
nationalism. They understand the limitations of the current system of
global governance, which tolerates gross violations of human rights and
which failed to prevent genocide in Bosnia and Rwanda, and the need
for reform in international institutions and international law. At the
same time, the authors in this volume do not attempt to apologize for
the specific mistakes and deceptions of the Bush administration’s prose-
cution of the war, and this book is not an attempt to whitewash his-
tory or to second the ideological positions of that administration. The
authors share the language of freedom and liberation that the US presi-
dent has adopted but ground that language in a specific body of liberal
principles. (It is hard, in this sense, to see George W. Bush as the “human
rights president,” but the consequence of the war was, in spite of the
conflicts and problems in its aftermath, a significant advance in the
human rights of the Iraqi people.) For most of the authors, the liberal
internationalist case for the war was not made strongly enough by the
Bush administration or at least as strongly as the argument for anticipa-

tory self-defense, which turned out to be empirically ungrounded.
What is striking about these essays is the willingness of each author to
voice pointed criticism of the Bush administration and its practices (as
Christopher Hitchens wryly notes in his contribution, “I write as one
who could not easily name a mistake that the Bush administration has
failed to make”).

Yet at the same time the authors also offer pointed critiques of the
liberal-left opposition to the war, much of which is contradictory, reduc-
tionistic, logically flawed, or excessively emotional, and irrational. Even
the most sober and reflective critics of the war occupied a stage that
also displayed demonstrators toting placards of Bush with a Hitler
mustache, waving Iraqi and Cuban flags, and passing out copies of the
Protocols of the Elders of Zion. Ironically, many of the authors in the
volume point out that the antiwar position was, in fact, something of a
conservative one in that it aimed to preserve a regime of intolerable cru-
elty in order to preserve the deeply flawed system of international law
that gives both tyrants and democratically elected leaders equal seats at
the table of international justice. Indeed, as Daniel Kofman notes in his
contribution here, it is odd that many leftists, who have built careers on
challenging the unrestrained sovereignty of states and state power, would find themselves arguing in favor of the current system that supports and guarantees the power of sovereign despots and the inviolability of their states, even in extreme cases such as Pol Pot, Kim Jong Il, or Saddam Hussein. Had there been no war, Saddam Hussein would still be in power rather than preparing for his trial for crimes against humanity. He would still be tormenting, torturing, and killing his own subjects, destabilizing the Middle East, and giving succor to international terrorists who are the avowed enemies of liberal democracy.

It is from this two-sided critique that the authors offer alternative viewpoints that challenge the status quo of both the left and the right. The essays in this volume offer unique observations by those of liberal disposition who wrestled with their consciences and took a stand in support of the liberation of the Iraqi people from tyranny, all the time recognizing that in conception, execution, and consequence, there were and remain significant problems with the prosecution of the war and the process of social reconstruction. The historical value of the present volume lies in the fact that it challenges the idea that the only true liberal position on the war was to be against it.

Maintaining a consistent humanitarian and liberal defense of the war has been a position increasingly difficult to sustain in light of the postwar developments in Iraq. Indeed, some liberal thinkers who originally supported the war changed their minds and decided that their original defenses could not be maintained in light of the mismanagement of the war, the failure to find weapons of mass destruction, the increasing hostility of the global community toward the United States, and the strengthening of the resolve of Islamofascism in its war against liberal democracy. Those who saw the removal of Saddam Hussein as an act of liberation and as a first step in the democratization of the Middle East are now confronted with the messy facts on the ground in Iraq. Several of the contributors express ambivalence about the humanitarian rationale for the war and concern about the unrestrained use of American power and unilateralism, the process of social reconstruction and democratization of postwar Iraq, and the perils and dangers associated with preemptive strategies. A crucial strength of the volume, though, is that the authors consider the war and reconstruction in all of its complexity and aim, constructively and critically, to remain committed to the possibilities for the advancement of liberal democracy in Iraq and for the advancement of the principles of liberal internationalism more generally. In the spirit of liberal hope, the authors focus on
positive consequences and outcomes—the restoration of sovereignty, the establishment of a new government, the hope that the Iraqi people themselves have about the future. This liberal hope, rather than the cynical pessimism and the moral indifference of realism, defines the spirit of the authors of these essays.

The need for such a volume is clear. Those who supported the war on the grounds put forth by the Bush administration enjoy the privilege of power, which affords their arguments a high degree of visibility. Those who were against the war—a group that consists of left-liberal intellectuals who are effective writers and activists—have suffered few barriers to the voicing of their views and have produced a constant stream of antiwar essays and books on the subject. In many cases, anti-war views dominate the pages of the traditional left-liberal press (as, for instance, in The Nation, although several liberal-minded magazines, such as Dissent and The New Republic, have been notably pluralistic in offering some of the opinions expressed in this volume). The New York Times, the global paper of record, has exhibited strong antiwar positions in its editorial columns. It is almost always the case that war polarizes ideological and intellectual discourse, and this is certainly the case in the Iraq war: one finds books that either support the war more or less on the grounds of the Bush administration or oppose it for a variety of reasons. No single volume, however, has collected the writings of those who defended the war on traditional principles of liberal internationalism, as a struggle against fascism and totalitarianism, or on human rights grounds. Indeed, the ideological tradition uniting many authors in this volume might be described as “antitotalitarianism,” as embodied in the views of the Polish leader of the Solidarity movement, Adam Michnik, whose ideas appear in an interview in this volume. In this respect, the authors are closer to the liberal form of solidarity that motivated those activist intellectuals who supported the fight against fascism in the Spanish Civil War than they are to an organization such as the United Nations and its realpolitik practices, moral indifference, and toleration of tyrants. As such, this volume serves as an important historical document that will ensure that a different voice of liberalism, one that remains principled and idealistic rather than descending into a vortex of cynical realism, appeasement, moral indifference, tolerance of tyrants, and the denial of human rights. Such a work is more important than ever, especially for the younger generation of liberals who, as Richard Just notes in his essay, have abandoned ideal-
ism for realism, thus jeopardizing the continuation of the most important defining quality of the liberal internationalist tradition.

