Is development “good” or “bad” for women? Does development weaken or strengthen patriarchy and gender inequality? In what ways do economic processes affect women’s labor force participation and social positions? How do gender relations change in the course of the social transformations brought about by development and modernization? How do women’s political participation, civil society activism, and other forms of female mobilization change the course of politics or influence institutions and policies? These are among the major questions that have preoccupied feminist sociologists of development, who are situated within the broader field of women, gender, and development.¹

The sociology of development and the field of women/gender and development have sometimes intersected but are, in general, parallel fields of research; although gender and development sociologists are fully conversant with the mainstream literature, the reverse typically is not the case. This argument cannot be developed in the present chapter, although it is worth noting that in international policy circles, the work of feminist development researchers from sociology and the other disciplines represented in the field has tended to have some impact on debates and policy initiatives. Here, the main objective is to provide an overview of the evolution of the field of women, gender, and development, with a focus on contributions by sociologists, and to draw attention to the conceptual and empirical contributions of feminist sociologists of development.

Over the years, at least two features distinguish feminist development sociology from other streams in the development literature. First are the advocacy underpinnings, wherein most studies have approached issues and problems pertaining to women in the
development process in terms not only of what is but also of what ought to be. Some studies steeped in Marxist, socialist, or world-systems analysis have offered trenchant critiques of capitalism. Others have been policy-oriented, with recommendations for initiatives or interventions to improve women’s conditions. Most studies have analyzed women’s participation and rights as well as the contributions of female productive and reproductive labor to economic growth, social development, and democratization. Second, feminist development scholarship is characterized methodologically and conceptually by a holistic approach that eschews positivism in favor of broad analysis and mixed methods; studies also have tended to be inter- and cross-disciplinary, approaching questions and problems from a broad perspective and within a complex framework. As such, both the focus on advocacy and the non-positivist method may be said to conform to what has sometimes been called feminist methodology.

This overview of the wide-ranging research that constitutes the field of women, gender, and development, focused on the feminist sociology of development, touches on the main issues and debates of the early years, the prescient critique of (capitalist) development and growth, the focus on state policies and institutions in connection with women’s participation and rights, and elucidation of the operations of gender in development policies and projects. Also included is a brief discussion of the shifts from women in development (WID) to women and development (WAD) and finally to gender and development (GAD).

WOMEN AND GENDERED DEVELOPMENT: THE EARLY YEARS

When theories of economic development were emerging in the 1950s and 1960s, little or no attention was paid to women’s productive roles. In policy circles, if women were discussed at all, it was in relation to their role as mothers, an approach that came to be known as the welfare or motherhood approach. Development was still considered to be a technical problem rather than imbued with political or ideological dimensions. Women and children were regarded as real or potential victims of the disruptive nature of development (or of modernization); the literature thus recommended that development efforts take household welfare into account and ensure that women and children benefited from social and economic change. Here, the domestic and reproductive roles of “Third World” women were emphasized, along with issues pertaining to population, health, nutrition, and literacy (see Moser 1993; Rathgeber 1990; Tinker 1990).

In the 1960s and 1970s, Third World states were engaged in modernization and economic development, launching state-owned industries, providing jobs and housing, and subsidizing food and utilities. Development specialists drew attention to the role of the state in the provision of public services such as health and education and in the development of agriculture and the rural sector. The policy field was oriented toward the achievement of “basic needs,” but, on the left, the sociology of development was influenced by theories of development and underdevelopment associated with the Latin
American “dependency school” and the Marxist approach to capitalism. The writings of Theotonio Dos Santos, Paul Baran, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Andre Gunder Frank, Samir Amin, Walter Rodney, and Immanuel Wallerstein influenced perhaps two generations of development researchers. This is the environment that helped launch research on women and development.

In 1970, Danish economist Ester Boserup published a book that would give rise to the new field of study. Offering an ambitious historical analysis, *Woman’s Role in Economic Development* described “male and female farming systems” and their implications for women’s economic participation; explored the effects of colonialism and development on women and families; and described different patterns of women’s work in rural and urban settings across world regions. A central insight drawn from her fieldwork in Africa was that modern development projects tended to favor men and marginalize women from agricultural activity, and that, by displacing women, development projects unintentionally contributed to lower food production and household poverty. Development projects failed, she argued, because they did not take women into account. Boserup’s study interested some practitioners, policymakers, and advocates, with the result that the U.S. Agency for International Development opened an Office of Women in Development (Tinker 1990). Here the concern was to overturn the marginalization that Boserup had described and ensure that women were adequately integrated into the development process, especially in rural sectors. Thus was born the women-in-development (WID) approach and research community. The WID strategy focused on women as a group and sought to address the exclusion of women from the development process, emphasizing that, if development incorporated and included women’s productive capacity, it would be more efficient.

Meanwhile, in sociology, concepts of “sex roles” and “women’s status”—inspired in part by modernization theories—were applied toward an understanding of similarities and differences in women’s social positions across cultures and countries (Abadan-Unat 1981; Giele and Smock 1977; Kagitcibasi 1982; Kandiyoti 1977; Safilios-Rothschild 1971). Janet Giele (1977) offered a useful framework that could be applied cross-nationally, and it seemed informed by feminist concepts of patriarchy and liberal notions of autonomy, equality, and choice. That study and others were occurring in the context of second-wave feminism, which was leading to the formulation of theories of women’s subordination and advocacy for equality.

