IN JANUARY 1965, in the wake of the turbulent Free Speech Movement on the Berkeley campus and the demise of its chancellor, Edward Strong, the new acting chancellor, Martin Meyerson, asked me to join his staff as a special assistant in the area of student political activity. This was the hottest seat in the chancellor’s office at that moment, given the political fragility of the campus. I served eight months in that capacity until a new chancellor, Roger Heyns, was appointed and I took a scheduled sabbatical leave. Those months were a tense and uncertain period that resulted in an unsteady but palpable restoration of authority on the Berkeley campus and a few steps toward campus “normalcy.” They also constituted a period of rapid and mandatory political learning on my part and one of the most demanding seasons of my life.

Over the years many colleagues have asked me to write about this important transitional period, both because it has received less attention than the historic Free Speech Movement days of late 1964 and because I had an “insider’s” point of view; now, in 2008, I have finally acceded to those requests. I have returned to the archives of the chancellor’s office, to accounts of the events in the press, and to my personal recollections.

The staff of the Bancroft Library were very helpful in supplying materials relevant to the Meyerson administration from the files of the chancellor’s office. I also benefited from the research assistance of Ziza Delgado and Catherine Shepard-Haier.
I have decided, for better or worse, to make the account both institutional/political and autobiographical, with the thought that my story will provide a more vivid account of those heady days.

On Sunday, January 3, 1965, I was in Washington, D.C., attending a meeting of the Council of the American Sociological Association. About 5 p.m. I was pulled out of the meeting for an urgent phone call. It was from Erving Goffman, my colleague and friend in sociology at Berkeley. He told me that my two children, a son, six, and a daughter, four, had been dramatically rescued from a fire that raged through their apartment in San Francisco the night before, but he assured me that they were unhurt and safe.

It was beginning to snow in Washington, so I dashed to the airport and was able catch a plane to the West Coast that night. I contacted my estranged wife and my children early the next morning and arranged for the children to stay with me in Berkeley until new lodgings could be found in San Francisco. A picture of them appeared that morning on the front page of the San Francisco Chronicle. That unusual publicity resulted from the fact that one of the firemen, during his heroic rescue work, fell backward from a ladder, broke his neck, and died.

As I was making arrangements to cope with this near-tragedy, my home telephone rang. It was Martin Meyerson, the new acting chancellor of the Berkeley campus, asking to see me that day. I arrived at his office a few hours later. Though he was a colleague on the Berkeley campus (dean of environmental design), I did not really know him. When we met, he offered condolences and best wishes for my children. Then he went straight to the point. He asked me to join his staff right away and become assistant to the chancellor for student political activities. I was blown away by the request, but within a matter of moments I accepted.

THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT OF MY APPOINTMENT

As of the beginning of January 1965, the Berkeley campus was in an institutional shambles. In September 1964, the Berkeley administration invoked a rule prohibiting political advertising and soliciting on a thin strip of land at Telegraph and Bancroft Avenues. Students had enjoyed informal use of this strip for years. The action occurred in the context of a history of extensive political activism during the preceding years (Heirich and Kaplan 1965) and in the context of the heated 1964 presidential cam-
The revocation triggered the Free Speech Movement, which involved massive rule violations, demonstrations, vacillating and ultimately unsuccessful efforts to discipline students, a giant rally and sit-in in Sproul Hall on December 2, and a decisive faculty resolution on December 8 that rebuked Chancellor Edward Strong and called for granting some of the students’ demands. (A detailed history is given in Heirich [1968]). The protesters and many others regarded December 8 as a decisive and heroic victory. Discredited, Strong was excused from office on January 2, and Meyerson was named acting chancellor for an indefinite period. A side issue was the presence of Alex Sherriffs, vice-chancellor for student affairs, who had been stridently anti-activist during the previous months and had been, like Strong, largely discredited; however, Sherriffs did not leave that office when Strong resigned, and was still formally in charge of student affairs. Kitty Malloy, a steadfast supporter of both Strong and Sherriffs, also remained in a key position on the chancellor’s staff.

At the moment he took office, Meyerson faced a situation in which campus authority was more or less nonexistent; the protesting students were exuberant and hopeful, although without a unified program; the faculty was divided and confused; and nobody really knew what to do. That was the situation Meyerson faced in early January and the situation into which he brought me.

**MY PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES AT THE TIME**

The year 1964–65 was my seventh year at Berkeley. I was in good academic and professional standing, having been promoted rapidly up through the ranks to full professor in 1962, mainly in response to several attractive offers from other major universities. My main points of professional reference in those years were my department and the national community of sociologists. I could not really have been described as a citizen of the campus, even though I had been a member of a chancellor’s committee on campus discrimination and had kept abreast of campus affairs.

My professional life in spring 1965 was, if anything, overloaded. I was scheduled to teach large required courses in social theory at both the undergraduate and graduate levels. I was in my third and last year as editor-in-chief of the *American Sociological Review*, a very demanding enterprise, and was active nationally in the American Sociological Association. I was also in the early phases of a research training candidacy at the San Francisco Psychoanalytic Institute, where I was undergoing
analysis and preparing to begin courses at the institute. The only relief I got for taking the position in the chancellor’s office was from the graduate course in theory. There was no supplementary stipend for my new duties.

My personal life was emerging from chaos. I had separated from my first wife in bitterness, conflict, and unhappiness about a year earlier (an event that triggered my entry into the Psychoanalytic Institute), and I was beginning the painful path toward divorce. My children lived in San Francisco with their mother, but I cared for them in Berkeley on Wednesdays and weekends. As I sketch these details of my professional and personal situation at the time, I return to a question I have never been able to answer: why did I say yes to Meyerson? All my efforts to address the question have resulted only in what I regard as superficial and post facto half-truths: this was my first taste of real institutional power; my home institution, which I liked but had not yet come to love, was in deep trouble and needed any help it could get; and the assignment promised to be a thrilling if difficult one. Oddly—especially in retrospect—I do not remember experiencing any fear that accepting his invitation to step into the political cauldron might damage my career. This was odd, because I had seen numerous administrators and faculty colleagues scalded for their past politics—for taking the wrong stand at the wrong moment, for making the wrong decision, for being in the wrong group. Why should I have been immune? In all events, failing to ask that question meant that I approached the assignment with few apprehensions and with a quiet but false confidence that, in the end, probably served me well in the job.

The other question was: why did Meyerson ask me? I have not been able to answer that question either. I had not been active during the Free Speech Movement, beyond sporadically joining temporary groups of faculty members who were seeking ways to ease the campus situation. Certainly I had not taken any public political stands in the months of conflict. I heard later (but never verified) that Meyerson contacted me on the suggestion of Marty Lipset, a colleague and friend in sociology and a confidant of both Meyerson and Clark Kerr (the president of the entire University of California system and former Berkeley chancellor). Perhaps the fact that I was not publicly identified with any faction (and thereby labeled) in the past few months was also a consideration. Perhaps it made some difference that I had recently written a treatise on collective behavior (Smelser 1962) that included the analysis of riots, protests, and social
movements. But these reasons, too, have always been speculations on my part.

**THE EARLY DAYS**

I had almost no time to prepare for the position. Within a matter of days I had moved into an office near the chancellor’s in Dwinelle Hall; was assigned a secretary/assistant from the chancellor’s staff; was introduced as Meyerson's assistant at a January 12 meeting of the Berkeley Division of the Academic Senate; held a press conference; and, with Meyerson, met with most of the members of the Steering Committee of the Free Speech Movement.

The introduction at the senate meeting seemed almost incidental. I merely rose when introduced, and sat down again. At the beginning of his brief remarks Martin Meyerson quipped that I was a student of riots, panics, and social movements. A notable feature of the introduction was that the name of Alex Sherriffs, who was still vice-chancellor but whom I was in effect replacing, did not come up either in the introduction or in the question period that followed. That omission was a symptom of the pretence that Sherriffs did not really exist in spring 1965, even though he formally remained in office. I had an early, civil but cool meeting with Sheriffs, and almost immediately established cordial working relations with Katherine Towle, dean of students, and Arleigh Williams, dean of men, both of whom were probably glad to see anyone other than Sherriffs in the chancellor’s office, because they had had such strained relations with him during the FSM months.

The news conference was well attended and reported in the Bay Area newspapers, although the appointment of a new assistant did not make front-page news. I also remember that Richard Hafner, public affairs officer, and Ray Colvig, public information officer, were present, probably because they did not trust me yet and were uncertain about what I would say. That distrust was justified, because I didn't know what I was going to say either.

Several items in the coverage of my appointment and news conference were noteworthy.

First, all the reports mentioned that I had been a Rhodes Scholar and some mentioned my Harvard background as well. All mentioned my age, thirty-four. (In announcing my appointment before the Academic Senate Meyerson had also quipped that I was “almost under thirty,” a reference
to the slogan “Don’t trust anyone over thirty” that had become a kind of mantra among student activists at the time.)

Second, the press coverage was generally benign. The newspapers described me as being a new man on the job, unaffiliated with factions, open to communication with students rather than a rule-enforcer, helpful and cooperative rather than punitive, open-door in attitude and respectful of students. In a “Profile of UC Peacemaker” (San Francisco Examiner, January 17), Fred Allgood included a flattering vignette:

At thirty-four he is young enough to win the respect of student groups and to convince them he is sympathetic to their needs and problems. And he is mature enough for Meyerson to accept his advice on how student activity can and should be controlled.

With a donnish uniform of bow tie, casual clothes, leather elbow pads, and heavy glasses, a habit of answering questions with honesty, vigor, seriousness and humor, and an athletic appearance that suggests the necessary stamina for long conferences, he has the ideal presence for the role of mediator on the campus.

Allgood went on to characterize me as “[standing] alone in the no-man’s-land of the University of California politics battle.” That phrase often came vividly to mind during the darker moments of those months.
Third, much was made of my research on collective behavior. Meyerson drew laughs when he mentioned it in introducing me to the Academic Senate. He also jested that my course on collective behavior had even been rated highly in the SLATE Supplement, a course evaluation pamphlet published periodically. The headline on my appointment in the San Francisco Examiner on January 13 was “Meyerson Picks Expert on Mobs.”

The other news accounts all stressed this background item. The two evident implications of such publicity were that the chancellor’s office was mainly interested in “handling” and “controlling” the dissidents, and that I was brought in to apply my expert knowledge. Both implications made good news for the press in the context of the times, but both were misleading. Neither Meyerson nor I—and nobody in the chancellor’s office at the time—had an articulated philosophy of manipulating the movement or the dissidents; we were living day by day without much time to reflect or plan and were most often forced by events to be reactive. I frequently joked that our lead time for decision making was five minutes.

