

Introduction

CORPORATIZED DEVELOPMENT

“It has been called the ultimate emerging market: women,” explained Margaret Brennan, a young white reporter for Bloomberg Television’s *InBusiness*, while standing in front of the American flag on the floor of the New York Stock Exchange.¹ She continued, “A recent announcement by Booz & Co.,” the global strategy consulting firm,² “found that about 860 million women are not prepared to take part in the world economy because they lack education, training, access, and finance. Enter the Third Billion.” This was February 1, 2012, the day that the Third Billion Campaign was officially launched. I watched the announcement on my laptop from where I was living in San Francisco, California. The campaign was created by “an alliance of corporations, including Coca-Cola, Ernst & Young, Accenture, and Standard Chartered” that was “working with the World Bank and others to invest in these women.” A video of women in headscarves walking on a sidewalk played on the screen as the headline “Niche for Global Growth: Women” flashed below.

Brennan then welcomed Beth Brooke, vice chair of Ernst & Young and “one of the world’s one hundred most powerful women according to *Forbes* magazine,” to the show.

“So tell me, what is this initiative about?” asked Brennan. Brooke, a middle-aged white woman, explained, “The Third Billion Campaign is really focused on just what you mentioned, which is within the next decade, the impact on the global economy of women coming into the workforce, as consumers, as entrepreneurs, as employees, will have an impact as great as China’s billion population or India’s billion population, which is why we use the term ‘the Third Billion.’ It’s that big of an impact.” Brennan sought clarification: “And so, as you have the population growing, it’s the participation, and how they participate, that’s the issue. Right?”

Brooke responded, “They’ve got to be prepared to participate, which means be educated, have access to technology, access to capital, access to finance. They’ve got to be prepared, and they’ve got to be empowered. There are cultural barriers and things like that, but when prepared and enabled as Booz & Co. reports, there could be the force of one billion additional individuals, who are going to be women, coming into the global economy. And what country and what company right now wouldn’t kill for that kind of economic growth?”

Later in the interview, Brennan asked Brooke if there was an existing model that the campaign was using to develop and implement its initiatives. Brooke explained that there was not one clear model. Instead, “Each of us, Ernst & Young in the private sector, countries, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), everyone can do what they do best. We do a lot around women, for talent, for women entrepreneurs, but we can only do what we do best. Then it takes others who are involved in the Third Billion Campaign. Goldman Sachs, doing what they do. It takes Walmart. Gonna do what they do. Coca-Cola. It takes governments. It takes NGOs. All of us in the Third Billion Campaign are actually coming together to say, if we are aware of each other’s efforts, we can collaborate for a collective impact.”

I began this introduction with the Third Billion Campaign to provide entrée to the following questions: How and why have these girls’ and women’s lives and futures become so deeply intertwined with corporations’ aspirations in the new millennium? And, more specifically, how has gender equality, particularly in the areas of education, training, and finance, come to be considered a necessary condition for economic growth and, correspondingly, for corporate profit?

This book examines how corporate investment in poor, racialized girls and women in the Global South functions to circumvent a fundamental contradiction inherent in the relationships between US corporations and these girls and women—powerful corporations are often exacerbating inequalities and vulnerabilities for this same population through their business practices even as they claim to be “doing good.”

THE THIRD BILLION

As DeAnne Aguirre and Karim Sabbagh of Booz & Co. originally argued, “If China and India each represent one billion emerging participants in the global marketplace, then this ‘third billion’ is made of women, in both developing and industrialized nations, whose economic lives have previously been stunted, underleveraged, or suppressed.”³ They created the composite figure by using estimates from the International Labour Organization (ILO) of women ages twenty to sixty-five who are considered “not prepared (lacking sufficient education) and not enabled (lacking support from families and communities)” to participate in the global economy.⁴ According to their estimated figures, approximately 882 million of these women are located in “emerging” or “developing” nations, while approximately forty-seven million live in North America, Western Europe, and Japan. According to their prediction, as “constraints are alleviated, the Third Billion’s movement into the middle class will accelerate.”⁵ Their potential power in the global economy is considered “akin to stumbling upon a relatively untapped emerging market.”⁶

The Third Billion Campaign’s coalition was comprised of representatives of powerful institutions, including corporations, NGOs, academic institutions, multilateral and bilateral agencies, and global forums.⁷ It originally developed out of an October 2009 gathering at New York University’s Villa La Pietra in New York City convened by the university and Vital Voices Global Partnership, with funding from the Paul E. Singer Family Foundation, in honor of the fifteenth anniversary of the United Nation’s Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, China. The group examined the state of women worldwide, changes made since Beijing, and the present-day “obstacles to women’s empowerment and challenges to gender





Figure 1. View of the proliferation of transnational networks of corporatized development focused on girls and women.



equality.” The following year, the group held a second meeting in Florence, Italy, to form the coalition. The coalition’s mission is to create an “economic case for women’s empowerment and gender equality” by developing messaging and initiatives that “tap women’s potential as critical resources, thus leading to stronger economic growth for nations, communities, and businesses around the world.”⁸ Its agenda focuses on four primary areas, including access to finance, education, and training; entrepreneurship; labor policy and practice; and legal and social status.⁹ This agenda forms the basis of the coalition’s bottom-billion strategy to invest in girls and women. It has resulted in corporate practices and policies targeting girls and women in order to end poverty and create conditions for economic growth.

Since its launch, the coalition has done relatively little. The campaign itself has fizzled away, and even the website is no longer functional. Yet, the discourse of the Third Billion has become more entrenched than ever as individual corporate members deepen and strengthen their commitment in this area. In many cases, they have continued their participation in other initiatives, such as the World Bank’s Global Private Sector Leaders Forum (PSLF), and joined campaigns in different geographies.

Take, for instance, O Movimento Mulher 360, which translates as the Women 360 Movement. Originally launched by Walmart Brasil, the initiative promotes “a 360-degree view of women’s economic empowerment” in corporate environments, communities, and supply chains.¹⁰ In September 2015, the initiative became an independent nonprofit association, bringing together Brazilian companies, including Bombril, Grupo Boticário, Duratex, GPA, Itaú, and Natura, with US and other international companies with subsidiaries or offices in Brazil, including Cargill, Coca-Cola, DelRio, Johnson & Johnson, Nestlé, Pepsico, Santander, and Unilever, to reap the purported benefits of investing in girls and women.¹¹

THE BUSINESS CASE FOR INVESTING IN GIRLS AND WOMEN

As corporations search for new frontiers of capitalist growth in the context of ongoing economic crises, they have increasingly made a “business case” for investing in poor girls and women in the Global South as an investment

with a high rate of return.¹² As Angel Gurria, secretary-general of the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), explains, this population is the “most underutilized asset in the global economy.”¹³ By emphasizing how “the potential of women as economic players has been unrealized,”¹⁴ corporations, such as, but not limited to, the members of the Third Billion Campaign, are promoting large-scale investment in particular girls and women to end poverty and promote development and economic growth.

Some of the corporations making themselves known in this area include Becton Dickinson; Booz & Co.; Chevron; Cisco Systems; Coca-Cola; Ernst & Young; ExxonMobil; Gap, Inc.; General Electric; Goldman Sachs; Gucci; Intel Corporation; J.P. Morgan Chase; Johnson & Johnson; Microsoft Corporation; Nike, Inc.; Stella Artois; Standard Chartered Bank; Starbucks Corporation; and Walmart; among others. Their corporate initiatives are typically directed by the corporation itself, often through a corporate social responsibility (CSR) department, or through an established foundation [501(c)(3)] that functions as its philanthropic arm. Philanthropy and CSR are increasingly streamlined within corporations’ core business strategies. The initiatives occur through a range of partnerships with development organizations, including international NGOs, bilateral and multilateral agencies, and universities. For instance, Gap, Inc.’s Personal Achievement and Career Enhancement (PACE)¹⁵ program that targets women in its contract factories through local NGOs; Goldman Sachs’ 10,000 Women¹⁶ program that partners with local institutions including technical and business schools to offer a variety of training opportunities for women. These programs typically occur through partnerships with traditional development organizations, including international NGOs and bilateral and multilateral agencies, as in the case of Nike, Inc.’s investment in the Girl Effect. As the book’s examination of the Girl Effect reveals, corporations are also making new partnerships with venture capitalists, whose access to capital and markets enable previously limited interventions to achieve scale.