The entry of women into the development arena became a subject of interest to the United Nations and its programs, funds, and specialized agencies. UNESCO monitored progress in literacy and education for women and girls, and it produced reports and datasets that were used by scholars; its director-general expressed support for women’s educational attainment and social participation. Issues of women in development were discussed at the first U.N. world conference on women, held in Mexico City in 1975, and became part of the U.N.’s Decade for Women (1976–85): Equality, Development, and Peace. The International Labour Organization—along with its
secretariat in Geneva, the International Labour Office (ILO)—sponsored studies on the undercounting of women in rural activities and agricultural production (see, e.g., Bene\-ria 1982). WID policy frameworks, replete with checklists, were designed to ensure women’s integration in and benefits from development projects. Many U.S. universities established women-in-development programs, especially at land-grant universities, and, at Michigan State University, sociologist Rita Gallin set up a WID working papers series. Women members of the International Sociological Association (ISA) formed the Research Committee on Women in Societies, known as RC-32 and still among the largest of the ISA research committees. Several members—including Fatima Mernissi, Deniz Kandiyoti, and Hanna Papanek—also helped organize a conference at Wellesley College that produced a book on women and national development (Wellesley Editorial Commit-tee 1977).

Across the Third World, a stratum of women was becoming educated and finding employment in the growing public sector, but many women remained illiterate and poor. Influenced by both feminist and dependency theories, some WID specialists came to criticize the focus on integration of women into what they regarded as a flawed economic process, and they formulated a line of thinking that came to be known as women and development (WAD). Here emphasis was placed on international inequalities, the persistence of poverty, and the exploitation of women in capitalist development (Beneria and Sen 1981; Fernández-Kelly 1983). It was argued that social inequalities and the long-standing sexual division of labor rendered women subordinate and vulnerable to projects that did not take their interests into account. As patriarchy and capitalism limited the options available to women, women’s advancement was not possible within established structures. WAD took issue with large governmental projects and advocated smaller-scale projects and local participation, calling in part for women-only projects to ensure participation and prevent male domination (Rathgeber 1990). Ecofeminists such as Vandana Shiva, Maria Mies, and Hilkka Pietila formulated profound critiques of development and economic growth as undermining both people’s welfare and the natural environment. Parallel to the WAD critique, scholars writing from within the world-systems theoretical paradigm pointed to processes such as “housewifization” that were generated by capitalist development (von Werlhof 1983; Mies 1986); to the inverse relationship between dependency and the status of women, measured in part by fertility rates (Ward 1984); and to the role of female labor, both paid and unpaid, in the semi-proletarian households of the capitalist world economy (Mies 1982; Smith, Waller-stein, and Evers 1984). In a related but separate line of inquiry, radical economists and Marxist- or socialist-feminist sociologists debated the evolution of the sexual division of labor and its relationship to capitalist development and patriarchy (Barrett 1980; Folbre 1982; Humphries 1991). Both the effects of capitalist development on women and the effects of the sexual division of labor on national and global growth strategies were being studied and theorized, albeit in the absence of consensus on dynamics, outcomes, and solutions.
A debate taking place at the time revolved around whether female labor was being marginalized or integrated into modernization and development, and if development could advance women’s longer-term interests (see, e.g., Moghadam 1992a). Following Boserup and the dependency school, but in a Marxian vein, Heleith Safiotti (1978) made a strong case for female marginalization as a key feature of the capitalist mode of production, arguing that women’s labor was being absorbed into the subsistence/marginal/informal sector of the economy. This was consistent with studies of the growth of the informal sector in the Third World (see, e.g., Portes and Walton 1981). In contrast, John Humphrey (1984) argued that female labor force participation had in fact increased in the Brazilian manufacturing sector as well as in the economy overall. Others began to study the growth of “world market factories” producing garments and electronics along the U.S.-Mexican border and in free trade zones in Southeast Asia (see, e.g., Elson and Pearson 1981; Nash and Fernández-Kelly 1983). Alison MacEwen Scott (1986) used census data and her own field research in Peru to argue against the “marginalization thesis.” Susan Tiano (1987) synthesized the debates by posing the question of whether women were being integrated, marginalized, or exploited by development, and, on the basis of her research on women in the Mexican maquila industry, she concluded that all three were occurring (see also Tiano 1994).

Confirming the “integration and exploitation” thesis, studies by other feminist social scientists showed how world market factories in Latin America and Southeast Asia were drawing on cheap female labor to generate profits (Elson and Pearson 1981; Heyzer 1986; Beneria and Roldan 1987). In an influential study, Fred Pampel and Kazuko Tanaka (1986) used data for seventy countries and two time points—1965 and 1970—to conclude that development initially forces women out of the labor force, but at advanced levels it increases female participation. Examining changes in female labor force participation (FLFP) between 1970 and 1980 in South Korea, Sunghee Nam (1991) found support for modernization theory’s prediction of higher levels of FLFP with rising educational attainment and for arguments that economic status and household need propelled women in the labor market in the context of export-led manufacturing. In a cross-national study, Roger Clark, Thomas Ramsbey, and Emily Adler (1991) argued that, though the more developed countries had higher FLFP rates, “culture” as a variable was found to be an explanation for lower levels of female employment in other regions.

Some research on women and capitalist development was premised on the Marxist notion of women as a “reserve army of labor,” in that semi-proletarianized women were recruited and expelled as necessary during the course of their life cycle or that of the family. Other researchers stressed the diverse forms of female labor incorporation into the world economy: in productive and reproductive sectors alike, and as wage and non-wage workers (Safa 1995). In the formal sector, female labor seemed to be preferred because it had a lower cost than male labor; it reduced the cost of labor power overall;
women could be paid less than men for their labor, whether in a factory or in home-based paid labor; and women’s “nimble fingers” were deemed especially suited to the garments and electronics sectors. Ruth Pearson and Swasti Mitter (1993) highlighted the vulnerability of female labor in low-skilled information processing sectors. Policies were thus seen as infused with gendered notions of work, incomes, and household management. For example, women became the target of a new program to alleviate poverty: microlending. Research had found that poor women tended to contribute a higher proportion of their income to family subsistence, holding back less for personal consumption. They were thus deemed to be good borrowers, favored by the microfinance industry (Blumberg 1989a, 2004). Scott put it thus: “[G]ender plays a role in structuring labour markets not just as cheap labour, but as subordinate labour, docile labour, immobile labour, domesticated labour, sexual labour, and so on” (1986, 673). Not only policies but also the economic theories that underpinned them were increasingly seen as gendered, as a growing community of feminist economists found. Diane Elson (1991) and contributors illustrated the “male bias” in neoclassical economic theory as well as in development processes.