By no stretch of the imagination could it be said that what we did or intended to do was “applied social science.” To imply anything like that was to endow us with a rationality we did not have. Yet there were several conclusions that I had reached in my comparative study of collective behavior (including riots) and social movements that informed my thinking in a general way and served me well: (a) I had asked the question of what happens after social movements score a dramatic success and had concluded that success generally creates a psychological letdown, generates internal divisions about what to do next, and leaves the movement floundering and seeking for new agendas and justifications. This conclusion was consistent with what I saw happening with the Free Speech Movement that spring. (b) I had also concluded that among the most incendiary influences on a social movement is authorities’ vacillation between punitiveness and weakness, which serves simultaneously to victimize and embolden the movement. I had also seen this principle in action during the late months of 1964 on the Berkeley campus. (c) A closely related conclusion was that it seemed the most legitimate policy on the part of authorities not to engage in direct, partisan ways with activists and antagonists, but to stick, as steadfastly as possible, to a posture of neutrality. In retrospect these lessons seemed to inform my outlook, but only as general orientations and never as fixed principles to be trotted out as specific rules to be applied.
The second noteworthy feature of the news conference was that I framed some of my responses with reference to the issue of free speech. These remarks seemed innocuous enough, and even into February I was quoted in the *Daily Californian* (February 17, 1965) as saying “already we’ve seen some helpful reformulations of the free speech issue and many reforms are on the way.” Meyerson had also been making conciliatory and liberal statements that were respectful of students and sympathetically echoed their preoccupations (*Daily Californian*, January 4, 1965). The atmosphere of those first days was such that Mario Savio, the FSM leader, could warn at a rally that students could be deluded by a false sense of security brought on by the university’s present attitude. He said, “They could kill us with kindness” (*Daily Californian*, January 7, 1965). Within a week or so after the press conference, however, I received an invitation (along with Meyerson) to come to dinner at the home of Regent Donald McLaughlin, a leader of the conservative wing of the board. I had known McLaughlin independently, mainly because I was a friend of his son during my graduate school years at Harvard and afterward. I had taken advantage of my acquaintance to pay a visit or two with McLaughlin during Fall 1964, mainly to talk with him about what I saw as the failures of the Strong administration in dealing with the Free Speech Movement. The other guest at dinner was John Lawrence, a noted Berkeley physicist, an outspoken conservative critic of the student movement and the faculty’s December 8 resolution, and a member of the small “Truth Squad” of right-wing faculty (Heirich 1968: 358–59) who were active on the campus, with the board of regents, and in Sacramento. After dinner the four of us—McLaughlin, Lawrence, Meyerson, and I—went to a separate room, and the true purpose of the meeting became clear: an occasion for Lawrence and McLaughlin to impose their views on Meyerson and me. In particular, Lawrence gave me a long, vigorous tongue-lashing for even using the term “free speech” in my press conference, because that endowed the movement with an undeserved legitimacy. I remember being very unsettled by this attack, but tended to listen rather than argue back, largely, I suppose, because I sensed that Lawrence was more interested in lecturing than in discussing or arguing. To my knowledge, that episode did not influence either Meyerson or me one way or the other. I did experience a certain muffled resentment toward McLaughlin for arranging the occasion—I suspect that Lawrence put him up to it—though that did not disrupt my friendship with him and his wife, Sylvia.
The initial meeting with the FSM Steering Committee was a generally cordial one. Martin advertised it as a friendly effort on our part to get to know those present and to learn things that might be useful and helpful to us. The students did not speak with one voice, though several messages came through: they were glad to be rid of Strong; they were flush with victory and did not want the new administration to “roll back” any of their gains; they wanted full freedom to do what they wanted by way of political activity on campus; and they exuded hope that the Meyerson administration would be receptive to furthering the objectives of the student movement, although these objectives were not very well articulated. John Searle, the Berkeley philosopher and faculty friend and confidante of the FSM at that time, was also present at the meeting, along with one or two other sympathetic faculty.

The meeting proceeded and ended without consequence, although I must report one very instructive incident. At the beginning of the meeting Meyerson said, quite ingenuously, that he would like to acquaint himself better with those present and proceeded to ask them, in a kind of go-around-the-table exercise, to say something about when and why they came to Berkeley, what they were majoring in, and what they planned to do after leaving college. The questions had a disastrous effect; almost all the students gave brief, muffled, and inarticulate answers and seemed to resent the questions. There was a good reason for these reactions. Meyerson had jolted them by making things mundane and profane whereas most of the students still regarded themselves on a sacred, quasi-religious mission that dwarfed anything personal in their lives. To bring up the personal was to trivialize everything and to insult the movement; but Meyerson couldn’t be openly accused of that because the questions he asked were evidently friendly, innocent, and legitimate.

Later in 1965 John Searle joined the administration of Chancellor Roger Heyns, in a vague way as my replacement. He had in the meantime turned against the movement when he came to resent what he regarded as its subsequent corruption and excesses. In a letter written to Carey McWilliams of The Nation later in 1965 Searle gave a revealing account of the frame of mind of the FSM and its “new radicalism”:

Clark Kerr is a labor-management negotiator and also a famous liberal. In labor-management negotiations both sides want something and if they can’t get all they want, they will try to get as much as they can: if not fifty cents, then maybe twenty-five cents. All such negotiations
presuppose such a system of interests. Now in FSM style radicalism such compromises are absolutely out of the question. Total defeat is much preferable to partial victory, both morally and tactically. Morally, because there is absolutely no selling out in being totally defeated; tactically, because total defeat increases the polarization of the issues, thus recruiting new radical adherents and increasing the bitterness and militancy of the existing adherents. In fact, the only victory worth having is a resounding symbolic victory [letter retrieved from chancellor’s files].

Searle was on target with these words. Furthermore, though framed in political language, they are consistent with my interpretation of Meyerson’s mischievous questions: those on a sacred mission despise the secular, whether framed in terms of political “interests” or personal concerns, because both corrupt the purity of the sacred.

I report one other notable feature of those early days. After the announcement of my appointment, I learned that some of the student activists had snooped around, asking other faculty about me and what my political “line” was—a perfectly comprehensible kind of inquiry about a new, unknown person in a position of unknown power. One thing they learned was that I was in psychoanalytic training. This was a hot item for student activists already carrying an attitude of distrust of the campus administration. My psychoanalytic connection, like my “expertise” in riot control, apparently raised some suspicions that I might possess some manipulative powers of which they were unaware. The presence of Dr. Saxon Pope, former director of psychiatric services at Cowell Hospital on campus, on the chancellor’s advisory staff may have added to these suspicions.

Actually, at the end of Meyerson’s and my first meeting with the activist core, one student pulled me aside and asked, in a hostile tone, “Are you going to be psychoanalyzing us away?”—to which I responded in true psychoanalytic fashion by saying nothing. Years later, in the 1980s, I had a chance meeting in the Strawberry Recreation Area with Michael Lerner, a conspicuous campus activist in the turbulent years of the 1960s, later a defendant in the Seattle Seven trial, and even later a rabbi and communitarian spokesman. In a kind of mock-congratulation, Lerner told me what a genius I had been in psychological manipulation, that I had given students genuine hope while in reality there was no such hope, and had
guided them into fruitless and self-defeating behavior. Such perceptions were, in my estimation, completely unrealistic and tapped into the latent paranoid fantasies that often reside in the ideologies of extreme social movements (Smelser 2007). They also tapped into threatening undertones that perhaps the motivations for participating in the movement might be psychopathological in nature. Such fears were made manifest in the May 17, 1965 issue of the San Francisco Chronicle in a news report entitled “FSM Byproduct—Group Therapy.” In that article David H. Powelson, chief psychiatrist at Cowell Hospital, reported a 20 percent drop in student admissions to the psychiatry department between October 1964 and January 1965. Powelson explained the drop as follows: “Many persons tend to go into a group for therapy. . . . Where they might have gone to a psychiatrist, they [found another] way to work out their problems.”

I do not wish to magnify the significance of either the hostile reaction to Meyerson’s questions that treated students as ordinary students or to the riot-control and psychoanalytic-manipulation fantasies, because in the end they were such minor aspects of the larger scene. But they do reveal the social-psychological complexities of the situation that we were dealing with in those unsteady days.

At this point I should mention a final, strange feature of my situation in the chancellor’s office. I learned only after several months in the office that my secretary/assistant was having a love affair with Alex Sherriffs, himself divorced earlier. Such a scene was right out of early Florentine politics. Sherriffs had been cast as my significant but unseen arch-enemy because I had displaced him and because we were poles apart politically on issues of student political activity. When I heard about the affair, I became unglued, for it meant that any semblance of confidentiality of office was a phantom, and that any and every thing I did or said was available to Sherriffs during after-work hours of the same day. I never asked her about this liaison during my stay in the chancellor’s office and in fact maintained a cordial though more guarded working relationship with her until I departed. She and Sherriffs subsequently married. Approximately fifteen years later I met them both at a meeting in Asilomar and in a private moment asked her how she had coped with that anomalous situation years ago. She responded with something vague, referring to keeping her two lives separate. As far as I know, this bizarre situation neither generated any specific mischief nor affected the course of campus history, but it did lend an element of spice to my story.
Of all the concerns of student activists in the months following their victory symbolized by the vote of the faculty on December 8, 1964, three stand out: (a) to safeguard the political gains made with respect to political activity on campus; on that date the faculty had voted that only the time, place, and manner of such activity should be regulated, and the activists pressed for minimal definitions of these aspects; (b) to minimize if not eliminate discipline for violation of these minimal rules; and (c) to gain amnesty or acquittal in the courts for those arrested in the sit-in at Sproul Hall on December 2, 1964. I will cover the issue of rules in a later section and discuss discipline mainly under the heading of the obscenity crisis.

With respect to the sit-ins, some eight hundred students were escorted or dragged from Sproul Hall on December 2, and approximately six hundred of these were arrested for trespassing and resisting arrest. The charges were brought by the Alameda County District Attorney, and the trial, heard by Judge Rupert Crittenden, ultimately began on April 1, 1965. In the months preceding the trial, the press covered every aspect of it. Bail funds were raised by sympathetic faculty and others for most of those charged (Daily Californian, Feb. 12, 1965). Of special interest to the chancellor’s office was a petition to dismiss all charges, submitted to Judge Crittenden and signed by 245 Berkeley faculty members, headed by Professor Jacobus ten Broek. Around mid-January the chancellor’s office received a number of visitations and appeals for the campus officially to request dismissal. Among these was a telegram from the “Parents Defense Committee for Berkeley Students.” Judge Crittenden dismissed the faculty petition on January 27, explaining that dropping the charges would not serve the interests of justice.