The volume is organized around a set of central questions, and various authors approach these questions in different ways. The intent is not to provide definitive answers but to use the Iraq war as a case to raise questions and issues about the war that have not enjoyed a prominent airing.

1. Are the ideologies of antitotalitarianism, antifascism, and the promotion of human rights sufficient justifications for unilateral armed intervention on the part of states? Do the moral and ethical imperatives of human rights trump international law, and under what conditions? What exactly is the responsibility of international organizations such as the United Nations and the Security Council, its central political apparatus? Is the war defensible purely on human rights grounds? If so, what are the problems and paradoxes created by the use of state power and violence for the advancement of human rights?

The Bush administration attempted to justify the war on humanitarian grounds, but this stand was more of an ad hoc rationale than one that was central to the overall argument for going to war. Indeed, as it became clear that intelligence on the existence of weapons of mass destruction was faulty and the threat posed by Saddam was not as immediate as Bush and British prime minister Tony Blair had led the world to believe, the humanitarian argument was increasingly asserted, but cynicism about the consistency of the Coalition’s rationale made that argument difficult for many to accept. However, it is reasonable to assume that Saddam, given past behavior and other intelligence information, was certainly trying to acquire weapons of mass destruction, and, as Christopher Hitchens, Jeffrey Herf, and others point out in this volume, he was in material breach of specific UN resolutions, breaches that the Security Council and other member states tolerated.

When considering the human rights case for the war, or what might be called the moral argument, it is interesting to note that most world criticism of the war focused on the United States and George W. Bush. The structure and practice of the United Nations, as well as the realpolitik machinations of France, Germany, Russia, and China in standing against the war, were seldom the object of critique. So we might turn the scenario on its head and ask, Can one make a moral
critique of the Security Council’s failure to uphold the resolutions and ethical principles of the United Nations? Can one criticize on moral grounds the failure of liberal democratic European societies to uphold their commitments to the liberal principles of the UN Charter? The answer is an unqualified yes. There are situations in which ethical imperatives trump laws, especially if those laws are unjust (an idea that was the basis for the civil rights movement in the United States and the struggle against apartheid in South Africa, to name just two of the most prominent examples). Again, it is notable that many, if not most, left-liberal critics of the war blindly accepted the authority of UN procedures, international law, and the questionable moral righteousness of the antiwar axis. In doing so, they were clearly tolerating the intolerable injustices of Saddam Hussein and betraying their own liberal principles.

Legal scholar Brian Lepard, in a pathbreaking work on ethics and international law, notes that

there ought to be a general principle of moral law requiring governments, international organizations, and other actors to take some reasonable measures within their abilities to prevent or curb widespread and flagrant violations of essential human rights, including genocide, crimes against humanity, and rampant and systematic war crimes or torture. The Security Council is bound by this general principle of moral law. . . . [It is] legally obligated to take some reasonable measures to prevent or stop widespread and severe violations of essential human rights to the extent of, and within the boundaries of, its lawful powers under the UN Charter. . . . It is competent and obligated to take steps to prevent and put an end to all widespread and flagrant violations of essential human rights, or more sporadic violations that threaten to become widespread or to ignite or exacerbate internal or external war, thus amounting to a “threat to peace.”

The Bush administration clearly tried to convince the United Nations and the Security Council of their responsibilities and obligations. These responsibilities and obligations, not only to protect the people of Iraq but also to preserve peace and stability, were not met by the Security Council, and therefore the legitimacy of the entire apparatus was deeply compromised. Thus any moral critique of the war or of the Bush administration must be accompanied by a similar critique of the failure of moral responsibility by the United Nations and the inability of international law to consistently embody and put into practice the basic ethical principles on which the international community is based. This is not to say that states ought to be given carte blanche to intervene on human rights grounds, since it is clear that just about any state could create such
2. Can, then, the war in Iraq be considered a humanitarian war?

As noted earlier, Human Rights Watch, one of the most esteemed non-governmental human rights organizations in the world, declared that the war was not a humanitarian war because it was not motivated by an effort to prevent genocide. This perspective, however, depends on a restrictive definition of humanitarian intervention solely as the prevention of impending genocide. This leaves open the question of whether the use of military intervention can be justified in relation to other types of gross violations of human rights. Would humanitarian intervention be justified if Saddam Hussein publicly tortured ten thousand babies per day on national television? How is it that Human Rights Watch could spend its energies over the years documenting the heinous nature of the regime but then argue against rescue?