From a somewhat different perspective, ILO labor economist Guy Standing (1989) offered a new analysis of changing (gendered) production relations under post-Keynesian policy conditions. His influential paper showed that the increasing globalization of production and the pursuit of flexible forms of labor to retain or increase competitiveness, as well as changing job structures in industrial enterprises, favored the “feminization of employment” in the dual sense of an increase in the numbers of women in the labor force and a deterioration of work conditions in terms of labor standards, income, and employment status. The decline of the social power of labor and of trade unions was a contributing factor, he argued.4

The focus on the varied forms of female labor incorporation was reflected in many studies appearing in the 1980s and 1990s of women and development, now fully informed by feminist concepts of the gendered nature of historical and social processes. The new gender-and-development (GAD) field was firmly rooted in feminist theorization of gender as a category of analysis, a source of power and inequality, a social identity, and a social marker or locus of oppression that intersected with others, such as class and race or ethnicity. The category “woman” or “women” was not discarded, but a principal goal now was to elucidate the gendered nature of the institutions, relations, policies, ideologies, and norms that shaped the development process. The social relations of gender were posited as both dependent and independent variables, so to speak, in connection with development. In the GAD perspective, economic or labor market arrangements—whether stable or changing—were infused with gender.

An example was the increasing informalization of the labor force. Many GAD studies examined women’s roles in the informal sector, the growth of home-based work, and the informalization of previously formal types of employment (Rakowski 1994; Reddock 1994; Boris and Prügl 1996; Beneria 2001; Purkayastha and Subramaniam 2004).
Unregistered and small-scale urban enterprises, home-based work, and self-employment fall into the informal sector category, and they include an array of commercial, productive, and service activities—which policymakers later came to celebrate as “entrepreneurship.” Here was a domain that provided cheap goods and services to the poor and thus relieved capital and the state of responsibility for jobs and welfare. Informalization was tied to employer efforts to increase flexibility and lower labor and production costs through subcontracting, but it was also a form of economic survival for semi-proletarian households. Drawing on existing gender ideologies regarding women’s roles and attachment to family, subcontracting arrangements continued to encourage the persistence of home-based work (Beneria and Roldan 1987; Gallin 1996).

These observations and arguments seemed to confirm the postulates of world-system theory regarding the role of the household and the housewife in (exploitative) production processes and capital accumulation. Wilma Dunaway argued that commodity chains are embedded in households and that “every node of every commodity chain is embedded in the gendered relations of households” (2001, 11). The hidden inputs of women and households into capitalist commodity chains, she argued, operate at three levels: women bearing and raising successive generations of workers; women’s unpaid labor for the present or future workers in the family/household; and core women diminish their own household hardships because they are subsidized by the peripheral women whose low-paid and unpaid labor keeps prices low. Dunaway concluded: “If, then, we engender commodity chains, we will discover that the tentacles of the world-system are entwined around the bodies of women” (2001, 23).

Other features of women’s labor incorporation described in the literature pertained to unemployment (Moghadam 1995a, 1995b), occupational sex segregation (Anker 1998), women’s poverty and female-headed households (Blumberg 1993; Chant 1995, 2007; Moghadam 1998a), and wage and income disparities. On average, women globally earned 75 percent of men’s wages, with a narrower wage gap in the public sector than in the private sector. Explanations for the gender gap were varied; some theories pointed to lower education and intermittent employment among women workers while others emphasized the presence of gender bias. Research showed that in Ecuador, Jamaica, and the Philippines, women earned less than men in the 1990s despite higher qualifications, a problem that was especially acute in the private sector (World Bank 1995, 41). Labor market segmentation along gender lines perpetuated the income gap. Pearson and Mitter (1993) found that, in the computing and information-processing sectors, the majority of high-skilled jobs went to male workers, whereas women were concentrated in the low-skilled ones.

Still, female labor was not in great demand in every region of the world economy. In the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), the formal sector remained male dominated (Moghadam 2013b). Nor did research find an influx of MENA women in the informal sector (Lobban 1998), contrary to findings for Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa. In a number of writings, I attributed low levels of female employment in MENA to the
The oil economy plays a key role in determining women’s employment in at least three ways. First, the oil sector is capital-intensive, and, though it employs relatively few workers overall, it is male-intensive. Second, a state’s receipt of oil revenues from export softens the incentive to diversify the economy and open it up to labor-intensive, export-led manufacturing that favors female employment (of the kind that has been characteristic of East and Southeast Asian economies). Third, oil revenues enable high wages for male workers; at the household level, that reality attenuates the need for women to seek employment. I also identified a “patriarchal gender contract” inscribed in Muslim family law as an institutional obstacle (Moghadam 2013b, chap. 3).