On January 7 Savio had appealed to students not to desert those arrested. Two days earlier students had announced the launching of a national defense fund, claiming that they had the support of Paul Goodman, Lawrence Ferlinghetti, James Farmer, Bertrand Russell, James Baldwin, Norman Mailer, and Jessica Mitford (Daily Californian, Feb. 4, 1965, no contributions specified). The press (San Francisco Examiner, Jan. 15) also reported an effort to raise a $50,000 defense fund by mail solicitation. Later in March defendants filed an unsuccessful suit for $45 million against the State, Alameda County, and the board of regents for police brutality, deprivation of the right to legal counsel, and illegal booking procedures (Daily Californian, March 12, 1965).
As a final strategy the activists decided to approach the chancellor’s office to persuade it to intervene directly. The decisive meeting with me as chancellor’s representative took place on January 15, at the request of two attorneys, Malcolm Burnstein and Alex Hoffman, representing the students. Because the meeting involved attorneys I arranged that Professor Arthur Sherry of the Boalt Law School (and member of the senate’s Emergency Executive Committee) be present. Three members of the FSM Steering Committee—Mario Savio, Jack Weinberg, and Suzanne Goldberg—were there, along with three other students active in the legal defense effort. I should mention that this meeting occurred only ten days after I joined Meyerson’s staff, so I approached it with some anxiety. I did decide in advance, however, that the best stance would be that of a listener and that I would neither make promises nor reject any demand outright.

The first part of the meeting was dominated by the attorneys, who explained in detail why the students would not plead either guilty or nolo contendere, but would enter a not-guilty plea. They argued that the university should influence the court by requesting the district attorney to dismiss or by persuading Judge Crittenden informally. Sherry and I said almost nothing during this presentation.

At its midway point the meeting turned ugly and brought on several abusive harangues, mainly by Savio. I summarized the proceedings in a memo to Meyerson:

The rest of the conversation consisted in the attorneys’ and students’ predictions and speculations of unwanted consequences if the university failed to intervene in some way on behalf of those arrested. The discussion was discursive, but it is possible to summarize the kinds of consequences that the students predicted and threatened:

1. That court action against the students would create great hostility among the students, and this would spill over against the university, thus raising once again the conflict that raged from September through December.
2. That court action against the students would, as in the case of the Sheraton Palace convictions, make the defendants less respectful of law and order.
3. That, particularly if a constitutional defense were chosen, many facts harmful to the reputation of the university would be revealed in testimony.
4. That the solidarity of the student movement would be augmented by their defensive battle against court action, and that the student movement would emerge stronger than if no court action were taken. Predictions were made that student organizations would be organized nationally and internationally.

5. That the defendants would, in unspecified ways, take offensive legal action against the university.

After presenting these ideas, and after discussing various aspects of the students’ outlook and activities, the attorneys and students pressed to know what the university was going to do about these demands for action on the arrestees’ behalf. I responded to this pressure by assuring that I would report faithfully and accurately their representations to the chancellor. It was further agreed that if I had any communications relating to the conversations of this meeting, I would convey them to Burnstein.

At the end of my memo I summarized my impressions and gave my recommendations to Meyerson:

My own response to the meetings of January 15 is that while the morale of the defendants is still fairly high, desperation is growing among them, and that their delegation to request university action marked a kind of last-minute effort to head off trials and legal convictions. My assessment of their predictions and threats is that they are quite vague and general, and should not influence the university in any way.

It is my unequivocal conviction that the university should take no action in response to these or any other demands for intervention. I am less certain on the question of how the university should communicate its position to the larger public and to the defendants themselves. My present feeling is that no public statement of any sort should be issued by the university, and that it should simply allow justice to take its course. My own position vis-à-vis the defendants and attorneys who approached me is a bit difficult, since I shall no doubt be pressed for some indication as to the university’s disposition. Simply to ignore this pressure would, I feel, be untenable. I would like to be able to indicate to Burnstein that the chancellor, while giving the defendants’ demands and arguments due consideration, contemplates no action.

That effectively ended the issue of campus intervention. Meyerson accepted my memo, and I was confident that Sherry and the rest of the
Emergency Executive Committee were in agreement. Neither the attorneys nor the activists attempted to influence the campus administration further on the matter. In another related action, however, the campus was more conciliatory. On December 23, 1964 the district attorney had requested student records from the campus. This set off internal discussions on the issue. Judge Thomas J. Cunningham, the regents’ counsel, had advised us to release records only after written authorization from the students. On February 25 I wrote to Meyerson, “it seemed a good time to begin the firm policy of releasing records only if the student gives consent,” and he agreed. We also advised the dean of students not to enter into any agreements about disciplining students in lieu of charges to be pressed by the civil authorities. On February 18 I received a phone call from Burnstein on the issue, and a few days later I informed him of the university’s position. That phone call effectively closed the “release of records” issue as well.

Reflecting on our decisions regarding trial of the sit-ins and the release of records, it seems to me that the campus administration set the right tone, one consistent with the “lessons” of patient listening, neutrality, noncontestation, and distance. I can testify honestly, however, that our reactions were completely ad hoc and situational, and in no way self-conscious “applications” of general knowledge.

A RARE LOOK FORWARD

After only three weeks in office, I decided, quite on my own, to send an orienting memorandum to Meyerson, setting down my own anticipations of issues and situations that we might confront during the coming months. I reproduce that memo here:

I thought I would take the opportunity to note down for your consideration a number of possible issues which I think may arise during the coming semester. You are aware of some of these issues yourself. I do not exactly predict that they will happen, but they are issues for which I think the university should be prepared and should know where they stand in advance, rather than having to be hurried into precipitous action.

1. The enrollment of Mario Savio. I note that as of January 19 Mario Savio has not applied for re-admission, though the deadline was January 15. It would not surprise me to see Savio turn up for
registration, be refused, and then begin to complain loudly that he is being discriminated against. It is very important that the university not be caught napping on this one.

2. *The problem of a fund-raising for legal defense* in Pauley Ballroom or some other University Building. It is essential that the university know what it intends to do, or else it is likely to be caught in that spiral of vacillation and changes of decision and apparent weakness.

3. *The trials.* I think the university’s posture is absolutely clear. It can do nothing officially or unofficially to influence the court or the district attorney. I feel it is most important to adhere to this policy. Certainly it will sustain some criticism because of the action of the Ten Broek group, but there is nothing it can do about this criticism. I envision one possibility—that a group of faculty members might very well attempt to pass some senate resolution on behalf of the defendants, perhaps at a sparsely attended senate meeting. I have had no word that this is likely to happen, but I think we should keep our ears to the ground.

4. *Demonstrations over the new rules.* I do not really anticipate any widespread student response to the new rules, since hopefully they will be liberal enough, but if the regents introduce some more stringent elements or if one part of the rules appears to be too strict, we may expect at least modest student demonstrations. For this reason I think it is most important that some kind of machinery . . . be set up after the new rules are announced. This will provide an immediate channel for examining the rules, hearing grievances, etc. In the event that a tri-partite committee is set up, I would anticipate that a demand will be made that that committee be established on a troika principle, rather than on the deliberative committee principle with one vote for one person.


6. *Student attempts to test the advocacy principles.* . . . This kind of activity would be to dare the university to re-create the September situation which gave the impetus to the whole series of disturbances last fall.

7. *Attacks by civil rights groups on university hiring practices.* . . .

8. *Widespread criticism of curricula, course offerings, etc., and demands that they be given a more direct voice in planning and executing the academic affairs of the university.* Frankly, I do not think that this kind of activity on the part of the students will make much headway, because I think basically that the faculty will resent
intrusions on its academic freedom from below as much as it resents them from above.

9. **Sale of materials on campus . . .**

Again, be assured that I venture these possibilities not in the spirit of paranoia, but in the spirit of being as prepared and as flexible as possible in the event of possibly difficult situations that may arise.

Many of the issues did not arise. The university was not the object of attack on its hiring practices. Student fund-raising for the sit-in trials never really got off the ground, so we had no requests to use facilities for that purpose. Faculty members made no effort to get the senate involved in dismissing charges against students. We did not have massive violation of the new time-place-manner rules, although there were many incidents of probing and testing. Savio did not attempt to re-enroll, but the salience of the issue was confirmed in a telephone call to me from a former vice-president of the university. He had heard (or been pressured by someone who had heard) that Savio was going to be taken on as an employee at the Student Union bookstore, and that we should forbid this. I told him that we had no basis for preventing his employment. Nothing further was heard on this issue, which I assume was based on rumor. However, Savio was hired as a part-time reader for the philosophy department after he dropped out of the university, and that drew the public ire of State Senator McAteer (*San Francisco Chronicle*, March 12, 1965).

Nonetheless, some of the points I mentioned materialized as themes as the semester proceeded. The “sale of materials on campus” point foreshadowed the *Spider* magazine episode; the “test of advocacy” issue was central in different ways in the obscenity crisis and the Vietnam Day events; and educational reform emerged, though in large part through administrative initiative. All these are covered below.

My memo specified only points of anticipation and a few guidelines for strategies; it certainly did not serve as any kind of handbook for planning. It was probably read only by Meyerson. But in my mind it stands out as a rare exception to the fundamentally reactive mode that dominated our responses during Spring 1965.

**TIME, PLACE, AND MANNER RULES**

Campus regulation of political activity was what the FSM was all about, so it stands to reason that a carry-over issue facing Meyerson was what if
any limits would emerge from the shambles of rule-violation, attempts at
discipline, and the collapse of those attempts in the FSM period. Almost
everybody, including activists, acknowledged the need for time-place-
manner (but not content) limits in the faculty’s December 8 resolution.
One of Meyerson’s first acts was to issue “interim” rules on January 4,
limiting location and time of sound amplification, specifying where tables
and posters could be placed and requiring official registration with the
campus as a student organization to hold rallies and man tables, as well
as advance notification of speakers.

Some staff and advisors to the chancellor argued for the prohibition of
noontime rallies with sound amplification on the Sproul Hall steps and
upper plaza. I dreaded such a prospect, regarding it as a likely recapitula-
tion of the revocation of political activity on the Bancroft strip at the
beginning of the Fall semester, 1964. Activists had come to regard the use
of the steps almost as a sacred entitlement and even made an effort to
name them “Alexander Meicklejohn steps.” On February 2, I wrote to
Meyerson: “I think that any attempt to convince the students that they
should give up Sproul Hall steps is . . . fruitless, because many students
will feel that is an arbitrary act. I would predict that it might be unnec-
sarily inflammatory.”