Corporate investment in girls and women is predicated on four interrelated discourses: bottom billion capitalism, philanthrocapitalism, gender equality, and Third World difference. The first, “bottom billion capitalism,” is the economic theory and practice promoted by those interested in mining

the fortunes of what C.K. Prahalad identifies as the “bottom of the pyramid.”¹⁷ Prahalad’s idea refers to the bottom billion poorest people in the world living in conditions of poverty and marginally positioned vis-à-vis capital markets.¹⁸ Investment in this economic stratum is intended to simultaneously generate economic profit for investors and benefit the poor. As Prahalad and Stuart Hart explain, “Low-income markets represent a prodigious opportunity for the world’s wealthiest companies to seek their fortunes and to bring prosperity to the aspiring poor.”¹⁹ This rationalization results in what Ananya Roy calls, “the ethicalization of market rule.”²⁰

As scholars note, bottom of the pyramid ventures driven by the ideology of bottom billion capitalism are often gendered in nature as they seek to harness girls and women as consumers as well as last-mile distribution entrepreneurs or retailers who can supposedly circumvent common barriers to accessing those markets, such as limited infrastructure, consumer dispersal, and product awareness.²¹ Girls and women are frequently targeted for gendered products, particularly those that promote the aspirational ideals of class mobility, racialized beauty, and professional status.²²

For example, Avon Corporation is anchored in a gendered bottom of the pyramid model. Across the world, the company’s direct sales model relies on its representatives, the majority of whom are women, to buy the cosmetic products for themselves, and sell and recruit other women to join the network of sellers and buyers. The company boasts to have been the first corporation to empower women by providing flexible out-of-home employment opportunities as early as 1886 when it was founded in the United States. Sales representatives pay an introductory fee, varying by country, to join the sales team, order merchandise, and earn the profit that they make off the merchandise.²³ However, as Linda Scott et al. found in their study in South Africa, the women in the Avon network gained some economic and social emancipation from their earnings, but those gains were set against systems of structural violence that continued to threaten their lives and well-being.²⁴

Second, the Third Billion concept is also related to the discourse of philanthrocapitalism, the philanthropic practice predicated on the notion of investment.²⁵ Philanthrocapitalists imagine themselves to be social investors who invest their money to maximize social and economic returns. The returns are defined in social, cultural, political, and economic

terms. The corporate focus on poor girls and women is similarly infused with the language of, and the desire for, returns. The high rate of returns—real or imagined—is precisely why corporations target this population. Philanthrocapitalists couple the focus on returns with the employment of market-based strategies and an insistence on measurable, often quantifiable, results.

These proponents claim their approach to philanthropy is new; yet, as Linsey McGoey argues, philanthrocapitalism is historically rooted in liberal political-economic thought, dating back to the eighteenth century, based on the idea that markets are the most efficient mechanism for distributing socioeconomic well-being and, thus, for contributing to the common good.²⁶ Moreover, it uses the early twentieth century strategies of John D. Rockefeller and Andrew Carnegie, among others, which promote the use of business strategies to solve social problems,²⁷ and builds upon the practice developed in the mid-nineteenth century of applying rational scientific investigation to human welfare to ensure measured results and accountability.²⁸

Beyond the desire to contribute to a particular form of social and economic well-being, philanthrocapitalists are also forthright regarding their own self-interests. There is profit to be made in pursuing the social good. Thus, as a practice, philanthrocapitalism rests comfortably upon a foundation of inequality. Philanthrocapitalists acknowledge capitalism's production of inequalities even as they simultaneously seek to capitalize upon the system's production of wealth to ameliorate the social and economic disparities produced by the system itself, and to produce greater wealth for those who can invest.²⁹ Their efforts thus obscure the fact that the surplus capital they reinvest in poor, racialized girls and women is often produced on their very backs, thus leaving intact durable, deeply entrenched inequalities across multiple relations of difference.³⁰

In this way, the philanthrocapitalism of companies such as Gap, Inc., and Walmart is intimately related to the inequalities their corporate practices create, exacerbate, and/or reproduce in girls' and women's lives. For example, both companies are the ongoing targets of campaigns fighting for safe, non-discriminatory working conditions and a living wage throughout their global supply chains.³¹ While both companies target girls and women through their discrete philanthrocapitalist strategies,

neither corporation has transformed its core business practices to adequately address the concerns of its majority female labor force and, thus, ensure the long-term health and economic well-being of girls and women.

Third, corporations have taken up the liberal feminist discourse of gender equality³² through the “business case” for investing in girls and women.³³ They have usurped feminist aspirations of liberating girls and women from the constraints of patriarchy for their goals of market growth and profit maximization.³⁴ As Isobel Coleman, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, argued during the days prior to her participation as co-chair of the Empowering Women and Girls track at the 2010 Clinton Global Initiative annual meeting, an event that I participated in for my research: “As companies seek new sources of revenue in developing economies, they will find that gender disparities pose an obstacle. The sooner and harder the private sector works to overcome gender inequality, the better off the world—and companies’ own bottom lines—will be.”³⁵

Feminist scholars of political economy have developed powerful historical and theoretical analyses of how feminist language and desires for liberation have been reframed within market logics. In this way, the market becomes the guarantor of equality as “the dream of women’s emancipation is harnessed to the engine of capitalist accumulation.”³⁶ In employing the feminist idea of empowering women to create the developmental conditions necessary for future corporate profit, as Hester Eisenstein argues more broadly, “women replace development”³⁷ as the most efficient and effective solution to generating economic growth. The World Bank’s tagline for its Gender Action Plan (GAP), “Gender equality is smart economics,” perfectly sums up this approach. Divorced from its origins in the feminist movement, this economic discourse on gender equality becomes “an uncanny double that [the feminist movement] can neither simply embrace nor wholly disavow.”³⁸ As documented by Lucy Ferguson and Daniella Morena Alarcón, this creates conflicts for progressive, transnational feminist organizations, such as the Association of Women in International Development (AWID) and women’s funds associated with the Prospera-International Network of Women’s Funds (INWF) (as well as individuals operating within mainstream development organizations), that have long critiqued corporate capitalism for its violence and marginalization of girls, women, and the

poor, yet are in need of funds to support their under-resourced movement toward gender equity.³⁹

Underlying this liberal feminist discourse is the assumption that gender oppression is what defines the lives, conditions, and futures of girls and women in the Global South and stands as the barrier to economic growth and corporate profit. This supposition informs the field of “gender and development” as a field of policy and practice that has grown over the past four decades, and its resulting efforts of gender mainstreaming across institutions in the development regime. Yet, even when the term gender is deployed, in practice it is often used as a “descriptive device,”⁴⁰ or, more specifically, as a way of targeting girls and women as population categories rather than attending to gender as a relation of power.⁴¹ As João, an NGO staff member in Brazil, remarked to me regarding the Girl Effect’s focus: “It’s not gender, it’s adolescent girls.”

To note, all names in the study are pseudonyms to protect the anonymity of the individuals unless the first name and last name are listed. Also, since there were very few people of color employed in the organizations I studied, including the NGOs, Nike Foundation, and the Clinton Global Initiative, I do not note the race, ethnicity, or skin color of individuals in my study as this could potentially make them identifiable. I recognize the limitations this places on the analysis.

Yet, the Third Billion is not actually about girls and women as universalized population categories of gender as the liberal feminist discourse on gender equality imagines. Rather, the concept of the Third Billion is also premised on the discourse around “Third World girls” and “Third World women”⁴² that has constructed them as Other within the projects of colonization, global capitalism, and Western feminisms. The term Third World is used here as a sociopolitical concept that does not necessarily map onto geographies of the North and South but rather considers the ways in which centuries of (post)colonial histories and imaginations have shaped understandings of racialized girls and women, as well as places and ways of being that exist within, between, and outside of nation-state boundaries.