Indeed, a number of studies emphasized patriarchy—patriarchal relations within the home, patriarchal features of the state, or traditional gender ideologies—as a block on women’s economic participation and agency. Researchers working in this vein were not unaware of the capitalist environment that shaped women’s lives and work, but their studies highlighted the persistence of kinship structures, neopatriarchal states, or conservative ideologies and legal frameworks that limited female labor supply and demand. Anita Weiss (1992, 2010) examined sociocultural constraints on low-income women seeking work in Lahore, Pakistan. Sylvia Walby (1989, 229) referred to “a tension between patriarchy and capitalism over the exploitation of women’s labour.” She also differentiated the “private patriarchy” of the family from the “public patriarchy” of the state. John Lie (1996) examined the shift from “agrarian patriarchy” to “patriarchal capitalism” in the context of capitalist development in South Korea. I distinguished “neopatriarchal” states from developmental and modernizing states, arguing that strong states with the capacity to enforce laws could undermine customary discrimination and patriarchal structures—or they could reinforce them (Moghadam 2013b). The state could enable or impede the integration of women citizens into public life (Moghadam 1992b). As Jean Pyle (1990) found for the Republic of Ireland, state policy could have contradictory goals: development of the economy and expansion of services, on the one hand, and maintenance of the “traditional family,” on the other. Such contradictory goals could create role conflicts for women, who found themselves torn between the economic need or desire to work and the gender ideology that stressed family roles for women. The concept of patriarchy, therefore, was relevant to macro-level analyses of gender relations and of development, although—as Walby (1996, 24) pointed out—it needed to be elaborated in terms of its operations within household work, paid work, the state, male violence, sexuality, and cultural institutions.

Some of the most interesting case studies elucidating the tensions between patriarchal structures and ideologies, on the one hand, and the pull of capitalist development, on the other, were by Turkish sociologists. Often ethnographic in nature, their research was premised on the notion of the importance of formal sector labor for women’s empowerment but was also sensitive to working women’s own perceptions and aspirations. Yildiz Ecevit (1991), Hale Bolak (1995), and Nadir Sugur and Serap Sugur (2005)
explored the extent to which women’s factory employment was leading to a change in the sexual division of labor at home, with mixed findings. In a somewhat different vein, Deniz Kandiyoti’s influential article “Bargaining with Patriarchy” (1988) sought to show how women in different cultural contexts negotiated existing constraints to “maximize security and optimize life options,” with a comparison of coping strategies in sub-Saharan Africa and in the “classic patriarchy” of South Asia and the Muslim Middle East.

Across the world, the proletarianization and professionalization of women had cultural repercussions and sometimes entailed backlashes and gender conflicts. In some advanced capitalist countries, working women encountered serious forms of sexual harassment, although this was followed by legal suits, court cases, and new legislation. Mexico saw a series of grisly murders of female factory workers in Ciudad Juárez. In the larger countries of the Middle East, women’s increasing participation in the labor force and growing presence in public space was accompanied in the 1980s by subtle or overt pressures that women conform to religious dictates concerning dress. Hence, in Egypt, many professional women came to don modest dress and to cover their hair. In the early years of the Islamist movements, the influx of women into the workforce raised fears of competition with men, leading to calls for the re-domestication of women, as occurred in Iran immediately after the 1979 Islamic revolution. Later, Islamists in Iran, Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey did not call on women to withdraw from the labor force—indeed, the female adherents of Islamism came to include a segment of the educated and employed female population—but they did insist on veiling, spatial and functional segregation, and the retention of women’s essential role as wife and mother (Moghadam 2013b).

Such cultural obstacles and backlashes would seem to mitigate any longer-term benefits to women of the development process. And yet it was also the case that development—and such concomitants as the building of roads, clinics, schools, childcare centers, and universities, along with the creation of jobs in manufacturing, public and private services, and public administration—could provide for both women’s basic needs and their longer-term “strategic interests.” These contradictory tendencies continued to generate discussion and debate within the WID/WAD/GAD community.

THE NEOLIBERAL TURN AND FEMINIST DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH

If development had generated debates among WID/WAD/GAD scholars about effects on women’s productive and reproductive roles, the provision of basic needs, and women’s longer-term advancement, there was more consensus regarding the shift from Keynesian and dirigiste economic development to neoliberal economics via stabilization and structural adjustment policies. Indeed, a singular contribution of feminist studies of development lies in this area of research and advocacy. In the 1980s, WAD specialists began to document the adverse effects on poor and low-income women of structural adjustment policies designed by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the U.S.
Treasury to reduce debt and budget deficits in developing countries in the wake of volatility in commodity and financial markets. Feminist economists Gita Sen and Caren Grown (1987) noted that reduced government social spending meant additional burdens on women for the care of their family members, including children and the elderly, over and above their formal and informal economic activities. They emphasized the onerous nature of poor women's productive and reproductive labor and the lack of acknowledgment of women's roles in sustaining households and communities, and they called for the strengthening of women's movements to oppose the trend toward denationalization and price and trade liberalization. A series of studies then analyzed the impact of structural adjustment on women and the gendered nature of such policies (Bakker 1994; Beneria and Feldman 1992; Blumberg et al. 1995; Catagay and Ozler 1995; Chant 1995; Commonwealth Secretariat 1989; Elson 1991; Joekes 1989; Kabeer 1994; Moghadam 1995a, 1995b, 1998a, 1998b; Sparr 1994). While feminist economists began constructing models of gender and macroeconomics, sociologists drew on Marxist, modernization, stratification, and feminist theories, used a variety of methods, and linked micro- to macro-levels of analysis to explain the differential effects of economic restructuring on female labor and on gender relations. As Cathy Rakowski observed:

Economic change may be linked—under certain conditions and through women's increasing incomes relative to men's—to greater autonomy and decision-making power within the household and community. But under other conditions—especially the appropriation of women's unpaid labor or declining standards of living in general—economic change may contribute to greater inequality and subordination. These patterns confirm that the household and the family cannot be assumed to be a “unit” of members with mutual interests whose individual actions have as an implicit goal the welfare of the group. (1995, 287)