The issuance of the January 4 specifications drew no mass reactions
from student activists, but members of the FSM Steering Committee
(Mayra Jellen and Martin Roysher) attacked them as unnecessary and
restrictive of advocacy (Daily California, January 4, 1965). I scheduled a
meeting with leaders in order “to find out what kinds of concerns they
have” (memo to files). Again on January 22, I entertained a delegation of
students headed by Martin Roysher and Suzanne Goldberg, during which
they first complained about not being consulted before the interim regula-
tions were promulgated. The remainder of the meeting concerned specif-
cics: that the lead time for announcing off-campus speakers was too long;
that the sound amplification regulations were unnecessary because the
loudspeakers did not disturb office-workers in Sproul Hall if extended
beyond 1 p.m.; that the rules on placement of tables were too restrictive,
as was the limit on hours of manning tables between 7 a.m. and 6 p.m.;
that it was unfair to restrict sales of materials to those relevant to the
student organizations’ purposes; and that it was unfair to require student
organizations to pay for the presence of police. I listened patiently to these
complaints, but we responded to none of them.
There were no mass protests against the January 4 regulations but there were a few mischievous probes. On February 11 I got a call from a Student Union official reporting that, when presented with a bill for $20 for amplification equipment, Steve Weissman of the Graduate Coordinating Committee gave it back and said “send it to Neil Smelser.” From time to time organizers of rallies nibbled away at the 1 p.m. deadline for ending amplification. On March 21 Meyerson issued some alterations of the interim rules, and these became the subject of daily rallies protesting them, as well as a “counter-rally” on the part of some faculty supporters of the December 8 resolution, at which they called the students “moral spastics” for protesting anything and everything and urged them to “cool it.” On April 1 Meyerson issued a new set of interim rules, and on April 15 the Berkeley Division commended these changes by a 198 to 7 vote.

With respect to the time-place-manner rules, I was evolving toward a policy of enforcing them but not taking the bait and going after minor provocations and thereby generating major provocations. On April 23 there was a special meeting in the chancellor’s office attended by campus deans, the public information officer (Hafner), and other members of the chancellor’s staff (including Alex Sherriffs in one of his rare appearances). I reported that yesterday’s rally went after 1 p.m. and hence was a violation, but no police action was taken, which I thought was a wise non-action. Names of speakers were taken and sent to the Faculty Committee on Student Political Activity. I explained that this was my favored mode of dealing with violations. The minutes of the meeting went on: “Smelser . . . asked the group to make suggestions on how future episodes should be handled. It was agreed that every effort should be made to avoid provocation, to stay with the procedures by taking names.” I pointed out that this was consistent with procedures set up by the Academic Senate to deal with time-place-manner issues. In the same spirit, those at the meeting confirmed that no effort should be made by police to seize illegal sound equipment before it came onto campus, and that we would not hold officers of student organizations responsible for the illegal use of equipment. This evolving outlook was the opposite of that which Vice-Chancellor Earl Cheit jokingly advanced a couple of years later: “Let’s go out and see what’s happening on Sproul Plaza and tell them to stop it.”

Another feature of my evolving outlook concerned how to respond to daily events on the plaza, to pamphlets, and to items in the daily press.
In the chancellor’s staff and among other groups there was always a person or group that became agitated when an item seeming to be embarrassing to the university appeared and, consistent with that reaction, demanded that “this must be set straight.” As daily events came and went, I gradually became convinced of exactly how short public memory is and came to believe that denials, corrections, and counter-statements as often as not prolonged the significance of the embarrassing event and did nothing to improve the image or status of the campus. My view came to be that very few things should be officially “answered” or “refuted” because that usually conveyed a certain nervousness or defensiveness on the part of the campus administration. Moreover, declining to respond tended to shorten the life of the incident. Correspondingly, I believed that only very few and very serious events should be “corrected” by issuing statements and calling news conferences. I am not certain that my view was the right one, but I think that following it during this period contributed a certain steadiness.

In the meantime Meyerson and I were working toward speeding up the disciplinary process (an obvious reaction to the impatience we experienced in the obscenity disciplinary hearings, which had just concluded—see below). On April 23 Meyerson proposed an administrative committee to replace the unwieldy faculty committees, and the Emergency Executive Committee backed up the proposal. The idea of a hearing officer was also floated. Nothing came of these suggestions in the short run.

As might be expected, the board of regents continued their interest in the issue of regulating student political activity. In response to the FSM drama, they had formed a Meyer Committee (named after its chair, Regent Theodore Meyer) on student political activity. After a sustained period of hearings, interviews, and meetings, the committee submitted its report to the regents in May. It was more far-reaching and restrictive than existing practices on any of the campuses. Activists sent an abusive letter to the chairman of the board of regents complaining that they were not involved in the process. The regents ignored the letter. The board did not act directly on the Meyer report but referred it to the office of the president on May 21 for implementation. After several weeks of work the president’s office sent out its adaptations to all the campuses, considerably watered down from the Meyer Committee recommendations. Meyerson announced immediately that the new campus rules, effective July 1, “conform in general” with the existing interim rules on the campus.
In the meantime, on June 30, I had written a 13-page, single-spaced memo to Meyerson analyzing the document from the office of the president, noting both vagueness and nonapplicability of some of its provisions to the Berkeley campus and the unenforceability of some provisions (for example, requiring a moderator and question-and-answer components at meetings). In that memo I also argued against a recommendation that would deny facilities if words were spoken that indicated that some illegal action was being contemplated. I gave reasons for this: something illegal is mentioned and discussed but does not occur; or the illegal act may occur but not as mentioned. I concluded, “I find it impossible and possibly threatening to the rights of individuals to prevent meetings at which illegal action is being contemplated. The only exception to this policy that I would suggest is when the advocacy of illegal action itself constitutes illegal action—for example the advocacy of the assassination of a public official.”

As far as I could determine, the new July 1 rules provoked no reaction among activists, but after all it was in the middle of summer vacation, when mobilization was virtually impossible. The new rules worked their way into the campus structure. The time-place-manner issues, however, would dog the succeeding administration of Roger Heyns in its trouble-ridden years.

**A NOTE ON STUDENT GOVERNMENT**

One line of student activity had to do with the constitution and politics of student government. Most of this concerned the issue of graduate student membership in the Associated Students of the University of California (ASUC). Graduate students voted to join in an election on February 24, and in a March 2 election undergraduates expressed their preference for graduate students to participate. The issue of graduate student membership was a genuine constitutional one involving the enfranchisement of a class of students, but it also was on the agenda because it was felt by some that graduate student membership would mean a more influential and perhaps more radical ASUC. On March 22 the regents declared the elections void on grounds that too few students voted and that a minority could not oblige the majority of graduate students to pay fees. The ASUC attempted another election in defiance of the regents, but this was aborted by rulings of the Student Judicial Committee. Nevertheless an unofficial “freedom ballot” election was held.
on April 5, 6, and 7, but the numbers voting again fell short of the 50 percent required by the regents. An equally abortive attempt to seat “graduate senators” was also made. This drawn-out drama excited new tensions and conflicts between more moderate student factions and the more radical SLATE party.

I report these developments as one subdrama of conflict during my period in the chancellor’s office. I also have to report, however, that I was little involved, and not very interested, in any of it. The reason for the former was that the ASUC did not interact much with the chancellor’s office; rather, they proceeded on their own with the elections, and the point of conflict was with the board of regents, which meant by-passing our office. The reason for the latter was that, although the ASUC had had an important history in campus conflict and SLATE in particular had exercised considerable influence and power through it, I simply felt that the other lines of ongoing conflict were more important and threatening to the campus. There were bigger fish to fry.

THE OBSCENITY CRISIS

My two most trying months in the chancellor’s office were March and May 1965. The first was the month that gripped the campus in conflict about the expression of obscenity and the second was the campus chaos associated with the Vietnam Day Committee and the huge anti-war protest on May 21–22. The story of the second comes later in the chapter.

The most general feature of the early months of 1965 was the fragmentation of the energy mobilized during the FSM crisis into multiple directions—protecting those arrested on December 2, resisting any restoration of rules limiting political activity, reforming student government, enacting educational reform, and establishing a Free University on the campus that would give “socially relevant” courses separate from the official university curriculum. Another manifestation was pressing the limits of expression of speech and behavior into the politically and legally sensitive area of obscenity. This went in several directions and culminated in the “Filthy Speech Movement” and its ramifications during March. Before entering that drama, I note a few elements of context.

The Ugly Man Contest

In late February the annual Ugly Man contest, a charity event for the World University Service and Cal Camp, was held. It consisted of a
competition among fraternities and other campus organizations. After a ribald campaign, the contest was won by Miss Pussy Galore (after the character in the James Bond movie) sponsored by Alpha Epsilon Pi. Noticed by few but regarded as traditional student high jinx by most of those who did notice, the event became an important reference point for protesters after John Thomson, a young nonstudent protester from New York, was arrested on March 2 for displaying a sign reading “Fuck” on the Student Union steps in Sproul Plaza. Why should fraternities go unpunished for obscenity when he was arrested? (This was one of the few manifestations of social class antagonism among students in the student politics of the period.) On March 3, the day after the arrest, a protester named Robert Hurwitt complained that the amplification from the Ugly Man contest in Lower Sproul Plaza was interfering with the SLATE rally on the upper plaza. I requested that the amplification be turned down.

Lenny Bruce

On February 10 an undergraduate student, Laura Mura, came to my office and asked about bringing the comedian Lenny Bruce on campus for a show. (Bruce was a charismatic and controversial figure and was at the time in the legal “soup,” with several obscenity suits against him pending.) She wondered whether we had any objections. I was inwardly alarmed but played it cool, saying that there would be no objection if procedures of advance notification and organizational sponsorship were followed. I heard no more about this, but on March 2, the day of Thomson’s arrest, I had a meeting with Mario Savio and a few others who pressed me for permission to bring Lenny Bruce to campus. On the day before they had requested to use the Greek Theater (with a capacity for thousands) for his show, with a lecture hall in the Life Sciences Building as backup, and now they wanted Harmon Gymnasium (capacity six thousand). I was noncommittal but did ask a member of the chancellor’s staff to work up a background statement on Bruce.

Two weeks later, at the very height of the obscenity crisis, the subject of Lenny Bruce arose in a meeting with Mario Savio, Steve Weissman, Laura Mura, and Robert Hurwitt. I raised the suggestion, diplomatically I thought, that at the current moment it might not be in their best interests to aggravate the obscenity issue by inviting Bruce and even suggested they withdraw the request. The students, especially Savio, became abusive at this suggestion. I asked that we not publicize this conversation (realizing
the hopelessness of such a suggestion) but Steve Weissman agreed, saying that they themselves had some things they did not want to publicize, including a scheme for some students to engage in a “puff-in” (public marijuana smoking) at an upcoming meeting of the Academic Senate.

Nothing happened in the wake of this March 15 meeting, and I even heard a rumor that the request was going to be called off. Nevertheless, I contacted two faculty members, Karl Schorske of the history department and William Kornhauser of the sociology department, both with ties to the activist students, and asked them to persuade the students to call off the invitation. I tried to get John Searle involved as well. In the meantime, my colleague in the sociology department, Philip Selznick, relayed a message to me that Bruce’s attorneys were pressing him not to make an appearance on campus because it might be damaging to him in the upcoming obscenity trials. In the meantime the chairman of the board of regents had been hammering daily on both Kerr and Meyerson to ban Bruce’s appearance; Martin resisted this pressure, explaining that he could not precensor, and that Bruce might conceivably appear and read out pages from the telephone book.