Those who argued against the applicability of the term humanitarian intervention in the case of the Iraq war have a strong argument based on the lack of a coherently articulated humanitarian motivation on the part of the Bush administration. Yet there is a distinct danger in making arguments based purely on considerations of motive. One of the strongest ethical arguments for the humanitarian intervention argument lies in considering the consequences of the war, and in this respect the authors in this volume can see clear humanitarian results in spite of the shadowy motivations of the Bush administration. One precondition for accepting a humanitarian case for the war is the acceptance of a certain kind of consequentialist ethics that judges actions based on their outcomes rather than the intentions and motivations of the actors involved. A basic principle of sociological reasoning is that social outcomes are seldom the product of the motivations or intentions of actors. In this respect, the outcomes of the war in terms of social dislocation, factionalism, and resistance were unanticipated negative consequences of the war. But in similar fashion, the victory of the Iraqi people over Saddam must be seen as a positive consequence from the standpoint of moral principles of human rights. Very few of even the most vociferous opponents of the war would deny, if pressed, that it is
a “good thing” that Saddam Hussein is gone and facing justice for his crimes. If that outcome is an acknowledged positive moral consequence, then all other critiques must be made in light of it.

This point brings up the question of the legitimacy of the war in relation to its legality and/or illegality. It is a fact that many people supported the interventions in Bosnia, and later in Kosovo, even while recognizing that they were technically illegal, but later they came out stridently opposed to the war in Iraq. This stance seems inconsistent, since Saddam was a far worse tyrant than Slobodan Milošević, and ample evidence indicated that he had committed acts of genocide against the Kurdish minority in the north and the Marsh Arabs in the south. He was almost certainly a greater threat to regional and global security and peace than the petty Milošević. Surely the commission of one or more acts of genocide is some indication of the potential to do it again, but this possibility was roundly denied in the left-liberal consciousness. Many of the authors in this volume considered intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo as morally legitimate, and their support of the Iraq war, on the same political grounds of the moral imperative of rescue and human rights, is logically consistent. It is an interesting question why those who supported the interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo, even though they were unilateral and occurred without UN sanction, turned away from supporting the war against Saddam Hussein on the same grounds. One wonders, indeed, if the war had been waged by a liberal Democratic American president rather than a Republican one (who is objectively and universally loathed by almost all liberals around the world), whether more moral support for the war among liberals would have been the consequence. Indeed, as Christopher Hitchens notes in his essay, both President Bill Clinton and Vice President Al Gore, in various speeches, called vociferously for regime change during their tenure of office, a call that was conveniently forgotten when George W. Bush was making the same argument. In any case, this volume at least raises the possibility that the war in Iraq was in keeping with other unilateral efforts to promote and protect human rights, whether or not one ultimately decides that it was not.

3. What are the political, sociological, and ethical critiques of the anti-war movement, and how do those critiques relate to the liberal humanitarian defense of the war?
This is an important question to ask, all the more so because there is a tendency for those who are similar ideologically not to criticize themselves or their own group but to unite in solidarity against the perceived enemy of the group (in this case, George W. Bush and his policies) and broach no dissent from within the group (“no enemies on the left,” as the old adage goes). Even if one were against the war, hearing the arguments in defense of it on humanitarian grounds and the limitations of one’s own arguments would be an intellectually valuable exercise in an ideal liberal free marketplace of ideas. Yet this has been extremely difficult to do in the current political climate on the left, a climate characterized by a persistent, emotional, and vehement criticism of the United States (often descending into a form of elemental anti-Americanism) and a visceral and mocking hatred and vilification of George W. Bush. The tendentious propagandist Michael Moore, who spares no effort to link emotional hatred of Bush with the purportedly objective methods of the documentary, has become the living demigod of the antiwar movement.

Several of the authors whose essays appear here have themselves suffered extreme pressure and even censure and political retaliation for violating the antiwar orthodoxies of the left. Mient Jan Faber, for instance, tells the story of how he was sacked from his position as the secretary-general of the Interfaith Peace Council in the Netherlands because he followed the ethical dictates of his conscience and could not bring himself to stand against the liberation of the Iraqi people from their despot. One author from Spain, a deeply committed liberal public intellectual who was committed to the project from its inception, found his prowar views received with such vitriolic condemnation that he could not bring himself to write another word and so recused himself from the present effort. The vilification of Christopher Hitchens’s positions on the war would itself make a fascinating case study of the current tide of intellectual orthodoxy on the left in relation to the Iraq war. Thus many of the authors here have found themselves suffering the fate of the heretic: intellectual outcasts banished, scorned, and vilified among their fellow liberals for expressing their heterodox views.

In my experience, what has been so striking from a sociological point of view is the resistance to even hearing the humanitarian case for the war. Throughout the essays, we hear in detail the frustration that many of the authors faced in simply trying to articulate the humanitarian case, never mind persuading people to accept it once made. This is a
fascinating sociological problem, since the left has usually been characterized precisely by its solidarity with the victims of repression around the globe. Yet, in the case of Iraq, this solidarity simply vanished in favor of a critique of the United States and George W. Bush and his so-called neoconservatives and their imperial agenda. If solidarity was expressed in any way, it was in the form of a quite legitimate concern for the civilian victims of the war. Yet, as several authors in this volume point out, and as survey research has shown consistently, the majority of Iraqis welcomed the war as a means to rid themselves of Saddam and in most cases were quite willing to make the sacrifices in civilian casualties that were necessary. That is, they did not see themselves as victims but as agents of resistance to Saddam who needed the war to activate their agency and to provide them with the means to overthrow Saddam’s tyranny.

