INTRODUCTION

Wealth, Empire, Cabals, and the Public State

I hope we shall crush in its birth the aristocracy of our monied corporations which dare already to challenge our government to a trial of strength, and bid defiance to the laws of our country.

Thomas Jefferson, 1816

We hold it a prime duty of the people to free our government from the control of money.

Theodore Roosevelt, 1912

The real truth . . . is, as you and I know, that a financial element in the larger centers has owned the Government ever since the days of Andrew Jackson.

Letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt to Colonel E. M. House, 1933

THE GROWTH OF GREAT WEALTH AT THE EXPENSE OF THE PUBLIC STATE

In this book I explain the paradoxes that distress most of the Americans I’ve met over the past few years. Whether they live in Berkeley, New England, or West Texas, these people wonder why the United States steered deliberately—and seemingly inevitably—into a war with Iraq that had little domestic support. They wonder why so many open processes of our government have been replaced by secret decisions at the
uppermost levels. They wonder why our country, which is not currently facing any major enemies, is increasing its defense budget more rapidly than ever before.

A stock answer often used to explain these changes is to invoke the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. But pressures for them had been building long before 9/11. Even more disturbing, some of those lobbying for a “revolution in military affairs,” including huge new defense budgets and military action against Iraq, stated before 2001 that such changes would not occur quickly without “some catastrophic and catalyzing event—like a new Pearl Harbor.” Since the 9/11 attacks, leading members of the Bush administration have spoken of the attacks as a “great opportunity” (President Bush) or (in Donald Rumsfeld’s words) “the kind of opportunities that World War II offered, to refashion the world.”

I wrote this book in an effort to contextualize 9/11. In one sense, 9/11 is an event without precedent, and one that threatens to move America beyond the age of public politics to a new era in which power, more than ever before, is administered downward from above. But at the same time, 9/11 must be seen as a culmination of trends developing through a half century: toward secret top-down decision making by small cabals, toward the militarization of law enforcement, toward plans for the sequestering of those who dissent, toward government off-the-books operations, transactions, and assets, and toward governance by those who pay for political parties rather than those who participate in them.

Essentially, I agree with political commentator Kevin Phillips that a major answer to these questions, although not a complete one and insufficiently discussed, is found in an area beyond politics: the “connecting lines . . . between tainted government, corrupted politics, corporate venality, and the unprecedented two-decade build-up of wealth itself.” Domination of the public state by private wealth is not a novelty in America, as the epigraphs at the beginning of this chapter make clear. The novelty since World War II, however, lies in the secret growth and articulation of this top-down power within government. In particular, the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), a group hidden from the public eye, was secretly created in June 1948 and dominated at first by a small ex–Office of Special Services (OSS) elite from the Wall Street. Wall Street’s secret intrusion of its views and personnel into American covert policy justifies our speaking of an American “overworld”—that realm of wealthy or privileged society that, although not formally authorized or institutionalized, is the scene of successful influence of government by private power.
Of all the political systems in the world, America’s has traditionally been characterized by its openness to self-analysis, self-criticism, and ultimately self-correction. Past periods of wealth disparity, notably in the Gilded Age, have been followed by reform movements that compressed the income gap. But, as Phillips has warned, the type of reforms that have followed past excesses of wealth in politics must happen again soon, or they may not happen at all: “As the twenty-first century gets underway, the imbalance of wealth and democracy in the United States is unsustainable. . . . Either democracy must be renewed, with politics brought back to life, or wealth is likely to cement a new and less democratic regime—plutocracy by some other name.”

Economist Paul Krugman has transmitted statistics for the staggering increases in income for America’s most wealthy: “A new research paper by Ian Dew-Becker and Robert Gordon of Northwestern University, ‘Where Did the Productivity Growth Go?,’ gives the details. Between 1972 and 2001, the wage and salary income of Americans at the 90th percentile of the income distribution rose only 34 percent, or about 1 percent per year. . . . But income at the 99th percentile rose 87 percent; income at the 99.9th percentile rose 181 percent; and income at the 99.99th percentile rose 497 percent.”

Many of these increases are marked by the transfer rather than the creation of wealth and derive from what Phillips has called the “financialization” of America: the “process whereby financial services, broadly construed, take over the dominant economic, cultural, and political role in a national economy.”

THE OVERWORLD, THE DEEP STATE, AND BUREAUCRATIC PARANOIA

Obviously, as the wealth of the top 1 percent has increased radically, so has its power, particularly over communications. Conversely, the public state—the realm of open and deliberated policy decisions—has diminished at the hands of private manipulators. Under both presidents Bill Clinton and George H. W. Bush, for example, the United States was committed to controversial commitments and interventions, from Uzbekistan to Kosovo, which were the product of secret lobbying by cabals, not public debate. The political power of money has been analyzed in the media and Congress chiefly as the external problem of what is often called corruption, the role of money in choosing and influencing Congress and the White House. To this, since the 1970s, has been added a coordinated campaign by a few wealthy individuals (such as billionaire publisher...
Richard Mellon Scaife, foundations (such as Coors, Allen-Bradley, Olin, Smith Richardson), and their media (such as Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation) to shift the political culture of the country radically to the right. But this book also focuses on something else: the top 1 percent’s direct or indirect control of certain specific domains of government, beginning in the 1940s with the creation of CIA. It is a story that looks beyond the well-defined public entities of open politics to include the more amorphous and fluid realm of private control behind them. This realm of wealthy private influence, the overworld, is a milieu of those who either by wealth or background have power great enough to have an observable influence on their society and its politics. Those parts of the government responding to their influence I call the “deep state” (if covert) or “security state” (if military). Both represent top-down or closed power, as opposed to the open power of the public state or res publica that represents the people as a whole.

I argue in this book that the power of the American public state needs to be revived, and its out-of-control deep state radically curtailed. I am not an opponent of deep states per se: publics are not infallible and sometimes need to be opposed. But in our current crisis the proper balance between the public state and the deep state has been lost, and the deep state’s secret top-down powers have become a major threat to democracy. A well-functioning deep state serves to impose needed wisdom and discipline, but in recent years America’s unchecked deep state has been imposing both folly and indiscipline. The tension between an open public state and a closed deep state or security state existing within it is an old and widespread phenomenon. In the United States it has become more acute since the beginning of the Cold War in the 1940s, when the investment firms of the Wall Street overworld provided President Harry Truman with his secretary of defense, James V. Forrestal. This same overworld provided them both with the ideas and personnel for a new Central Intelligence Agency.