On March 18 I entered a memo into the files that I had received a telephone call from Alex Hoffman, the Berkeley attorney, saying that Lenny Bruce definitely was not coming to campus. My memo was terse and straight-faced, but it reeked with feelings of relief. We had heard independently that Bruce had fallen and broken his leg a few days earlier and that that was the occasion for the cancellation. To this day I do not know whether the request was called off by Bruce (either voluntarily or on account of his incapacitation), by his attorneys, or by the interested students. I know even less about any influence I might have had on events.

The Word, the Rallies, and the Immediate Aftermath

I did not learn of the arrest of John Thomson until the evening of March 2, when a campus police officer telephoned me at home and informed me. I received the news without comment. Inwardly, however, my heart sank. Why had they arrested him? Why hadn’t they apprehended the young man, escorted him from the campus, and threatened that if he returned to repeat the action or one like it he would be arrested? The logic that informed my reaction, of course, was that by now I was, like most of my colleagues in the chancellor’s office, eager to avoid the negative publicity for the campus that I knew this event would create. How
wrong my first reaction was in the light of the events that unfolded over the next month. I could not have guessed that some ill-advised FSM activists would embrace Thomson’s action as a free-speech issue and thereby initiate the process of discrediting and ultimately killing the movement; that the campus would be able to discipline those charged and thereby regain some of its authority and legitimacy; or that the events would provoke a noisy counterrevolution from the right that would fail in the short run.

I did not have much time to reflect on this new event, because the next day Art Goldberg (FSM Steering Committee member) and a few others stormed into my office, loudly and abusively demanding that we drop charges against Thomson. Goldberg called his arrest a “crackdown” on our part, rambled on about the violation of free speech (the next day he said before a rally, “A guy has the right to express himself like he wants”; Daily Californian, March 4, 1965), and issued threat after threat. As I recall, I remained calm and did not argue, although I did ask him whether he could envision any possible limits on public behavior. At one point Goldberg demanded to know what the university would do tomorrow when there would be a parade of a thousand students carrying signs with the offensive word through Sproul Plaza. I remember saying that I could not know, but there might be a thousand arrests. (Dean Arleigh Williams had heard the same threat and telephoned me on March 4, asking what to do if such a parade occurred, and I advised him to treat offenders in the same way as Thomson was treated.) I also remember cautioning Goldberg that any further displays would be likely to set off a major political reaction in the state—probably a futile warning, because that is no doubt part of what Goldberg and his friends wanted.

There was no parade, but on March 4 there was an “obscenity rally” on the steps of Sproul Hall at which the letters of the word “Fuck” were shouted out as if at a football rally. Others shouted or displayed the word, for example on a sign reading “Student Committee for a Good Fuck.” Another student publicly read the juiciest passages from D. H. Lawrence’s Lady Chatterley’s Lover. The police arrested several students and nonstudents. All this was raw meat for the local press, who reported the events with a combination of shock, bemusement, ridicule, and barely-beneath-the-surface glee over great university’s new troubles.

The events set off a flurry of frantic meetings among the chancellor’s staff, some faculty, representatives from the Office of the Dean of Students,
and police about what to do if these displays continued and whether and in what ways to discipline the students. I was in the middle of most of these meetings. There was a consensus that the students ought to be charged by the university (no matter what the civil authorities decided to do). That consensus was bred, I think, both by outrage at the protesters’ behavior and by a more or less unspoken sense that the political consequences for the campus would be disastrous if we did not do so.

Our efforts ran into a major snag immediately. There were two student disciplinary committees through which we might have proceeded: the Faculty Committee on Student Conduct, long established but handling mainly “beer and sex” offenses; and a newer Faculty Committee on Student Political Activity, established in early January in response to prodding from the regents and intended to correct the inadequacies of disciplinary machinery made evident during the FSM period. When approached, both committees declined to hear the case on grounds that it was not in their jurisdiction. At this news I remember cursing my faculty colleagues under my breath for fiddling while Rome was burning or, perhaps more apt, lecturing on principles of navigation as the ship was sinking. (Kerr also criticized the committees for their reluctance; San Francisco Chronicle, March 11, 1965.) Meyerson responded to what he called the “difficult questions of jurisdiction” by forming a new ad hoc committee consisting of two members from each of the two disciplinary committees and a new chairman, Professor John Whinnery from the School of Engineering. The choice of Whinnery was a brilliant one. His academic and professional credentials were the highest. He was a supremely unflappable man, utterly committed to due process. He displayed the greatest patience in the face of pressures to turn the proceedings into a public trial and accusations that the committee was railroading the students. The committee carried on through all the legalisms, challenges, and criticisms, and on April 20 all four students were suspended, Goldberg indefinitely. The work of the committee was flawless, and on July 19 Meyerson could respond honestly to a request for review from Clark Kerr that the students were “granted procedural safeguards for a fair and informed decision.”

During March and early April my life was made chaotic by dozens of questions and complaints from faculty, students, and outsiders, including the parents of one of the defendants who begged that the chancellor intervene on behalf of their son, who, they argued, was basically a “good boy.” We also received a communication from the regents’ counsel
informing us that board members were interested in speedy discipline. For a period of approximately one month I was telephoned every three or four days by a highly placed staff member in the office of Governor Pat Brown. Every call was identical. The official did not press for a specific outcome but would ask only how the hearings were going, informing me how interested the governor was in their expeditious conclusion. I concluded the governor surely wanted discipline as an outcome but in the interest of self-protection advised his staff member not to press openly for it. I surmised further that Brown, a steadfast friend of the university and strong defender of Kerr and Meyerson (San Francisco Chronicle, March 13, 1965), was anxious for discipline because that would help insulate the campus from the ongoing savage attacks from the right. In response to the calls I adopted a reassuring stance but gave no guarantees. I also kept in constant touch with Whinnery, informing him of the interest of the governor’s office, and Whinnery kept me posted in detail about the committee’s work. I thus found myself exerting a double if not contradictory set of pressures on the committee: to observe the fairest procedures and due process while making haste. Otherwise the chancellor’s office did not communicate with the Whinnery committee during its work; we were concerned mainly with the timeliness and steadiness of its work and with its scrupulous observance of due process.

In the meantime the obscenity crisis escalated to the highest levels of the university and state government. On March 9, when it became public that neither disciplinary committee on the campus would take on the obscenity case, conservative members of the board of regents, led by its chair, Edwin Carter, handed down an ultimatum to Clark Kerr to expel the students immediately. For Kerr this raised a constitutional issue of interference in the affairs of the campus. Accordingly, he took the occasion to tender his resignation and persuaded Meyerson (apparently without difficulty) to join him in resigning. (My own feeling at the time was that at some level Meyerson’s heart was not fully in this decision because of his own ambitions to be made permanent chancellor, although I never discussed this with him.) Immediately thereafter the right-wing critics of Kerr and Meyerson launched a savage attack in the pages of the Oakland Tribune and called for a reinstatement of Edward Strong to the chancellorship. On the personal level, I should add that I was not at all involved in this higher-level drama, which extended beyond the campus, except for being in close and continuous conversation with Meyerson.
The drama continued in full heat during the next few days. On March 11 Meyerson announced the appointment of the ad hoc committee (thus giving evidence that the campus was behaving responsibly in the matter of discipline). Two days earlier both the ASUC senate and the editorial board of the *Daily Californian* made statements commending Kerr and Meyerson (*Daily Californian, March 10, 1965*). On March 12 the Berkeley division of the Academic Senate held a massive meeting (more than 1,100 faculty in attendance) at which, almost unanimously, the faculty condemned the “flaunting of obscenity” by a few students, endorsed the administration’s initiation of efforts to discipline them, called for the withdrawal of the resignations of Kerr and Meyerson and for making Meyerson full, not acting, chancellor; and produced a token vote of esteem for Chancellor Strong. On the following day, at a meeting of the board of regents, Meyerson and Kerr withdrew their resignation threats and Chancellor Strong submitted his written resignation (he had not resigned, only taken leave, on January 2). In the meantime, the FSM Steering Committee, in somewhat defensive news releases, simultaneously denied that it initiated or supported the obscenity episodes, assaulted the regents for unconstitutional meddling, and attacked Kerr for using the obscenity issue as an excuse for a power grab and for continuing his assault on student freedoms. In a rally on March 11 Savio attacked Kerr as a “two-faced hypocrite” and hotly denied that the Free Speech Movement was associated with “the unfortunate free sexual intercourse movement” (*San Francisco Chronicle, March 12, 1965*).

The larger political implications of these few days cannot be overestimated. Though threatened, the campus administration held its own with respect to managing its daily affairs. The administration and faculty were fully unified in opposition to the conservative wing of the regents and to the activist student movement—at least the few who had perpetrated the excesses. The Free Speech Movement, unable to dissociate itself from the excesses of the obscenity incidents, was decisively weakened and sent into a downward spiral toward morbidity. Furthermore, Kerr and the campus were able temporarily to stave off the mounting counter-revolution from the right, although attacks continued to be heard, and the counter-revolution reemerged in full force during Reagan’s gubernatorial campaign of 1966 and in the firing of Clark Kerr in 1967.

A final factor connected with the obscenity crisis further accelerated the decline of the Free Speech Movement and its leadership. Despite the embarrassment that the obscenity demonstrations carried for the steering
committee, they continued to be active in resisting and complaining about the discipline of the four students—indeed, it was their main preoccupation during March and April. Activists immediately condemned the arrest of Thomson and demanded that charges be dropped. Only a few days after the obscenity rallies, Savio argued that the students should not be disciplined, and if they were, the board of regents could expect trouble (Daily Californian, March 10, 1965). FSM speakers repeatedly and publicly advocated no discipline for the students who were charged and attempted to discredit or alter the hearings. A group called the “Physics Department Graduate Students’ Association” attacked John Whinnery for unfairness when he said that those involved in the obscenity rally would be “disciplined expeditiously.” Mario Savio came to my office on March 23 and demanded that the hearings be open as a matter of due process (and, I might add but Savio did not, subject to heckling and disruption.) Student activists and the attorney representing those charged, Peter Franck, demanded that the hearings be public and that the proceedings be released. At the time of the suspensions—April 20—Goldberg promised a challenge in the courts (Daily Californian, April 22, 1965), which never materialized. Even after the suspensions were imposed, a group of students demanded that the Emergency Executive Committee create yet another committee to open new hearings on the obscenity cases, on grounds that the previous ones were biased; the EEC rejected the request.