Of particular relevance for understanding this is Chandra Talpade Mohanty’s critique of how Western feminist texts in international development, in particular, have historically constructed the Third World

woman as a singular, monolithic subject.⁴³ Her work builds on the premise by Western and non-Western feminists of color that gender is necessary though not sufficient for understanding and theorizing the identities, experiences, conditions, and power relations informing lives lived across multiple social, cultural, economic, political, religious, and geographic locations.⁴⁴ In relying solely on the concept of “woman” as their central analytical category, and gender as the “single axis” around which difference is understood, hegemonic Western and Anglo-American feminisms often reduce and/or mask how difference operates in relation to and within gender categories.⁴⁵ As Trinh Minh-ha argues, “Yearning for universality, the generic ‘woman,’ like its counterpart, the generic ‘man,’ tends to efface difference within itself.”⁴⁶

While the oppressed woman is generated by an exclusive focus on gender difference, Mohanty’s work contributes to understanding how the oppressed Third World woman is imagined to have an additional attribute: “Third World difference.”⁴⁷ She defines it as “that stable, ahistorical something that apparently oppresses most if not all the women in these countries.”⁴⁸ Through this homogenizing application of difference, she argues that the texts she analyzes “discursively colonize the material and historical heterogeneities of the lives of women in the Third World.”⁴⁹

The Third World difference that defines the subject position of Third World girl in this historical moment constructs her as both oppressed and full of what I identified previously as Third World potential.⁵⁰ She occupies a precarious subject position in which she is simultaneously a universalized victim in need of saving and “the answer” to solving the problems of development and growth.⁵¹ Here the act of empowering her to fulfill her potential for development becomes an act of saving her. It is the potential productivity of this contradiction that corporate elites and development experts have embraced, as this book’s analysis of Nike, Inc.’s investments in the Girl Effect in Brazil and in partnership with other institutions reveals.

THE GIRL EFFECT

Beginning in the early 1990s, Nike, Inc. emerged as the global target of the anti-sweatshop and anti-globalization movements.⁵² Transnational

criticism focused on the corporation's well-documented abusive practices against its predominantly young, uneducated, poor, racialized female labor force in the Global South. In its 2005–2006 Corporate Responsibility Report, Nike, Inc. estimated that “80 percent of [their] workers are women aged 18 to 24,” and “they are typically poorly educated, living against a precarious backdrop of poverty and insecurity, within emerging economies.”⁵³

The company which originally began in 1964 as a partnership between Japanese shoe manufacturer Onitsuka and Blue Ribbon Sports to distribute Onitsuka shoes, began manufacturing its own shoes in 1971. It became the Nike brand in 1978. In the years preceding, the company shifted its production from Japan to South Korea as Japanese wages increased, making it less profitable than other locations in Asia with lower wages. In the ongoing race to the bottom that characterizes the global manufacturing industry, the company moved much of its production to Taiwan in the 1980s, and then to Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam in the 1990s. Nike, Inc.'s role in pioneering outsourcing led to skyrocketing growth as it secured its place as the largest manufacturer of athletic shoes and apparel in the global economy. Yet, the corporation fell victim to its own success, as the same practices that contributed to its impressive growth rate also led anti-sweatshop campaigns to bring to light the abusive labor conditions in its contract factories.⁵⁴

Responding to tarnishing accusations, including media exposés on child labor, co-founder and then CEO Phil H. Knight publicly stated at the National Press Club in Washington, DC, in May 1998, that “Nike product has become synonymous with slave wages, forced overtime, and arbitrary abuse.”⁵⁵ Yet, despite Knight's promise in 1998 to transform the corporation's practices, accusations of abusive labor problems have persisted in its contract factories, as reflected in well-publicized worker strikes.⁵⁶ Nevertheless, since this moment of crisis, the corporation has focused on remaking itself as socially responsible.

This led to a strategic search for an undiscovered niche in the development market. Knight said he “tapped” Maria Eitel, a white woman, “to create a not-for-profit arm—but had not dictated a mission.”⁵⁷ A trained communications specialist, Eitel was originally hired by the corporation as its first vice president of corporate responsibility (1998–2004) to





Figure 2. Timeline of Nike, Inc. and Nike Foundation history and public response. For sources to timeline, see p. 210.



ameliorate its public relations image during the late 1990s. She was formerly deputy director of media affairs at the White House, then a special assistant to President George H.W. Bush, a manager and director of Microsoft Corporation, and a manager of MCI Communications Corporation. As described in *Fast Company* magazine, “Eitel was in the midst of a yearlong exploration to determine how to make the biggest impact.”⁵⁸ She consulted with a wide range of development experts, including a number of my interviewees in the areas of formal education, reproductive health, and economic development, as well as “villagers, NGO leaders, and industry titans” before determining that Nike, Inc. should focus on adolescent girls.⁵⁹ *Fast Company* recounted Eitel’s pitch to the Nike, Inc. board of trustees:

She remembers the gremlin that whispered in her ear as she nervously waited outside the 2004 meeting where she was to make her case: *Hey, Nike! Let’s invest in adolescent girls and poverty! And not in any country where we have factories or businesses! Let’s go to places like Ethiopia and northern Nigeria, where no one else dares to go!* After a perilous few moments of silence, Knight gave her the thumbs-up, the flick that ignited an essential part of a movement.⁶⁰

Beginning in that moment, Nike, Inc. worked to position itself as leading the effort to end poverty in the Global South through the foundation’s investments in adolescent girls. As described in the company’s press release in 2005:

“The Nike Foundation is a further step in Nike’s evolution as an engaged global corporate citizen,” said Philip H. Knight, founder and chairman of NIKE, Inc. “Its philanthropic focus on poverty and gender inequality allows us to further invest in human capital not just where we do business, but where there is the greatest need. We believe the Foundation’s investments in human capital will spark a positive cycle of development and complements NIKE, Inc.’s efforts around improvements in our fundamental business practices.”⁶¹

The foundation’s focus on adolescent girls was a noncontroversial way to redirect public attention away from ongoing labor strikes and campaigns against the corporation in order to secure its social license to operate and, correspondingly, its financial bottom line.

While the corporation's original intent was not to locate its philanthropic efforts in countries where its business is located, it included Brazil, India, and China in its portfolio from the beginning. These powerful economies, commonly referred to as three of the five BRICS countries, constitute both significant, consistent areas of consumer growth outside of the United States and locations with high numbers of contract factories.⁶² They are not, however, countries where the corporation has typically experienced labor unrest. Those countries tend to be geographically situated in Southeast Asia and Central America, including Indonesia, Cambodia, and Honduras,⁶³ and tend to have the lowest wages and least regulations in the world, as well as governments that suppress labor protests. The Nike Foundation has had relatively few grantees in these regions, with the exception of Bangladesh where it funded Grameen Bank and BRAC, formerly known as the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee. The majority of Nike Foundation's grantees have been located in or focused their programs on the African continent throughout all of the phases of the Nike Foundation's development, including countries such as Kenya, Liberia, and Rwanda, where Nike, Inc. neither has contract factories nor significant consumer markets. Nevertheless, the company's interest in the continent has grown over time. As of August 2017, the company has one contract factory in South Africa and three in Egypt.⁶⁴

In 2008, the foundation branded its philanthropic investment strategy by launching the Girl Effect with the United Nations Foundation and the NoVo Foundation, the family foundation of Peter and Jennifer Buffett. Peter is the son of financier Warren Buffett whose investments provided the financial basis for the NoVo Foundation's contribution of \$72,700,00 to the Nike Foundation between 2007 and 2013 (see Table 1). During the duration of Nike Foundation's focus on adolescent girls, between 2005 and 2015, Nike, Inc. contributed \$94,464,911 to the Nike Foundation, and \$6,903,850 in 2004, the year the foundation prepared to launch its new focus (see Table 1). In total, between 2005 and 2015, the Nike Foundation received \$191,219,834 in contributions and dispersed \$145,594,118 in contributions, gifts, and grants (see Table 1).