Further economic change came about through “neoliberal globalization,” which in the 1990s became the buzzwords for the post-Keynesian, post-statist, post-communist turn in international affairs and the global economy. Protectionism and the emphasis on national development were replaced by outsourcing and trade and price liberalization; stable employment was replaced by flexible employment arrangements; and privatization supplanted statist economic strategies. The informal sector, which had been deemed a problem in earlier decades, now became a solution, with the promotion of microlending for poverty-alleviation and small-scale entrepreneurship (Karides 2010). The financial sector had been growing for some time, and now it seemed to be the dominant sector, especially in the economies of the core countries. Globalization was said by its advocates to entail the expansion of a “knowledge economy” through education, technological innovation, skills-building, and business development. But while the knowledge economy has provided rewards for those women with higher education, multiple skills, and mobility, the downside of globalization has been quite deleterious to other groups of women.
The generation of jobs for women in world factories, free trade zones, or export-processing zones (EPZs) has enabled women in many developing countries to earn and control income and to break away from the hold of patriarchal structures, including traditional household and familial relations. However, much of the work available to women is badly paid, or demeaning, insecure, or unhealthy (Blumberg and Salazar-Paredes 2011), and women continue to face sexual harassment and cultural backlashes, whether in white-collar or blue-collar jobs—even if in many places women working for multinationals in the EPZs are better paid than in domestic firms. Poor working conditions persisted, and the April 2013 disaster in Bangladesh, where over a thousand garment workers were killed and more than two thousand injured when their badly built factory collapsed near Dhaka, was only one of the more tragic examples. In “state socialist” China, rural women sought to escape poverty and patriarchal controls by migrating to urban areas for factory jobs, but work conditions left much to be desired, with many industrial accidents; in addition, laws excluded such migrants from long-term settlement in the city (Lee 1998; Pun 2005). Female labor may have played a major role in the phenomenal growth of China’s export manufacturing, but it did so with little benefit to many of the women workers themselves.

Other effects of economic change have included female labor migration across borders and indeed, continents. Women from low-income households have traveled from, for example, the Philippines and Sri Lanka to work as nannies and maids in the Middle East, from Latin America and the Caribbean to do the same in Europe and North America, or from sub-Saharan Africa to work in nursing homes for the elderly in the United States. The remittances sent home by the women workers is an important source of revenue to the sending country, and their labor—whether as nannies, nurses, nursing-home aides, hotel and restaurant staff, or cleaners—is a critical economic contribution to the receiving country (Chang 2000; Pyle 2001; United Nations 2004), forming what some scholars have termed a “global care chain” or a key sector within the “care economy” (Beneria 2008; Folbre 2006; Hondagneu-Sotelo 2001; Moya 2007; Parrenas 2002; Razavi 2007; UNRISD 2005). There remains much scholarly debate, and policy disagreements, about the costs and benefits of labor migration. There is consensus, however, around one of the sadder outcomes of the collapse of communism: the migration of women from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union for work as prostitutes in Western Europe and even Turkey.

Neoliberal globalization—with its features of under-regulated financial markets and hyper-masculinity among the predominantly male finance workers—produced several serious financial crises between the Asian crisis of 1998 and the Great Recession of 2008, all of which were accompanied by job losses (Moghadam 2011). The gendered nature of neoliberalism was evident not only in the composition and behavior of the financial elite but also in the patterns of unemployment that followed the crises. The global recession that followed the 2008 financial crisis was initially called a “mancession” due to job losses by men in manufacturing and constructions sectors. Gradually,
more women lost pink collar and public sector jobs (Gottfried 2013; Rubery and Rafferty 2013).

From a WID perspective, with its focus on women’s marginalization and exclusion, the economic disempowerment of large sections of the female population by structural adjustment policies in developing countries, the transitions in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, and various financial crises that accompanied neoliberal globalization, would seem to have undermined, set back, or prevented the gains in women’s status, gender relations, and women’s income control that had come about or were expected with educational attainment and other aspects of development and modernization processes. For WAD and GAD researchers, the various transitions, restructurings, and crises reflect both gender and class dynamics. Effects on women depend on social class (or their relationship to the means of production), on positioning within the labor market, on the nature of state policies and legal frameworks, and on the dominant gender ideology. Many feminist researchers agree that neoliberal globalization has led to a polarization of women (and men) in the global economy and in world society: the highly educated with various skills and “cultural capital” have benefited from the availability of professional careers that are stable and well remunerated, whereas those with less education as well as a large proportion of young people are part of what Standing (2011) has termed the global precariat. The economic power of the wealthiest is also translated into political power and even the capacity to define “democracy.”

It is perhaps an irony of history that it was during the neoliberal era that the global women’s rights agenda developed most expansively, in the form of international treaties, funding for women’s NGOs, and the design of datasets to measure the progress of women and girls. GAD aligned itself with the global women’s rights agenda, endorsing and promoting such international instruments as the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, and the Millennium Development Goals of 2000–2015. These agreements call for the integration of women and gender issues in all development planning, policies, and projects (“gender mainstreaming”) along with mechanisms such as gender budgets and gender audits to realize the goal of gender equality in such areas as education, employment, and political participation (United Nations 1996). To monitor progress and compare trends, international datasets were developed by U.N. agencies and other international organizations, as well as by groups of academics, with various statistical measures and gender indicators, all now available online. Some include cross-national rankings and indices, such the U.N. Development Programme’s Gender and Development Index, which “engenders” its Human Development Index by accounting for women’s participation and rights; the programme’s Human Development indicators database also includes many indicators on women. More recently, The Economist magazine’s Intelligence Unit provides a “Women’s Economic Opportunity” index and rankings table. The World Bank’s Gender Data Portal provides descriptive statistics and information, and the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap database includes both
descriptive data and an index. The ILO’s labor force statistics database is gender-disaggregated, and the International Parliamentary Union provides data on women’s political participation, including their share of parliamentary seats. Academics use these international datasets but have also designed their own datasets. These include empowerment measurement frameworks by feminist scholars (e.g., Kabeer 1999; Moghadam and Senftová 2005; Walby 2005), the WomanStats database designed by feminist scholars at Brigham Young University, and the CIRI Human Rights database on civil, political, and social rights designed by two professors at Binghamton University and the University of Connecticut. The World Values Survey also provides gender-disaggregated data that is increasingly utilized by feminist development researchers to illustrate cross-national attitudes toward women’s economic and political participation and gender equality.10