In response to the news of the suspensions, activists staged a “sit-on” on the steps of Sproul Hall steps to protest. Between six hundred and a thousand students were estimated to have attended. Students threatened to use amplification equipment after it was officially shut down. I said that that was a violation, and if the dean recommended disciplinary action the cases would be sent to the Faculty Committee on Student Political Activity. I was quoted as saying that any new violations would be “an unfortunate retrogression in the progress we had made” and that in any event alternative facilities had been made available in Lower Sproul Plaza for continuing the meeting. At the rally Michael Lerner boldly announced that “this is the beginning of a new and larger student protest that will overshadow the events of last semester” (San Francisco Chronicle, April 23, 1965) and Savio announced that “the honeymoon with Marty [Meyerson] is over.”

The same day the activists sent a telegram to the regents, signed by Savio, Suzanne Goldberg, and other students (calling themselves the “Provisional Committee to Protect Student Rights”). The telegram proclaimed the continuing crisis of the university and demanded reinstate-
ment of the suspended students and appointment of a new committee by the Berkeley division. Regents ridiculed the telegram (Daily Californian, April 26, 1965). Savio, who had been criticized by members of his Steering Committee for having nothing to back up the threats in the telegram, then resigned from the movement. That event made page one headlines in every San Francisco Bay Area newspaper.

Savio’s resignation was merely the final flutter of a movement that was already nearly dead. (At the end of March, the Steering Committee had been formally “dissolved” into a “list of representatives” from other organizations; Daily Californian, March 30, 1965). On the day of Savio’s resignation the San Francisco Chronicle reported that five other members of the Steering Committee had already left town or had quietly withdrawn from the movement. Art Goldberg was suspended and facing criminal charges for obscenity. Herb Caen of the Chronicle wrote that Savio resigned because the regents had rebuffed the ultimatum and because he had lost the confidence of much of his student following after the Berkeley faculty had declared that obscenity was “not a free speech issue” and called for disciplining the students.

Spider Magazine: A Subdrama within the Obscenity Crisis

Early in the term a little magazine named Spider, obviously amateur and low-cost, was started by a number of students who had been active in the Free Speech Movement. Its editors explained that its purpose was to reflect the concerns of contemporary students: “sex, politics, international communism, drugs, extremism, and rock and roll” (Heirich 1968: 158). Some of the language and illustrations were evidently obscene. My own private reaction to the publication was that it was a low-quality, tasteless, irritating, but basically harmless rag. In mid-March, however, the magazine became the focus of a crisis—superimposing itself on the obscenity storm—and a source of embarrassment and urgency for the campus administration. As such, the tempest over the magazine is an example of a minor item that becomes elevated to a major item because of a change in its context. Here is an account of some particulars, including my role in the events.

At the obscenity rally on March 4 a great image of a spider was displayed, obviously to call attention to the magazine (San Francisco Chronicle, March 5, 1965). In the subsequent few days sales apparently thrived, both because attention had been brought to it by the obscenity rallies and because its publishers surely realized that the little magazine had suddenly

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assumed a new and more provocative significance. We also heard an increasing number of complaints about the publication and its sales, which were said to be offensive to some passers-by. Finally, because the chancellor’s office, especially Meyerson, was by early March under intense outside pressure to discipline offenders at the obscenity rallies, the problem of Spider also became urgent.

The administration dealt with the problem initially by sending a complaint about the magazine submitted by Dean Arleigh Williams to the Faculty Committee on Student Political Activity. That committee recommended banning the magazine from the campus, along with a shady play called “For Unlawful Carnal Knowledge.” Accordingly, on March 18, Meyerson issued a ban on both, which was to be in effect until the committee made a final decision. The ban cast the administration into the always difficult role of moral censor. The news made front-page headlines in the Berkeley Daily Gazette (March 19, 1965). The next day a rally attended by an estimated 1,200 protested the ban and, predictably in retrospect, various groups proceeded to defy it and sell the magazine on campus. The embarrassment thus continued.

On March 18 a group of chancellor’s staff held a strategy meeting on what to do about sales of Spider, especially by nonstudents. Meyerson had extended the ban until the end of the month. At the end of that meeting Martin asked me to go onto Sproul Plaza and try to persuade a group of people selling the magazine to stop the sales and leave the campus. Inwardly I balked at doing this, but in the heat of the whole obscenity tempest, and out of loyalty to Meyerson, I agreed to do so and ventured on to the Plaza with Arleigh Williams.

My effort failed completely. I should have remembered Williams’ admonition that the main effect when an administrator confronted a defiant group on the plaza was to attract a throng of a hundred shouting, taunting students and nonstudents. That is exactly what happened. Furthermore, partly because my heart was not in this little expedition, I remember being especially inarticulate, not knowing what arguments to make beyond telling the group that they should leave because the chancellor wanted them to and mentioning the possibility of discipline if they didn’t. I left after a while, but the sellers did not. The Daily Californian reported continuing sales. On the next day several dozen graduate students from the sociology department signed a letter to the Daily Californian. The letter was addressed to me. It began by complimenting me for “being one of the most conscientious and dedicated teachers and
scholars in the university community” and for “maintaining the highest intellectual standards in the classroom.” It went on to say, however, that I had affiliated myself with an administration that was violating the December 8 faculty resolutions, disregarding due process, and engaging in “arbitrary Administrative power.” I had disappointed them, they concluded, and they “respectfully” urged me to resign (Daily Californian, March 19, 1965).

To this day I rue that whole episode. I know that is an irrational feeling, because the event soon faded from the scene, did not impair my ongoing activity in the chancellor’s office, and left no mark on my later reputation, and nobody but a handful of old-timers can now dredge up any memory of it. It was the only moment in my time in the chancellor’s office that I was publicly criticized (and this only in an obscure letter in the campus newspaper). I suppose that might be regarded as a sign of success—that I maneuvered my way through those months so unscathed—but my foray onto the plaza was out of keeping with my evolving philosophy of how to deal with protest (in this case, letting it die a natural death) and damaging to my only partially conscious self-image as a quiet hero helping the cause of the campus but basically operating behind the scenes. I also think Meyerson should not have asked me to undertake that fruitless expedition, though I fully appreciate the magnitude of the pressures on him at the moment.

The Spider issue gradually faded as the obscenity crisis worked its way toward resolution through the disciplining of the students. There was a flurry of activity around March 23 and 24 when Meyerson upheld the ban, with heated arguments over whether Spider should be regarded primarily as a political publication or an obscene magazine, and whether it might be sold in the ASUC bookstore but not on the plaza. Outside sales continued in defiance of the ban. Meyerson lifted the ban at the end of March, with a face-saving but unenforceable proviso that students could sell it only if it could be shown to serve the purposes of their student organization. SLATE continued to sell the magazine, and on April 2 the Oakland Tribune reported “brisk sales.” As the weeks passed, however, the excitement over the magazine flagged, and it passed from the scene like so many of the experimental forays in that Spring.

_A Post-mortem Gasp: The Free Student Union_

Almost immediately after Savio’s departure, members of the executive committee of the FSM, after an all day meeting, determined to form a
separate new organization, pressed by Jack Weinberg and Bettina Aptheker. She called for a labor-union type organization that would use the student strike as its principal weapon. Weinberg said the time was ripe for such an organization, because “all across the country people are looking to Berkeley and following our activities” (Daily Californian, April 29, 1965). An organizational meeting was held in Harmon Gymnasium with Aptheker, Weinberg, and Michael Lerner speaking. The leaders reported that two thousand had joined by paying 25-cent membership dues; they had announced a goal of five thousand members.

The new Free Student Union (FSU) generated a small squall on May 4 by setting up and manning tables in Sproul Plaza. Police hauled away several FSU tables as directed by the dean’s office on grounds that the Union was not registered. I recommended that we deal with the “illegality” issue by persuading the organization to register as a student organization. We gave the FSU a week of grace to comply, and I invited representatives of the group to meet with me and some faculty members to discuss the interim rules (Berkeley Daily Gazette, May 5, 1965). They refused the invitation, but on the next day the FSU voted to comply with the interim rules requiring application for table permits. About the same time a member of the fledgling organization came to me to recommend a working group made up of regents, administrators, faculty, and students to work out a “more workable” set of rules for campus political activity; I said I would take the idea under consideration. They tried to be heard at a regents’ meeting on May 21 but were denied. On May 29 the organization attempted again to test the rules by demanding an extension of amplification on Sproul Plaza beyond the deadline. Finally, they agitated unsuccessfully for office space in the Student Union.

The press paid little attention to the FSU. I also felt at the time that it could not be taken seriously and regarded it as part search for a new model for activists, part fantasy, part bluster, and part face-saving in the face of the ignominious collapse of the FSM a few days earlier. We played it straight with the new organization, however, and within a short time it seemed to melt away.

**Educational Reform**

The issue of student-oriented educational reform had been in the air for some time but was not the most salient item on the activists’ agenda. Part of the concern had to do with accusation that faculty were in bed with
the national power establishment, helping its war designs and weapons-making, and sucking research funds to their own coffers to the neglect of their proper mission of dedication to students. The pamphlets and the public rallies made frequent references to depersonalization, lack of “relevant” education, the university as factory, and large courses not taught or graded by instructors. The slogan, “I am a student; do not fold, staple, or mutilate” became a kind of hostile mantra in student protestors’ rhetoric. Bill Trombley wrote an article entitled “Knowledge Factory” in the Los Angeles Times (Jan. 20, 1965), quoting FSM leaders to the effect that Berkeley is a place where “human nerves and flesh are transformed under the pressures and stress of the university routine.”

The campus extended an early, small peacemaking gesture by permitting the granting of “E” grades (incomplete), rather than F, for work the preceding semester so students could make up the work. Predictably, the decision was welcomed by the students and sniped at by Regent Cannaday, who charged we had “capitulated to pressure” (San Francisco Chronicle, January 23, 1965). More generally, however, Meyerson was beginning to speak in terms of educational reform. He took a keen interest in the upcoming Proposed Experimental Program (the Tusssman Program) and announced that an administrator ought to extend beyond the caretaker aspects of his office and “sponsor new experimental programs outside the existing units which sometimes find it difficult to initiate because of traditional commitments.” I can report independently that his sentiment was a genuine one, because from time to time in our private conversations he would bring up points of educational inadequacy in mass research universities and seek my reaction to possible lines of reform. However, although educational reform was part of the rhetoric of the student activist movement, I had not heard much student talk about it during the Spring semester of 1965.

On March 2 Meyerson made a major move, delivering a long, somewhat pedagogical and philosophy-of-education message to the Academic Senate. He mentioned educational models such as St. John’s at Annapolis, as well as Oxford and Cambridge, and advocated different kinds of general education. At the end he called for a kind of “commission on the state of education at Berkeley.” He asked the Emergency Executive Committee to consult widely in the senate about the best ways to deal with the intellectual ferment about education on the campus. Conspicuous faculty members (including its chair, Charles Muscatine, Department of English) were appointed to an education commission. Meyerson
called on the faculty to make definite and practical proposals. A modest amount of hopeful commentary in the press was stirred by Meyerson’s initiative.

