It was an exciting time. The dawn of the fifth century was at hand, and the birth of a new era. As the fourth century drew to a close, orthodox Christianity was at its zenith in practically every sense of the word. It was a period of rapid Christianization, the golden age of patristic preaching—the age of Ambrose of Milan, Augustine of Hippo, and, in the East, a man named John of Antioch, later to be hailed as the Golden-Mouthed. Dominating the news and gossip in church halls and homes alike were the doctrinal developments of orthodoxy, the state of heterodoxy, the religio-political agenda of the emperor, and the threat of those who lived outside the borders of the great Roman Empire—the barbarians. These were the topics that gained most attention in philosophical and theological discussions and political debates. But one day, during a church service in Syrian Antioch, the presbyter John, whom we shall call Chrysostom, preached a sermon on the apostle Paul's Letter to the Ephesians and posed two frequently asked questions, with an unequivocal answer: “If someone were to ask, where does slavery come from, and why has it come to humanity?—and I know that many are asking these questions and desire to have them answered—I will tell you. Slavery is the result of greed, of degradation, of brutality, since Noah, we know, had no slave, nor Abel, nor Seth, nor those who came after them. The institution was the fruit of sin.”

1. Hom. Eph. 22.1 (F4.334): Ἐὰν δέ τις ἔροιτο πόθεν ἡ δουλεία, καὶ διὰ τί εἰς τὸν βίον εἰσῆλθε τὸν ἀνθρώπινον καὶ γὰρ οὐδὰ πολλοὺς καὶ ἐρωτώμενος τὰ τοιαῦτα ἡδέως καὶ μαθεῖν βουλομένους, ἐγὼ πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐρῶ· Ἡ πλεονεξία τὴν δουλείαν ἐτεκεν, ἡ βαναυσία, ἡ ἀπληστία· ἐπεὶ Νῶε δοῦλον οὐκ εἶχεν, οὐδὲ ᾿Αβελ, οὐδὲ ῾Σῆθ, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ οἱ μετὰ ταύτα. ᾿Αμαρτία τοῦτο τὸ πράγμα ἐτεκεν. Most of the translations from Chrysostom’s works are my own, unless otherwise indicated. I have tried to use modern translations of Chrysostom’s works in certain instances, and I compare translations of certain
To Chrysostom’s audience, which consisted mainly of people who owned slaves, along with some actual slaves, these may seem banal questions. Yet they were questions that cut to the very core of their everyday life, since most of the moments that would eventually make up their life-span, including getting dressed, cooking, cleaning, dealing with money, going to the shops, and numerous other events, involved in some way or another the activity of slaves. Slavery did not directly form part of the great doctrinal controversies, nor did it visibly play any deciding role in the politics of the day. Yet it was perhaps more relevant to the ordinary person than any other issue. Slavery—the ownership and domination of one human body by another—influenced every aspect of life in the Roman world and was one of the most influential social institutions in defining one’s identity. One was either a slave (or an ex-slave) or free.²

**DOULOLOGY: THE DISCOURSE OF SLAVERY IN EARLY CHRISTIANITY**

This book is primarily concerned with the dynamics of the discourse of slavery, what I term “doulology,” in the homilies of John Chrysostom (347–407 C.E.), one of the most prolific personalities of fourth-century Christendom.³ The term may refer to "slaves," I am including both male and female slaves unless I specifically emphasize a certain gender. The same applies for the terms “master” and “owner.”

2. When I refer to “slaves,” I am including both male and female slaves unless I specifically emphasize a certain gender. The same applies for the terms “master” and “owner.”

seem alien to many readers. Doulology is a term of my own, made up from two ancient Greek words, doulos (slave) and logos (word, argument, discourse). Doulology is therefore the discourse of slavery—that is, when slavery as a constitution of knowledge, a language, and a social practice is used to produce and reproduce meanings and behaviors in various contexts. In writing this book, I was constantly challenged to develop a new analytical language for speaking about slavery, a language that would assist in laying bare the discursivity of slavery. I must apologize in advance if some of the neologisms in the book seems copious, overambitious, or arduous; they represent my own struggle with the problem of slavery and my desire to enunciate those pervasive and often ineffable operations at the core of the discourse, operations that are both material and symbolic, somatic and psychic. It would perhaps be more appropriate to speak of “despotology,” the discourse of mastery, since all the sources I will examine in this book were written not from the viewpoint of the slave, but from the perspective of the master. But to limit my neologistic verbosity, I will consider despotology as a correlative of doulology, and assume in the use of the term doulology also the discourse of mastery.

Another related term that will surface in the course of this book is doulomorphism. When speaking of doulomorphism, I refer to the instance where a certain subjectivity will be provided with or assume the subjectivity of a slave. My ambition for this new linguistic and rhetorical venture in slavery studies was fuelled by that prolific scholar of early Christianity, Elizabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, who took the same approach in feminist biblical criticism. Two of her neologisms are also very prevalent in this book—namely, “kyriarchy” and “kyriarchization”—which she understands as appellations for the intersectional structures of domination, and those processes by which a dominant subjectivity exercises power over a subordinated subjectivity. Kyriarchization, in essence, points to the formation of masters and attitudes of mastery.

What is meant by doulology, or a discourse of slavery? In approaching ancient slavery as a discourse, I rely particularly on the analytical concepts of Michel Foucault, although I have also found the critical theories of Michel de Certeau and


Pierre Bourdieu helpful. The discourse of slavery should be understood as a system of statements, signs, ideas, and practices discursively associated not only with a framework of labour regulation and the possession of human bodies as fungible property, but perhaps more importantly, one that shaped the very essence of late ancient subjectivity and relationships. While the economic dimension of slavery cannot possibly be downplayed, the discourse of slavery is much more complex—it touches on aspects of late ancient domesticity and housecraft, education, discipline and punishment, and sexualities, in addition to views of human beings as property. The economy of slavery will be problematized in the next section.

I will argue here that the discourse of slavery directly shaped late ancient subjectivities, with a focus on Christian subjectivity in Chrysostom’s homilies. The main aim of this book can be stated thus: to define, examine, and critique the dou- lology of one important figure, John Chrysostom, who operated within the regime of power-knowledge-domination that sustained the discourse of slavery in late ancient Christianity, and also to identify and critique its place and dynamics in the broader operation of late antique social discourses. My aim is not simply to say how bad and wrong ancient slavery was, or to assert its importance and influence or downplay its effects. Rather, the study of Chrysostom’s views on slavery forms part of a crucial scholarly enterprise that aims (1) to account for how ancient slavery is “put into discourse” in the context of everyday life and is spoken about, how it is enunciated and what it says (or is made to say), (2) to determine who does the speaking (and who compels the slave body to speak), and (3) to discover which institutions prompted individuals like Chrysostom to speak about slavery, who stores, distributes, and utilizes the things that were said, and most importantly, how the pervasive technologies of power, the discursive “power tools,” behind various statements in this discourse led to the formation of various Christian identities. Slavery seeped into later Roman culture and reached its very roots. Thus, I will investigate domination and what Foucault calls “those polymorphous techniques of power,” and the discourses they permeated, to produce and maintain individual modes of behavior performing the discourse of slavery, and how this discourse penetrated, controlled, and reproduced enslaved bodies and bodies of domination lost in l’invention du quotidien. This book is a search for discursive productions, and their accompanying silences and ignorance, for productions of


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power, which tend to dominate, and for propagations of knowledge that directly influence the formation of corporeal subjectivities and, especially in the case of slavery, their pathologization. The process of pathologization involves characterizing and classifying the slave body as abnormal, deviant, and socially ill or dead.

The focus on discourse is particularly appropriate for the genre of ancient sources on which this book focuses: the homilies of Chrysostom. Homilies are excellent sources for discursive analysis, since they often represent the tension between the vision of the preacher for an ideal society, and real social phenomena and problems people faced every day. Hence the title of this book, *Preaching Bondage*, since preaching is in itself a manifestation and modalization of discourse. While the discourse of slavery in Chrysostom is my focus, it is my hope that this book will also serve as a conceptual bridge for approaching slavery in other late ancient Christian and non-Christian authors, and in modern discussions of the topic. I will also place Chrysostom in dialogue with the broader Christian discourse on slavery in antiquity. There is a great need for studies on slavery in individual ancient authors. Too many studies on slavery in antiquity focus instead on a vast array of ancient authors across a long time span (sometimes across centuries), with the result that the evidence and conclusions are often generalized or cursory.

Late ancient Christianity seized this discourse of slavery because it was a discourse of potential, or perhaps more appropriately stated, a power discourse; the discourse of slavery exhibits immense potential for the production and reproduction of subjectivities, but also shows potential for controlling, regulating, and disciplining these produced and reproduced subjects. Slavery contributed to the definition of personhood in Roman times. The habitus of slaveholding feeds into this discursive operation, but is also sustained by it. Moreover, ancient slavery was a highly somatic discourse—that is, a discourse preoccupied by and expressing itself in statements relating to the human body as a discursive formation and strategy in itself. Jennifer Glancy makes a crucial point in this regard: “Slaveholders in the first century characterized their slaves as bodies, and their treatment of slaves was commensurate with that characterization. This was equally the case in the fourth century, when Constantine came to power, and a century after that.”

Building on Glancy’s work, this book also approaches slaves as bodies, and aims to evaluate the discourse of slavery in Chrysostom’s homilies as a corporeal discourse.

I need to stress here that any reconstruction of slavery remains an informed scholarly conjecture. It is crucial to understand that the discourse of slavery as

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reconstructed from ancient sources is fragmented and fissured at best, with many lacunae. The reconstruction of doulology in antiquity involves numerous scholarly decisions and can often be problematic and inconclusive; indeed, the complexities of this task can seem overwhelming. Furthermore, the evidence for slaveholding in this period is notoriously difficult to assess and interpret.9 Some of the main sources are Christian homilies and treatises, which are not concerned with slavery per se, but rather present the discourse of slavery interwoven with many other discourses, some theological and some socioethical. Thus one of the aims of this book is to extrapolate the discourse of slavery from other discourses, including those concerning domesticity, education, discipline, sexuality, and the economy. In addition, the majority of ancient sources are highly biased in favor of slaveholders—none of the sources from antiquity were written by slaves, and all of them exhibit a social disinvestment in the concerns of the enslaved. They display only one dimension of domination, and the voice of the slave is deafeningly silent. Despite this, one cannot ignore slavery in the understanding of ancient culture. All aspects of everyday life in antiquity were influenced by slavery—architecture, education, sexuality, wealth and poverty, household management, even something as banal as putting on one’s shoes or defecation and sewerage management. Slavery was an integral part of daily life, and thus must figure in any project of writing a cultural history of late antiquity.