As Johann Hari notes in his essay, even more troubling is the way in which many antiwar advocates made no effort to familiarize themselves with actual Iraqi public opinion and in some cases even distorted that opinion to make it concordant with their own ideological agendas. What is striking about the antiwar movement is the way in which the global left has turned against the United States rather than gross violators of human rights such as Saddam Hussein. Indeed, the war has been the pretext for a global revival of anti-Americanism, much of it well grounded, but much of it a rehearsal of a more fundamental twentieth-century proclivity of the left to vent its rage primarily at the “empire” rather than the various despots who have wreaked havoc on the global stage. Indeed, such tyrants figured out very early on that they could always gain a certain advantage by articulating critiques of the bugbear of American empire (witness, for instance, the enthralment of the left wing in America with Fidel Castro, who is the personification of resistance to the United States).

The central question regarding the immunity to the humanitarian case for the war is one for the sociology of cognition: Why was the left so unwilling to listen to or acknowledge the human rights case for the war, even if most leftists would ultimately reject it? The response of the left to the humanitarian argument indicates a lack of tolerance for alternative views that ought to be the hallmark of liberal intellectual life. In this respect, the left during the war displayed a pattern of intolerance that is not new in its history. A question that I ask of my colleagues on the left who opposed the war is, What would you say to the Iraqi person who asked you one year later why you stood against our libera-
tion? I have not yet been able to get a meaningful answer to that question, because all of the possible answers—pertaining, for example, to resisting American empire, obeying international law, preventing the deaths of civilians, taking moral stands against war itself as a crime—would mean that the average Iraqi who desired liberation from Saddam would still be subject to his terror, enslaved to tyranny, and denied the basic human rights that liberals purportedly cherish as central to their own existences.

It is clearly the case that current practices of international law and international organizations have failed rather glaringly to deal with tyrants. One has only to think of UN indifference to the plight of Bosnia, Rwanda, and Kosovo and its current ineptitude with regard to events in Congo and Sudan to see that the current structure of dealing with illiberal despots with liberal principles of law, negotiation, and accommodation is deeply flawed. The flaw consists in allowing illiberal despots the luxury of treatment according to Enlightenment ideals of toleration. If you treat an illiberal tyrant liberally, you can count on rendering him a distinct advantage.

It is seldom recognized that the war was not as unilateral as many maintain. By the time the war started in March 2003, forty-eight countries had joined the “Coalition of the Willing,” and critics tended to overgeneralize about the extent of opposition to the war in the world. Indeed, in Europe alone, the famous “Letter of the Eight” was a significant act of solidarity with the decision to go to war: the heads of state of England, Spain, the Netherlands, Italy, Hungary, Poland, Denmark, and the Czech Republic all supported the war in an open letter signed on January 29, 2003. This act evoked great consternation on the part of French president Jacques Chirac, who opined that in the case of the
former Soviet bloc countries, they were severely jeopardizing their smooth entrance into the European Union. In his now-famous words, “They missed their opportunity to shut up.”

Another significant act of support occurred when a group of former communist states known as the Vilnius—Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, Macedonia, and Albania—signed a statement of support of the war effort. The language of this statement reflected not only an affirmation that Saddam was clearly in violation of UN resolutions but a common recognition, based on the member states’ historical experiences with communist domination, of the moral importance of fighting tyranny: “Our countries understand the dangers posed by tyranny and the special responsibility of democracies to defend our shared values. The trans-Atlantic community must stand together to face the threat posed by the nexus of terrorism and dictators with weapons of mass destruction.”

Overall, as it turns out, more countries in Europe supported the war than were against it; one year after the war, only Spain officially rejected the original position of support. In addition, the Coalition enjoyed the support of Japan, Korea, Singapore, the Philippines, and many other Asian states. The new postcommunist republics of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Mongolia, and Azerbaijan joined the Coalition. It is also important to underscore the fact that several liberal titans, deeply respected heroes of the global left such as Vaclav Havel, Adam Michnik, and Jose Ramos-Horta, supported the war on liberal-humanitarian grounds.

Some critics of this Coalition have laid the charge that it was “bribed” or “coerced.” Yet the rhetoric of those leaders who supported the war—and I would again stress that it was the majority of European leaders who did so—especially in the case of the former countries of the Soviet bloc, present very convincing moral arguments for allying with the United States in the war against terror, more generally, and the war in Iraq, specifically. It will be up to political scientists and historians to write the history of the Coalition of the Willing, but as it stands, that Coalition was a powerful symbolic (if not material) display of support for the war in Iraq. What has been most striking is the left’s general ignorance of the reality of the Coalition, as well as its hesitance to grant it any credibility or significance whatsoever.

Obviously, then, there was far more consensus and support for the war than critics acknowledge. How is it that we are still led to believe that the effort was strictly unilateral? It is not comforting to think of
war and action outside the structures of global governance as the best means to promote peace and justice. In this sense, it is wise to consider the war as functional in a sociological sense: out of this conflict, perhaps reform and improvement of international institutions and law can result. The war, in this sense, might serve as a catalyst to forge new understandings and practices that might lead to a more peaceful and just future.