The Girl Effect as a branded theory and method of social change was developed through a collaboration between the Nike Foundation's in-house creative team and Nike, Inc.'s long-time Portland-based advertising firm

Table 1 Nike Inc. Revenue and Nike Foundation Asset Value, Contributions, and Disbursements for Charitable Purposes (\$US), 2001–2015.

	<i>2001</i>	<i>2002</i>	<i>2003</i>	<i>2004</i>	<i>2005</i>	<i>2006</i>	<i>2007</i>
Nike Inc. annual revenue¹	9,490,000,000	9,890,000,000	10,700,000,000	12,250,000,000	13,740,000,000	14,955,000,000	16,326,000,000
Nike Foundation fair market value of all assets²	1,075,306	799,016	21,556,463	24,369,952	17,971,919	14,506,024	21,932,305
Nike, Inc. contribution	2,785,237	1,173,332	19,204,428	6,903,850	10,875,000	0.00	12,262,000
NoVo Foundation contribution	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	15,000,000
DFID contribution	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
World Bank contribution	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Other contributions	110,443	7,933	5,922	1,783	12,290	7,138	5,227
Total contributions, gifts, and grants received	2,895,680	1,181,265	19,210,350	6,905,633	10,887,290	7,138	27,267,227
Operating and administrative expenses	55,024	95,125	136,873	610,718	946,656	416,443	1,366,328
Charitable disbursements paid	2,336,000	1,372,500	3,838,000	5,218,500	9,543,299	10,040,887	11,939,843
Total expenses and disbursements	2,391,024	1,467,625	3,974,873	5,829,218	10,489,955	10,457,330	13,306,171

1 “Earnings News,” Nike, Inc., accessed September 24, 2017, <https://news.nike.com/earnings>.

2 All financials from the Nike Foundation are from federal tax filings (990s). “Nonprofit Explorer,” ProPublica, accessed September 24, 2017, <https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/>.

<i>2008</i>	<i>2009</i>	<i>2010</i>	<i>2011</i>	<i>2012</i>	<i>2013</i>	<i>2014</i>	<i>2015</i>
18,627,000,000	18,528,000,000	18,324,000,000	20,117,000,000	23,331,000,000	25,313,000,000	27,799,000,000	30,601,000,000
29,174,327	36,033,351	39,761,379	39,698,757	71,495,610	60,378,797	22,893,171	17,549,681
0.00	8,900,000	7,680,484	6,780,543	5,752,301	7,183,448	18,392,869	16,638,266
15,000,000	15,000,000	15,000,000	12,700,000	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
0.00	652,806	3,338,738	4,984,128	0.00	9,736,796	0.00	0.00
0.00	0.00	0.00	500,000	500,000	0.00	500,000	0.00
4,600	390,286	1,144,985	1,396,592	523,506	359,263	-32,930	54
15,004,600	24,943,092	27,164,207	26,362,725	6,775,807	17,279,507	18,859,939	16,638,302
1,590,584	1,981,569	6,404,056	13,491,581	16,503,528	20,342,358	17,589,080	825,440
19,922,308	16,119,930	17,108,276	13,840,324	10,143,661	6,164,078	9,552,230	21,219,282
21,512,892	18,101,499	23,512,332	27,331,905	26,647,189	26,506,436	27,141,310	22,044,722



Figure 3. Photograph of Nike Foundation banner, “The End of Poverty Starts with a Girl,” with a reflection of author and a building at Nike, Inc. world headquarters in Beaverton, Oregon. August 2009. Photograph by author.

Weiden + Kennedy.⁶⁵ The foundation defined the strategy as “the unique potential of 250 million adolescent girls to end poverty for themselves and the world.”⁶⁶ It branded particular adolescent girls—poor, racialized, and living in the Global South—with the potential to end poverty in the new millennium.

The potential is predicated on what the foundation calls the “ripple effect” that investing in adolescent girls purportedly has across multiple development indicators, including alleviating poverty, promoting economic growth, reducing fertility rates and population growth, controlling the spread of HIV/AIDS, and conserving environmental resources.

Using this theory of change, between 2005 and 2015 the foundation structured its investments in girls throughout the Global South. The foundation first worked through existing international and national NGOs as it sought to develop a knowledge base on adolescent girls. Once it secured this

knowledge, it promoted the brand to bilateral and multilateral agencies, such as the World Bank and the UK's Department for International Development (DFID); powerful private foundations, such as the NoVo Foundation; and global elites in powerful forums, such as CGI in New York City and the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos, Switzerland. In its final phase in 2014, it tapped entrepreneurs and venture capitalists in the cradles of innovation in Silicon Valley who were seeking to capitalize on girls' economic potential. Through those partnerships on different scales, the Nike Foundation focused on "driving massive resources to adolescent girls" and "getting girls on the international development agenda."⁶⁷ And, most significantly, through Nike Foundation's strategic efforts, the Girl Effect moved into the everyday lives and educations of girls and young women, and their families and communities throughout the Global South.

As the Girl Effect became one of the most prominent corporate philanthropic brands in the world, it reflected a moment of development in which corporations and their foundations were creating philanthropic brands and utilizing their consumer brands to influence how girls and women in the Global South are understood and how development interventions are structured in their name. Yet, as the Girl Effect brand's reach extended far beyond the corporate headquarters in Beaverton, Oregon, it created an unevenly contested political terrain of feminism, development, and corporate capitalism as girls and women in the Global South operated as the site of competing and often contradictory interests.

The legitimacy of the Girl Effect grew from acknowledgments of gendered poverty and inequality in girls' and women's lives. Some of those acknowledgments have been codified in past decades in key international declarations, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Education for All Initiative (EFA), the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and, most recently, the Sustainable Development Goals. While the Girl Effect builds on these, it nevertheless constructs marginalized girls as a new, efficient resource for poverty alleviation and economic development. As Maria Eitel, then president and CEO of Nike Foundation, explained, "I'll never get tired of saying it: Girls are the world's greatest untapped resource for economic growth and prosperity."⁶⁸ In this way, future economic growth resides with girls at the bottom of the pyramid.

Yet, feminist activists and scholars from a range of disciplinary perspectives have increasingly contested the Girl Effect in popular media and scholarly journals as it has traveled.⁶⁹ Those include cultural studies analyses of the representations through which the Girl Effect is produced,⁷⁰ and ethnographic examinations of how the Girl Effect is taken up in particular geographic locations, often by NGOs, and to what effects for girls.⁷¹ Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork in the United Nations Foundation's Girl Up program, Emily Bent⁷² also considers the ways in which the Girl Effect and similar campaigns produce new, relational, and often contradictory, political subjectivities for girls in the Global North. While those are important contributions to understanding the Girl Effect, very little is known about how the Girl Effect is constituted as a global development apparatus or how its logic shapes social relations on multiple spatial scales from an ethnographic perspective.⁷³ In this way, this book includes, but moves beyond, analyzing the realm of representation or the implementation of Nike Foundation-funded programs in specific locales to consider how the phenomenon is constituted across spatial scales and diverse geographies. It provides in-depth, ethnographic theorizing of how the practice of investing in the Girl Effect is constructed and negotiated by unequally resourced actors—from corporate and foundation executives to NGO educators—in diverse research sites including Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; New York City; Washington, DC; and Beaverton, Oregon.

DEFINING CORPORATIZED DEVELOPMENT

Since the inception of the development regime in the post-World War II era, corporations have been primary beneficiaries of the international development project. The roots of this privileged position originate in the birth of modern capitalism and centuries of colonial empires in which corporations and the state were deeply embedded within one another.⁷⁴ Throughout the twentieth century, corporations were one of development's primary customers. Institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were designed from their inception, at least in part, to serve the interests of global capital. As a result, corporations were recipients of international development organizations' lucrative contracts to build dams and

highways; the inheritors of privatized public-sector services, such as water, sanitation, and energy, as a result of loan conditionalities in structural adjustment programs (SAPs),⁷⁵ or, more broadly, the beneficiaries of economic growth strategies favoring corporate interests and global financial integration.⁷⁶ Yet, they were minimally involved in the everyday processes of designing, funding, branding, marketing, and executing development programs and policies. As Dinah Rajak explains, today they are both—development's primary beneficiaries *and* some of its principle architects.⁷⁷ Since the beginning of the new millennium, US-based transnational corporations and their foundations have become increasingly influential actors in the development regime. They have created new businesses to provide previously public services and forged relationships with traditional development institutions to implement programs and policies focused on a wide array of issues, including the environment, health, infrastructure, formal education, technology, and finance.⁷⁸ An increasing number of these corporations have begun focusing on girls and women as a target population for business, CSR, and corporate philanthropic efforts, as the Third Billion Campaign reveals.