The phenomenon of slavery in the Roman Empire has held the fascination of scholars for more than a century, and was of particular interest during the period of the transatlantic slave trade and the abolition of slavery. In an interesting comparative study, Enrico Dal Lago and Constantina Katsari have identified some striking continuities between Roman slaveholding and slaveholding in the ante-bellum American South.10 They point out that models of slave management in the South often mirrored their Roman counterparts. The well-being of slaves, punishment and reward, and dependency and reciprocity appear to be commonalities of the Roman Empire and the American South. Drawing especially from Roman agronomical sources like Cato, Varro, and Columella, Dal Lago and Katsari conclude that “the master-slave relationship as it expressed itself through reciprocity, interference, and the fiction of father-child relations highlights what in our view are the main features of the ideal model of slave management in the Roman world and the ante-bellum American South.”11 Of course, there were also some important differences between these slave systems, which Dal Lago and Katsari also

9. For more on the problems of late antique evidence for slavery, see Harper, *Slavery in the Late Roman World*, 1–32.
11. Ibid., 213.
highlight: for instance, Roman slavery was not based on racial difference to the extent that transatlantic slavery was. Orlando Patterson has come to similar conclusions on the continuities and discontinuities between Graeco-Roman slavery and slavery in the modern period.

**APPROACHING LATE ROMAN SLAVERY**

Before approaching the discourse of slavery in Chrysostom’s homilies, we should consider what axioms serve as foundations for reconstructing slavery more broadly in later Roman society. Three presuppositions are central to the study of slavery. The first two presuppositions have been recounted and reinforced in Kyle Harper’s work *Slavery in the Late Roman World, AD 275–425*, and I will refer to them in overview. The third presupposition calls for thorough qualification.

One of the major challenges in writing about slavery in the late Roman Empire is to prove that it was actually functional as a social institution during this period, and if it was, to determine what type of slave system it was and how it was sustained. These questions remain important and cannot be said to have been completely answered. However, significant progress has been made to date in arriving at some conclusions, and two presuppositions that are central to the study of


slavery in Chrysostom can be noted—first, slavery was indeed a functional institution in the Roman Empire up to the mid-fifth century, and even into the Byzantine period in certain territories; and second, the Roman institution of slavery did not slowly decline into medieval serfdom, but rather suffered a complete systemic collapse due to the lack of both supply and demand during the years of the disintegration of the later Roman Empire. I will not argue these points here again; I accept them as presuppositions. For the sake of clarity, however, I will attempt to briefly summarize the crucial points of departure. It has been argued by Chris Wickham, and more recently by Kyle Harper and Cam Grey, that late Roman slavery did not slowly morph into what could be called medieval serfdom, nor did the crisis of the assumed “decline” of the slave mode of production lead to the rise of feudalism. Roman slavery was alive and well probably until the mid-fifth century. The many references to slaves and slavery in Chrysostom’s homilies are a testament to this. The problem that Harper identifies is that some scholars, especially Weberian and Marxist scholars, relied on the concept of conquest to give an account of Roman slavery, and thus as conquest declined slavery declined as well since the channels of supply were becoming more limited.

But as scholarship has progressed, the view that the later Roman Empire was dependent on military conquest to sustain its slave system has become less convincing. Indeed, it appears that late Roman slavery was sustained by means of natural reproduction of slaves, and with the booming Roman economy, the demand for slaves remained high. Rather than promoting a theory of conquest, Harper bases his argument for the endurance of late Roman slavery, specifically for the period 275–425 C.E., on the concept of capital and the importance of supply and demand of slaves, which were well sustained in the Roman economy of that period. It is not surprising then to find ample references to slavery in the Christian homilies of the fourth century. The homilies of John Chrysostom contain numerous references to slaves, and Harper rightly identifies John Chrysostom as “an unparalleled source for the realities of Roman slavery.”


16. Wickham, “The Other Transition”; Harper, Slavery in the Late Roman World, 1–99; Grey, “Slavery in the Late Roman World,” 482–509. Grey highlights the continuities of slavery during the period of late antiquity with other periods despite various socioeconomic and juridical changes related to slavery.


In the homilies of John Chrysostom, the issue of slavery surfaces sporadically in the context of discussions of other socioethical issues, including household relationships, education, discipline, sexuality, and wealth renunciation. Slaves were owned by individual Christians, priests, bishops, churches, and monasteries. Both slaveholders and slaves attended Chrysostom’s services. In fact, the diverse makeup of Chrysostom’s audience suggests that many owned slaves. Chrysostom’s homilies provide a tinted window into the lives of slaves and slaveholders—tinted with the common ancient prejudice most elite persons had against slaves; the homilies are filters through which cultural-historical data may be sifted, and this data should be interpreted with great care. Chrysostom writes from the perspective of the slaveholders. Slaves are advised to be submissive, to serve their masters with their whole life, and to fear them. They do not own any property, for they are the property of their owners. Moreover, Chrysostom is of the opinion that masters do more for their slaves than vice versa, since masters have to care for their slaves.

Furthermore, the church not only accepted slavery as a social institution, but it used the slave model of behavior and mode of existence as a metaphor for the practice of Christian religion, the composition of Christian theology, and the formation of Christian subjectivity, and the metaphor of slavery also played an important role in Christian leadership formulations. The use of scripture was central to the process of subjectivizing slavery. But along with assuming the subjectivity of the slave in its theological and ethical formulations, we find that Christianity also had a clear vision for real, institutional slaves in society. It was not a vision of the abolition of slavery. Because slaves were part of the household, they were included in the vision of pastoral power to transform the household into an institution that closely mirrored the church, a process I will call pastoralization. All these issues will be explored in greater depth in the chapters that follow.

20. I have provided an introductory discussion of Chrysostom’s views on slavery in De Wet, “John Chrysostom on Slavery.”

21. In Hom. Eph. 22.2 (F4.336–337), Chrysostom complains that churchgoers often neglect to bring their slaves to church, showing that it was a practice among some, and one that is lauded by Chrysostom.


23. This has been illustrated by Sessa in her work on formations of episcopal leadership, in which she demonstrates how a domestic model was used for episcopal authority; Kristina Sessa, The Formation of Papal Authority in Late Antique Italy: Roman Bishops and the Domestic Sphere (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 1–33.
This brings me to the third presupposition of this book—namely, that late ancient Christianity accepted slavery as a necessary social institution, and that the rise of Christendom did not change or abolish the oppressive system of slaveholding. Late ancient Christianity did not once utter a word supporting the formal abolition of slavery. In fact, from the earliest days of Christianity, during the time of Paul the apostle, the discourse of slavery was assimilated into the language of Christian subjectivity, and the Christian legacy of slavery is present to this very day within Christian communities.

If by some miracle slavery were to be erased from the pages of human history, the appearance and expression of Christian identity would be fundamentally different. As I will argue, in addition to accepting slavery as a socioeconomic phenomenon, all facets of Christian subjectivity, whether socioethical or theological, were shaped at their very core by the discourse of ancient slavery. It is clear that Christianity did not ameliorate slavery in late antiquity, but rather adopted and transformed it into something different—not better, but different.

The Christianization of doulology in late antiquity is a central concern of this book. The first question I ask is why Christianity chose to adopt both the language and the practice of slavery as legitimate means of expression and behavior. We see the Christian movement(s) seizing on slavery, and then pinning it on its very body of subjectivity as early as the New Testament and the noncanonical literature of the first century. In the letters of Paul, some of the earliest Christian documents, he identifies himself, first and foremost, as a “slave of Christ” and calls Christ his “Lord” (e.g., Rom. 1:1; Phil. 1:1). On a more practical level, certain other documents claiming to have been written by Paul, the Deutero-Pauline epistles of Colossians and Ephesians, provide some very basic guidelines for how to treat one’s slaves (Eph. 6:5–9; Col. 3:22–4:1), and in another authentic letter by Paul, his Epistle to Philemon, he directly intervenes in a possible dispute between a Christian neophyte slave, Onesimus, and his master, Philemon. Paul does not advise manumission, but urges the slave to return to his master and the master to gracefully accept the slave “as a brother” (Philem. 16). Why did early Christian leaders like Paul, and leaders up to the fifth century, deem it so crucial to claim and transform the...
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discourse of slavery instead of rejecting it? Why do we have this discursive colonization of an institution considered to be so vile and oppressive?

Jennifer Glancy has argued that slaveholding in late ancient Christianity should be understood as a corporeal habitus. She states that “conditioning to slavery was habitual, a dimension of a corporal vernacular rather than an area of conscious decision-making.” Authors of late antiquity therefore find themselves in this symbolic social space and operate socially within its “naturalness,” or rather, its banality. The potency of corporeal habitualization within the operation of social reproduction should not be underestimated. I am in agreement with Glancy that slavery functioned as a habitus, a set of nearly inescapable social dispositions, which are translated onto bodies, or rather, into bodily performances. But is it enough to say that late ancient Christianity transformed slavery simply because it could not escape it; because of habitualization and social reproduction, Christianity was unable to think beyond the presence of slavery, and, as the argument often goes, Christians were “children of their times,” trapped within the sociocultural confines of ancient Mediterranean society? Slavery was indeed a moral problem for the early Christians, and we do find some criticism of slavery in early Christian writers.

For instance, Gregory of Nyssa’s fourth homily on Ecclesiastes has been described by Harper as “in some ways anticipating the moral groundwork and poetry of the abolitionist movement by nearly a millennium-and-a-half.” There is also a rather obscure rumour about the Eustathians in the fourth-century synodical letter from the Council of Gangra, accusing the group of allowing slaves to wear strange clothing, act insolently toward their masters, and even leave their masters. Were the Eustathians premodern abolitionists? This information is very difficult to assess, but what we do know is that these acts led to the anathematization of the Eustathians. Furthermore, the majority of late ancient Christian authors, Chrysostom included, linked slavery to the origins of sin, and displayed some discomfort with the idea of slavery. Thus, some Christians were at least able to comprehend the moral turpitude of slavery. While I agree that the habitualization of slavery in late Roman society played a significant role in the assimilation of slavery into ancient Christian culture, I do not think this was the determining factor of its assimilation, nor does this fact absolve late ancient Christianity from its moral failure.

in accepting slavery. Along with the corporeal habitualization of slavery, I am arguing that slavery as a discourse, and a power discourse at that, proved to be too valuable, irresistible, and influential to be ignored by the Christian authors of late antiquity.

Now that we know that slavery existed in the late Roman world, and have noted its importance as a discourse in early Christianity, it should be asked what the basic features of slavery in late antiquity were, and how slavery should be understood as an economic institution.

THE ECONOMY AND CARCERALITY OF SLAVERY

The economy of slavery in late Roman antiquity was quite complex. It would be incorrect to state that slaves were simply the property of slaveholders. Slaves were not only seen as assets of the owner, but they also had some inherent social value when they were displayed. On the one hand, slaves were considered subjects in their own right who still had some limited social mobility and limited means to secure their own freedom. On the other hand, the slave body was subject to a potent operation of objectification and commodification. Slaves were commodified and fungible objects and possessions that had both economic and symbolic, or status-based, value. No matter what a slave was, whether a menial field worker or a court official, whatever his or her position in the familia or broader society, all slaves had one common denominator of identity—their deed and point of sale, or at least their vulnerability to being sold. All unfree bodies were subject to sale as an object, a commodity.