The policy making of the closed deep state, shielded by secrecy, has tended increasingly toward global dominance at any price, without regard to consequences. The collective wisdom of foreign policy experts, usually most represented in the State Department, has been powerless to restrain it. Over and over throughout this book I reveal occasions where the relatively sane proposals of the State Department have been trumped by the bureaucratic paranoia of people whose career success was based on their commitment to worst-case scenarios. This “paranoid style in
American politics” has traditionally referred to marginal elements that exist remote from true power. But there has been a paranoid tradition of the deep state as well, dating back to the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1799 (recently cited by the Department of Homeland Security as a model for its Endgame program).12

Closed policy making that puts security first above all, especially when protected by secrecy, is a formula for bureaucratic paranoia. The United States experienced such paranoia with the Alien Act and the Palmer Raids of 1918 and again with the State Department and Treasury personnel purges after World War II. In this book I argue that the bureaucratic paranoia of the deep state was a major cause (as well as a result of) 9/11. I believe our present course of ever more heightened paranoia is a sure formula for more 9/11s.

This book will not address the often asked questions of to what extent the Bush-Cheney administration knew in advance of the impending attacks on 9/11, and then either let them happen or even possibly made them happen. Instead, this book makes a more general argument that the bureaucratic paranoia inside the American deep state, undisciplined by the available wisdom of the public state, helped years ago to create al Qaeda and then to create the circumstances in which, almost inevitably, elements in al Qaeda would turn against the United States.13

Having worked briefly in the Canadian bureaucracy, I have observed that bureaucratic debate where power is involved tends to favor paranoid or worst-case analyses, especially those that justify budget and bureaucratic growth. Today’s bureaucratic paranoia has indeed been institutionalized by what has been popularized as Vice President Cheney’s “one percent doctrine”: “Even if there’s just a 1 percent chance of the unimaginable coming due, act as if it is a certainty. It’s not about ‘our analysis,’ as Cheney said. It’s about ‘our response’ . . . Justified or not, fact-based or not, ‘our response’ is what matters. As to ‘evidence,’ the bar was set so low that the word itself almost didn’t apply. If there was even a one percent chance of terrorists getting a weapon of mass destruction . . . the United States must now act as if it were a certainty.”14

This doctrine is a license for untrammeled expansion of the secret deep state. As the deep state metastasizes, its origins in the overworld become less clear and possibly less relevant. In using the term “over-world,” we must be careful not to reify it or attribute to it a unity and coherence it does not possess. It is a term of convenience to indicate, at least initially, a somewhat amorphous realm of sociopolitical change on which we should focus attention. The overworld is emphatically less
cohesive than a class, despite what popular historian Frederick Lundberg and others have suggested. Ultimately its much discussed institutions, like the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and the Trilateral Commission, are more significant as symptoms and evidence rather than as sources of overworld power.

The overworld was clearly centered in Wall Street in the 1940s, and CIA was primarily designed there. With the postwar shifts of U.S. demographics and economic structure southward and westward, the overworld itself has shifted, becoming less defined by geography than by the interrelated functions of the petroleum-industrial-financial complex. Cheney’s global oilfield services firm Halliburton, today a “bridge between the oil industry and the military-industrial complex,” was nowhere near the Wall Street power center in the 1940s. This shift in the overworld led by 1968 to a polarizing debate over the Vietnam War. The expanding military-industrial complex, dedicated to winning that war at any cost, found themselves increasingly opposed by elements on Wall Street (which at the time I labeled the “CIA-financial complex”) who feared the impact of the war’s costs on the stability of the dollar. I argue that Nixon’s inability to satisfy either of the two polarized factions—symbolized by the American Security Council and the Council on Foreign Relations—was a major factor in the unprecedented and ultimately unresolved drama of Watergate.

Today, with the relative decline of the domestic civilian economy and the proliferation of military business, we can see an emerging military-financial complex. This is symbolized by the easy movement up from the Pentagon to Wall Street of such key players as the director Bruce P. Jackson of the Project for the New American Century. One can measure the emergent power of the military in the establishment by comparing the relatively critical stance of the mainstream media toward the Vietnam War and the recent misleading White House propaganda about Iraq that was published uncritically in the New York Times. Increasingly a gap has widened between the mainstream press and television—the so-called old media—and the emerging new media of open communications via the Internet.

In a sense, the current American political crisis can be seen as a tension between the goals of this military-financial complex, on the one hand, and the requisite conditions for a healthy civilian economy and civil society on the other. This is another way of understanding the tension, described throughout this book, between the deep/security state and the public state. Through all these shifts certain essential continuities can be
traced in the overworld’s influence—first on CIA and increasingly on national security policy in general. Most recently, private power consolidated its influence by managing to establish a small but extremely important “shadow government,” or “parallel government.” The overworld did this through planning for what is officially known as continuity of government (COG), with its own secret, parallel institutions. Toward the end of this book I show how the plans for COG in a time of crisis were first implemented on 9/11. More important, they may also have contributed to changes in U.S. emergency defense responses that perhaps escalated a much smaller terrorist attack into “a new Pearl Harbor.”

THE DIALECTICS OF WEALTH, EXPANSION, AND RESTRAINT

History has demonstrated, four or five times over, the dialectics of democratic openness. This process determined the fates of the ancient city-states of Athens and Rome, and since the Renaissance we have seen it again with the empires of Spain, the Netherlands, and Great Britain. An urban civil society that was relatively free and open surpassed its neighbors in generating wealth. As wealth increased, it expanded the reach of the state beyond that society’s borders. And then, as Yale historian Paul Kennedy wrote in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, a military overstretch ensued that weakened the homeland economically and precipitated its decline.