As such, WID/WAD/GAD has “engendered” international development policymaking, at least to some extent; arguments for working “where women are” or “within the system” would accordingly seem to have some merit. However, GAD advocacy had no effect on the global system’s increasing financialization, which led to the Great Recession of 2008 and the continuing polarization and income gaps within countries, not to mention the persistence of poverty in sub-Saharan Africa and southern Asia. Nor has there been any effect on militarism and conflicts in various parts of the world. In this way, arguments that GAD has been depoliticized and its ideas co-opted and appropriated for stopgap measures rather than longer-term transformations also have merit. One might conclude from the present survey of feminist development research and advocacy that the wide-ranging and macro-level critiques of the ecofeminists and socialist feminists of the WAD perspective, along with those who adhere to Marxist and world-system analyses, retain their compelling explanatory power while also constituting a call for action. It should nevertheless be noted that scholarly research on forms of female labor deployment and advocacy for women’s economic empowerment has drawn attention to both the needed policy measures to improve women’s welfare and the necessary prerequisites for women’s collective action and social change.

**WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION AND POWER: WHY THEY MATTER**

Feminist development sociology is characterized by both critical analysis of what is and advocacy of what ought to be. From Friedrich Engels to sociologists such as Rae Lesser Blumberg (1984, 1989b) and Janet Chafetz (1984, 1990), theorists and advocates have argued that women’s economic independence is a prerequisite for involvement in political society. In turn, economic independence comes about through formal-sector labor or some form of income-generation and control. For Engels and Karl Marx, work in a capitalist economy was both a source of exploitation and a possibility for mobilization. In *Origins of the Family, Private Property and the State* ([1884] 1972), Engels refers to the “world-historical defeat of the female sex” in the wake of the agricultural revolution, which
entailed women’s marginalization from production and the establishment of codes of sexual control—or what historian Gerda Lerner (1987) later referred to as “the creation of patriarchy.” Patterns of female economic activity have varied over historical periods and systems of production, and—as we have seen—feminist theorists hypothesized “housewifization” or marginalization/domestication with the spread of capitalist relations of production or the development of capitalist modernity. If workers (male and female) faced exploitation at the sphere of production, women also faced it within the sphere of reproduction. For workers, the prospect of self-empowerment lay in the conditions of their existence (i.e., social production), which enabled class consciousness and mobilization toward broader social change. It stands to reason, then, that for women the first step toward self-empowerment is to enter the labor force and control the fruits of their labor.

Blumberg’s gender stratification theory emphasizes women’s degree of control of the means of production and the distribution of economic surplus. It is based on a broad empirical knowledge of diverse societal types, ranging from hunting and gathering through horticultural and agrarian systems to industrial societies. The degree of gender stratification, she argues, is inversely related to the level of economic power women can mobilize; conversely, the less economic power women can mobilize, the more likely are they to be oppressed physically, politically, and ideologically. The greater women’s economic power relative to men’s and the more women control their own lives, the greater their access will be to other sources of value in stratified social systems, especially honor and prestige, political power, and ideological support for their rights.

In Blumberg’s view (1984; 1989b, 163), gender inequalities are “nested” at diverse levels: male-female relations are nested in households; households are nested in local communities; and, if a society is sufficiently large to reveal a coercive state and a system of class stratification, household and community are nested inside of the class structure that, in turn, is lodged within a larger state-managed society. This nesting is important because women’s control of economic resources can be located at different levels, and the level at which their economic power is strongest influences the power that women can command at the other levels of social organization.

Chafetz’s 1990 book *Gender Equity: An Integrated Theory of Stability and Change* presents a set of models and propositions to explain both the forces maintaining a system of gender inequality and a theory of how such a system can be changed. In her conceptualization, three types of *gender social definitions* link macro- and meso-level coercive and voluntaristic processes: *gender ideology* (beliefs about basic differences between the sexes, often presumed to be biological; *gender norms* (expectations about appropriate forms of behavior for women and men); and *gender stereotypes* (accentuation of sex differences and presumed responses in specific situations). Change comes about as a result of sociodemographic, technological, economic, and political processes. These factors and the change they bring about are largely “unintended,” although sociologists now can predict longer-term societal and gender effects of such processes. But inten-
tional change can occur when elite males perceive that gender inequality threatens their status or their plans for the society, or when competing male elites seek to recruit women to their side. Such elites—in and around the state—will try to mobilize women's support in exchange for promises to ameliorate women's disadvantages in the division of labor and in the system of gender definitions. Such elite male-initiated reforms, along with long-term changes caused by industrialization, urbanization, and expansion of the middle classes, create an enabling environment for middle-class women who experience a sense of relative deprivation and have the material and educational resources to seek expanded opportunities outside their domestic responsibilities and pursue a wider set of interests. The formation of women's rights organizations and feminist movements follows.