5. Do wars in the name of human rights advance the ideals of liberal democracy, or are they likely to foster outcomes that are contrary to those ideas and create more problems? Is liberal democracy possible in the Middle East, especially in light of the resentment that the war has created? Does the liberal defense of the war set up an inevitable clash of civilizations and a retrenchment and strengthening of the very forces that oppose liberal internationalism? To what extent do the cultures of the Middle East, described in this volume by Mehdi Mozaffari as a constellation of “oriental despotisms,” impede the advancement of liberal democracy?

In the wake of the victory over Saddam, we have seen the emergence of a strong Shiite resistance led by Islamists from Iraq and their supporters abroad. This response was, of course, to be expected, but it was never adequately anticipated by the Coalition forces.

Yet such resistance does not necessarily indicate a lack of desire on the part of “ordinary” Iraqis to craft a liberal democratic society. In the months immediately after the war, the organization Physicians for Human Rights carried out a rather extensive survey of two thousand households in southern Iraq. The results, as seen in figure 1, were quite striking in two regards: they reflect, first, a strong consensus in the legitimacy of a US and Coalition role in democratization and, second, a rather high degree of commitment to basic liberal values, justice, and human rights.¹⁷

These data are not necessarily representative of the entire Iraqi population, and much has happened in the last year that has affected the public opinion of Iraqis. But it does challenge the negative perceptions that resistance, dissatisfaction, and political strife are the only realities of the Iraqi landscape. Those who were against the war find support in their critiques by focusing on bad news; sociologically, it is important pay attention to public opinion more generally, and the news, even now, is not as disheartening as critics might predict.
One of the most comprehensive surveys of Iraqi public opinion is under way by Oxford Research International. The results are surprising, given the constant stream of negative news reports emanating from Iraq. In answer to the question “Overall, how would you say things are going in your life these days—very good, quite good, quite bad, or very bad?” fully 71 percent of respondents answered very good or quite good, whereas only 29 percent answered quite bad or very bad. As for optimism about the future, when asked, “What is your expectation for how things overall in your life will be in a year from now? Will they be much better, somewhat better, about the same, somewhat worse, or much worse?” 82 percent of respondents answered much better or somewhat better, 11 percent about the same, and only 8 percent some-
what worse or much worse. This response is a rather stark indicator of hope for the future, which contrasts quite dramatically with news reports that focus on resistance to the occupation, terrorist acts, and disaster. Primarily, the survey shows that most Iraqis are concerned about security, jobs, living standards, and rising prices. Only 1.5 percent noted that the occupation was the biggest problem, 0.6 percent were worried about chaos, and only 0.3 percent were worried about ethnic and religious tensions.

As can be seen in figure 2, one of the most interesting findings of the survey indicates that, overall, Iraqis supported the United States-led Coalition war to depose Saddam Hussein. The percentages of people

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[Ask all]

Q5 From today’s perspective and all things considered, was it absolutely right, somewhat right, somewhat wrong or absolutely wrong that US-led coalition forces invaded Iraq in Spring 2003?

Base = All respondents

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<tr>
<td>Liberated Iraq</td>
<td>1109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2202</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

source: The data from figure 2 are taken from Oxford Research International’s National Survey of Iraq, June 2004, which can be found at http://www.oxfordresearch.com/publications.html (accessed December 29, 2004). Reproduced by permission of the University of Oxford and Oxford Research International (UK), Ltd.

FIGURE 2. Iraqi Views of the War in Iraq
for and against are close, but only 30 percent of the people felt the war was “absolutely wrong.” In fact, one crucial finding from this study, also seen in figure 2, is that there are conflicting views of the war: 50 percent of Iraqis feel that the war liberated Iraq, whereas 50 percent believe that it humiliated Iraq. This important response indicates that positive and negative views of the war coexist: the Iraqis appear to be grateful for the deposition of Saddam’s regime and reign of terror, but they also feel deeply humiliated about being an occupied country.

It is important to point out also that much of the positive reception of the war has been eroded by the failures of the postwar period, and especially the Abu Ghraib scandal, which severely damaged the ability of US forces to claim the mantle of “liberator.” The evidence from the Oxford International survey indicates that the management and public relations failures of the postwar period are primarily responsible for the increasingly negative attitude toward the war and the occupation forces.

The point of these forays into public opinion is to challenge the characterization of the postwar situation in purely negative terms. Critics of the war can find it difficult to acknowledge the satisfaction of most Iraqis with the fact that Saddam’s brutal regime is over, just as it was hard for them to see that before the war, widespread support for it existed. Instead, many authors have glorified the “resistance” to the occupation without fully recognizing that this resistance is mostly composed of either former Baath Party loyalists or Islamist fundamentalists from Iraq and abroad who are using the Iraqi stage to wage jihad.

6. For many people, the war represents a severe blow to the principles of cosmopolitan universalism. The United States’ unilateral action is seen as a threat the very principles of multilateral engagement. Does the war threaten the liberal idea of cosmopolitan universalism? What is the relationship between cosmopolitanism and the use of violent force? Can (and should) human rights be promoted “out of the barrel of a gun”? Following Kant, is it likely that the tensions and anxieties surrounding the war might lead to a renewed effort of will to strengthen the cosmopolitan world order? Or are further schisms and tensions on the horizon?