In the context of Roman law, slaves were grouped within the category of res mancipi. In Roman private law, this category represented the acquired property of a person. The Latin term res implies an object or a thing, and specifically in this context, private property. Thus it seems that in terms of the legal management of slavery, it was easiest to treat slaves as property or things. This does not imply that the average free person considered all slaves simply as property or objects, but in terms of the administration of human bondage, property rights rather than human rights applied. Chrysostom himself sometimes finds it difficult to conceptualize slavery outside of its fungibility. He refers to slaves as “the master’s goods” or “commodities of domination” (ta despotika chrēmata).

Such a social disposition implies that slaves were provided with value measures, and injuring a slave was considered damage to property. The term res mancipi therefore functions within a very specific set of legal parameters, and Leonard Schumacher

35. Propt. fornic. 4 (PG 51.214.18–20).
rightly notes the tension in Roman law between the slave as res mancipi and the slave as ius naturale—that is, a human being. It becomes difficult, if not impossible, to separate these two dimensions in the practical sense. Varro’s references to the slave as instrumentum vocale, as well as his use of the phrase venalium greges, also emphasize the fungible nature of slavery. As we will see, Chrysostom’s numerous references to “herds” of slaves also attest to the commodification of slave bodies in the late Roman world. The exploitation of slaves for their reproductive capital is also an instance of objectification —slaves who had many children were rewarded, since this implied a “profit” for the slaveholder. Of course, early Christian attitudes toward the regulation of slave sexualities and the proliferation of chastity among slaves, as we will see in chapter 6, may have influenced their status as reproductive capital.

The frequent reference to slaves as simply “bodies” also highlights their objectification. The body of the slave determined his or her price—beauty, age, and build were as important as education and practical skills in deciding the price of a slave. The process of objectification of slaves also included a potent operation of alterization.

40. See Xenophon, Occ. 9.5 (Marchant 440–41); Columella, Rust. 1.8.16–19 (Ash 1:92–95).
41. Glancy, Slavery in Early Christianity, 10–12.
The economy of slavery then was an economy of both subjectified and objectified bodies. It was an economy based on supply and demand, and just before the collapse of the channels of supply and demand in the fifth century, the slave system of late antiquity was a well-oiled machine. For any economic system to be effective, it needs to be sustainable. One of the main channels by which the Roman slave supply was sustained was natural reproduction. Other channels included kidnapping and trading outside the borders of the empire, child exposure, self-sale, debt-slavery, and new slaves coming in as captives of war. Many slaves therefore started out as home-born slaves—such a slave was known in Greek as an oikogenēs and in Latin as a verna. Having slaves born in the very household that possessed them may have been beneficial for the owners, since it enabled them to habituate the slave from the period of infancy. But slaves who were not home-born were purchased either at the slave market or from another family. Many transactions involving slaves, home-born or not, were minor, informal exchanges between slave-holders.

The one figure that stands out with regard to the venality of the slave body is the slave trader. The Roman government had an “uneasy alliance” with slave traders, as with pimps, who were also often slave traders. The derogatory Greek term for a slave trader is the same used for a kidnapper: andrapodistēs. Another term used for a slave trader is sōmatemporos, “trader of bodies.” The equivalent Latin terms are plagiarius, venaliciarius, and mango, the latter probably a Grecism related to the verb manganeuô, meaning “doctor, trick, or dress artificially.” Slave traders were often grouped with social undesirables and criminals.


46. See chapter 4 for a full discussion of the habituation and education of slaves.


48. Harper, Slavery in the Late Roman World, 84.


50. See, in the New Testament, 1 Tim. 1:10; Chrysostom, Hom. 1 Tim. 2.2 (F6.16–17); Harrill, “Vice of Slave Dealers,” 97–122.
Two activities of slave traders stand out in these appellations. First is the suggestion that they kidnap free persons to sell as slaves. This was a major problem in the later Roman Empire. It was such a significant issue that Augustine sought help from the courts to intervene—he wrote a letter to Alypius pleading for imperial assistance to weed out such kidnappers. One of the greatest fears of a free citizen was being kidnapped and sold into slavery, or having their children kidnapped by slave traders. Chrysostom warns his audience that kidnappers often try to lure children with sweets and cakes in order to abduct them. Slave traders knew how to play on the appetites of children (and perhaps adults). Kidnapped children were then sold in faraway countries to minimize detection. Chrysostom was very aware of the problem of people with uncertain social status due to abduction by criminal slave traders; masters were being sold as if they were slaves.

The other trait suggested by the terms identified above is the slave trader’s capacity to deceive clients. Roman law included provisions to guard buyers from being duped, although the extent to which a deceived buyer was recompensed is difficult to determine. Caveat emptor was the best advice for people dealing with slave traders. Slave traders had to disclose any relevant information about the slave, especially if the slave was disloyal, disobedient, prone to flee, physically disabled, or ill. However, slave traders were famous for concealing possible defects and manipulating the bodies of slaves so that they appeared fairer, sexier, and younger.

Chrysostom describes in detail the anxieties a buyer might face: “Those who want to purchase a slave, show him to the physician, and request sureties for the sale, and information about him from their neighbors, and after all this they still do not confirm the venture without asking for a period of time to scrutinize the slave.” Purchasing a slave, especially an expensive slave, was a long process, and
we see here all the measures someone may take to secure their investment. As a commodity, the slave body was subject to inspection at any time. Physicians could examine slaves to ensure a good bill of health, and slaves were often stripped naked in the slave market to be inspected. Even the virginity of some slaves was tested. Slaves were also scrutinized for a period, in a type of probation known as dokimasia, before some sales were finalized. This seems to have been a common practice. “A new slave is not entrusted with anything in a house,” Chrysostom tells us, “till he has given proof of his character, having undergone many trials.”

Chrysostom also says that possible buyers asked slaves if they wanted to be in their service—this may have happened in some cases, but it was perhaps more a courtesy; essentially slaves did not have any choice in the matter; they had to accept their fate after being sold. However, it would be beneficial to all parties involved if the sale created no ill feelings on the part of either the slaves or their prospective owners. Once the transaction was finalized, the slave was named, while vernae were often named in consultation with the master.

Slave nomenclature was very telling—it could give information about the character of the slave or his or her occupation (the names of prostitutes were recognizable), details about the slaveholder, and whether he or she was a freed person. Slaves were sold with a name, but the name could be changed. Most notable was the absence of any name related to ancestry; the natal alienation of slaves was most clearly visible in their names. Chrysostom refers to Adam, who gave names to the animals like a master giving names to his slaves, as a “symbol of his domination (to symbolon tēs despoteias).” This domination-by-name was all-encompassing. While expounding the significance of God being called the “God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob,” Chrysostom explains: “What happens in the case of human beings you can see occurring in the case of God as well; for example, with human beings, slaves are called after their masters, and it is customary for everyone to speak in these terms: ‘So-and-so the custodian belonging to so-and-so.’”

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59. The term δοκιμασία was also used for the scrutiny of sinners in the late ancient church; see Kyle Harper, From Shame to Sin: The Christian Transformation of Sexual Morality in Late Antiquity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013), 144.
60. Hom. 1 Tim. 11.1 (F6.85): εἰς μὲν οἷς ἔχειν γενόντων οἰκίζεται μὴ πρότερον ἐγκαίρωςαῖ τι τῶν ἐνδον, πρὶν ἀν διὰ πολλῆς τῆς πείρας τῆς αὐτοῦ γνώμης πολλὰ τεκμήρια δῷ.
61. Illum. catech. 2.5 (PG 49.239.17–20).
62. For more on the naming of slaves, see Christer Bruun, “Greek or Latin? The Owner’s Choice of Names for Vernae in Rome,” in Roman Slavery and Roman Material Culture, ed. Michele George (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013), 19–42.
63. Hom. Gen. 9.2 (PG 53.79.11–13); see also Hom. Gen. 14.5 (PG 53.116.45–46), 40.1 (53.568.8–12); Mut. nom. 3.3 (PG 51.137.22–46).
64. Anna 4 (PG 54.665.26–30): Καὶ ὅπερ ἐπή ἀνθρώπου ᾗ γίνεται, τούτῳ ἐπὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ συμβαίνειν ἔστιν ἱερόν. Οὐδὲν τι λεγόν· ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἕνα ἀπὸ τῶν δειμπτών ἃν δοῦλοι καλοῦνται, καὶ οὕτως ἔθος ἄψευν λέγειν. Ο δένα ἐπίτροπος τοῦ δείνου. Translation: Robert C. Hill, trans., Homilies on Hannah,
an exceptional case, he continues, for although slaves are always named after their masters, God is named after his slaves, and slaves after God. Chrysostom compares biblical theophorisms (names that have the name of God embedded in them) with the naming of slaves—illustrating a type of kyriophorism (when the slaveholder gives a new name to a slave that signifies and affirms his domination over the slave). Kyriophorism shows that the body of the slave becomes the possession and the surrogate body of the owner in all respects.

Kyriarchy writes its name on the body of the slave, like someone marking his tools with his name. It also implies that the slave represents the master, and any shame or honor that accrues to the slave reflects on the slaveholder. The slaveholder must also protect his or her property, and hence any injury to a slave was considered an injury to the slaveholder. Kyriophorism binds the individual doulological body to the kyriarchal body politic.

Once slaves were in the service of their owners they could be allocated whatever service their owners deemed fit. Some slaves were allotted a peculium, basically the right to earn extra money via various entrepreneurial pursuits. The money in the peculium could be used for whatever the slave desired, of course in consultation with the master. A slave could use it to purchase freedom or to buy his or her own slaves. But the peculium was not always what it seemed to be, as Harper rightly notes: “The institution of the peculium also allowed masters to act as silent partners in unsavoury forms of commerce, such as the slave trade, tavern-keeping, and prostitution.”

Chrysostom himself states that some slaveholders compelled their slaves to engage in fraud, theft, and other dodgy deals. Slaves often had to manage some of the owner’s funds and account for how the funds were used. Chrysostom makes it very clear that “it is the privilege of the master to claim what belongs to the slaves.”

The conditions in which slaves lived were quite varied. On one hand, Chrysostom tells of slaves who eat only bread, sleep on straw, and always live in fear, and on the other, he does not hesitate to mention that the master cares for all the physical needs of slaves, including lodging and food. Some slaves in the higher echelons of Roman society may have lived better lives than many free persons. Chrysostom also says that prostitutes, who were often slaves or freed persons, made far

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65. Hom. Eph. 15.2 (F4.259); Hom. Phlm. arg. (F6.328); Hom. 1 Tim. 16.2 (F6.141).


68. Hom. Phlm. 1.2 (F6.333).

69. Stat. 20.6 (PG 49.206.29).

70. Hom. Phlm. 2.2 (F6.345): τοῦτο δόξα δεσπότου, τὸ οἰκειοῦσθαι τὰ ἐκεῖνα.

71. Hom. 1 Cor. 19.6 (F2.224); Hom. 1 Tim. 16.2 (F6.144).
more money than the average poor person. Yet if we look at the majority of slaves in late antiquity, who were not well educated or literate, it seems probable that their lives closely mirrored the lives of the poor in society. It is also strange, then, that while Chrysostom may have been one of the most outspoken advocates of the poor, slaves receive very little sympathy from him by comparison.