To the extent that wealth expanded, these extra-societal institutions came to lie outside the transparency of domestic civil society. In effect, they become both powerful and secret, and new elements of the state developed to interact with these institutions on a secret level. Paradoxically, as the power, scope, and exposure of the state increased, so did that society’s paranoia—the fear of being surpassed by competing states. Within the state secrecy trumped openness. There is a political sociology of secrecy: those with higher clearances participated in policy making at a level where those without clearances were denied access. The result was the increasing dominance over the officially organized public state by an undemocratic top-down deep state, one that answered to other interests than those of the homeland public. Institutions and relationships outside the geographic bounds of civil society consolidated more and more into an overworld, usually strengthened by offshore resources, that had the wealth and de facto power to influence and eventually determine the policies of the public state.

America since World War II has differed from these empires before it
in two respects. On the one hand, the modern nation-state system is now
global; on the other, America’s overwhelming military preeminence has
contributed to the impression of a unipolar world. Because of these two
factors, the flag imperialism of a century ago (such as the Spanish-
American War) has evolved into trade imperialism: the flag now follows
trade and investment, rather than vice versa. (Admiral George Dewey
sent the U.S. Navy to the Philippines in 1898 before any major American
firms had invested there. But when President George W. Bush dispatched
U.S. troops to Georgia in 2002, it was only after U.S. oil firms had begun
to develop a major oil pipeline across the country.)

This subordination of the flag to trade has satisfied most U.S. eco-
nomic interests, or so-called traders, symbolized by Wall Street and the
Council on Foreign Relations. But it also created a so-called Prussian
backlash, especially in the military, from those who believed that as long
as America had the military capacity to overwhelm its enemies, it should
not hesitate to do so. As a result, postwar presidents from Harry Truman
through Richard Nixon repeatedly had to restrain rebellious hawkish
elements in the armed forces of which they were the commanders in
chief. President Dwight Eisenhower was able to restrain Admiral Arthur
Radford’s demand in 1954 for direct U.S. intervention in the French
Indochina War, when the French were being defeated at Dien Bien Phu.
But the top CIA and Pentagon leadership plotted for further engagement
in Indochina in the late 1950s, planning not so much with Eisenhower as
against him. As I have described in detail in my book Drugs, Oil, and
War, key decisions in escalating U.S. support in Laos were only belatedly
approved by Eisenhower, at times when he was away from his office,
either to play golf or for a planned check-up in a hospital.

Economist James Galbraith has revealed how, in the midst of the 1961
Berlin crisis, President John Kennedy angered the U.S. generals, and pos-
sibly CIA director Allen Dulles, by rejecting “the military’s drive for a
vast U.S. nuclear build-up” and possible first strike as well. A few days
later Kennedy was told about a study by White House aide Carl Kaysen
“that showed that a ‘disarming first strike’ against Soviet strategic forces
could be carried out with a high degree of confidence that it would catch
them all on the ground.” Galbraith also notes the report of Nikita
Khrushchev that at the peak of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, Robert
Kennedy told the Russian ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin: “Even though
the President himself is very much against starting a war over Cuba, an
irreversible chain of events could occur against his will. . . . If the situ-
ation continues for much longer, the President is not sure that the military
will not overthrow him and seize power. The American military could get out of control.”

A recent study of the second Tonkin Gulf incident on August 4, 1964, which led eventually to the Vietnam War, indicates that the crucial decision to bomb North Vietnam did not come from President Lyndon Johnson, who “was deliberately prevented” by those below him “from making an informed decision” on that day. Later, we shall see that Nixon also faced opposition from the bureaucratic faction that wished for a more unrestrained exercise of U.S. military power. America’s ignominious departure from Vietnam silenced, for a generation, the “Prussians” demand for the reckless use of American military force. But it also gave rise to a compensatory belief, articulated by Marine Colonel Oliver North, that the war effort in Vietnam was not lost on the battlefield; rather, it was lost in the streets of America. Quietly and secretly, North and his allies began to make arrangements, through continuity of government planning, to ensure that in any future military engagement, American dissent at home would not be allowed to endanger the outcome.

THE SPREAD OF SECRECY AND THE ROAD TO 9/11

In the 1987 Iran-Contra hearings the congressman Jack Brooks tried vainly to question Colonel North about his “work on plans for continuity of government in the event of a major disaster.” Denied an answer, Brooks then accused North of being part of a secret “government within a government.” Author Theodore Draper later echoed the charge when he wrote of a “junta-like cabal.” North’s work on so-called COG was important, and the planning was continued after his departure by a small cabal-like committee, including Dick Cheney (then a congressman) and Donald Rumsfeld (who at the time was a private citizen). Eventually North’s most secret and controversial recommendations, including plans for the warrantless roundup and detention of minorities, saw fruition after 9/11. Chapter 14 of this book explores in detail how 9/11, or more accurately the U.S. response to that attack, is the fruit of COG planning in the 1980s.

These two apparently unrelated episodes—Iran-Contra and the U.S. response to 9/11—are in fact part of a continuous expansion of secret policy making by cabals going back to the 1940s. More and more, major redirections of U.S. foreign policy have been initiated and conducted not by those who are publicly charged with the responsibility for them, but by others, often in secret. This practice can be traced back chiefly to the
creation, in 1947, of two related institutions: the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency. Indeed, one political motive for these institutions was to create a larger space for secrecy at the heart of what had been traditionally a more open form of government. Since then, secrecy, invoked at first as necessary to the defense of the public state, has become increasingly an enemy to the public state.

Perhaps no one in 1947 could have predicted the extent to which the public power of the open democratic state would be overridden by secret edicts and processes, imposed within government from outside sources, rather than publicly arrived at. But anyone interested in saving the American Republic will want to identify these secret forces that have been eroding it. This erosion was not an inevitable historical process. Rather, it was the result of recurrent intrusions into the public political process by a few individuals, above all from the overworld, who have influenced the course of American politics.