Through this study, I identify this phenomenon as an instantiation of *corporatized development*, which I define as the practices, processes, and power relations of corporations and corporate foundations operating in and through the institutionalized regime of power of the post-World War II project of international development as it is embedded within broader historical processes of capitalism. In this way, corporatized development is an articulation of the post-war project of international development and the ongoing, uneven processes of capitalist development as they are historically embedded within (post)colonial relations.⁷⁹ On the one hand, corporatized development represents the still emergent, yet disproportionate, weight of corporate actors in funding, advocating, designing, implementing, and branding development practices, programs, and policies in the new millennium.⁸⁰ On the other hand, it signifies the use of the logic and strategies of business in solving the problems of development. These include the emphasis on market-based rationales for development interventions, the measurement of rates of return in terms of direct and indirect benefits to business, and the branding and marketing of development populations and projects. While these practices are not confined to

corporations alone—the World Bank and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) have been using these practices for decades—the emergence of corporations in the field has only increased them.

These elements of corporatized development emerge from the interrelated practices of CSR, corporate philanthropy, and social innovation in business. Simply put, these practices are predicated on “doing well by doing good.” Consent for doing well is constructed through the other half of the corporate mantra—by doing good. In this particular historical moment, corporatized development sutures them together. As a practice, it enables doing well and doing good to occur in concert rather than in conflict with one another.

Corporations have long engaged in discourses designed to indicate responsibility. From the world’s first global trading companies, such as the East India Company and the Hudson Bay Company of the British Crown, to modern day transnational corporations with roots in colonial and US empires, such as the Anglo American Corporation,⁸¹ corporations have participated in trusteeship and improvement practices alongside extractive practices.⁸² Yet, in contrast with previous eras, corporations in the new millennium are involved in a performance of making their ethical and unethical practices explicit.⁸³

In response to the anti-sweatshop and anti-globalization movements of the late 1990s, corporations were pressured to respond to the demands of transnational networks of critics concerned with their socially, morally, economically, and environmentally deleterious practices. The historical context was defined by mounting social, political, and economic pressures for corporations to remain accountable to “multiple constituencies,” including labor, consumers, local communities, governments, and the environment.⁸⁴ As Andrew Barry notes, for British Petroleum (BP) and other corporations, the concern with ethics emerged in the midst of public protests and as a way of managing them.⁸⁵ In the midst of this crisis of corporate capitalism, ethics became the key “interface between the world of BP and other companies and a global public political realm.”⁸⁶

With the support of transnational institutional structures, such as the UN Global Compact, corporations were able to develop a “cluster of techniques” for making the “ethical or unethical conduct of businesses

explicit,”⁸⁷ with techniques such as social auditing and certifications. This “process of ethicalization” has solidified in the new millennium.⁸⁸ The movement of corporations and their foundations into the field of development through the discourse of CSR has been critical to this nexus.⁸⁹ It has been a powerful mechanism for responding to and recuperating from both external and internal criticism of corporate practices. And, thus, it has been important for revising tarnished images and securing social licenses to operate on different scales and to ensure financial bottom lines. Those development efforts were critical to the restoration of corporate hegemony at the beginning of the new millennium.⁹⁰

As Anke Schwittay argues in her critical ethnography of Hewlett-Packard’s CSR programs, corporations are constituted as “ethical actors” and “corporate citizens” through the “actions of others, foremost among them corporate critics” and through the “resulting corporate responses.”⁹¹ As her research demonstrates, one observed reaction to corporate criticism is “corporate philanthropy and its technicalization as strategic philanthropy.”⁹² Nike, Inc.’s investments in adolescent girls through the Girl Effect represents an example of strategic philanthropy, as the corporation restructured its foundation in 2005 to specifically target the very demographic it was accused of exploiting.

For corporate executives as well as CSR proponents, strategic philanthropy is not merely an altruistic endeavor; rather, it contributes to the corporation’s financial bottom line by increasing market share, opening new markets, producing new consumers, and securing long-term investments.⁹³ As Trevor Neilson of GBC Health argues, “The dominant trend in corporate philanthropy is to do giving that reinforces a firm’s core strategy”⁹⁴ in order to enhance growth and profit. In the context of the global economic crisis and increasing global competition, corporations are increasingly reorganizing their business, CSR, and philanthropic strategies to address the problems that create obstacles for them. For Nike, Inc. and the other corporations involved in the phenomenon of investing in the Third Billion, there is an increasingly explicit focus on removing gender inequality as an obstacle to further growth, in terms of labor, consumers, and general conditions of development.

As demonstrated by Dinah Rajak in her ethnography of CSR focused on the Anglo American Corporation, the “moral economy of CSR” symbolizes

“not an opposition to corporate capitalism, nor a limit to it, but the very mechanism through which it is replenished, extended, and endowed with moral authority”⁹⁵ regardless of the continuation of a corporation’s exploitative practices. This book contributes to debates on if, how, and to what extent corporate beliefs, narratives, rituals, and practices of “doing good” through corporate philanthropy and CSR enable corporations to reconstitute themselves as benevolent institutional actors and extend their moral authority despite the persistence of exploitive profit-seeking business practices.⁹⁶

By the mid-2000s, broad consent for the regime of CSR, as a practice and performance of corporate responsibility, responsiveness, and goodness, made the critiques of sweatshops and globalization from the 1990s appear passé. Its institutionalization through corporatized development enabled corporations to dedicate themselves to ending poverty and promoting social and economic development through a particular set of mechanisms. They signed moral compacts, such as the UN Global Compact,⁹⁷ committed to supporting the MDGs, and created and joined organizations, such as the World Business Council for Sustainable Development⁹⁸ and GBC Health. Moreover, they participated in an annual circuit of global forums, including CGI,⁹⁹ the Global Philanthropy Forum, and the WEF; began initiatives with universities, such as the CSR Initiative at Harvard University’s Kennedy School; and channeled their influence through corporate platforms within traditional development institutions, such as the World Bank’s Global Private Sector Leaders Forum (PSLF). In short, they rapidly positioned themselves at the forefront of development in the new millennium. And, in doing so, they have become principle “architects” of development.¹⁰⁰

Yet, in contrast to the first decade of the new millennium, the ground shifted in the beginning of the second. Three decades of neoliberal deregulation and reregulation in favor of corporations in the United States and globally led to corporations becoming disproportionately powerful in fundamental aspects of our lives from finance and housing to health care and education, as global inequality rose to levels not seen since the Great Depression.¹⁰¹ In response to this, a groundswell of people and communities rose up across the globe through social movements, including the Occupy Movement in response to Wall Street abuses and the Black Lives Matter movement in response to state violence in policing and the prison industrial complex in

the United States, and through unprecedented legal cases against transnational corporations, including Walmart, and Chevron,¹⁰² for their abusive labor and environmental practices. Yet, even as public acceptance of excessive corporate power and influence slowly unhinged across the globe and academics and activists revealed the persistent contradictions of “ethical” corporate capitalism, corporations’ influence over Third World girls and women through corporate investment has received minimal critique.

On the eve of International Women’s Day in 2012, various members of the Third Billion Campaign gathered at an event hosted by the International Center for Research on Women (ICRW).¹⁰³ The event was titled, “The Bottom Line: How Big Business Is Empowering Women and Girls.” As Third Billion Campaign member Mary Ellen Iskenderian, president and CEO of Women’s World Banking, explained on the panel, “There is a way that the business community needs to be interacting with women to unlock that real treasure trove of the market.”¹⁰⁴ As Iskenderian’s comment reveals, benevolence—doing good—and profit maximization—doing well—have become inextricably tangled around the figures of racialized Third World girls and women. How did these girls and women in the Global South become a means to eliminating poverty and opening new economic frontiers in the imaginary of corporatized development?