But the sustainability of the slave economy of the late ancient world depended on much more than the means to supply slaves to willing buyers. It extended far beyond corporeal transactions in the slave market or the accumulation of *vernae* in the household. The internal dynamics of Roman slavery ensured its continued existence. This means that every aspect of the system of slaveholding served the function of sustaining it. Roman slavery was an institution that operated on the principle of carcerality—indeed, without carcerality there can be no system of enslavement. By carcerality I mean a state of durance, a symbolic imprisonment that manifests itself in many ways. Slaves found themselves in a constant state of carcerality. Kyriarchal power is the nexus of slave carcerality—the authority of the slaveholder, which is attributed to him or her by both society and judiciary, is the most potent prison of the slave body. Even if the slave is not physically surrounded by walls or chained, kyriarchal authority still incarcerates the slave body.

The mechanisms of carcerality were manifold. When I speak of a carceral mechanism here, I am referring to those technologies that actually intensify the enslaved state of the unfree. In its most basic sense, a carceral mechanism could be something that physically imprisoned or bound a slave. Some slaves were physically locked up, chained, wore slave collars,72 and had their movement limited to certain spaces within the household and society.

But there are some mechanisms of carcerality that are more difficult to identify; here I am referring to such mechanisms as reward, kinship, social mobility, manumission, and freed status. These are all modalities of slave carcerality, and each has very distinct features.73 The historian of slavery should be aware of these mechanisms especially, since at face value they may seem positive and benevolent. Yet without these “positive” carceral mechanisms, the economy of slavery would be unsustainable. The greatest danger in this case is that these positive carceral mechanisms may lead some to romanticize certain aspects of ancient slavery. Let me give some examples.

We will see in the course of this book that many ancient authors, including Chrysostom, stressed the humanity of slaves. Emphasizing the humanity of slaves may seem good, yet its carceral dynamics are extremely oppressive. In this regard,

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73. For an excellent discussion of the containment and mobility of slaves in Roman society, see Sandra R. Joshel, “Geographies of Slave Containment and Movement,” in George, *Roman Slavery and Roman Material Culture*, 99–128.
Saidiya Hartman states: “I argue that the barbarism of slavery did not express itself singularly in the constitution of the slave as object but also in the forms of subjectivity and circumscribed humanity imputed to the enslaved.”

Hartman goes on to argue that notions of the humanity of slaves in fact intensified the suffering of slaves. It was this recourse to the human characteristics of the slave that opened up new avenues for oppression, such as threats to partners and children, sexual regulation, and deprivation of food. Here, humanity operates as a carceral mechanism that actually ramifies the enslaved state of a person. Humanized slave language can also be offensive and disparaging, and used to confirm slave stereotypes. Chrysostom often refers to the “race” or ‘stock” (genos) of slaves, a derogatory term that typically exemplifies their social exclusion and pathologization (but is not to be confused with modern racism).

The subjectivation of the slave body was just as oppressive as its objectification—both sustained the economy of slavery.

Another problem is that humanity is often used as an argument to highlight the “equality” between slaves and slaveholders—an “equality” with very little impact on institutional slavery. It was an extremely common motif in Stoicism and early Christianity. Cyprian, for instance, uses a similar argument, advising masters not to treat their slaves harshly, based on their shared humanity. But Glancy is correct in noting: “Beyond an implicit critique of slaveholders who wielded excessive force against their slaves, Cyprian sketched no practical consequences from his strongly worded statement of equality.”

In the same way, the fourth-century author Aphrahat, while musing on the impartiality of death, states: “He leads away to himself both slaves together with their masters; and there the masters are not honored more than their slaves. Small and great are there, and they hear not the voice of the oppressor. The slave who is freed from his master there pays no regard to him who used to oppress him.” Equality had a very relative and limited meaning in the context of ancient slavery.

Kinship, freedom, and social mobility are also often identified as positive features of ancient slavery. Marleen Flory notes the “social cohesion of the familia and how its quasi-familial bond, which persisted beyond slavery and into freedom, helped to contribute to the social stability of the slave population” and “gave slaves


75. See Hom. 1 Cor. 40.6 (F2.515); Hom. Eph. 15.2 (F.4.259); Hom. Phlm. arg. (F6.327); Hom. Tit. 4.1 (F6.298); Serm. Gen. 5.1 (PG 54.599.26–28).


77. Aphrahat, Dem. 22.7 (PS 1.1008; translation: revised NPNF); see also Job 3:18–19.
and ex-slaves a sense of social security.” Yet, the notions of familia and kinship were in themselves carceral mechanisms. These strategies were also very common in the New Testament, where, for instance, Paul tells Philemon to accept Onesimus as a “brother” (Philem. 16). Such strategies create the illusion of softening the harshness of slavery, but in actual fact, they only ramify it. The inclusion of slaves in kinship structures like the familia made it extremely difficult, indeed almost impossible, to escape the channels of domination.

The subjectivity of the slave was, then, perhaps one of the most complex subjectivities in ancient times. Patterson’s definition of slavery as “the permanent, violent domination of natally alienated and generally dishonored persons” certainly rings true. Others, like Paul Bohannan, refer to slavery as “antikinship,” in line with what Moses Finley noted as exclusion from “the most elementary of social bonds, kinship.” Bohannan makes a distinction between antikinship and nonkinship. Slaves are not included under nonkinship because they are not like individuals in a business relationship or a contract established by rank. Slaves can have no kin in the legal sense of the word; they are, as Patterson states, natally alienated. Although slaves are transplanted into the patriarchal structure of the familia, which appears to be a kinship structure, they are still socially and economically valuated in terms of antikinship standards. They are part of the domus, but they are also a threat to the domus—they are social outsiders, Others, and objects.

Notions like Bohannan’s antikinship and Patterson’s natal alienation do indeed help us to understand the social exclusion slaves experienced, and we need to take care in the direct application of these theories to early Christianity. There is also a rhetoric of “natal association” in early Christian texts (e.g., calling slaves brothers and sisters), in which slaves are included in kinship structures like the familia; but this natal association is perhaps even more pervasively oppressive than natal alienation. Natal association, or at least the profession of including slaves in kinship

79. Patterson, Slavery and Social Death, 13.
82. Bohannan, Social Anthropology, 180.
structures, gave rise to other additional technologies of regulation and domination that aided in the reproduction of kyriarchal social structures.

While slaves were included in the kinship structure of the Roman familia, they were still denied basic elements of kinship in the Roman world—namely, acknowledgment of legal and legitimate heirs, the ability to own property, and possession of a name that signified one's own lineage. Roman society did of course substitute weak equivalents for these missing elements, such as informal recognition of marriage and children, and the right to have a peculium. All of these “privileges” were still subject to the owner's authority. The Roman familia was perhaps the most common carceral space for slaves in antiquity, a prison not made from bricks and mortar, but by free bodies and kyriarchal authority.

Dale Martin also reads the upward social mobility of slaves as a positive factor, and quotes John Myers's statement that slavery functioned as “a compulsory initiation into a higher culture.” Martin explains: “As surprising as it may sound to modern ears, slavery was arguably the most important channel through which outsiders entered the mainstream of Roman power structures.” It is true that slaves had recourse to upward mobility, and many slaves did indeed have a great deal of authority. Yet they remained slaves, and their situation could change quite swiftly. Not all freed persons shared in the idyllic life that Martin emphasizes.

Some slaves indeed preferred to stay in their carceral state and make use of opportunities within this disposition to better themselves and eventually be manumitted. Manumission was a very important element of slavery; it sustained the very system of slaveholding. It was an incentive of domination; it motivated slaves to work harder. Manumission was not only a reward, but also a necessity. It opened

up positions of exploitation for new slaves. Old, sick, and long-overworked slaves were also manumitted because of their physical condition. In many cases, slaves were manumitted after the death of their master by his or her testament. Chrysostom reminds slaveholders: "At your death you would not choose to leave the slave that has served you well unhonored, but compensate him both with freedom, and with a gift of money." The good slaveholder did not have to make provisions, then, for only his or her spouse and children, but also his or her slaves. "And having passed away, you will not be able to do him good, you make arrangements for him with the future heirs of your estate," Chrysostom explains, "ensuring, exhorting, doing everything, so that he may not stay unrewarded."

Slaves were also able to buy their freedom if their *peculium* was enough. It should not, however, be assumed that all slaves desired freedom. Sudden manumission could be very traumatic and debilitating for a slave, who would be released into a society inherently antagonistic toward him or her. Chrysostom in fact notes that many slaves feared manumission, since some died of famine and others lived hard lives outside the care of their former owner. This is also why many slaves allegedly revolted after the famous mass manumission by Melania. Manumission could also break up families and marriages. The process of manumission was in itself complex. Along with the usual channels of manumission by testament or in court, *manumissio in ecclesia*, "ecclesiastical manumission," also became a common occurrence in late ancient society. There was also *manumissio inter amicos*, manumission "before friends," which was a more informal way of manumitting slaves.

Chrysostom does not comment much on the method of manumission, focusing rather on the motives and purpose. Manumission had an ascetic impetus in Chrysostom’s view, because it could be a form of wealth renunciation. Manumission was not good in itself, especially because it could be a display of vainglory. Manumission was at the discretion of the slaveholder, but Chrysostom also tells

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89. Hom. 1 Tim. 16.2 (F6.144).
91. Virg. 28.1.31–33 (SC 125.184).
92. Hom. 1 Tim. 16.2 (F6.144).
slaves not to seek freedom in principle, as we will see in chapter 2. God chooses to keep slaves in bondage, according to Chrysostom, so that the nature of true freedom may be revealed. A slave may ask: “Why did He let him continue as a slave?” (1 Cor. 7:21–22). Some people may have rightly asked how God could not want freedom for slaves. “Just as keeping the bodies of the three boys unharmed with the furnace still burning was much more remarkable than extinguishing it,” Chrysostom explains with an analogy from Daniel 3:27, “so demonstrating His freedom with slavery in force was much more important and more remarkable than freeing the slave from it.” Chrysostom believed that slaves had much more potential to exhibit spiritual freedom while being enslaved than after manumission. Freedom, then, is quite relative, and also a carceral mechanism.

Even in the New Testament, manumission does not really have much prominence. The imminent eschatology of early Christian thinking was probably the main cause for this philosophical divestiture of manumission—because Christ is coming very soon, it makes no sense to seek freedom. This being said, Chrysostom does tell slaveholders to instruct their slaves in virtue and a trade, and thereafter to manumit them. This type of advice was common in the Roman world, and in fact very important in the mechanics of the slaveholding system. Educating slaves and then manumitting them could be profitable to the slaveholder, but what was more important was that even after manumission, many slaves still continued in the service of their former owners as tradesmen and tradeswomen. There were many successful freed persons in the Roman world, showing how prevalent and effective the system was. It provided the former slave with a means for upward social mobility and also for the acquisition of wealth.