This influence is exercised both publicly and covertly. The most obvious influence is through money, changing hands both above and below the table. The right of the wealthy to donate to political parties and causes is a legally circumscribed one. Beyond the reach of the law, however, is the ability of wealth to subvert true public discourse by creating an artificial realm of media discourse, in which the honest reporters of unpleasant truths are marginalized and sometimes lose their jobs. One such example is that of Gary Webb, whose Pulitzer Prize–winning journalistic career ended after he wrote about the Contras and drugs.34

The sustained maintenance of bias in media discourse is thus reflected and enhanced by bureaucratic discourse. It is unusual for the overworld to intervene directly in the higher processes of government. More common is the maintenance of artificial consensus by influencing the selection and promotion of power experts within the government. Throughout this book I document how, time after time, solid expert advice on policy was overridden by power experts who knew next to nothing about the foreign region affected but everything about self-advancement in a corrupt Washington.35

There are also less visible institutions that mediate and serve as a more secret interface between the American people and overworld power.36 Besides CIA itself, an institution initially guided more from Wall Street than from Washington, there are less-known institutions, such as the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and, more recently, the group set up under Ronald Reagan to plan for so-called COG. As we shall see, the history of COG planning, which originated in the 1950s,
assumed its current shape in response to the mobilization of U.S. Army intelligence and CIA against left-wing Americans during the civil disorder of the 1960s and 1970s. The reactive planning under Presidents Johnson and Nixon became increasingly proactive in the 1980s administration of President Reagan. Under him the COG project was developed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) operating under the White House National Program Office (NPO), a group so supersecret it was not publicly named until a 1991 CNN news story.37

This increasing articulation and institutionalization of secret power corresponds to an increasing subordination of public power to the private realm. Many Americans have become inured to the fact that major policy decisions, ranging from defense strategies to the initiation of pre-emptive war, are no longer formulated by the public state. Rather, many of these decisions are now imposed on it from outside.

The beginnings of this public implementation can be traced to the creation of CIA in 1947. This was the most important of a series of secret decisions made in the 1940s and 1950s, decades before many of the events I detail throughout this book. Right after World War II the chances seemed greater than ever before for a more peaceful, orderly, legal, and open world. The United States was then wealthy enough to finance postwar reconstruction in devastated Europe. Later the U.S. government would fund health and agriculture programs in the newly liberated former colonies of the third world. The world’s two great superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union—had apparently agreed on rules and procedures for mediating their serious differences through a neutral body, the United Nations.

But the United Nations was to prove inadequate for the resolution of international conflict. One major reason for this was that the Soviet Union, the United States, and (after 1949) China all pursued covert expansive policies that brought them into conflict and occasionally into war. The Marxist-Leninist nations of the USSR and China lent support to other Marxist-Leninist parties and movements, some of them insurrectionary, in other parts of the world. The immediate concern of the United States was Europe, where it appeared that the French and Italian Communist parties might be elected to power in 1948.

From the beginning of the postwar era, Washington looked for assets and “proxy armies” of its own, to combat the threat it perceived from the Soviet Union and China. Some of these proxies, like the Nationalist Chinese Kuomintang (KMT) troops in Burma, or the mafias in Italy and
Marseilles, soon outgrew their U.S. support to become de facto regional players, or parastates (exhibiting some but not all of the features of states) in their own right.

From 1945 to 1947 elements in the U.S. Army conspired to maintain contacts with former German anti-Communists in Europe and their German Army commander, General Reinhard Gehlen. Five men were involved, of whom three (William J. Donovan, Allen Dulles, and Frank Wisner) were representatives of the Wall Street overworld and also of the New York Social Register, which listed the members of New York high society. They were awaiting a new agency to succeed Donovan’s Office of Special Services (OSS) and take over the Nazis’ ethnic armies in Eastern Europe. But the idea of a centralized intelligence agency encountered fierce competitive opposition from the FBI’s J. Edgar Hoover, who was backed at first by elements of army intelligence.

Although it took two years to overcome their opponents, the Wall Street lawyers and bankers in Truman’s administration succeeded in 1947 in establishing CIA, which would report to the president through the new National Security Council (NSC). This new agency, based on the precedent and personnel of the OSS, had been urged on Washington by the War-Peace Studies Project of the Council on Foreign Relations in the early 1940s. It was reinforced by a report commissioned in 1945 by navy secretary James V. Forrestal. The report was written by Ferdinand Eberstadt, who like Forrestal was a private Wall Street banker from the investment bank Dillon Read.

As CIA director Richard Helms narrates in his memoirs, Allen Dulles (then a Republican lawyer at Sullivan and Cromwell in New York) was recruited in 1946 “to draft proposals for the shape and organization of what was to become the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947.” Dulles promptly formed an advisory group of six men, all but one of whom were Wall Street investment bankers or lawyers. In 1948, Forrestal appointed Dulles chairman of a committee, along with two other New York lawyers, to review CIA’s performance. “The three lawyers conferred for close to a year in one of the board rooms at J. H. Whitney,” another Wall Street investment firm.

In its first two decades, CIA, like its intellectual parent the Council on Foreign Relations, was dominated internally and externally by the aristocratic elements of the New York overworld. All seven of the known deputy directors of CIA during this period came from the same New York legal and financial circles; and six of them were listed in the New York Social Register as well. When joined by the young James Angle-
ton, son of an international corporate executive, this early core became the basis for an inner “agency-within-an-agency” that survived into the 1960s.47

Within a year the NSC was authorizing covert operations overseas through CIA. In fact, these operations were being implemented by an even more secret group within CIA, the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC). The CIA at least had been publicly empowered by the 1947 National Security Act, even though it contained a “loophole” through which CIA launched covert operations in a way Congress had “not intended.”48 In June 1948 the National Security Council secretly launched OPC, without any congressional authorization at all.49

The decision to create OPC was “based on what was seen as a CIA success in Italy,” the election of a Christian Democratic government in April despite widespread fears of a Communist electoral victory.50 Key to this success was the rapid supply of millions of dollars to the non-Communist parties, another decision that had its origins in New York. As journalists David Wise and Thomas B. Ross wrote: “[Defense Secretary] Forrestal felt that secret counteraction was vital, but his initial assessment was that the Italian operation would have to be private. The wealthy industrialists in Milan were hesitant to provide the money, fearing reprisals if the Communists won, and so the hat was passed at the Brook Club in New York. But Allen Dulles felt the problem could not be handled effectively in private hands. He urged strongly that the government establish a covert organization.”51

This episode is instructive. The defense secretary felt the operation should be a private undertaking, but a private Wall Street lawyer (from the political party that was not currently in power) determined that it should be carried out by the government. For years, we as common taxpayers have similarly unwittingly been taxed to pay for projects like those of the Brook Club and the wealthy industrialists in Milan. More important, a practice had been consolidated of subordinating public policy to overworld policy (as we shall see again in 1979, with respect to the shah of Iran).