Several authors in this volume engage the work of Immanuel Kant and John Rawls to understand the war. At first glance, it might be tempting
to think that Kant or Rawls would be against the war, because it violates the laws of the federation of “perpetual peace” or the “law of peoples” as well as the Kantian injunction, clearly specified in *Perpetual Peace*, against intervention except in cases of self-defense. Yet, it is clearly the case that the United Nations, as presently structured, is not exactly what Kant (or Rawls, for that matter) had in mind as the institutional embodiment of perpetual peace or the society of peoples: for these thinkers, a global federation must consist of free and democratic republics. The United Nations, however, consists of a variety of types of states and makes no distinctions among them: liberal democracies, Islamic theocracies, communist totalitarian states, and failed states are all allowed seats at the table as equal partners, a situation that Kant himself would have disapproved of. The United Nations has become a site where rogue and outlaw states can form alliances and power blocs and use international law to promote and protect their own power and challenge collectively the power of liberal states that would attempt to compel them to change their ways. One has only to think of the unrelenting and sustained castigation of Israel by UN bodies and member states that use the UN structures to mount their attacks on the only democratic state in the Middle East. The UN Commission on Human Rights, headed by Libya in 2003, is an example of how the UN structures have been commandeered by illiberal states to their own political advantage. Saddam Hussein’s manipulation of UN procedures and practices (as well as the United Nations’ own bureaucratic inefficiency, which is infinitely amenable to manipulation by those who wish to carry it out) to maintain his hold on power is indicative of how it is that tyrants take advantage of the international community’s commitment to the idea of peace at all costs to commit injustices, violence, and gross violations of human rights.

To be sure, Kant and Rawls would not argue that war is the best means for bringing rogue states to heel and turn them into liberal republics. Yet, at the same time, Kant clearly argues in *Perpetual Peace* that if war did occur (as he felt it inevitably would), it could serve as a pretext for the kinds of negotiations and reconsiderations that might reduce the frequency of future wars. In this sense, one of the more positive functions of the war might be to force reform of the United Nations. The question then remains as to whether the organization is even amenable to reform. The sociological complexities of this issue must be explored elsewhere.
In the case of John Rawls, it is not patently clear from a reading of *The Law of Peoples* whether Rawls would have supported the war in Iraq. He does note rather cryptically that war is justifiable in the case of gross violations of human rights, but he leaves open the question as to whether the decision should be made on a strictly multilateral basis with the consent of the United Nations. More important, Rawls points out that liberal peoples, should they decide to go to war and should they win, have a strict obligation to create a liberal republic in place of the vanquished outlaw state. One might imagine that Rawls would concur that the war was justifiable on consequentialist grounds: after all, one of the worst regimes in modern history was deposed. Yet, Rawls surely would have been dismayed by the postwar situation in Iraq. From a liberal-humanitarian point of view, there is no question that the postwar reconstruction of Iraq has been deeply flawed. There were clearly never enough American troops to guarantee security. Likewise, financial resources necessary for a truly invigorating liberal reconstruction have been lacking. The Abu Ghraib prison scandal severely damaged the possibility of convincing people that the American occupation was furthering the liberal principles of human rights. Indeed, it is very difficult to sustain any humanitarian case for the war in light of the fact that the occupation force engaged in the very practices that it purported to be fighting against. Nonetheless, it is important to see the bigger picture: while much of the attention of critics of the war was focused on Abu Ghraib, there has been a tendency toward moral equivocation in which the abuses of a small coterie of soldiers were seen as comparable to the magnificent and glaring atrocities of Saddam Hussein and his regime. According to the Oxford International survey of June 2004, the majority of Iraqis do not consider the Abu Ghraib scandal as official US policy; the majority feel that fewer than one hundred persons were involved in the abhorrent practices that occurred in the prison.

The narrative of the war put forth by its critics has tended to focus almost exclusively on the negative historical occurrences that would tend to support a stance of opposition. Positive outcomes are seldom the object of news reporting, and people who were against the war are cognitively disposed to consider its aftermath in purely negative terms, selecting those cases that confirm their critical agenda and ignoring positive evidence that would justify the war in terms of its intent or consequences. Here is where the liberal-humanitarian case is made stronger by conscious attention to some of the more positive aspects of social reconstruction that are often ignored by news media.
7. **What are the ongoing effects of the war on US-European relations, as well as relations among EU countries? What are the prospects for significant rapprochement between the United States and Europe? How has the war affected the liberal project of European unification, particularly with regard to new member nations from the former Soviet bloc, such as Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary?**

Opponents of the war, both in the United States and in Europe, express a distinct hesitance to examine the political processes and factors that led various European countries to oppose the war. In this view, American power is seen as the central object of critique, whereas European aspirations for power in Europe and in the international order more generally are not sufficiently addressed.

What was most striking about those who were critical of the United States and the Coalition is that they seldom cast a critical eye on the leading nations that opposed the war—in this case, France, Germany, and Russia. The “default” position was that these countries were acting nobly to preserve peace and multilateral institutions. What was less forthcoming, however, was an open, honest, and critical appraisal of the realpolitik considerations that led these nations to form an alliance against the war. As Kenneth Timmerman has shown in painstaking detail, France had much to lose if Saddam were to be deposed; France’s alliance with Saddam’s Iraq was an enduring one with strong economic benefits that Jacques Chirac was obligated to protect. 19 The situation was similar with Russia, which had long-standing political and economic ties to Iraq and stood to gain much by the preservation of Saddam’s regime, especially as a check against American hegemony in the Middle East. As for Germany, Gerhard Schroeder clearly had to maintain opposition to the United States’ action to ensure reelection in a political environment rife with opposition to American domination and, as Richard Herzinger notes in his essay, eager to break away from the guilt of its own fascist past. There was no way that the chancellor could have survived politically if he had joined forces with the US president and the British prime minister. The reasons for the French-German-Russian axis of opposition are complex, but the point is that in the logic of the opposition to the war, it was almost always the case that the United States was seen as acting illiberally, whereas the antiwar coalition was acting as the guardian of liberalism.