Not all were successful and secure, as Chrysostom has already noted. Freed persons still had numerous obligations to their former owners. A freed person always had to show “gratitude” to his or her former owners; thus, the kyriarchal grip even extended into so-called freedom. In legal terms, this kyriarchal hold on the freed person was called *obsequium*, a rather vague concept that implied a type

95. *Hom. 1 Cor. 19.4–5* (F.2.221–25).
97. *Hom. 1 Cor. 40.6* (F.2.515).
98. For the manumission and freed status of women in the Roman world, see Perry, *Gender, Manumission, and the Roman Freedwoman*.
of debt that could never be fully repaid to the patron of the freed—*obsequium* could be money, labor, or favors, for example. It was a means of showing one's gratitude for being manumitted. This is also why the metaphor of slavery to God was so effective and common in late ancient Christian discourse, deriving especially from its use in 1 Corinthians 7:21–22. Christ had freed the Christian from slavery to sin and the passions, and in this way the freed person, who was now under the kyriarchal hold of Christ, needed to constantly show gratitude, respect, and service. Thus, outside of abolition, there are no aspects of slavery that are truly in the greater interest of slaves, nor are there any that do not serve the interest of slaveholders.

So the challenge to the scholar of doulology is to be aware of this pervasive yet sustaining carcerality of the slave economy, which seems at face value to be positive, but is actually highly inhuman and tyrannical. One of the further aims of this book is to identify these pervasive carceral mechanisms in Chrysostom’s rhetoric, and to expose their function in sustaining slavery. This being said, I believe one of the most important and pervasive carceral mechanisms of the economy of slavery was its interiorization and metaphorization. By having people focus on moral slavery, one immediately shifts the focus away from the oppression of real-life slavery. The interiorization of slavery in the ancient social imagination is worth highlighting.

### THE HETERONYM OF THE BODY: DE NATURALIZING AND INTERIORIZING SLAVERY

“But perhaps it was not in this way that the term ‘slave’ was originally applied—that is, to a person for whose body someone paid money, or as the majority think, to one who was sprung from persons who were called slaves, but rather to the man who lacked a free man’s spirit and was of a servile nature,” contemplates the first-century Stoic philosopher Dio of Prusa, also called Chrysostom. He continues: “For those who are called slaves we will, I presume, admit that many have the spirit of free men, and among free men there are many who are altogether servile.”

The interiorization of the principles of mastery as a practice of subjectivation was a decisive moment in the history of slavery. It was so significant that Dio

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Chrysostom could not decide whether metaphorical (or moral) slavery existed before institutional slavery. It seems to be a chicken-egg riddle, one that cannot be answered except by speculation. More importantly, it is very problematic to speak about slavery outside of its use as a metaphor, since metaphors and reality, as we read above in Dio’s statement, often intersect, overlap, and influence each other. The metaphor of slavery had a direct impact on the economy of slavery, and with all the accompanying carceral mechanisms served to sustain the institution of slavery. We must therefore commence with an act of désévénementialisation, isolating this event in the history of doulology and using it as a point of departure for the discussions in the chapters that follow. If we want to understand slavery in late ancient Christianity, and in John Chrysostom, we must make sense of how the interiorization of slavery took place.

To trace this development, I will draw on sources predating late antiquity and Chrysostom: most notably, Aristotle, Xenophon, and the Roman agronomists; yet, at the outset I want to emphasize that these ancient sources were fundamentally and directly relevant in shaping later Roman society, and were neither discarded nor ignored during late antiquity. Their relevance will be delineated as the discussion progresses.

To begin, institutional slavery, in ancient thought, presents itself as a subset of a much larger discursive formation in Christian discourse—namely, that of the heteronomy of the body and the polymorphous levels of domination required by the subject. What is meant by this? In ancient Christian thought all bodies were heteronomous; in other words, the body, by definition, was made to be ruled by another. The mode of domination is complex—men could rule over women, but men were also expected to rule or control themselves, and God or sin also ruled over all. These modes of domination were also interconnected, and had an ancient legacy. As early as Plato, in Alcibiades, the control and government of others and the city were inseparable from the government of the self. Therefore, in order to comprehend the discourse of slavery, the concept and development of corporeal heteronomy needs to be laid bare, since it is this form of self-governance in early Christian thought that not only defined but also justified the existence of institutional slavery, and vice versa. And, by implication, it is also on account of the heteronomy of the body that many ancient Christian authors simply accepted institutional slavery. It is thus impossible to write a history of slavery, as a discourse, without giving attention to the metaphorization and interiorization of slavery, since the metaphor, in turn, shaped and reshaped the reality of institutional slavery. The heteronomy of the body is the semantic bridge between metaphorical and institutional slavery; it is the basis and starting point of Christian doulology.

104. Foucault, Hermeneutics of the Subject, 25–106.
Here I am specifically concerned with how the heteronomy of the body shaped early Christian doulology, and in particular, Chrysostomic doulology. In the first instance, I will attempt to reconstruct late ancient Christian doulology by looking at developments in classical and Hellenistic thought that served as a foundation for Roman slavery, since Christian doulology was simply another expression of Roman doulology. Two important developments will be central to this examination of corporeal heteronomy and the foundations of Christian views on slavery: first, the denaturalization (or perhaps better, the “de-Aristotelianization”) of slavery in Roman thought in favor of a Xenophonian understanding of slavery based on a strategy of alterization or “othering”; and, second, the popularization of metaphorical and moral slavery by Stoicism and its transfusion into and evolution in Hellenistic Judaism, particularly in Philo of Alexandria, which gave rise to the revolutionary concept of slavery to God. These two developments lie at the core of what would become corporeal heteronomy in early Christian thought, and help illuminate the Christian understanding of slaveholding in the late Roman world.

The Denaturalization of Slavery: Xenophon and the Agronomists

In some instances, it has become conventional when speaking about the development of slavery in the Roman world to start with Aristotle’s famous theory of natural slavery. This theory uses the strategy of naturalization to make sense of the distinction between slaveholders and slaves. To Aristotle, the art of governance was something visible in nature, and nature provided a norm for people to follow. The strategy of naturalization is quite potent, especially in the premodern, prescientific world—“nature” provided something stable, it functioned as a norm, something that should be imitated, and something beneficial.

The concept of nature is of course a conjecture in itself. In current science, there is no such thing as “nature”—there are “natures,” and as theories of evolution have shown, nature is anything but stable—nature adapts to its surroundings and reciprocates on the basis of its need to reproduce itself. Nature is, in the same breath, both stable and unstable. In antiquity, however, the discourse of naturalization was

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a powerful rhetorical strategy for explaining and manipulating sociocultural phenomena.

Aristotle explains natural slavery thus: “For that which can foresee with the mind is the naturally ruling and naturally mastering element, while that which can do these things with the body is the naturally ruled and slave; hence the same thing is advantageous for the master and the slave.”

Nature is presented as the architect of slavery, and marks the master with foresight (prooraō) to command and the slave with body (sōma) to labor. Again the link between slavery and corporeality in Aristotle is clear. Aristotle is one of the main sources for the theory of natural slavery. But how influential was the theory of natural slavery in the later Roman world, particularly among early Christian authors like Chrysostom? I will argue here that reliance on Aristotle to reconstruct Roman slavery is problematic, and that we have instead a denaturalization of slavery and proliferation of Xenophonian ideas of slavery.

The reason for the denaturalization is somewhat difficult to determine, but it seems that it may have occurred by chance rather than choice. The status of the Aristotelian corpus during the nascent years of Roman civilization is a highly contested matter. While the legendary accounts of Strabo and Plutarch on the disappearance of the library of Theophrastus, from a broad perspective, seems to be exactly that, mostly legend, there does seem to be some truth to their stories. If we examine the extant catalogues of the Aristotelian corpus—namely, those of Diogenes Laeritus, the anonymous Vita Menagiana, and especially the medieval Arabic translation of the catalogue of Ptolemy (probably based on the edition of Andronicus)—we see that some treatises that were known in earlier decades fell into disuse for quite some time. Ironically, for the discussion of slavery, Aristotle’s Politica is one such document (the other being the Poetica).

The status and presence of the biological treatises are somewhat more complex. Carnes Lord makes the following astute observation: “Why were the Politics, Parts of Animals, and the Generation of Animals not included among the works sold to Ptolemy? The two latter works may have been too long and specialized for regular use, and the HA [History of Animals] was available as an apparent substitute. In the case of the Politics, changing political circumstances could readily account for its falling into disuse.”

While the older Diogenes catalogue, in entry seventy-five,
cites a “lecture course on politics like that of Theophrastus,” it does not seem to indicate that the Politica was known to the cataloguer and, as Lord states, “had been supplanted by the similar treatise of Theophrastus for the purposes of the school.”

This could explain the absence of the notion of natural slavery in later treatises on slave and household management, especially among ancient Roman philosophers and agronomists. The concept is almost completely absent in early Christian writings. While Aristotle’s influence is contested (and I must state that I do not assert that it was completely absent) in discussions on domestic slaveholding, Xenophon’s influence is much more apparent, especially the influence of his work the Oeconomicus. Xenophon is widely cited or alluded to in the agricultural treatises of Cato, Varro, and Columella, and Philodemus’s entire treatise De oeconomia is aimed at refuting Xenophon and pseudo-Aristotle, or Theophrastus (Philodemus attributed the pseudo-Aristotelian Oeconomica to Theophrastus), but not Aristotle per se.

While the availability of Aristotle’s Politica was extremely limited, the Oeconomicus of Xenophon was translated into Latin by Cicero. Xenophon does not subscribe to natural slavery, but rather views slaves as social outsiders subject to suspicion, exclusion, and domination. Of course, I am not saying that Xenophon is the first to promote such a view of slaves, but he was the most influential proponent of this view in the Roman world. Xenophon also supported the notion of holistic household management (oikonomia)—the idea that the governance of the household represented a microcosm of state and other macrocosmic examples of government. Aristotle was much more skeptical about holistic oikonomia. In

109. Ibid., 161.
114. Aristotle distinguished between the rule of masters over slaves (despoteia) and governance among free persons (politikê). He concluded that one cannot govern the free as one governs slaves; see Pol. 1253b16–40 (Rackham 30–31).
late antiquity, however, holistic *oikonomia* became very popular, even with Chrysostom.\textsuperscript{115}

Finally, the notion of natural slavery is almost totally absent in late ancient Christian authors. A notable exception here is Athanasius, who seems to subscribe to some theory of natural slavery, probably more influenced by his natural theology and anti-Arian theological presuppositions than Aristotelian naturalization. Influenced by Origen, Athanasius especially emphasizes the notion that all human beings are slaves to God by nature, as Peter Garnsey points out in his discussion of Athanasius’s slave language: “Athanasius accepted and reinforced Origen’s distinction between sonship by nature and sonship by adoption: Christ was a/the son by nature, we in contrast are slaves by nature. God is our natural master.”\textsuperscript{116} Garnsey notes that the idea that people are slaves by nature is also present in Augustine’s thought.\textsuperscript{117} Chrysostom, on the other hand, disagreed with this view, attributing this fact to sin, and the turpitude of slaves to their upbringing.\textsuperscript{118}

Thus it was Xenophon, not Aristotle, who had a major influence on Roman slaveholding. Whereas Aristotle promoted the theory of natural slavery, Xenophon’s theory of slaveholding was based on alterizing (or othering) rather than naturalizing discourses. As noted above, slave management formed part of the more expansive discourse of *oikonomia*, the art of household governance.\textsuperscript{119} But ancient *oikonomia* was an androcentric discourse—one that sought to shape and sustain ancient masculinities.\textsuperscript{120} *Oikonomia* was primarily concerned with how a man must master the persons in his house so as to be respectable in the eyes of his peers. The way a man treated his slaves was crucial to his self-fashioning. A man had to exhibit himself as someone who could sufficiently master his slaves.\textsuperscript{121}

\textsuperscript{118} *Hom. Tit.* 4.1 (F6.298); Serm. Gen. 5 (PG 54.599.2–604.40); see chapter 2.
\textsuperscript{120} Sessa, *Formation of Papal Authority*, 1–2.
Principles for governing the household served well as correlates for state governance.