Even more than CIA, OPC was a creation of the New York overworld. It was the work principally of four men associated with the Council on Foreign Relations: the career diplomat George Kennan and the three-man committee in 1948 chaired by CFR president Dulles.52 Dulles and his allies also arranged for the OPC chief to be Frank Wisner, another Wall Street lawyer who in 1947 had joined the State Department with the deliberately understated title “deputy assistant secretary for
occupied countries.” OPC set in motion at least three projects that acquired a life, culture, and momentum of their own. These projects—collectively and much later, long after the demise of OPC itself—contributed to the catastrophe of 9/11.

The first project was an arrangement for the creation and support of right-wing “stay-behind” groups in Europe to combat the risk of Communist takeover. This arrangement in Italy, known later as Operation Gladio, led in turn to a shadow system of parallel intelligence agencies, shielded from the overview of Italy’s public and more centrist government. These CIA-linked agencies developed a strategy of tension in which a series of lethal terrorist bombings, falsely presented as left-wing, were used to drive Italy further to the right. (The Piazza Fontana bombing of December 1969 killed sixteen people; the Bologna Station massacre of May 1983 killed eighty-five.)

Guido Giannettini, one of the Italian authors of this strategy of tension (and of the Piazza Fontana bombing eight years later), came to America in 1961 to lecture at the Naval War College on “Techniques and Possibilities of a Coup d’Etat in Europe.” In March 1962 the Joint Chiefs of Staff prepared their own documents developing Giannettini’s strategy. This was Operation Northwoods, which many books have cited as a “precedent” for “U.S. complicity in the attacks of 9/11.” As journalist James Bamford wrote of Northwoods: “The plan, which had been written with the approval of the Chairman and every member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, called for innocent people to be shot on American streets.”

In addition to this stay-behind project, OPC began a psychological warfare campaign to go beyond the State Department’s official policy of containing Communism, by mobilizing public opinion and covert resources for the destabilization of eastern Europe. OPC’s third project, which eventually had global consequences affecting both Afghanistan and al Qaeda, was to combat Communism by using assets supported by illegal drug trafficking.

**OPC, THE DRUG TRAFFIC, **
**AND GOVERNMENT OFF-THE-BOOKS ASSETS**

One of Wisner’s projects in 1950 was so-called Operation Paper, the U.S. government’s support for the remnants of the Nationalist Chinese KMT forces in Burma and Thailand. These forces worked off and on with OPC and CIA for more than a decade. Operation Paper’s assets were off
By restoring the global drug traffic out of Southeast Asia, the KMT proxy institutionalized what would become a CIA habit of turning to drug-supported, off-the-books assets for fighting wars—in Indochina and the South China Sea in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s; in Afghanistan, Mexico, and Central America in the 1980s; in Colombia in the 1990s; and again in Afghanistan in 2001. As I have written elsewhere, nearly all these wars were in defense of the overseas interests or aspirations of major U.S. oil companies.61

Because the use of drug-supported proxy armies was at odds with Washington’s official antidrug policies, the practice had to remain secret. This meant that major programs with long-term consequences were being initiated and administered by small cliques that were almost unknown in Washington. Operation Paper brought OPC into contact not only with drug traffickers abroad but also with organized crime at home. OPC officer Paul Helliwell was the key figure involved in creating an infrastructure in Thailand (SEA Supply Inc.) and a supporting airline (Civil Air Transport, later Air America). Helliwell’s infrastructure linked top CIA officials from the Wall Street overworld with leaders from the organized crime underworld. For example, he was the legal counsel for the small Miami National Bank used by gangster financier Meyer Lansky to launder his foreign profits.62

Operation Paper became a precedent for other, even larger operations where OPC (and later CIA) worked with criminals in off-the-books, self-financing operations. The OPC’s use of the KMT as a proxy for U.S. power was followed without interruption by similar programs, first in Thailand and Laos and later against Cuba.63 In 1996 veteran Senate staffer Jack Blum told the Senate Intelligence Committee that “a careful review of covert operations in the Caribbean and South and Central America shows a forty-year connection between crime and covert operations that has repeatedly blown back upon the United States.”64 Some of these drug-supported programs continued to receive direct overworld and/or CIA guidance. For example, the sponsor of CIA’s drug-financed Thai Paramilitary Police Unit (PARU) operation in Thailand and Laos was former Office of Special Services (OSS) director William Donovan, who in 1953 returned from private life as a Wall Street lawyer to serve as America’s ambassador to Thailand.65 Helliwell also worked after 1959 for CIA on anti-Castro projects; some of these Cuban recruits later became drug traffickers.66

Today’s vastly expanded global heroin traffic is largely the product of
CIA’s work with two different sets of proxy forces: the drug-supported KMT and PARU troops in Southeast Asia in the 1950s and 1960s, and the drug-supported Afghan networks in the 1980s. When OPC/CIA began to support the KMT troops in Burma in the 1950s, local opium production in the region was on the order of eighty tons a year. At the height of the Vietnam War, production reached a thousand tons in 1970, before declining at the war’s end. Later, as first Pakistan and then CIA started supporting guerrillas in Afghanistan after 1973, opium production in this region began to rise spectacularly. From a hundred tons in 1971, it reached eight hundred tons in 1979, the year of CIA intervention, and then two thousand tons by 1991. With the U.S. occupation in Afghanistan opium production, which the Taliban had nearly eliminated for the single year of 2001, reached a new high of five thousand six hundred tons in 2006.

The result of all of this is not just a worldwide drug scourge; the flow of drugs also supplies the socioeconomic infrastructure for the scattered terrorist groups collectively known as al Qaeda. Those who blame CIA for the rise of al Qaeda usually point to CIA’s supply of training and arms during the 1980s Afghan war. But U.S. operations in conjunction with jihadi drug armies after the end of that war have been perhaps even more responsible. In chapters 8 and 9, I show that U.S. toleration of and even alliance with al Qaeda–backed jihadi groups—notably in Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Bosnia, and Kosovo—have been in areas of major interest to U.S. oil companies.