In fact, as the essays in this volume point out, it is hard to see tolerance of Saddam and his atrocities as being in any way in keeping with
liberal internationalist and humanitarian ideological principles. One of
the most bitter pills to swallow for those who opposed the war is that,
in the end, George W. Bush might have acted more in accord with the
principles of liberal internationalism than those who purported to be
liberals did. If one agrees with Paul Berman that the West is at war with
the forces of Islamofascism, then those who do not recognize this point
or take it seriously are, objectively, part of the problem of fighting suc-
cessfully against it.

George Orwell once noted in a famous epigraph, “Pacifism is objec-
tively profascist.” Extending his insights to the case of the Iraq war, it is
an objective fact that those who chose to stand against the war were in
one sense standing with Saddam Hussein, because if they had been suc-
cessful in their efforts to stop the war, he would still be in power today.
One must imagine that Saddam Hussein, in his struggle to maintain
his power, and his Baathist Party henchmen were greatly appreciative
of the global left’s opposition to the war. Indeed, this antiwar stance
appears to have been a vital component of Saddam’s strategy for
manipulation of the United Nations and various countries in order to
get sanctions lifted so that he could begin the process of rearmament
and development of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).

Overall, the essays in this volume constitute a collective effort to see
the Iraq war in a different light. The authors articulate a number of lib-
eral-humanitarian arguments and raise important issues that have not
enjoyed adequate attention and that deserve to be heard amid the
polarized discourse on the war. The self-critical and reflexive quality of
the essays indicates the tension and ambivalence that most of the
authors feel in holding the positions that they do. Taken as a whole,
though, the essays are examples of intellectual commitment to the idea
of what Max Weber calls “politics as a vocation”:

There are two ways of making politics one’s vocation: Either one lives “for”
politics or one lives “off” politics. By no means is this contrast an exclusive
one. The rule is, rather, that man does both, at least in thought, and cer-
tainly he also does both in practice. He who lives “for” politics makes pol-
itics his life, in an internal sense. Either he enjoys the naked possession of
the power he exerts, or he nourishes his inner balance and self-feeling by
the consciousness that his life has meaning in the service of a “cause.” . . .
The serving of a cause must not be absent if action is to have inner strength.
Exactly what the cause, in the service of which the politician strives for
power and uses power, looks like is a matter of faith. The politician may
serve national, humanitarian, social, ethical, cultural, worldly, or religious
ends. The politician may be sustained by a strong belief in “progress”—
no matter in which sense—or he may coolly reject this kind of belief. He may claim to stand in the service of an “idea” or, rejecting this in principle, he may want to serve external ends of everyday life. However, some kind of faith must always exist. Otherwise, it is absolutely true that the curse of the creature’s worthlessness overshadows even the externally strongest political successes. . . . It is immensely moving when a mature man—no matter whether old or young in years—is aware of a responsibility for the consequences of his conduct and really feels such responsibility with heart and soul. He then acts by following an ethic of responsibility and somewhere he reaches the point where he says: “Here I stand; I can do no other.”

What unites this volume’s authors is commitment to the cause of liberal internationalism and solidarity with the weak as a political vocation. To be a dissident on this particular issue is to occupy a lonely place, but those true to their own political vocations enjoy the satisfaction and pleasure of autonomy and the inner joy of living according to the ethics of responsibility.

**ORGANIZATION OF THE VOLUME**

The themes and arguments of the essays in this volume overlap considerably, yet the essays are categorized according to the general themes that are raised in each essay. The volume is organized so that the reader might comfortably begin reading at any point in the book, and the themes of each essay resonate strongly with and reinforce each other, even though they appear in groupings in various sections.

The first section is entitled “Reconsidering Regime Change.” The essays in this section state the case for regime change and provide reflections on the liberal-humanitarian case for the war.

The second section, “Philosophical Arguments,” presents the work of three philosophers who make philosophical interpretations of the war. These essays offer Kantian and Rawlsian analyses of the war, as well as arguments from consequentialist ethics.

The third section, “Critiques of the Left,” highlights an important aspect of this volume. As noted earlier, most of the authors came to their own arguments in defense of the war based on a critical examination of the positions of their own ideological group. These essays serve as documentary evidence that there is no one politically correct left-liberal position on the war and that there is room enough in that space for articulation and toleration of dissenting arguments.

The fourth section of this volume, “European Dimensions,” presents the views of three European commentators on European dimensions of
the war. Most critics of the war tend to assume the hegemony of European opposition to it, but several leading intellectuals and writers in Europe supported the war on liberal-humanitarian grounds. A more in-depth examination of the European perceptions of the war would necessitate a separate volume, but the essays here present a glimpse into the more heterodox views that existed amid the dominant antiwar sentiments of much of Europe.