The frameworks by Blumberg and by Chafetz retain their analytical power and may be applied toward an analysis of the relationship between women's economic empowerment and their political empowerment in different national contexts, and an understanding of where and when women's collective action might emerge and succeed. Blumberg's emphasis on the relationship between women's income control and women's empowerment might also help explain differences in women's status across cultures. For example, state failures in the development process, along with patriarchal barriers to women's employment and education in Pakistan and Yemen, are reflected in the low female labor force participation rates: 23 percent in Pakistan and 25 percent in Yemen. In 2010, the mean years of schooling for women were just 5 in Pakistan and a mere 2.5 in Yemen; women aged 25 and above with secondary schooling constituted just 18 percent in Pakistan and 7.6 percent in Yemen. Total fertility rates (average number of children per woman) were 3.2 in Pakistan and 5 in Yemen.11

As Blumberg would argue, women without income under their own control have little control over their own bodies or leverage within the household. Another study that would confirm Blumberg's theory is by Mary Osirim (2009), who found that, despite challenges such as male domination and an onerous structural adjustment environment in Zimbabwe in the 1990s, many women who owned small businesses were able to contribute to their households and communities as well as gain respect. Income control can also lead to changes in gender relations within the household, as Barbara Finlay (1989) found for rural women in the Dominican Republic and as Yildiz Ecevit (1991) found for married women factory workers in Bursa, Turkey. However, a qualitative study of working-class and middle-class households in Mexico in 1990 (Garcia and de Oliveira 1995) concluded that a commitment to work—more present among the middle-class than the working-class working women in their sample—was also salient. If poor working conditions act as a disincentive to women's labor force participation and commitment, then the benefits of earned income control—such as changes in the household division of labor and higher aspirations for children—cannot be reaped.

This is where the relevance of the ILO's “decent work” agenda, along with women's collective action for change, becomes obvious. Indeed, GAD scholars have called for
women’s empowerment through collective action in feminist and grassroots women’s groups (Kabeer 1994, Momsen 2004; Jaquette and Summerfield 2006) and in trade unions (Moghadam, Franzway, and Fonow 2011). Such activism, in part to demand improvements in women’s work conditions, could lead to what Walby (2009) predicts will be greater support for social democracy among the world’s women.

CONCLUSIONS: NEW AND ONGOING RESEARCH AGENDAS

Over the decades, theories have emerged to explain modernization, development, and globalization, whether from the “mainstream” of social science or from feminist researchers. Policy frameworks also have been introduced—and in many cases imposed—that have had distinct and varied effects on women and men of different social classes in world-system locations. Table 1.1 highlights the major theoretical and policy frameworks from the 1950s to 2011 and the main agents and actors behind those frameworks. In addition, I have included a column that summarizes some of the social outcomes. Clearly, we have come a long way since the early days of modernization and development theories, which tended to present a homogeneous “Third World.” We now have an appreciation of the dynamics of the semiperiphery, what were once called newly industrializing countries (NICs), and such contemporary economic powerhouses as Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (collectively known as BRICS). Declining U.S. hegemony, the periodic crises of the capitalist world system, and class polarization have eroded the system’s legitimacy and led to numerous protests across the globe.

Throughout, WID/WAD/GAD specialists within sociology have demonstrated the ways in which women and men are differentially affected by development processes, and the ways by which gender relations influence, and are influenced by, social transformations. Feminist development sociology has been informed by stratification, social change, and migration theories; by labor economics; by Marxian, dependency, and world-system theories as well as (neo)institutionalism; and by feminist concepts of patriarchy, the sexual division of labor, and gender. It has addressed questions and issues posed in the wider inter-, cross-, and multidisciplinary WID/WAD/GAD field and contributed key studies that have broadened its parameters. Sociologists have tackled issues such as gender inequality and world-system location; variations in female labor supply and demand over time and space; education-fertility-employment linkages; women, income, and bargaining positions within the household; the place of household labor in commodity chains; how forms of female labor contribute to capital accumulation and to social reproduction; and the state, gendered institutions, and women’s rights. These issues have been studied at macro-, meso-, and micro-levels of analysis, using qualitative and quantitative methods of ethnography, surveys, interviews and participant observation, statistical analyses based on large-N databases, and meta-analyses. Field research has been carried out by specialists of sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Middle East and North Africa. As such, feminist development
<table>
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<th>Date</th>
<th>Theories</th>
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<tr>
<td>1950s–1960s</td>
<td>Theories of development and modernization: industrialization, transition from traditional to modern society</td>
<td>Import-substitution industrialization; land reform; public schooling and health (states)</td>
<td>Growth of manufacturing; new social classes; rising social inequality; growth of male proletariat in “Third World”</td>
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<td>1960s–1970s</td>
<td>Rise of dependency school</td>
<td>“Non-capitalist road to development”; basic needs approach (Third World countries and advocates)</td>
<td>“Marginalization” of female labor; “housewifization”; Third World “golden age”</td>
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<td>1970s–1980s</td>
<td>Ester Boserup’s Women and Economic Development, WID paradigm; Subordination of Women Group, Institute for Development Studies, University of Sussex</td>
<td>Integrate women into development (WID offices and advocates); transform marriage and the market to end female oppression (feminist scholars); first and second U.N. world conferences on women (U.N. and women’s groups)</td>
<td>Rise of NICs; incorporation of female labor in world factories in Southeast Asia and Mexico-U.S. border; global expansion of WID/WAD research networks; “third wave of democratization” begins</td>
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<td>1980s</td>
<td>Neoclassical economic theories supplant Keynesianism and state-directed development; rise of critical WAD approach</td>
<td>IMF stabilization and World Bank structural adjustment policies (international financial institutions [IFIs] and U.S. Treasury)</td>
<td>Reliance on “unlimited supplies” of female labor for both low-wage productive and non-waged reproductive labor; double burden increases among poor women</td>
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<td>1990s</td>
<td>“Washington Consensus”; “Human Development”; GAD approach, “feminist economics”</td>
<td>Privatization, liberalization, flexibilization, neoliberal globalization; microloans and entrepreneurship (IFIs and most governments); capabilities and women’s human rights (women’s policy agencies, NGOs, and transnational feminist networks [TFNs]); gender-disaggregated data, measurements of empowerment, gender budgets (researchers in academia, international nongovernmental organizations [INGOs], and international organizations [IOs])</td>
<td>Single global economy; subcontracting of female labor; new wars; women gather at Fourth World Conference on Women (Beijing, Sept. 1995); rise of transnational feminist networks and women’s human rights discourse</td>
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<td>2000s</td>
<td>Neoliberal economics; critical globalization studies; gender and globalization studies; democratization studies; conflict and security studies; GAD</td>
<td>Financialization (transnational capitalist class [TCC] and core states); Millennium Development Goals (U.N. and advocacy groups); gender equality (TFNs and U.N.)</td>
<td>Rise of BRICS; Financial crisis 2007–8, global recession, rising food prices, Eurozone crisis; global protests; Arab Spring</td>
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research has not only deepened sociological knowledge of gender dynamics and the interconnections of gender relations and broad development processes but also helped to internationalize American sociology.