In contrast to Aristotle, the concept of holistic oikonomia lay at the heart of Xenophon’s work, as Niall McKeown infers: “Xenophon’s aim . . . is neither reportage nor even managerial advice; nor is his primary focus slavery. He wants his audience to become better leaders of people. Both the Memorabilia and the Oeconomicus equate managing a household (an oikos) and other forms of power, notably military and political (Mem. 3.4.6; Oec. 5.14–17, 21.2, 21.12).” Holistic oikonomia and its relationship to processes of social othering with regard to slavery were instrumental, in my view, to preparing the ground for Christian corporeal heteronomy. Holistic oikonomia suggests that dominance operates on various levels, with an ideological and conceptual congruency between macro- and microtexts. Aristotle saw governance as something more complex. But if, as in Xenophon’s view, in principle dominance works the same regardless of context, the implication is that bodies are, principally, subject to be ruled—otherwise holistic governance or oikonomia would not be possible.

Moreover, from a very early point in classical antiquity, there is conceptual symbiosis between doulology and polemology, or the discourse of war and warfare. Peter Hunt has shown the links between Xenophon’s thoughts on slaveholding and the relational dynamics between soldiers and generals. But Xenophon did not believe that slaves belonged in the army, most likely because of his highly aristocratic perception of the military—a view many in the Roman world shared. Slaves were inferior in this sense, not because of their nature, as Aristotle would argue, but because of their egotistical interests and social positioning. Slaves were outsiders, Others, who posed a considerable risk both socially and in a military sense. In her stimulating analysis of Xenophon’s Oeconomicus, Sarah Pomeroy explains: “At first all three [wife, housekeeper, and farm foremen] are outsiders, who must be transformed into insiders so that they will be concerned as he [the male head] is about the success of the oikos.”

The householder therefore must hold a suspicious view of slaves, and very strict corporeal regulation is necessary. Slave bodies, according to Xenophon, must be controlled via the intermediary of the passions, with the strategic use of rewards and punishments. This corporeal control of the passions lies at the core of successful mastery. Xenophon’s slaveholder is someone, then, who is quite adept at reading and manipulating the passions of his slaves. For example, Xenophon’s states that sexual intercourse or cohabitation can be used successfully as a reward, or

124. Pomeroy, Xenophon, Oeconomicus, 65.
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depriving slaves thereof as punishment. These measures of control and mastery were to be translated onto the very architecture of the house. Ischomachus describes the layout of his house so: "Then I pointed out to her the [slave-]women’s apartments, separated from the men’s by a bolted door, so that nothing may be taken out that shouldn’t be and so that the slaves may not produce offspring without our knowledge. For the useful ones, for the most part, feel even better once they have had children, but when wicked ones are paired together, they become only more resourceful in their bad behavior."\(^{125}\)

Moreover, Xenophon advised slaveholders to allow obedient slaves to have families and never to utter a word of manumission.\(^{126}\) Manumission may have been very traumatic for some slaves, since it removed them from the ephemeral care of the slaveholder and also broke up families. This shows how pervasive slavery was in antiquity; by its very operation it had systems built in to ensure it remained stable. While manumission may seem positive at first glance, it was far more complex, and actually sustained slavery, as I will show below. Furthermore, when the passions of the slaves are mastered, Xenophon assures his readers, slaves are less likely to run away, steal, or be lazy.\(^{127}\) Xenophon was in favor of treating slaves well, and taking responsibility for their health, since this boosted productivity and profits for the landowner.

The ideas of the ancient Greek philosophers, and historians of the classical period such as Xenophon, were well known in late antiquity, and having possibly studied under the rhetorician Libanius (or a teacher with similar skills),\(^{128}\) Chrysostom himself would have been most likely aware of their views. It is also clear in his homilies that he was aware of ancient Athenian views on slaveholding.\(^{129}\) Thus, it is important to understand the foundational social narratives that continued to shape society even centuries after the passing of their authors. While Xenophon is often referenced in the development of the novel in late antiquity, he was especially influential in the formation of Roman ideas on slaveholding, ideas that persisted into late antiquity.

126. Strauss, Xenophon’s Socratic Discourse, 45.
127. See Xenophon, Oec. 3.3 (Marchant 383–83); Mem. 2.1.9 (Marchant 86–87); Oec. 21.10–11 (Marchant 524–25).
129. See chapter 6.
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Xenophonian ideas about slaveholding, based on alterizing practices and the mastery of slaves’ passions, were transmitted to Roman thinking through agronomical literature. After the Punic Wars, the Roman Republic entered a period of vast expansion, which had profound effects on slaveholding. The second century of the republic, especially in Italy, saw the rise of the villa system of landholding, in which estates, mostly owned by illustrious Roman citizens, relied for their operation on very large agricultural tracts that produced cash crops like grapes and olives. The main purpose of the villa estate was to generate products and profits. As Keith Bradley has shown, this process was not a rapid consolidation but a gradual assimilation of smaller landholdings into large estates. This phenomenon was complemented by rapid urbanization as a result of the military expansion of the republic.

Most of the large landholdings had absentee owners, who had to rely on a slave-foreman (called a vilicus, or an epitropos in Greek) to manage day-to-day operations, including the management of other slaves. These estates had large contingents of slaves who performed most of the labor, and the development of the estates led to the rise of the so-called slave mode of production. Estate management was a topic of discussion for several elite authors of the period. Most notably, the writings of Cato the Elder (De agricultura) and Varro (Rerum rusticarum) illustrate the requirements of owning a large villa estate. Both are also very concerned with how slaves should be managed. Both Cato and Varro drew directly on

133. Marazano, Roman Villas in Central Italy, 224.
the views of Xenophon in their understanding of slave management. Manipulating the needs and passions of slaves was central to their argument.

Although the *vilicus* was a surrogate for the absentee owner, the absenteeism of landholders did not escape criticism. The Roman agronomist Columella, writing during the early years of the empire, believed that landowners should be present and directly involved in their estates. In his view, the absenteeism of landowners and the baseness of slaves were the reasons why farming had, according to him, lost its former republican luster: “I do not believe that such misfortunes [bad crops, the decline in fertile soil, and the general state of farming] come upon us as a result of the fury of the elements, but rather because of our own fault; for the matter of husbandry, which all the best of our ancestors had treated with the best of care, we have delivered over to all the worst of our slaves, as if to a hangman for punishment.”

Although these agronomists do not fall within the period

136. Varro is famously known for his grouping of slaves under “articulate tools” (*instrumentum vocale*), although the difficulties of this Latinism have been duly noted, and there is little certainty about what Varro actually meant by this phrase; see Craigie Champion, “Columella’s *De re rustica*,” in *The Historical Encyclopedia of World Slavery*, vol. 1, A–K, ed. Junius P. Rodriguez (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 1997), 174–75.

137. For example, Cato’s remarks on slave management are extremely interesting and do show influence from Xenophonian ideas about slaveholding. Cato is a firm believer in the manipulation of slaves’ passions; see Joshel, “Slavery and the Roman Literary Culture,” 223–24. Slaves who are sick have their rations limited (*Agr.* 2.4), and on rainy days slaves can perform numerous other tasks if they cannot work outside, even if it is simply mending their own clothing (*Agr.* 2.3). Cato is highly specific and detailed regarding the diet of slaves, which is a high-carbohydrate diet with very little protein, fruits, or vegetables (*Agr.* 56–59); see Sandra R. Joshel, *Slavery in the Roman World* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 131–32; Phyllis P. Bober, *Art, Culture, and Cuisine: Ancient and Medieval Gastronomy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 183. Cato gives details regarding the consumption of wine, often a contested matter in debates on slave management, and he also advises about the role of slaves in feasts such as the Saturnalia and Compitalia (*Agr.* 57). Clothing and blankets are regulated (*Agr.* 59). These precise guidelines for rationing not only show the intricacy of accounting on these villa estates, but the precise regulations concerning bodily needs reinforce the authority-based hierarchical taxonomy, and also lay bare its complexity. Female and child slaves had their respective roles to fulfill on these estates; Roth, *Thinking Tools*, 15–16. Thus, in Cato we have a source from the second century Republic, one that is very traditional and sentimental. Cato writes to an emerging class of Romans who were extremely wealthy and powerful, but absent from their villa estates. To help them cope with the challenges of this type of management by proxy, Cato writes a detailed and precise guide on *oikonomia* on these villa estates, and also gives advice to men on how to be the best *oikonomos*; see Brendon Reay, "Agriculture, Writing, and Cato’s Aristocratic Self-Fashioning," *Classical Antiquity* 24, no. 2 (2005): 331–61.

138. Glancy notes that slaves often served as surrogate bodies for their owners; Glancy, *Slavery in Early Christianity*, 15–16.


140. *Rust.* pref.3 (Ash 1:4–5): Nec post haec reor violentia caeli nobis ista, sed nostro potius accidere vitio, qui rem rusticam pessimo cuique servorum velut carnifici noxae dedimus, quam maiorum nostrorum optimus quisque optime tractaverat.
of late antiquity, they are important for understanding later agricultural attitudes and practices. The late ancient agronomist Palladius made use of these writings, especially those of Columella, in his own work on farming, and we should not underestimate their value for the period with which we are concerned. The lack of extensive writing on agriculture from this period also supports the use of these sources.

While these agronomists differed in many ways, they agreed that slave bodies should be manipulated so that they were optimally productive, since the main purpose of an estate was to generate maximum profits; any notion of natural slavery was absent. The Epicurean philosopher Philodemus (110–40 B.C.E.), on the other hand, argued that landowners should be interested not simply in maximizing profits, but should conduct their oikonomia in a virtuous manner, including treating their slaves well. It is not that Xenophon, Cato, Varro, and Columella were not concerned about virtue; they simply chose to emphasize economic profitability. These authors also agreed that slaves should not be treated harshly. They said this not only because they feared slave revolts, but also because treating slaves well would ensure optimum productivity. Philodemus wanted the estate manager to be a quasi virtuoso, not only helping to make a profit, but leading people toward the virtuous life—even slaves. This discourse persisted in later Christian rhetoric about slaveholding.