The penultimate section, “Solidarity,” consists of essays by those who supported the war on what is perhaps the most basic liberal-humanitarian principle: solidarity with the weak. Three of the four essays in this section are by world political leaders who have struggled against despotism in their own personal lives and political practice and who have carried that struggle to the Iraqi people. With all of the openly shared doubts, ambivalences, and criticisms about the decision to go to war and its consequences, these authors—and indeed all of the authors in this volume—share one enduring disposition: that those who are in a position of strength have a responsibility to protect the weak. The very basis of liberal consciousness depends on fulfilling that responsibility. Indifference, whatever its basis, is an abdication of the duty of solidarity and the responsibility to protect.

Finally, we end the volume with two speeches by Tony Blair, the prime minister of Great Britain and a leading voice of the liberal-humanitarian argument for the war. Much of the criticism of the war focused on the administration and ideology of George W. Bush, a conservative president with a clear ideological agenda that repulses many liberals. Blair was often seen as a helpless acolyte of Bush’s will. Yet these speeches show with great poignancy Blair’s own liberal vision of political responsibility not only to ensure global moral responsibility to peace and security but to protect and liberate the oppressed. In this sense, Tony Blair is a model of liberal statesmanship, and his speeches serve as a reminder to all that the war can be defended on the basis of morality and principle rather than resisted on stark considerations of hegemony or empire alone.

NOTES

1. See Ken Roth, “War in Iraq: Not a Humanitarian Intervention,” http://hrw.org/wr2k4/3.htm (accessed November 22, 2004). Roth writes, “The result is that at a time of renewed interest in humanitarian intervention, the Iraq war and the effort to justify it even in part in humanitarian terms risk giv-
ing humanitarian intervention a bad name. If that breeds cynicism about the use of military force for humanitarian purposes, it could be devastating for people in need of future rescue.” According to this strange logic, rescuing people from tyrants and totalitarian regimes endangers the future of rescuing people from tyrants and totalitarian regimes. A more detailed critique of Human Rights Watch’s view of the Iraq war can be found in Thomas Cushman, “The Human Rights Case for the War in Iraq: A Consequentialist View,” forthcoming in Human Rights in an Age of Terror, ed. Richard Ashby Wilson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).


3. In the contemporary world, the meaning of liberal is quite varied. In Europe and the United States, it is usually applied to progressives, social democrats, or proponents of the welfare state, yet at the same time it has been used to describe those who advocate developing free markets and easing state control on the latter (i.e., neoliberals). The term liberal internationalism is used in a very specific sense to describe the points of articulation among the contributors of the volume. The principles that define this position should be clear from the arguments presented here.


6. Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace: Humanitarian Intervention and International Law (London: Oxford University Press, 2001), 27. Chesterman argues that this is the central danger in allowing humanitarian considerations to trump international law. In his view, it is better to hold to an imperfect body of law (and seek to perfect it) than to open the door to powerful states that claim to be fighting for human rights but have rather the obverse intention. Yet, as Christopher Hitchens notes in his essay herein, there is no reason to assume that now that the United States has acted unilaterally, other powers will start unleashing wars of aggression in the name of human rights. One year after the war, this has decidedly not been the case.

7. For a fascinating and rare glimpse of Hitler’s abuse of the human rights argument, see Polish Acts of Atrocity against the German Minority in Poland (German Library of Information, for the German Foreign Office, Berlin–New York, 1940).

8. See Roth, “War in Iraq.”

9. Samuel Scheffler defines consequentialism as “a moral doctrine which says the right act in any given situation is the one that will produce the best overall outcome as judged from an impersonal standpoint which gives equal weight to the interests of everyone” (Samuel Scheffler, ed., Consequentialism and Its Critics [London: Oxford University Press, 1988], 1). The aim of this volume is to argue not that consequentialism is the ideal ethical framework for interpreting the world but that the current disjuncture between the ethical imperatives of human rights and formal international law must be reexamined: thinking about the ethical consequences of the war allows us at least to imagine that some things can be considered morally right but against the law.
10. Danny Postel has pointed out this phenomenon of “selective solidarity” with regard to Iran: the response of the global left to the theocratic repression in Iran has been virtually nonexistent. See Danny Postel, “Iran, Solidarity, and the Left,” *Radical Society: A Review of Culture and Politics* 30, no. 4 (October/December 2003): 69–76.


14. This letter was subsequently published on January 30, 2003, in the *Wall Street Journal*. It is important to note that the acts of these heads of state were not uncontroversial in their own countries.


18. Oxford Research International has been commissioning and carrying out successive waves of social research in Iraq. Its reports are issued at http://www.oxfordresearch.com/publications.html. The present discussion is based on results from the February 4, 2004, survey and offers a snapshot of Iraqi sentiment at that time. It is important to continue to examine the findings of ongoing research in light of continual developments, but, as of now, these are the most complete and systematic surveys available on Iraqi public opinion.


20. This book was going to press just as the Charles Duelfer’s comprehensive report on WMDs in Iraq appeared. The report indicates that Saddam Hussein most likely destroyed existing stocks of WMDS in a plan to get UN sanctions lifted in order to rearm. The report makes very clear that many countries that opposed the war had rather questionable relations with Saddam’s regime, a fact that was consistently and willfully ignored by anti-Bush opponents of the war. Because this volume was going to press just as the report was released, a complete discussion of its implications for some of the arguments presented in the volume is not possible. The complete Duelfer Report is available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004/ (accessed December 29, 2004).