Changes in the characteristics of the world's female population, as well as the contradictions and opportunities afforded by modernization, development and globalization, have resulted in the proliferation of women's mobilizations, from campaigns to save waterways, trees, and communities to the formation of feminist organizations and networks, and the involvement of women in broad political movements such as mass social protests, revolutions, the World Social Forum, and democratic transitions. Neoliberal globalization has been met with organized protest activity, including transnational feminist activism, which has become the subject of much sociological research (Desai 2009; Ferree and Tripp 2006; Moghadam 2005a, 2013a; Naples and Desai 2002; Pangsapa 2007; Smith et al. 2008). Studies of women and revolution in the Global South have examined the causes of revolution, the gender dynamics of revolutionary movements, the policies and laws of revolutionary states, and modes of women's resistance to subordination (Farhi 1994; Molyneux 1986; Kampwirth 2003; Moghadam 1997, 2003; Shayne 2004). As new “revolutions” break out, feminist development sociologists will bring four decades of accumulated knowledge to bear on causes, dynamics, and possible outcomes. Feminist political scientists studying recent democratic transitions (e.g., Jaquette 2009; Waylen 1994, 2007) have been joined by sociologists (Di Marco and Tabbush 2010; Moghadam 2013c; Paxton and Hughes 2014; Seidman 1999; Viterna and Fallon 2008) who study patterns of women's political participation and offer a set of factors—internal and external—that might explain or predict different gendered outcomes of democracy movements. Some of the most insightful and original sociological research on women's and feminist movements emanates from those writing on countries of the Middle East and North Africa (Hasso 1998; Lazreg 1994; Rezai-Rashti and Moghadam 2011; Rizzo 2005; Salime 2011; Skalli 2011). The complexities of the Arab Spring and the divergent directions taken by the various outbreaks of 2011 suggest that research on their gendered dynamics and their connections to global economic and political processes will continue for years to come.

The literature on women's collective action in the context of development and global restructuring is vast and significant, and it is likely to grow. Studies of women, work, family, and social policies should extend to more countries in the semi-periphery. Research on trends in, and implications of, women's political representation and leadership will continue. We should expect more feminist research that builds on the pioneering work of Mies and Shiva (1993) to examine the gendered impacts of climate change and to interrogate models of endless growth that generate ecological degradation and undermine progress toward women's well-being and empowerment. Given economic, political, and social trends in the world system, there is bound to be an abundance of research questions to pursue and change mechanisms to promote.
NOTES

1. As explained further in this article and illustrated in Table 1.1, the field of women, gender, and development has experienced conceptual shifts and related policy and advocacy foci. Women in development (WID) emphasized women’s marginalization from the development process—whether caused by modernization, industrialization, agricultural commercialization, or rural-urban migration—and called for women’s integration. Women and development (WAD) was a more critical turn, interrogating capitalist development and its policy prescriptions such as “structural adjustment,” along with state policies reinforcing women’s subordination. Gender and development (GAD) places the focus of analysis on the social relations of gender with a view toward transformation and equality. For a full exposition, see Rathegeber 1990 and Kabeer 1994. Feminist development sociology may draw on all three traditions.

2. As early as 1965, René Maheu, UNESCO director-general, delivered an address entitled “The Promotion of Women’s Rights” to members of the Consultant Panel on the Promotion of Women’s Rights and Opportunities, meeting at UNESCO House, Paris, from June 23 to July 2, 1965. (From UNESCO archives, acquired in 2005 when I was a UNESCO section chief.)


4. Another study emphasizing the links between the absence of trade unions and the growth of female labor in manufacturing is by political scientist Teri Caraway (2007), with a case study of Indonesia.

5. The first edition of my book Modernizing Women appeared in 1993, so that is when the argument was first made.

6. In 2008, Michael Ross made a similar argument, using quantitative methods. Other studies have sought to disprove the “oil thesis,” emphasizing instead patriarchal structures, including kin-based solidarities and Islamic laws and norms. See, e.g., Charrad 2009.


8. In this context, a line of inquiry known as the postmodernist feminist perspective on development was more prominent among political scientists than among sociologists but remained arguably marginal to the larger literature and research trends. In Marchand and Parpart 1995, for example, the essays by two scholar-activists from Kenya and India (Nzomo 1995; Udayagiri 1995) raised fundamental questions about postmodernism’s relevance, given its detachment from politics and policy.

9. Prostitution antedates structural adjustment and neoliberal globalization, of course, and, as an extreme form of female subordination, it has been associated with male privilege since “the world-historical defeat of the female sex,” in Friedrich Engels’s apt term, with the rise of private property and the state. Prostitution is also generated by militarism (see, e.g., Enloe 1989; Truong 1990) as well as poverty and state failures.

10. The sponsorship of the World Values Survey is diffuse; the surveys are carried out by a global network of social scientists, with a central office in Stockholm. See http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org.

REFERENCES