In sum, OPC established the practice of using off-the-books forces, some of which broke domestic drug laws. This practice endured and has had lasting consequences, affecting even the catastrophic events of 9/11. Eventually, the more bureaucratic and hierarchical CIA raised objections to the practices of the freewheeling “Fifth Avenue Cowboys” in OPC, with particular respect to the KMT in Burma and Thailand. By 1952 scandals over the KMT drug trafficking, some possibly involving OPC officers, had become so offensive that CIA director Walter Bedell Smith abolished OPC altogether, merging its personnel with CIA’s own covert operations staff. But this merger, far from suppressing or even controlling the former “cowboys” of OPC, gave them a more permanent home inside CIA.

Since the events of 9/11, it is clear that America has begun to turn away radically from its own professed ideals of a democratically governed state in an open civil society. But from as early as the 1940s the public power of the public state has been increasingly overridden by the
covert power of elite and nonaccountable intelligence and security bureaucracies. Covert operations today represent a serious challenge to the Enlightenment hopes of the great liberal historian Lord Acton, that now “all information is within reach, and every problem . . . capable of solution.”  

The chronological record of events as reconstructed by archival historians from public records has become increasingly subverted by suppressed or deep history. We now have a chronology for which the public records are either nonexistent or have been falsified. The result is a serious challenge to the democratic hopes of the philosopher Jürgen Habermas for an expanding public sphere of rational discourse, protected against the intrusive policies of nongovernment groups.

THE REPUBLICANS AND ROLLBACK IN THE 1950S: A NEW RUTHLESSNESS

In 1953 America’s strategic objectives expanded from a containment of the Soviet Union to a rollback of it. An era of covert interventions in countries with large non-Communist populations (notably in France and Italy) was succeeded by an era of trying to eradicate Communist and other movements that had demonstrably high support (specifically in Indochina and Indonesia). A sign that the United States had assumed more expansive ambitions was its participation in the overthrow of the democratically elected premier Mohammed Mossadeq and his government in Iran in 1953. In doing so, the United States intervened to rescue the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, a British company that had the backing of the British and U.S. overworld but no significant popular support in Iran.

A year later the United States intervened in Guatemala against another elected leader, on behalf of United Fruit, which faced expropriation of its lands not under cultivation. Both of these interventions, in Iran and Guatemala, were initially advocated within the Council on Foreign Relations.

I call rollback’s expansion of U.S. intervention an overreach, not just on ethical grounds but because in these cases there was no lasting support for the operation from the local people. Both in Iran and Guatemala the pro-U.S. dictatorships established could only maintain themselves by brutal repressive tactics that eventually led to their overthrow. In the case of Iran it seems inevitable in retrospect that finally, in 1979, this overreach would be annulled by the victory of anti-American
ayatollahs who are among America’s chief problems today. The first postwar political victory of Islamist extremism, can be attributed in part to CIA expansive overreach in 1953.

In a more general way the expansions of rollback contributed to the militarization of U.S. foreign policy and specifically to the type of U.S. military interventions, common in Central America a century ago, that Franklin Roosevelt appeared to have renounced with his “Good Neighbor” policy. After World War II rollback was supported inside the United States by a number of sources—from ethnic groups appalled by Roosevelt’s acceptance at the 1945 Yalta Conference of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe, to the lavish funds of T. V. Soong and the China lobby, seeking to prevent U.S. recognition of the People’s Republic of China. There were elite pressures as well, from people like William Donovan, Henry Luce of the Time-Life empire, and the former Trotskyite James Burnham, who was taken up both by Luce and OPC.79

Official National Security Council doctrine for the Cold War was set down in the 1950 document NSC-68, drafted by Forrestal’s longtime protégé Paul Nitze. NSC-68 assumed that conflict with the “inescapably militant” Kremlin was inevitable, U.S. policy must be “to check and to roll back the Kremlin’s drive for world domination.”80 The document’s paranoid exaggeration of Soviet strength and American weakness would be repeated: in the Gaither Report of 1957 (also drafted by Nitze), which became the basis of false fears about a “missile gap,” and (as I discuss later) in the 1970s anti-Soviet campaign mounted by the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), in which Nitze was again prominent.81

Thanks largely to the Korean War, the U.S. annual military budget, which was at $14.5 billion in 1950, more than tripled by 1953 to $49.6 billion. It would remain over $40 billion throughout the 1950s.82 Soon what Eisenhower would label the “military-industrial complex” was asserting itself through new lobbying groups, notably the American Security Council (ASC), founded in 1955. The ASC united old-wealth oil and military corporations with new-wealth businesses in the South and the West, some of which incorporated investments from organized crime.83

As the goal of rollback became more ambitious and overreaching, U.S. foreign policy became more ruthless. OPC/CIA proclivity for so-called dirty tricks was sanctioned by the report of a special committee chaired by Lieutenant General James Doolittle, a friend of the CIA’s covert operations chief Frank Wisner.84 The whole of American foreign policy now reached for more costly and difficult goals. The most egregious example was the U.S. engagement in Indochina after 1959, urged
by oil interests through the Council on Foreign Relations and by the military-industrial complex through the American Security Council.\textsuperscript{85}

The deep state’s expansion abroad was matched domestically. CIA developed covert relationships “with about 50 American journalists or employees of U.S. media organizations.”\textsuperscript{86} According to one CIA operative: “You could get a journalist cheaper than a good call girl, for a couple hundred dollars a month.”\textsuperscript{87} The agency arranged for the publication of books to be read in America, and for at least one of these works to be reviewed favorably in the \textit{New York Times}.\textsuperscript{88} CIA also developed covert relationships with “several hundred American academics” on U.S. campuses.\textsuperscript{89}

Violent U.S.-supported overthrows of democratically elected leaders in the 1960s—such as those in Brazil, Ghana, and Indonesia—were followed by a radical increase of overseas U.S. direct and indirect investment in these same countries, particularly in fossil fuels. This was reflected in changes in the American overworld (now less dominated by the Europe-oriented Council on Foreign Relations) and in the deep state. The CFR became more and more allied with the traditionally powerful petroleum lobby, once primarily domestic but now increasingly global in its concerns.\textsuperscript{90} Especially before the withdrawal after 1967 of the British Navy from the Indian Ocean, U.S. strategy in the Middle East was dominated by CIA and international oil players, rather than by the Pentagon. Their policies were in the main pro-Arab and above all pro-Saudi, with the oil companies acquiescing in and even subsidizing the Saudi policy of expanding the influence of its extremist and anti-Western Wahhabi sect throughout the Muslim world.