Momentum continued on March 23 when Martin and I met with a steering committee to set up the machinery for reforms. The preliminary report issued by the Muscatine committee was, in my estimation, a quite bold one, calling for changes in instructional offerings, praising student idealism, assailing admission standards for being too dependent on grades, augmenting general education, and improving advising. It incorporated a great deal of the student rhetoric of the day. In a predictable move, Savio found fault with its timidity, scolded the faculty for its lack of courage, and declared that “students would have true independence and excellence in education only after they had organized themselves into trade unions” (Harper’s Magazine, October, 1966).

In the end these educational efforts drew significant attention and initiated a number of changes, notably a faculty board of educational development and an assistant chancellor for educational development on the Berkeley campus, which were established in Fall 1968. The specific charge to the BED was to entertain, foster, develop, and put into place experimental programs. As the first assistant chancellor for educational development (1966–68), I steered the ship of educational innovation over stormy seas for two years, but that is another story to be related at another time. Suffice it to say that the issue of educational reform through the 1964–68 period was unique in that it occupied a place but not high salience in the reformers’ agenda, was taken up with more initiative by administrators than either students or faculty, and in the end made only a modest scratch on the furniture of the campus at that time (see chapter 2 for a more extended account).

THE VIETNAM DAY EVENTS AND THEIR AFTERMATH

At the time, and even in retrospect, the collapse of the FSM and the sputtering of the FSU seemed to me to mark the effective demise of the student movement that had gained such potency and achieved such results in the second half of 1964. I have also spoken from time to time of an imaginary experiment to the effect that if the Vietnam War had not escalated, the American student protest movement would have fizzled in 1965. (I am less confident in saying this about Europe’s student activism, however, because I regarded the structural problems facing the European
systems of higher education as much more profound than those in American universities and colleges, and the European systems were no doubt going to be experiencing their own independent troubles. Nevertheless, the Vietnam War and its accompanying anti-Americanism was a primary component of student protest in Europe as well.)

That mental experiment is, of course, an idle one, because the Vietnam War did escalate, and it dominated campus protests for the remainder of the decade and indeed until the effective end of the war. I was in on the first phases of the massive anti-war activity during Spring 1965, and here is an account of that drama from my perspective.

Expression of opposition to the Vietnam War became evident early in the semester and built up gradually, reflecting, more or less, the increasing aggressiveness of the Johnson administration. An escalation of the war occurred dramatically on January 31, 1965 with the transfer of a fighter squadron from Okinawa to Danang Air Force Base. Bombings of targets in North Vietnam began almost immediately. In early March 3,500 U.S. Marines were dispatched to South Vietnam, a figure that increased to nearly 200,000 troops by the following December. The incidence of military conflict increased correspondingly.

An article in the *Daily Californian* on February 3 called for protesting America's involvement in Vietnam to congressmen. A week later a rally on Sproul Hall steps featured speakers from the War Resisters League and other organizations, who appealed to young men to refuse to join the armed services until the United States was out of Vietnam (*Daily Californian*, February 9, 1965). At a public meeting two days later a former Vietnamese diplomat called for a pullout of American troops (*Daily Californian*, February 11, 1965). A few days after that the Berkeley University Teachers' Union condemned the bombing of North Vietnam (*Daily Californian*, February 17, 1965). Of special interest was the anti-war rally on February 18, sponsored by SLATE, Campus Women for Peace, and the Committee for Non-Violent Action, indicating, as it did, increased interest by student activists in the war (*Daily Californian*, February 19, 1965).

Anti-war activity on the campus continued through March and April, much of it led by the Berkeley University Teachers’ Union. Eighty Berkeley professors signed a letter protesting the war that was published by the local press on March 1. A number of Berkeley faculty traveled to Michigan for the giant anti-war “teach-in” held on March 24. (That event became a kind of model for the subsequent anti-war meetings on October
15–16, overseen by the new chancellor, Roger Heynes, who came to Berkeley from Michigan). Large anti-war meetings were held on March 25 and 26, with Berkeley faculty as the main speakers. A week-long fast to be held at the Oakland Army Terminal was initiated at a Sproul Steps rally on March 26. Campus peace groups also participated in the mass march on San Francisco to protest the war on April 9. About that time anti-war activists began serious planning for a massive event in late May (*Daily Californian*, May 7, 1965).

Jerry Rubin was a key leader in organizing the May 21–22 demonstrations. This was the Jerry Rubin who was later (1967) to become co-leader (with Abbie Hoffman) of the Yippies (Youth International Party), a far-left protest organization emerging from the Students for a Democratic Society. He was also to be a leader of the massive demonstrations at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago in 1968 and a defendant in the famous Chicago Eight (or Seven) trial in 1969. Rubin was admitted to Berkeley as a “limited student” (non-degree) in February 1964 and withdrew in May, 1964. Somebody told me he had audited my undergraduate social theory course, mainly to hear my lectures on Karl Marx’s *Das Kapital*, but became bored after those lectures and left. (The class had more than 300 students in attendance, with no roll taken, so I could know nothing about the truth or falsity of that story.) Rubin helped create and operated through the Vietnam Day Committee, said to have one hundred members, with the conspicuous presence of faculty members, led by Stephen Smale, Morris Hirsch, and John Lewis. Rubin and Smale were its cochairs and real leaders, and they were the ones who negotiated with me about upcoming events. Other familiar names of activists also appeared (for example, Betina Aptheker and Jack Kurzweil). Because of the presence of many faculty members on the committee, we were inclined to negotiate more seriously and in better faith than if it had been the usual mix of student and nonstudent activists; that proved to be a misguided understanding on our part because the presence of faculty members did little to temper the actions of the protesters.

On May 11 Rubin and Smale submitted a written statement asking for various arrangements and the use of facilities on May 21–22. Several campus spaces were requested, as well as a suspension of “all the usual regulations regarding limitations on the distribution of literature, fund raising, speakers approval, and other political activity” for the period of the demonstrations (*Daily Californian*, May 12, 1965). Over the next few days I met with them several times and worked out agreements. On May
18 I explained to Meyerson that I had reached the following understand-
ings with the VDC: on-campus parking would not be permitted; dining
facilities would not remain open beyond normal hours; the Terrace (a
restaurant on Sproul Plaza) would remain open all day Saturday, sandwich
distribution permitted; the Student Union would remain open only
during regular hours; no sleeping quarters permitted. I also gave permis-
sion to use the Lower Sproul Plaza for the whole time but restricted the
use of the Upper Plaza, and denied permission to use the West Gate area.
Smale asked that the campus pick up part of the financial cost, and I said
no. In response to a further request from Meyerson, I explained that the
only “rule” that was relaxed was that the office of the dean would grant
additional space for tables if requested. Earlier, on May 14, Meyerson had
ruled that no classes would be cancelled. In the meantime, Rubin was
quoted by the Daily Californian (May 14, 1965) as saying that the chancel-
lor’s office had granted the use of certain athletic fields for Vietnam Day
“because we were afraid of a confrontation.” When I confronted Smale
and Rubin on this item, they ingratiatingly explained that they were
misquoted, and would write a retraction in the newspaper. They did so
a few days later, writing in a letter to the editor that the chancellor’s office
had been “very cooperative.”

Other developments did not bode well. Certain speakers from the
moderate “right,” such as Robert Scalapino and Eugene Burdick, had
withdrawn, calling the upcoming events a “circus” (Berkeley Daily Gazette,
May 20). An editorial in the San Francisco Examiner (May 18, 1965) called
the occasion “rigged” and imbalanced, and the State Department, after
promising to send representatives, withdrew from participating a week in
advance because the program was “not balanced.” McGeorge Bundy,
President Johnson’s assistant for national security affairs, withdrew at the
last moment on account of “prior commitments.” These withdrawals
simply augmented the sense that the events were going to be a massive
anti-war exhortation. They also assured that the tone of the days was not
going to be in the nature of an “educational protest” (Smale in the Daily
Californian, May 3, 1965) or an academically oriented “teach-in,” as some
advertised it.

The events on May 24–25 were indeed something like a circus, even
though it was attended by 5,000–7,000 people rather than the advance
estimations of 25,000–50,000 predicted by the event’s leaders. The orga-
nizers and participants basically threw our advance agreements to the
wind, as they themselves unilaterally “suspended” the rules governing
political activity. In the days following we heard many complaints from students and others regarding the size of signs, manning of tables by off-campus groups, tables larger than permitted, huge banners, commercial food concessions, unauthorized signs, a “circus” atmosphere, and assertions that the university had been “taken in.” The press coverage was heavy, dominated by headlines such as “Thousands Mob UC Teach-in” and “U.S. Vietnam Policy Blasted at Teach-in”—headlines not upstaged by the story on “Matrimony for Savio” (with fellow-activist Suzanne Goldberg). Whatever the success of the event in mobilizing protest against the war, I felt the campus administration had been damaged by appearing to compromise its high-road stance of political neutrality. After the event we had to hassle the VDC for expenses incurred, and in the end we were only partially compensated.

I remember being very upset at the outcome of the Vietnam Day protests. This was based on the facts that (a) I had lost control of May 21–22, even though I had made every effort to negotiate the conditions under which activities were to take place; (b) many complaints came in after the events, both about the violations of understandings with the organizers and about the “biased” and “propagandistic” character of the days’ activities. My unhappiness had nothing to do with any feelings I might have had about the rightness or wrongness of the war; it was based on my chagrin that the campus (and by implication, I) had been embarrassed.

By July, Rubin and his associates were already planning for even greater demonstrations on October 15–16, which were designated “Days of International Protest.” A planning meeting was held in Dwinelle Hall on July 7. Even though I knew I was going to leave the chancellor’s office in the Fall and wasn’t going to be around for the October days, at the end of July I decided to write a memorandum to Lincoln Constance (who had taken over as acting chancellor from Meyerson late in the Summer). The memo read as follows:

[Matters of legality] remain in the hands of the legal authorities. Nevertheless, the University has every obligation to protect its own financial interests, and to see it that its regulations are adhered to during any protest or other political activity. In this connection, I would suggest that the University adopt the following policies if the Vietnam Day Committee requests the use of facilities on October 15 and 16:

(1) To determine whether a massive protest on campus would interfere with other University activities, such as class day meetings, Family
Day festivities, and so on. If so, the request should be either declined, limited to non-disruptive times, or shifted to another date.

(2) Facilities should not be granted until full payment for last spring’s Vietnam Day is given to the University, and until advance payment for any University outlays is provided by the sponsoring group. Furthermore, the sponsoring group or groups should be required to sign a statement for financial responsibility for any damage that might be done to University buildings or landscaping.

(3) The sponsoring group for any demonstrations should be required to agree in writing to certain procedures that will help to insure that University regulations will not be violated. For example, they should agree that, in advertising the event, no non-authorized organizations are invited to participate (this will allow the University better to assure the regulation prohibiting non-students from circulating material and setting up tables will be observed). For another example, the sponsoring group or groups should agree in advance that certain kinds of displays will not be made. For a third example, the sponsoring groups should agree in advance to abide by any request by an authorized University official to lower the sound level or otherwise moderate the proceedings. The sponsoring groups should be notified that if they do not adhere to these pledges, they are endangering their future access to the facilities.