The suspicious attitude of late ancient Christian authors toward slaves is a testament to the influence of the Xenophonian understanding of slavery, and the views of the Roman agronomists. Most late ancient Christian authors, including Chrysostom, accepted the common stereotype that slaves were social outsiders, prone to laziness, theft, and other social vices, and also believed that the passions of slaves should be mastered by the slaveholder to ensure not only good and diligent work but also virtuous behavior. All these authors advised against the harsh treatment of slaves.

Metaphorical or Moral Slavery: The Stoics and Philo

The second development in classical and Hellenistic thought that served as a foundation for Roman slavery and influenced late ancient Christian doulology was the spread of the Stoic-Philonic ideology of metaphorical slavery. The development of metaphorical (or, as some call it, “spiritual” or “moral”) slavery in ancient thought is complex and difficult to trace. It seems that it emerged from a conceptual

143. In Chrysostom’s case, see *Hom.* 1 Cor. 40.6 (F2.515); *Hom.* Eph. 22.2 (F4.336–37); *Hom.* Phlm. arg. (F6.325–28); *Hom.* Tit. 4.1 (F6.298–99).
144. See *Hom.* Tit. 4.1 (F6.298).
conglomeration of power discourses both from “below,” pertaining to the regulation of bodily practices and performances during the Augustan era, and from “above,” within Stoic physics and psychotheological discursive formations. Metaphorical slavery also seems to have emerged from the interiorization of the principle of mastery. This principle provided masculinity with a new impetus: it no longer simply depended on the ability to master one’s wife, children, and slaves; a man also had to master his passions. It is incorrect, however, to suggest that the operation of interiorization occurred independently of the first development—namely, the denaturalization and alterization of slavery in Roman thought.

An example from the correspondence between Marcus Aurelius and Fronto helps to illustrate this. The young Marcus Aurelius describes his day to his mentor Fronto in a letter. He relates his sleeping patterns, the time he spent with his father and mother, his participation in religious sacrifices, and even his gargling routine. He also says that he read Cato’s *De agricultura* from eleven at night to about five in the morning. Why does Marcus Aurelius mention his reading of Cato? Why, in the first place, does he read Cato, especially at such strange hours while being ill? The entire correspondence is a record of Marcus Aurelius’s regimen; it describes his health in terms of sleep, eating, and hygiene, and it also provides insights into his familial and religious duties—all part of his self-fashioning. Marcus Aurelius, destined to be emperor, would probably never only lead the life of a farmer. So why does he read Cato? Because the Roman agronomical writings present the *vita rustica* as preparing the individual not simply for farming, but for governance. Based on Xenophon’s *Oeconomicus*, Cato’s work prepares someone like Marcus Aurelius for domination—not only of others, but also of himself. Agronomical writings such as Cato’s thus served a purpose in self-fashioning and subject formation and portrayed both the exterior and the interior dimensions of mastery. Marcus Aurelius reads Cato not to become a farmer, but to become an emperor—one who must govern himself and others.

This interiorization of mastery formed part of a larger socio-intellectual enterprise—the idealization of individualism in Augustan Rome, especially with the Augustan reforms pertaining to the control of sexuality, as well as the rise of Stoic ethics and asceticism. As we have seen above in the case of Marcus Aurelius, the political self is now essentially defined as one who governs himself, and this makes him capable of ruling over others. Unbridled indulgence in the passions was to be avoided. This was enforced juridically by Augustan legislation, and

145. *Ep. 4.6* (Haines 180–82); see Foucault, *Hermeneutics of the Subject*, 160–61.
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also popularized philosophically by Stoicism (and perhaps even earlier by Cynicism). One’s passions had the potential to enslave the self, and true freedom could be gained only when there was control of the passions.

The notion of the soul (psykhē) also plays a role. While the Christian concept of the soul had hamartiological and soteriological aspects, it also had a very strong ethical background. Foucault juxtaposes the Christian invention of the soul with the formulation of the soul as a power over the body, but I am of the opinion that the distinction proposed by Foucault is not really visible. The notion of the soul as a technology of power and self-control was indeed prevalent in Christianity, especially in patristic literature, because of the strong Stoic influence on early Christian thinking. Foucault has shown how the concept of the soul became a technology of power over the body,148 and in this formulation the soul represented those mechanisms that should exercise control over the passions. The soul virtually became a prison for the body. It should also be remembered that the soul was seen as a material entity, having a very physical effect on the body; an enslaved soul resulted in the deterioration of the health of the body.149 In line with the Augustan reforms, Stoic ethics became increasingly concerned with the problem of enslavement to the passions, and here we have the popularization of metaphorical slavery in the Roman world. By means of those psychic technologies of control over bodily passions, the self can truly be free and the body in good health, and this freedom became a defining trait of Roman masculinity.

But the Stoics also promoted a shift from “above” in the development of their physics. In Stoic physics, the principle of holistic oikonomia was elevated to a new level in the form of divine oikonomia. Stoic physics was very dependent on two interrelated concepts: nature (physis) and reason (logos).150 The nature of the cosmos is rational, it is guided by the divine Logos, and within nature there is also a certain arrangement or order (dioikēsis). Naturalizing a concept therefore gives it not only authority, but also structure—there exists a predetermined order, which is good for copying.151 Aristotle did the same in his theory of natural slavery, although the Stoics used nature in a different way, which had a direct influence on how they understood both metaphorical and institutional slavery.152 Not one Stoic author agreed with the concept of natural slavery, although there is also no

evidence of any Stoic directly opposing Aristotle’s formulations of natural slavery.\textsuperscript{153} The metaphorization of slavery by the Stoics came at the cost of not giving much attention to the social problem of institutional slavery, often leading to indifference about the matter. The Stoics rather emphasized moral slavery.\textsuperscript{154} Because slavery is not a natural phenomenon, but rather a legal phenomenon and the result of fate, it makes no difference to one’s ability to live a good and virtuous life—it is merely a social title.\textsuperscript{155}

For the sake of brevity, I will use the first-century Stoic writer Seneca’s formulation of divine \textit{oikonomia}, metaphorical slavery, and institutional slavery as an example to illustrate the dynamics of the metaphorization of slavery. Seneca is well known for his \textit{Epistle 47}, in which he calls for the “humane” treatment of slaves. Seneca bases this principle on the grounds of divine \textit{oikonomia}:

Kindly remember that he whom you call your slave sprang from the same stock, is smiled upon by the same skies, and on equal terms with yourself breathes, lives, and dies. It is just as possible for you to see in him a free-born man as for him to see in you a slave. . . . I do not wish to involve myself in too large a question, and to discuss the treatment of slaves, towards whom we Romans are excessively haughty, cruel, and insulting. But this is the kernel of my advice: Treat your inferiors as you would be treated by your betters. And as often as you reflect how much power you have over a slave, remember that your master has just as much power over you. “But I have no master,” you say. You are still young; perhaps you will have one.\textsuperscript{156}

Masters ought to treat their slaves humanely because they “sprang from the same stock” or seed (\textit{semen}; in the Greek sense we have the \textit{logos spermatikos}); in other words, they share the same preexistential origin.\textsuperscript{157} In Stoic reasoning, the


\textsuperscript{154} See Dio Chrysostom, \textit{2 Serv. lib.} 15.29.1–8 (Cohoon 170–71).


spermfunction of the divine *Logos* is that it establishes an isomorphism between the slave and the master.\(^{158}\) There is also an inherent cyclicity in this type of reasoning. Since nature consists of life cycles—birth, growth, and death—both slave and master are entrapped within these cycles. But there is also the cycle of enslavement, and in one breath a slave can become free, and a master can become enslaved. Similar reasoning is presented by Epictetus, who mentions the universal kinship of humanity,\(^{159}\) and Cicero, who states that all human beings are the offspring of the gods.\(^{160}\) There is a telling feature of divine *oikonomia* in Seneca’s statement about the power of a master over a slave. Seneca is not only referring to the power of the slaveholder as conferred upon him or her by society. In Stoic thinking the universal *Logos* had a *hegemonikon*, “a soul center from which the powers go into the body,”\(^{161}\) and this great *hegemonikon* governed power within the cosmos. Seneca’s reasoning then entails that while the master may have power over his or her slave, there is also the *hegemonikon* of the universal *Logos* that governs the slaveholder. This view of Stoic physics fed into the previous view that the self had to master its passions. Stoic metaphysical naturalism also denaturalized slavery. These then were the two crucial moves that popularized the notion of metaphorical slavery: the enslavement and/or mastery of the passions by means of psychic technologies of control, and the view of Stoic physics that there is a divine *oikonomia* and a universal *hegemonikon* that governs all of nature.

Stoic physics and ethics were very influential in early Christian thinking, but many of the Stoic ideologies were transmitted into early Christianity through the intermediary of Hellenistic Judaism. This transmission is most clear in the works of Philo and Paul the apostle. In their writings we have the discourses of mastering the passions and divine *oikonomia* intact, although the latter would undergo some evolution. Philo in particular transformed the Stoic concept of divine *oikonomia* into the unique notion of slavery to God.\(^{162}\) Slavery to the divine is implicit in Stoic writings, as seen above, although it certainly had a different character and emphasis in Philonic literature.


\(^{160}\) Cicero, *Leg.* 1.24 (Keyes 340–43); see Fitzgerald, ”Treatment of Slaves,” 156.

\(^{161}\) Meijer, *Stoic Theology*, 5.

In the first century C.E., Philo wrote a treatise entitled *De agricultura*. At this time, when the works of Cato the Elder and Varro on agriculture were well in circulation, there is already a noticeable shift in philosophical thinking toward the notion of the cultivation of the soul—the main theme of Philo’s work. Although Cato, for instance, emphasized the importance of maximizing profit from agricultural holdings, it is clear from the letter of Marcus Aurelius that Cato’s work on agriculture lent itself to interiorization and self-fashioning. While an author like Philodemus was concerned with how the householder and farmer could fulfill their duties in an ethical manner, rather than focusing only on profit making, with Philo there is a complete shift away from physical agriculture to the cultivation of the soul as a landscape within itself.

The leap from Cato, and implicitly Xenophon, to Philo is not as great as one may think. Agricultural language seems to have been quite useful to Philo in explaining the management of the self, and the metaphor of slavery to the passions is very common in his treatise. Every person is now a farmer, or a shepherd, and the inner workings of the self are related to the dynamics of rural occupations. In *De agricultura* the discourse operates on a very high level of abstraction. The shepherd, for instance, is one who controls bodily appetites as a shepherd controls livestock. In contrast, a cattle feeder is simply one who feeds the desires of the body, and is in fact a slave of the passions. The thinking here is that a shepherd controls the livestock, manages them, while the cattle feeder, who simply feeds the animals, is a slave of them. Philo did not believe that any human being could be totally free, and psychic bondage is only one side of the metaphysical coin. Philo’s thinking was firmly entrenched in the notion of corporeal heteronomy. “Since then it has been shown that no mortal can in solid reality be lord of anything, and when we give the name of master we speak in the language of mere opinion, not of real truth,” Philo says, “since too, as there is subject and servant, so in the universe there must be a leader and a lord, it follows that this true prince and lord must be one, even God, who alone can rightly claim that all things are His possessions.” Whether one is a master over real slaves or a master over one’s passions, the fact remains that every master is a slave, a slave of God. The integration of slavery to the passions and slavery to God is seamless. Philo is simply one of the testimonies to the development of what John Byron calls a “Jewish slave of God.”