“CO-FORMATIONS” OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM

To explore these questions, I begin with the premise that difference matters in structuring the global political economy. From colonialization and slavery through globalization, gendered, sexualized, racialized, and classed differences have been appropriated in the service of global capitalism. These are not arbitrary epiphenomenon that emerge as effects of capitalism, but rather are constitutive of capitalism,¹⁰⁵ albeit in “variable and contingent” ways under different historical and geographic conditions.¹⁰⁶

Theories regarding the creation of gender and racial categories as a way to justify dispossession beginning with the birth of capitalism provide a way of thinking through this problem. For example, Sylvia Federici analyzes the ways gender and sexual difference was created and expropriated in the service of capital through the witch hunts of the sixteenth and

seventeenth centuries in Europe and the Americas. She argues they were as central to the birth of capitalism as colonialism and the enclosures of the public commons. They created a “new sexual division of labor”¹⁰⁷ that reduced women’s role to reproducing the labor force. This led to the emergence of a patriarchal system that was predicated on women’s subordination and their exclusion from wage labor. She argues further that the “degradation of women” has been one of the necessary conditions of capitalism throughout all phases of globalization, from early capitalism to neoliberal globalization.¹⁰⁸

During this same moment of the emergence and development of capitalism, scholars from different theoretical lineages within decolonial, race, and feminist theories, such as Aime Cesaire, Anibal Quijano, Cedric Robinson, and Collette Guillaumin, explain how the invention of a new form of difference, the biologic concept of race, emerged as a way of dividing the world’s population into a new social hierarchy.¹⁰⁹ Social groups became naturalized during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, along with a conceptualization of “multiplicity” or intergroup heterogeneity.¹¹⁰ This new social categorization allowed colonial empires such as Britain, Portugal, Spain, France, and later the United States to label indigenous populations in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and the Americas as biologically inferior based on a new ideology of race. This ideology created a fictitious scientific rationalization for the colonialists’ system of slavery, and for their territorial and economic expansion as they expropriated labor, land, and raw materials across large territories of the world. Moreover, the burgeoning forms of capitalism depended on this justified inequality between newly designated races. Cedric Robinson’s theory of “racial capitalism”¹¹¹ is generative for thinking through the ways “the development, organization, and expansion of capitalist society pursued essentially racial directions”¹¹² from its inception. Robinson and others show how this form of racialization continues as a dominant mode of social organization, one that underpins the global capitalist system and thus strongly influences the ongoing imbalance between labor and capital.¹¹³ As Anibal Quijano explains, while “the racial axis has a colonial origin and character, . . . it has proven to be more durable and stable than the colonialism in whose matrix it was established.”¹¹⁴

Yet to understand the Third Billion, it is necessary to simultaneously rather than separately attend to the racialized, gendered, sexualized, and

classed dimensions of global capitalism. Over the past three decades, Western and non-Western feminists of color have thought through the ways in which gender and racial categories, in particular, work together to generate exclusions.¹¹⁵ As Denise Ferreira da Silva explains, the majority of those texts examine the “effects of gender on race or race on gender. . . . That is, when coupled with gender, race produces additional gender exclusion, and, when coupled with race, gender produces additional racial exclusion, and so on.”¹¹⁶ Within political economy, this has resulted in scholarship that often privileges one axis of difference (e.g., gender) as a way to think through a particular theoretical, ethnographic, or historical site of global capitalism and as the basis for thinking through or gesturing to the way the other axis (e.g., race) produces the “additional exclusion,” to use the language of Ferreira da Silva.¹¹⁷

To illustrate, drawing on decolonial and intersectionality theories, Maria Lugones examines how gender operated through the racializing processes of colonialism. She argues that, rather than forcing “precolonial, European gender arrangements on the colonized,” colonialism “imposed a new gender system that created very different arrangements for colonized males and females than for white bourgeois colonizers.”¹¹⁸ She considers gender a “colonial concept.”¹¹⁹ The introduction of gender, or multiple genders, as she notes, materially organized the social relations of production, property ownership, ways of understanding, and knowledge production in the colonial world.¹²⁰ Building on Quijano’s notion of the coloniality of power, in which race is the central analytic, Lugones explains that understanding “the relation of the birth of the colonial/modern gender system to the birth of global colonial capitalism”¹²¹ is critical to understanding the present-day global political economy. Thus, her theoretical project is central to understanding the ways in which racial and gender inequality are inherent in capitalist inequality. Yet, even with Lugones’ careful attention to how race and gender work together, the colonial/modern gender system of power and its subjects are still theorized through the modern/colonial world system as a racialized system of power. Ferreira da Silva explains the problem feminist and race theorists get caught in when attempting to explain or elucidate one exclusion in relation to another to understand the racialized and gendered subaltern subject: “What I am suggesting is that precisely this sociohistorical logic of exclusion that makes the racial and gender such

a suitable pair also hinders our understanding of how gender and race work together to institute a particular kind of subaltern subject.”¹²²

The work of Angela Davis on ownership of Black women’s bodies during US slavery provides one of the most specific analyses of the ways in which race, gender, sexuality, and class simultaneously came together to attempt to violently control the bodies of Black women to secure the reproduction of the US slave-based economy and its connections to the structures of global capitalism. Rape by white male slave masters was used as “a weapon of domination, a weapon of repression, whose covert goal was to extinguish the slave women’s will to resist, and in the process to demoralize their men.”¹²³ But as Davis explains, this attempt was never complete: it was marked by “the accumulated experiences of all those women who toiled under the lash for their masters, worked for and protected their families, fought against slavery, and who were beaten and raped, but never subdued.”¹²⁴

To understand how the appropriation of difference functions in today’s global economy, I employ Paola Bacchetta’s theory of “co-formation.”¹²⁵ As Bacchetta articulates, critical feminist analytics emerging from postcolonial, transnational, US women of color, and US Third World feminisms have interrogated how difference functions within universalized categories. They have contributed to “rendering visible power, conditions and subjects that were previously unaccounted for.”¹²⁶ Nevertheless, she argues that, in contrast to feminist theories of intersectionality, it is more productive to “conceptualize powers not as separate axes, vectors or systems, even if intersecting or otherwise combined, but rather always already as multidimensional co-formations.”¹²⁷ Within this conceptualization, power is always co-constituted, as it operates discursively and materially in different contexts.

Building on her theory of co-formation, I consider how the bodies, lives, and futures of Third World girls are co-formed across axes of difference within the global political economy through the Girl Effect. While the language of the Girl Effect is almost always conceptualized in practice, as well as in critique, as a gender project, its underlying logic of only targeting Black and Brown bodies without naming them as such reflects the ways in which, in the language of Denise Ferreira da Silva, “the racial still constitutes a prolific strategy of power.”¹²⁸ Yet, the racialized strategy within the Girl Effect continues to be masked by the focus on the universalized category of

girl, as the ethnographic focus of this study demonstrates. This project thus takes up the analytic of co-formation to illuminate how corporations such as Nike, Inc. target girls and women through the specificity of their racialized, gendered, sexualized, and classed bodies in particular geographies of interest. While these co-formations cannot be separated, one of the primary empirical and theoretical fields in which the Girl Effect is situated at the intersection of feminism and development is commonly known as gender and development. As both a field of practice and a theoretical field of scholarship, the default way this field is understood is through gender, and at times sexuality, particularly with regard to reproduction rather than identity, but rarely through race. For example, it wouldn't be appropriate within colorblind discourses to call it the Black or Brown Effect rather than the Girl Effect. Scholars of race and development, such as Uma Kothari and Sarah White, have noted this silence on race in the field of development more broadly.¹²⁹ As White notes, "Talking about race in development is like breaking a taboo,"¹³⁰ particularly when applied to North-South discussions rather than conversations within regions and even when critiquing neocolonialism and Eurocentricism. As Kothari notes, despite the different ways in which racial difference manifests in different geographies and social formations, there are "tenacious strands of racialized forms of knowing and representing in development discourse and practice."¹³¹

Nevertheless, through my analysis of the empirical and theoretical field of the Girl Effect, I recognize that my default in the study is to often think through how other forms of difference are co-formed with gender or how they play out in relation to girls as a population category even as I put forward a critique of these tendencies. In this way, the discursive boundaries of the fields of theory, policy, and practice we study can generate certain limits or analytic blind spots.