The oil industry is the largest, richest, and most powerful in the world. But the power in Washington of the pro-Arab oil lobby (which journalist Ovid Demaris once characterized as “in itself a subgovernment, with roots planted deep in the soil of the real government”) was increasingly matched by the legislative lobbying of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC).\textsuperscript{91} Today, U.S. policies on the Middle East, particularly with respect to Iraq and Iran, reflect a consensus of the expansionist agendas of both lobbies.

\textbf{FROM ROLLBACK TO GLOBALIZATION AND FULL-SPECTRUM DOMINANCE}

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the term “rollback” has also become a historical memory. But the forces that worked for it are very much
alive in contemporary America foreign policy and characterize both sides of the two main global strategies—civilian and military—dominating it. This overarching policy has been characterized by scholar Richard Falk and others as a “global domination project.” U.S. foreign policy specialist Andrew Bacevich has described it as a “strategy of openness,” with a dual emphasis on “free trade and investment” complemented by “a belief in the necessity of American hegemony.”

The civilian strategy is for what I call top-down globalization—government-enforced market fundamentalism, or global economic integration on American terms, which include the opening of foreign markets to U.S. investment.

The military strategy is for full-spectrum dominance of the globe. “Full-spectrum dominance” was the key term in Joint Vision 2020, the U.S. Department of Defense blueprint for the future, endorsed on May 30, 2000, by General John M. Shalikashvili, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The term was taken from U.S. Space Command’s Vision for 2020 in 1998, which spoke of USSPACECOM as “dominating the space dimension of military operations to protect U.S. interests and investment.” The same sense of mission as protecting investment can be seen in an article from the Foreign Military Studies Office of Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, which was published three months before the 2001 World Trade Center attacks: “The Caspian Sea appears to be sitting on yet another sea—a sea of hydrocarbons. . . . The presence of these oil reserves and the possibility of their export raises [sic] new strategic concerns for the United States and other Western industrial powers. As oil companies build oil pipelines from the Caucasus and Central Asia to supply Japan and the West, these strategic concerns gain military implications.”

U.S. oil companies had worked actively to ensure this military interest. Since 1995, they had been united in a private foreign oil companies group to lobby in Washington for an active U.S. policy to promote their interests in the Caspian basin. Their meeting with NSC energy expert Sheila Heslin in the summer of 1995 was followed shortly by the creation of an interagency governmental committee to formulate U.S. policy toward the Caspian. Heslin told Congress in 1997 that U.S. policy in Central Asia was “to in essence break Russia’s monopoly control over the transportation of oil [and gas] from that region, and frankly, to promote Western energy security through diversification of supply.” A former CIA officer later complained about Heslin’s subservience to the oil lobby in the Clinton administration. That oil company influence did not diminish with the election, financed in large part by oil companies, of
President George W. Bush (formerly a Saudi-financed oilman) and Vice President Dick Cheney (formerly CEO of Halliburton and board member of the U.S.-Azerbaijan Chamber of Commerce).

The disastrous policy failure of the Vietnam War saw the first serious dissatisfaction expressed, by both the left and the right, with the role of America’s foreign policy establishment in creating that war. The publication of such books as Noam Chomsky’s *American Power and the New Mandarins*, Richard J. Barnet’s *The Roots of War*, and David Halberstam’s *The Best and the Brightest* supplied serious critiques of the roles played by men like national security adviser McGeorge Bundy, whom the mainstream media had previously treated as icons. The war produced unprecedented unrest and violence in the United States. In 1967 and 1968 this violence led to the creation of a special army directorate with plans to coordinate with local police in surveillance and control of left-wing protesters. This led to de facto use of right-wing gangs in surveillance and control, one of many factors that signaled a shift of the country to the right.

Nixon inherited these programs, but he also augmented them. Later I discuss how one vastly expanded army plan, known as Garden Plot, continued to proliferate after Nixon’s fall from office. Garden Plot is the direct ancestor of the planning for continuity of government, which I see as contributing to the catastrophic events of 9/11. In the Nixon era the multilateralist policies of the once-dominant Council on Foreign Relations came to yield place to the unilateralist and neocon policies of the once-marginal American Enterprise Institute. A key moment was the split in the CFR establishment after 1968, dividing the “traders” (those who were concerned for international economic order) from the “Prussians” or “warriors” (those who were concerned for preserving U.S. predominance over the Soviet Union). This last group included the first neocons.

Let’s look in particular at what neocon founder Irving Kristol called the right wing’s “intellectual counterrevolution” in the late 1960s and early 1970s. This counterrevolution arose from the fear, approaching panic, at the spread of chaos, violence, and revolutionary rhetoric in the United States during this period. Author and editor Lewis Lapham recalled the grave anxiety with which the overworld watched America coming apart: “I remembered my own encounter with the fear and trembling of what was still known as ‘The Establishment,’ . . . at the July encampment of San Francisco’s Bohemian Club. . . . In the summer of
1968, the misgivings were indistinguishable from panic. . . . [The] country’s institutional infrastructure, also its laws, customs . . . seemed to be collapsing into anarchy and chaos—black people rioting in the streets of Los Angeles and Detroit, American soldiers killing their officers in Vietnam.”

Future Supreme Court Justice Lewis Powell, in a 1971 confidential memorandum for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, warned that survival of the free enterprise system lay “in organization, in careful long-range planning and implementation, in consistency of action over an indefinite period of years, in the scale of financing available only through joint effort, and in the political power available only through united action and national organizations.” Soon, funding for this right-wing ideological offensive was being provided “by a small sewing circle of rich philanthropists—Richard Mellon Scaife in Pittsburgh, Lynde and Harry Bradley in Milwaukee, John Olin in New York City, the Smith Richardson family in North Carolina, Joseph Coors in Denver, [and] David and Charles Koch in Wichita.” With support from these foundations America saw a spate of new and well-funded right-wing organizations, such as the Scaife-backed Moral Majority and the interlocking Coors-backed Council for National Policy (once called by ABC News “the most powerful conservative group you’ve never heard of”).