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164. Ibid., 120–62.
165. Philo, *Cher.* 83 (Colson and Whitaker 60–61): ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν θνητός οὐδὲς οὐδενὸς ἐπιδέδεικται παγίως καὶ βεβαίως κύριος, οἳ δὲ λεγόμενοι δεσπόται δοξή μόνον, οὐ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν, ὄνομαὶ λέγονται, ἀνάγκη δὲ ὡς ὑπήκοον καὶ δουλόν, οὕτως ἡγεμόνα ἐν τῷ παντὶ εἶναι καὶ κύριον, γένοιτ’ ἐν ὅ τρ’ ὄντι ἄρχων καὶ ἡγεμόνων εἰς ὅ θεός, ψ’ λέγειν ἣν πρεπόδεικτον, ὅτι πάντα αὐτοῦ κτήματα.
Introducing Doulology. In his *Quod omnis probus liber*, Philo distinguishes between two forms of slavery: institutional slavery and moral/metaphorical slavery. There is a hybridity in Philo’s thinking here: he combines the Stoic notion of moral slavery with the view of the believer as a slave of God, the latter of which is undoubtedly an influence from his monotheistic and Jewish background. Slavery to God is an acceptable form of slavery for Philo, and he cites heroes like Abraham and Joseph as exemplary slaves of God. Philo explains: “For to be the slave of God is the highest boast of man, a treasure more precious not only than freedom, but than wealth and power and all that mortals most cherish.”

Most importantly, this interlocking of power discourses from Stoic and Philonic philosophy gave rise to the heteronomy of the body. It basically entails that, in ancient Judeo-Christian thought, all bodies were made to be ruled, and true somatic autonomy never really existed—the closest one could get to freedom was to be ruled by the most beneficial force, which also enabled the subject to rule over his or her passions, or submit to them. It is a universal doulologization of bodies.

Unfortunately, as already mentioned, the type of Stoic-Philonic thinking delineated above often leads to indifference with regard to institutional slavery. Most Stoic and Christian authors, including Chrysostom, agreed that one should not be concerned with one’s social status as slave or free, but rather with one’s moral and spiritual status as being enslaved to the passions or, in the case of Christian thinking, enslaved to sin and the devil. In chapter 2 we will look in detail at how the metaphor of slavery functioned in Chrysostom’s homilies through the intermediary of Pauline theology and ethics.

In conclusion, I want to stress again that the border between metaphorical and institutional slavery is opaque at best. This is also why the metaphorization of slavery must be viewed as a carceral mechanism in the economy of slavery. It is not at all possible to understand institutional slavery without examining its metaphorization, since the process of making metaphors of objects entails a complexification and to some extent a universalization of the discourse at hand—it takes the process of enunciation to an extremely potent level, and its power effects become

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168. For ancient Jewish views on slavery, see Hezser, *Jewish Slavery*.
distributed over a much wider symbolic expanse, and it often also transforms into other metadiscourses. The metadiscourses born from the metaphorization of slavery include the proliferation of masculinities, racism, and domination of minorities. The study of doulology is then distinctive in its mandate to investigate not only the separate operations of metaphorical and institutional slavery, but also their interactive dynamics with these metadiscourses.

Slavery studies have fostered extensive development of critical theory, as slavery as a discourse permeates a vast array of fields, from socioeconomic and political studies to archaeology and literary studies, and so on. The development of critical theory is evident in Orlando Patterson’s *Slavery and Social Death* (1982), for instance, in which the comparatisms and dialectics of slavery are examined within a very wide historical scope. In the field of early Christian studies, to cite another example, Jennifer Glancy’s *Slavery in Early Christianity* (2002) demonstrates the utility of understanding slavery from a corporeal and a habitual perspective, as we have seen above.

This book aims to continue this tradition of utilizing critical theoretical approaches in the study of slavery by examining the discourse of slavery in Chrysostom’s homilies, within the wider enterprise that is cultural historiography. More specifically, the approach to slavery here falls within the framework of new cultural history. One of the trademarks of this new paradigm in cultural historiography is its valuation of the body—that is, the history and rhetoric of the body, and its occurrence in discourse and practice. The most important theorists who will figure in my approach to slavery in this book are Michel Foucault, Michel de Certeau, and Pierre Bourdieu, all of whom have made considerable contributions to the development of new cultural theory.

In sum, then, I am interested in revealing the discourse of slavery embedded in Chrysostom’s homilies by examining how the slave body is enunciated therein. The slave body does not speak itself, but is spoken for by the operations of corporeal domination. In his earlier work, Foucault showed that this process of creating discourse, the formation of discursive enunciations, occurs as a modal and positional operation. The slave body, then, is not simply enunciated within its discursive framework (that is, the economy of slavery), but is put into discourse from a position, a somatic enunciative modality and positionality—that is, a “mode” in which, and a “position” from which, the slave body is enunciated.

Doulology then enunciates itself from a network of symbolic positionalities, a conceptual and interconnected framework of discourses. It is impossible to
understand ancient slavery in a discursive vacuum. It has permeated other aspects of ancient life so thoroughly that it is almost impossible to isolate it without seriously affecting its nature. The discourses I will highlight in this instance are the metaphor of slavery and its theologization, which has already been treated in some detail in this introduction, and the modalizations of domesticity—specifically the pastoralization of the household and its slaves, education, discipline and punishment, and sexuality. At the intersection of these discourses and modalizations we find the interlocking of power that epitomizes the kyriarchal hold on the slave body.

Chapter 2 investigates the metaphor of slavery in Chrysostom’s theology, as well as the relevance of the heteronomy of the body. Chrysostom was very dependent on the thinking of Paul in this regard, and like Paul, he also juxtaposed slavery to God to slavery to sin and the passions. This chapter explores the role of sin in the dynamics of doulology, since Chrysostom does not attribute slavery to nature or fate, but to sin and disobedience. Central to this discussion is the dynamics of free moral agency, as well as how slavery, through the catalyst of hamartiology (the discourse of sin), functioned in other modes of Chrysostom’s theology, especially his anthropology, cosmology, Christology, and eschatology. Thus, the chapter concerns the theologization of the slave metaphor. Chapter 2 also examines slavery to the passions. Although slavery to sin and slavery to the passions are inseparable in Chrysostom, they have different emphases and implications for behavior and status. The discussion of slavery to the passions in chapter 2 will focus on Chrysostom’s reading of 1 Corinthians 7:21–23, and why Chrysostom feels that it is better to be an institutional slave than a slave of sin and the passions.

Chapter 3 examines the place of slavery within Chrysostom’s program of domestic pastoralization. The chapter starts by delineating the nature and dynamics of domestic pastoralization, especially as it relates to the slaves in the household. Domestic pastoralization had implications both for the character of the slave in contrast to the wife and children, and for the number of slaves a household was supposed to have. Chapter 3 focuses on the latter to distinguish between strategic slaveholding, based on a large number of slaves, and tactical slaveholding, based on a minimal number of slaves—which Chrysostom promotes. The chapter concludes with an examination of the implications of pastoralization and tactical slaveholding for elite Roman aristocrats, including women, and how pastoralization and tactical slaveholding relate to the crisis of masculinity in the fourth century.

Chapter 4 considers the role of slaves in education and the formation of masculinity according to Chrysostom. Slaves were very involved in educational practices in the Roman world, and their involvement, chapter 4 argues, both reproduced and destabilized patriarchal and kyriarchal power. Attention is given to Chrysostom’s comments on the offices of nurse and pedagogue, which were most commonly occupied by slaves or former slaves. The nurse and pedagogue were the most important and influential slave figures in the life of a Roman child. Nurses
both suckled and cared for infants, and even after infancy, they helped to protect the modesty of the young Roman girl. Pedagogues were key in guiding the young *filiusfamilias* to manhood. The pedagogue not only had to school the boy in formal education, as a tutor and assistant to the teacher, but also had to teach the boy masculine virtue and what it meant to be a slaveholder. In addition to the nurse and pedagogue, the chapter highlights the role of ordinary household slaves in the education of children. It concludes by looking at how slaves themselves were educated.

Chapter 5 delineates those discursivities related to the discipline and punishment of slaves. The very essence of slave life was the slave’s capacity to be disciplined, punished, or rewarded. Chapter 5 starts by looking at how Chrysostom envisions the discipline of slaves, which is directly related to the teaching of virtue, or aretagogy. What was the dynamic between virtue, essentially a discourse of masculinization, and doulology? Why should slaves be taught virtue, and what did it mean for their status and identity as slaves? A second aspect of discipline, which was also part of aretagogy, was surveillance. In ancient thought, slaves always had to be monitored to ensure good productivity and behavior. But how does Chrysostom envision slave surveillance? As will be shown, Chrysostom introduces the notion of the Christic panopticon for the surveillance of slaves. Finally, chapter 5 discusses Chrysostom’s comments on the punishment of slaves, specifically the theological justification, methods, and limits of punishment.

Chapter 6 addresses the exploitation, regulation, and restructuring of slave sexualities as presented in Chrysostom. Slaves were viewed as bodies to be used and abused by their owners, especially sexually. Chrysostom opposes such exploitation of slaves, and does so by totally restructuring the concept of slave sexuality within his wide project of domestic pastoralization. Chapter 6 investigates how Chrysostom restructures slave sexuality in the context of his universal sexual ethics related to marriage, adultery, and sexual dishonor; it also explores the problem of prostitution, one of the greatest domestic threats in Chrysostom’s view. Finally, the chapter takes up the question of eunuchism and castration.

The conclusion of this book not only summarizes the points raised above, but also looks at their relevance in understanding slavery as a discourse preached by Chrysostom. It is widely accepted that Christianity did not ameliorate slavery; however, Christianity did not leave slavery untouched. Thus, we must ask, what can be deduced from Chrysostom’s homilies about how Christianity changed late Roman slavery, and what are the implications of these findings for the broader study of slavery in antiquity?

The purpose of this book is to discover the lost bodies of slaves in the pages of Chrysostom’s homilies. The appearance of these bodies is phantasmal at best, and the voices of slaves are silent, without any possibility of being adequately and justly recovered. Slavery is a great failure of humanity, with an enduring legacy. Perhaps
then, in analyzing the discourse of slavery as it manifested itself in antiquity in authors like Chrysostom, we may be able to more clearly discern the disturbing legacy of slavery in our own context. In this way, a study on slavery becomes an act of academic activism. If this book can in some way assist in identifying and critiquing the discursive tremors of slavery not only within the project of late ancient cultural historiography, but also in the broader study of slavery in human society, and in some way challenge and resist that oppressive legacy, it will have been a worthwhile endeavor.