THE FIGURE OF THE THIRD WORLD WOMAN IN THE TRANSNATIONAL DIVISION OF LABOR

To understand how the figure of the Third World woman, and, more recently, the Third World girl, became, in the language of Gayatri Spivak, "the favored agent-as-instrument of transnational capital's globalizing

reach,”¹³² it is necessary to consider the shift in the transnational division of labor that began in the 1970s. Transnational corporations, including Nike, Inc.; General Electric; and Walmart, adopted new outsourcing and export processing models and moved their production sites to locations in the Global South.¹³³ The establishment of special economic zones (SEZs) in East Asia and Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s and the initiation of free trade agreements, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1994, assisted this movement of capital.¹³⁴

David Harvey describes this shift as capital’s search for a “spatial fix,” or, more specifically, the expansionary tendencies of capitalism that lead to the growth of markets within and beyond given geographies.¹³⁵ As Jennifer Bair reminds us, “the globalization of production is fundamentally about reorganizing the social geography of industry.”¹³⁶ This process sparked an ongoing search for the least expensive, most productive laborer whereby shifting the social relations of production in the global economy. The poor Third World woman, at the intersection of multiple interlocking systems of oppression, including patriarchy, racism, and poverty, was imagined to be the paradigmatic worker—docile, dexterous, obedient, and cheap. As Jane Collins explains, “the development of transnational production arrangements was a profoundly gendered process, as the vast majority of new workers in the relocating industries were women.”¹³⁷ As she and other feminist ethnographers have documented, transnational firms and their contract factories recruited “mostly young, unmarried women without children . . . firing them when they married, gave birth or simply reached a certain age.”¹³⁸ In factories throughout the global assembly line, documented strategies to control girls’ and women’s bodies include reproductive control; excessive overtime; verbal, physical, and sexual abuse; and limits on association between workers in the workplace. These illuminate Marx’s primary critique of capitalism, as articulated by Harvey, that it “so frequently violates, disfigures, subdues, maims, and destroys the integrity of the laboring body (even in ways that can be dangerous to the further accumulation of capital).”¹³⁹

While the geography of this feminized and racialized labor force continually changes as companies move their production, it is broadly driven by what Melissa Wright describes as the “myth of disposability” of women and girls who work the shop floor. She explains:

The myth of the disposable third world woman revolves around the trials and tribulations of its central protagonist—a young woman from a third world locale—who, through the passage of time, comes to personify the meaning of human disposability: someone who eventually evolves into a living state of worthlessness.¹⁴⁰

Even as the discourse on disposability shifts over time and place, Wright claims there is a seemingly “intrinsic quality of disposability” and the “capitalist value” that emerges from the imaginary and materialist networks that constitute global capitalism.¹⁴¹

Critical feminists have contributed to understanding how these gendered social relations of production differ across historical moments, geographies, and political-economic formations, whereby contesting homogenizing narratives of paradigmatic Third World woman workers and factories.¹⁴² Leslie Salzinger, for example, challenges understandings of how the hegemonic trope of productive femininity functions in her ethnographic examination of four foreign-owned export-oriented assembly plants in Ciudad Juárez, México. She demonstrates the ways in which gendered practices are (re)constituted through distinct governing practices that operate on interpersonal and structural levels on different shop floors, such that each *maquiladora* produces different femininities and masculinities.¹⁴³

While feminists have challenged processes of capitalist expansion and their repercussions on women,¹⁴⁴ situated local and global feminist responses are not unified.¹⁴⁵ As Manisha Desai explains, they are best characterized as “scattered resistance.”¹⁴⁶ Transnational solidarity networks are formed through the coming together of unions, social movements, and feminist activists.¹⁴⁷ These include well-known efforts by organizations in the Global North, such as the Netherlands-based Clean Clothes Campaign, which have waged campaigns against Nike, Inc.,¹⁴⁸ and associations of poor and working class women in the Global South, such as the Self-Employed Women’s Association.¹⁴⁹ Yet, diverse groups of actors understand and approach capitalist expansion from different vantage points, leading to seemingly contradictory responses. In Dina Siddiqi’s ethnographic research with women factory workers in Bangladesh, she finds disjunctures between local and global feminist concerns about the “sweatshop economy.”¹⁵⁰ In such instances, these tensions can undermine the work of

local activists while furthering the trope of the Third World women in need of “saving.”¹⁵¹

INSTRUMENTALIZATION OF GIRLS AND WOMEN

The use of girls’ and women’s bodies as sites of intervention has deep economic and cultural roots in US and colonial empires. These complex colonial histories created the precedent for using girls’ and women’s economic production and social and sexual reproduction as instruments to influence development on multiple scales, from individual girls and women to the nation. Take, for example, Lata Mani’s discussion of British colonial intervention in the traditional Hindu practice of *sati* or widow self-immolation.¹⁵² This intervention was not always “about women” per se, but rather where the “moral challenge of colonial rule was confronted and negotiated” through the use of colonized women’s bodies.¹⁵³ In breaking from modernization theory’s analyses of *sati*, Mani argues that “Colonial officials sought to justify interference in indigenous tradition, even colonial rule itself, on the basis of women’s low position in indigenous tradition as also in contemporary society.”¹⁵⁴ She argues, “Women are neither subjects nor objects, but rather the ground of the discourse on *sati*.”¹⁵⁵

These complex histories in different geographies are, therefore, the ever-present backdrop for interventions targeting poor girls and women in the Global South in the latter portion of the twentieth century and into the new millennium. Just as colonized girls’ and women’s bodies were a terrain upon which colonization violently occurred, the bodies of racialized girls and women in the Global South are the ground upon which corporatized development is imagined, constructed, and continuously negotiated through competing and often contradictory processes.¹⁵⁶ Girls and women become a means by which corporations enter the development regime through the entangled discourses of bottom-billion capitalism, philanthrocapitalism, gender equality, and Third World difference. Girls and women are imagined to be instruments for achieving a whole set of development outcomes and a new frontier for corporate growth and profit.

The focus on girls and women as a population target in development is related to a debate within economic theory that emerged in the early 1990s, which led to women being positioned as rational, efficient economic actors at the level of the household. As Gillian Hart¹⁵⁷ explains, collective models of the household, such as those created by economists Pierre-André Chiappori, Shelly Lundberg, and Robert A. Pollack, challenged the dominant unitary model of aggregating preferences of household members,¹⁵⁸ as exemplified in the work of economist Gary Becker.¹⁵⁹ These economists “endorse arguments that resources should be channeled to women on grounds not only of equity, but also efficiency.”¹⁶⁰ This theoretical move within economics—from conceiving of women as “rotten wives” who are kept in line by an “altruistic male household head” to promoting them as “good mothers”—has undergirded the broader shift toward women’s empowerment in development policy and practice.¹⁶¹

Over the past two decades, this view of women as the most responsible economic actors at the level of the household has been scaled up through various development programs and policies, particularly as “gender mainstreaming” occurred within traditional development institutions.¹⁶² A product of a historical liaison between liberal development and liberal feminism, one of the results of gender mainstreaming has been particular girls and women becoming key “instruments” for alleviating poverty, reducing population growth, and generating economic growth.¹⁶³ Under this logic, investments in them purportedly provide higher rates of return than other development investments, such as technology or infrastructure.