The stage was set for what political commentator Kevin Phillips and others have called the “greed decade” of the 1980s, when “the portion of the nation’s wealth held by the top 1 percent nearly doubled, skyrocketing from 22 percent to 39 percent, probably the most rapid escalation in U.S. history.” With the spreading gap between rich and poor, the ideal of a public state in which all classes participated was further weakened by the reality of a deep state or security state in which, more than ever before, a few manipulated the many. This was facilitated by a parallel development in the media, with the emergence of new press barons like Rupert Murdoch and Conrad Black. As journalist David Brock wrote: “In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Keith Rupert Murdoch [the prime example] went on a buying spree in the United States, purchasing papers in San Antonio, New York City, Boston, and Chicago. American journalism was never the same.”

In addition, the Reagan administration instituted its own Office of Public Diplomacy in the State Department, staffed by “perception management” experts from CIA and Special Forces, to plant anti-Communist propaganda in the American press. As a result of these trends, the old
media—the mainstream press and television—became less and less likely to present critical perspectives on controversial government policies.

“A NEW PEARL HARBOR”

Once in power, Ronald Reagan, his CIA director William Casey, and vice president George H. W. Bush initiated emergency planning, building from the Garden Plot plan, for what Alfonso Chardy of the Miami Herald called “suspension of the Constitution, turning control of the government over to FEMA [the Federal Emergency Management Agency], emergency appointment of military commanders to run state and local governments and declaration of martial law.”108 The plan also gave FEMA, which had been involved in drafting it, sweeping new powers, including the power “to surveil political dissenters and to arrange for the detention of hundreds of thousands of undocumented aliens in case of an unspecified national emergency.”109

What is most astonishing about this 1980s planning is that Congress was “completely bypassed.”110 Once again, as in the early days of OPC, private power allied with the extreme wealth of the overworld was imposing policies and structures by secret procedures that radically redirected the course of the public state. It was doing so at a constitutional level. COG—more properly characterized as change of government rather than continuity of government—was not seeking to influence or assist constitutional authority, but to control it, and if necessary, to override it. Questions about this program emerged briefly in the 1980s, particularly in the Iran-Contra hearings of July 1987 when Oliver North was asked (but did not get to answer) whether he had worked on “a contingency plan . . . that would suspend the American constitution.”111

Public alarm was alleviated by the false assurance that this referred to a proposed executive order from FEMA and that this had already been “effectively killed” by the attorney general William French Smith.112 In fact, FEMA planning continued up to the day of September 11, 2001, when COG was first implemented.113 Worse, however, there are indications that COG planning may have helped set the stage for 9/11 to happen. Two members of the ultra-secret private group drafting COG in the 1980s were Dick Cheney (then a congressman) and Donald Rumsfeld (then the CEO of G. D. Searle, a pharmaceutical company).114 In the fall of 2000, a year before 9/11, Cheney and Rumsfeld signed on to a major study, Rebuilding America’s Defenses, by the lobbying group Project for...
the New American Century (PNAC). The study called for a major increase in the defense budget, the removal of Saddam Hussein from Iraq, and the maintenance of U.S. troops in the Gulf area even after Saddam’s disappearance.

The PNAC study was a blueprint for the George W. Bush foreign policy that has been and still is being implemented. It also reflected support from the private sector for the blueprint of full-spectrum dominance that had been articulated in the Pentagon’s Joint Vision 2020. The similarity between the two blueprints was not coincidental. Joint Vision 2020 built on a draft known as Defense Planning Guidance written in 1992 for then Defense Secretary Cheney by future PNAC members Paul Wolfowitz, I. Lewis Libby, and Zalmay Khalilzad. Every critical study of 9/11 has noted the PNAC report’s frank assertion that the policy changes it advocated would be difficult to implement quickly, “absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event—like a new Pearl Harbor.”

Rumsfeld, in addition to being a PNAC member and a member of the COG secret team, endorsed the same idea as the chair of the so-called Rumsfeld Commission, which made proposals with regard to the projected multibillion-dollar project for the U.S. Space Command. This commission’s report, issued January 7, 2001, said with respect to attacks in space: “The question is whether the U.S. will be wise enough to act responsibly and soon enough to reduce U.S. space vulnerabilities. Or whether, as in the past, a disabling attack against the country and its people—a ‘Space Pearl Harbor’—will be the only event able to galvanize the nation and cause the U.S. government to act.”

From these various quotations we can see that the high-profile PNAC report was merely the public face of a consensus that had already emerged at a high level. Throughout the 1990s both the U.S. oil industry and the Pentagon had contributed to the consensus that America would need full-spectrum dominance to guarantee access to oil and other resources in the rest of the world. This program would require massive expenditures, perhaps as much as a trillion dollars, and this could not be expected from Congress—except in response to an attack as massive and frightening as Pearl Harbor. This leads us to recall that America’s entry into wars has frequently been triggered by disputed attacks, including the Tonkin Gulf incidents in Vietnam. With respect to the events of 9/11 it is clear that the administration’s settled goal of invading Iraq depended on the attack. What we have been witnessing, to quote the Oslo researcher Ola Tunander, is “the use of terrorism to construct world order.”
Almost two centuries ago the French statesman Alexis de Tocqueville wrote of America’s “great democratic revolution” as being irresistible “because it is the most uniform, the most ancient, and the most permanent tendency that is to be found in history.” The political developments of the past few years have led many Americans to fear that proponents of top-down power have at last found the means to frustrate that tendency. In this book’s concluding chapter, I suggest ways to give renewed strength to what I call the prevailable will of the people—that potential for solidarity that, instead of being checked by top-down repression, can actually be awakened and reinforced by it. Whether the United States can again be counted among the forces working for democratic revolution may well depend on the future of the Internet, and whether the new media, profiting from the increasing limitations of the old media, can help create the public arena for a more democratic society.