The other side of this discourse is that Third World men irresponsibly spend their money on alcohol, cigarettes, and women rather than prioritizing their families. The relationship between the discourses on Third World women and men has resulted in what Sylvia Chant identifies as the “feminization of responsibility and obligation.”¹⁶⁴ This phrase highlights how development programs and policies target girls and women in ways that maintain traditional aspects of social reproduction that undergird capitalism while producing new, heteronormative gender norms based on economic responsibilities and obligations women are imagined to have or should obtain to catalyze future economic growth.¹⁶⁵

These processes are predicated, in part, on an instrumental logic. Programs and policies with an instrumental logic target girls or women

for purposes beyond serving those girls and women.¹⁶⁶ They position them as means rather than ends in and of themselves.¹⁶⁷ While they claim a win-win situation in which girls and women benefit from the educational opportunities, they focus on the return on investment. As such, the content of empowerment programs and policies is structured to reflect the broader goal of achieving a high rate of return. The return is framed not only by the girls and women as human beings with intrinsic value, but in terms of what investing in them will do for poverty, the economy, population growth, health, or the environment. In many cases, instrumentalism may be the result of constrained “political maneuvers by internal advocates” who aim to “highlight the relevance of gender” within institutions that have not traditionally been receptive to it; yet, nevertheless it has had powerful consequences over time as a structuring logic of development.¹⁶⁸

These consequences can be observed through two streams of development investment. The first is the priority to invest in girls’ primary and secondary education in the Global South in the early 1990s.¹⁶⁹ A range of prominent individual and institutional actors heralded girls’ primary and secondary education as the development investment with the highest “rate of return.” As Frances Vavrus reveals, during this historical moment, girls’ education became an “ideal target for development interventions”¹⁷⁰ because it addressed questions of equity without critiquing the broader interventions like SAPs that were disproportionately affecting girls and women.¹⁷¹ Individual and institutional actors with diverse and, perhaps, contradictory rationales for promoting girls’ education coalesced around this issue. Gender equity in education was codified through a series of prominent declarations, including EFA in 1990 and 2000 and the MDGs in 2000.¹⁷²

The second stream of development investment has channeled money to women through a proliferation of microfinance programs,¹⁷³ such as Grameen Bank and the BRAC, and government-based conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs, such as Bolsa Família in Brazil and Progres/ Oportunidades in Mexico.¹⁷⁴ Microfinance is the practice of providing banking services, frequently access to credit, to poor individuals or groups, particularly women, who otherwise do not have access to financial services, and CCTs provide cash payments to poor households, mainly through

women, who fulfill “behavioral requirements” in the areas of children’s health and education.¹⁷⁵

Both of those development streams aim to strengthen girls’ and women’s contribution to economic growth and to harness their productivity for poverty reduction in their presumed roles—current or future—as wives and mothers while reducing fertility rates to control population growth.¹⁷⁶ The Nike Foundation’s focus united the goals of those two streams. It distinguished its investment focus from the saturated areas of girls’ education and women’s microcredit and CCTs while remaining focused on their purported benefits—decreased fertility rates and increased economic growth.

ARGUMENT

In the chapters that follow, I examine how corporatized development focused on poor girls and women in the Global South is constituted through the reactionary and expansionary tendencies of corporate capitalism. As I demonstrate, it becomes a means by which US transnational corporations imagine mitigating their short- and medium-term internal and external crises while simultaneously attempting to expand long-term opportunities in new geographic and population frontiers. I show how one company in particular did so by incorporating aspects of the critique waged against it for economic exploitation of female laborers into its response while simultaneously embedding market expansion into it. I argue that consequences of this gendered, racialized, and classed regime are as follows:

First, corporations are investing in girls and women as a means to ending poverty as they seek to create the conditions for development and economic growth. In doing so, they are investing in, rather than transforming, existing inequities across multiple axes of difference—gender, racial, class, religious, and geographic—even as they claim to be ameliorating them.¹⁷⁷

This occurs through a racialized, gendered, and classed logic that imagines individual Third World girls and women to be responsible for and to possess the agency necessary to solve the structural problems of poverty.

This logic is predicated on inequitable historical and present day sociocultural and political-economic conditions that make poor racialized girls and women of color disproportionately responsible for the well-being and futures of others, such that once they are educated, they are expected to generate a multi-indicator, multi-scalar ripple effect across multiple development indicators from the scale of the family to the world. The theoretical basis of this logic assumes that the combination of their unpaid social reproductive labor, anticipated paid professional or entrepreneurial labor, and increased consumption practices will underpin future capitalist growth and development.

Second, corporatized development positions girls and women as a new frontier for capitalist growth and accumulation. This practice becomes a way for companies embroiled in public relations and/or legal crises, and for those who are seeking a way through ongoing economic crises, to imagine escaping those crises through market expansion. In this way, corporatized development focused on girls and women is part of developing “frontier” markets.¹⁷⁸ Bodies on the geographic and population peripheries of capital accumulation, such as the “Third Billion,” are turned into new imagined frontiers for economic growth and development. As Derek Gregory explains, “imaginative geographies” are “constructions that fold distance into difference through a series of spatializations.”¹⁷⁹ In this sense, gendered, racialized, and classed difference maps onto a new imagined geography of corporate expansion.¹⁸⁰ Once unemployed women on the edge of ExxonMobil’s oil fields or unbanked women on the periphery of Goldman Sachs’s circuits of financial capital, poor girls and women are imagined to be a new frontier for economic growth as potential future productive, reproductive, and consumptive subjects.

Yet, lastly, as I will show ethnographically, the project of investing in girls and women is fragile and always incomplete. It requires ongoing negotiations on multiple scales as knowledge, money, and other resources move within, across, and between unequal social actors and institutions located in seemingly disparate places around the world, from corporate headquarters and global forums in the United States and Europe to NGO offices in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. As the power of corporations and their foundations grows in international development, diverse actors from across social, cultural, economic, and geographic locations—including

educators, NGO practitioners, development experts, feminist activists, and corporate employees—are quietly, carefully, and actively negotiating, albeit on unequal terms, how corporations discursively position girls and women and structure interventions in their name.

OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS

As I have presented in the introduction, the business case for investing in girls and women has become a powerful prevailing rationality and practice in international development. This book provides insight into the ongoing processes of the feminization and racialization of corporate capitalism, and, in doing so, reveals the uneven consequences of this contradiction for poor, racialized girls and women and for corporations.

I begin in chapter 1 by theorizing the Girl Effect as a global apparatus of power, and reflecting on my role as an ethnographer in and of the apparatus. In chapter 2, I examine corporatized development focused on the Girl Effect as a discursive practice whose history long precedes the historical moment in which it materialized, and I consider how this institutional landscape has developed over the past decade. In chapter 3, drawing on fieldwork at the Clinton Global Initiative, I examine how and why poor girls and women become the means for ameliorating corporate crises and the broader problems of capitalism, and posit that the business of empowering girls and women operates through a gendered, racialized, and classed regime of representation, what I identify as *poverty as spectacle*. In chapter 4, I draw on ethnographic fieldwork at the educational program of one of the Nike Foundation's NGO grantees in Brazil to illuminate how the Girl Effect functions through a gendered, racialized, and classed neoliberal logic predicated on imagined *Third World potential*, and how this influences who embodies this potential. Chapter 5 examines the elaborate, yet continually contested processes of attempting to prove the Girl Effect as a theory of social change. I analyze how knowledge on the purported potential of particular adolescent girls to end poverty is funded, produced, and distributed. In chapter 6, I focus on how diverse social and institutional actors unevenly negotiate consent for corporatized development by examining the material and nonmaterial resources NGOs employ and

exploring the boundaries of possibility that result from a curricular, pedagogical, and relational perspective. In the final chapter, I end by tracing the Nike Foundation's movement away from the perceived limitations of traditional development channels and into Silicon Valley's world of fast capital and market-driven enterprise through the Girl Effect Accelerator. The chapter demonstrates the expansionary tendencies of corporatized development as Third World girls are promoted as a potential billion-dollar market and, thus, a valuable new capitalist frontier. The chapter concludes with an analysis of Nike, Inc.'s decision to make the Girl Effect an independent organization and a discussion of the phenomenon of corporatized development in light of emergent trends within transnational feminism.