These agreements between the University and the sponsoring organization should be drawn up in a fairly formal way, and the University should have the advice of legal counsel in drawing them up. These relatively formal agreements will avoid a sort of ad hoc verbal agreement between individuals and University representatives that last Spring proved to be a quite unsatisfactory means of making arrangements for such a massive and complex event as Vietnam Day.

Incidentally, I do not mean these procedures only to apply to anti-war activities; they should perhaps be common policy for any costly large-scale event that takes place on campus and makes use of campus facilities.

I make these suggestions in no spirit of wishing to harass any organization, but rather to prevent, in a fairly careful way, the development of the completely unrestrained and disruptive features that characterized the Vietnam Day events last May.

I regard that memo as simultaneously an effort to shape future policy; as a commentary on the unworkability of informal, ad hoc agreements
between a single university representative (as I had been) and individuals and organizations determined to do anything they want to do; and as an expression of my personal regret about our being overwhelmed the previous May. The chancellor’s files indicate that my memo was forwarded to Chancellor Heyns in anticipation of the October 15–16 demonstrations, but since I had departed well before the planning to deal with these events took place, I cannot assess what effect, if any, it had on the Heyns administration’s thinking and preparations. I do know that the chancellor’s office was more systematic in its approach to that event and demanded a written memorandum, signed on October 12 by Smale and John Searle of the chancellor’s office, regarding facilities to be used, reimbursement of the campus, and other matters. At that time, too, the administration took greater care to coordinate with the police, to use neutral parties (such as members of the campus ministries) as “monitors,” and to achieve better political “balance.” The events in October were conducted in such a way that William Trombley could write that “to date Heyns has avoided confrontation with the Vietnam Day committee by a process of constant conversation and persuasion” (*Los Angeles Times*, November 2, 1965).

In retrospect I regard the sequence of events from early May to late October as an important episode in the learning process that universities and colleges were evolving to face situations of unprecedented political protest and group conflict that had descended upon them and for which they were ill-equipped to manage. The nature of this evolution was from ad hoc, naïve, and amateur coping toward a more prepared and professional stance.

**Authority by Default**

As can be seen from the narratives in this chapter, the Berkeley campus faced a situation in Spring 1965 that had two special features: (a) many political and organizational situations that it had not experienced before; (b) a campus authority system that was reevolving slowly and irregularly toward restoring normalcy, but along a path that was tentative and fraught with ambiguity and uncertainty. Under these circumstances all kinds of requests and situations come up the line of authority for handling, because those down the line don’t know what to do or are afraid of doing anything. I certainly experienced that situation in my period in the
chancellor’s office, and I give a few examples of how this process of “authority by default” worked out.

· On February 15 a student came to me, protesting a grade change from E (incomplete) to F in a course he had taken, with the result that he could not drop the course retrospectively. He obviously did not want the F on his transcript. I informed him of his right to appeal after consultation with the dean, and to have a conversation with the chair of the Committee on Courses.

· On February 21 I was approached by a group of Interfaith Workers to use campus facilities for their work. I recommended that the dean’s office take up regular negotiations with the group, adding in a memo to the files “I don’t think I am the person to be doing this [negotiation] because the thing is not really a political matter.”

· On April 26 Donald Coney, the campus librarian, apprehensive of a threatened sit-in, asked me what he should do. I told him I thought the sit-in was only a remote possibility and that he should keep the library open but report to the police any damage in the event that a sit-in occurred.

· On May 21, at the beginning of the Vietnam Day events, I received a call from a local clergyman, Keith Chamberlain, asking whether clergymen could attend as witnesses, because participating students were “afraid that the fraternity crowd will come and make trouble.” I said that the clergy should feel free to do so.

· Mario Savio came to me, unannounced, on March 2, complaining about the university’s taping of rallies; he also demanded to know what kinds of dossiers were being kept on students. I recommended to Meyerson that we stop taping the rallies and also that we should keep only minimal, factually established materials in the student files.

· On June 29 representatives from the Graduate Coordinating Committee (FSM), the Free Student Union, and the American Federation of Teachers came to me to demand space in the Student Union. I turned this down after talking with Student Union officials.
On May 5, I received a call from the campus accounting office, in which an officer, N. M. Mundell, said he was under pressure to mail fellowship payments directly to students (to avoid the inconvenience that students experienced in having to pick them up). Mundell was worried about this, and believed that direct mail would entail mailing checks to students who had dropped out. I supported Mundell in this matter.

As far as I could or can determine, I was not really authorized to deal with or make decisions with respect to any of these matters, with the exception of Savio’s request. But in the absence of clear understandings people came to me, and I sometimes responded to their visits with some kind of decision, which almost immediately became official, even though I had no formal power in the matter. From these kinds of episodes I concluded that a great deal of “authority by default” accrues under conditions of ambiguity.

**Impressions of a Few Characters in the Drama**

During my time in the chancellor’s office I interacted with scores of others on campus—colleagues on the chancellor’s staff and the dean’s office; faculty, both through the Academic Senate channels and individually; student and nonstudent activists; and miscellaneous individual persons who contacted me as representatives of interested organizations or on their own. I would like to record a few memories.

Despite my sensitive position in the Berkeley campus, I almost never communicated with Clark Kerr or any of the members of the board of regents. My friendship with Kerr developed only later. Kerr’s formal communications were mainly with Meyerson; I know he also interacted informally with known faculty colleagues on the Berkeley campus. But as Martin’s assistant I did not communicate with the president’s office, and I went to only one meeting of the board, and that was to make a presentation on academic policy. I did receive phone calls from members of the board of regents occasionally when they were concerned or irate about some campus situation. Because of the basically local (campus) reference of my work, I am not able to comment on such interesting “higher-level” questions such as why Meyerson was not appointed as full chancellor, though I, like others, heard all the rumors—that he was too liberal for many regents, that he hurt his chances by pretending to the regents to be
more hard-line than he really was, and that there was a residue of sentiment among some regents that a Jew should not be chancellor. I am not, however, in a position to verify any of these assertions.

**Martin Meyerson**

During the months I worked with Martin I developed the deepest respect and affection for him. He was a committed academic and intellectual. Some might have considered him too much so, because he was sometimes thought to intellectualize unduly about the demanding practical conditions around him. I never found that a fault. I found him an extremely intelligent and sensitive man with full commitment to the highest values of the academy. His bent was to take the high academic road, although he had a realistic political sense as well. His leadership skills were impressive, and I have always marveled how he held the loyalty of so many different groups in the faculty. In general he respected others, and the two of us developed a relationship of the greatest mutual respect. We interacted easily and had very few disagreements. He was free in his expressions of gratitude for my service. He brought me easily and frequently into his family. He had two other special assistants, Robert O’Neill from Boalt Law School on legal matters and Dale Jorgenson of the economics department on issues of educational reform. But because almost everything was fraught with politics in those months, Martin and I developed the closest and most intimate relationship. I felt that we were a very close two-person group under constant threat.

Under such circumstances, those under fire often develop an attitude that has been called “groupthink,” a bunker mentality that identifies who are one’s friends and who are one’s enemies, rigidifies that outlook, shuts out information that is inconsistent or unfriendly, and rejects others who do not appear to be fully on board (see chapter 3). Although Martin and I shared likes and dislikes, we never fell into such an attitude. It was almost as though we didn’t have time to do so. That mentality certainly developed in the last crisis months of the Strong administration, and I saw evidence of it in the beleaguered inner circle of the Heyns administration (of which I was not a member, even though I was in his administration for two years.)

Martin had a keen sense of humor and a playful side. We could always joke about the grimmest moments and situations. At one moment in the spring he asked me to head a little committee of three, which he called the Committee on Pieces of Paper. We gathered all the communications
that go out to students each year from the library, the registrar’s office, the Office of the Dean of Students, the financial aid office, and the housing office. He asked us to analyze their content and tone. In doing so, we concluded that these messages revealed a preoccupation with rules and sanctions if rules were broken (you cannot graduate if you haven’t paid your library fines), which together made an unfriendly, nonsupportive, distrustful impression. As chair of this little group I wrote up some recommendations for making these communications more humane and submitted them to Martin. As far as I know the report disappeared almost immediately and has never been heard of since.

Martin could also be teased. I would sometimes tell him that he would go down in history as a great Puritan moral guardian, à la Oliver Cromwell, for his accomplishments in rooting out obscenity on the campus. Then I would say, no, that’s wrong, you will be regarded more like Pierre Mèndes-France, who did the right, necessary, and dirty work of extracting France from Algeria during his brief premiership in 1954–55, then was crucified for his good deed. I saw Martin’s humor fail him only once, on April Fools Day, 1965, when I wrote him a spoof memo reporting an unbelievably hostile phone call from a feared member of the board of regents. Martin took it literally and became very alarmed. I had to spend some time apologizing for the tasteless jest.

About a year after he left the chancellor’s office Martin was appointed president of the State University New York at Buffalo and later took on the presidency of the University of Pennsylvania in 1971. We lost close touch with one another, though he did attempt unsuccessfully too hire me at Penn at one point, and our paths crossed from time to time in the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and elsewhere. When we did meet we always fell into the warmest of reminiscences. When he died in June 2007, I was greatly saddened.

Arthur Ross

As chair of the Emergency Executive Committee, Ross was a source of bedrock support for the Meyerson administration and managed to engineer the same support from the rest of the committee and to a large degree from the remainder of the faculty. He and I had a very good and cordial working relationship, marred only by Ross’s occasional outbursts of hostility and punitiveness toward the student activists that I believed to be excessive and unhelpful. I frequently described him to Martin as “our Irish cop.”
Richard Hafner

As public affairs officer, Richard Hafner was the steadiest, most sensitive, most dedicated to and protective of the campus of anyone I knew. We came to like one another immediately and discovered how many outlooks we shared in common. Because I so often felt that the chancellor’s office resembled a military high command post, I dubbed him “General Hafner,” and the label has stuck ever since. I also teased him for being the only public relations officer in the country whose primary interest was to keep the university’s name out of the news. For years afterward I would drift into his office to take the pulse of the campus, especially when it was in trouble. Like war veterans, we have remained steadfast friends ever since. Later I also became good friends with Ray Colvig, the public information officer, who also helped see me through the crises.

Mario Savio and Other Activists

I had every reason to dislike Savio because he was the perceived and, in many respects, the actual leader of the group that was a constant thorn in our side, and because he broke into abusive tirades at me on many occasions. Despite this, he would let down his guard from time to time and reveal a sensitive and humane side. He was the only one of the lot whom I liked personally, though I never showed those feelings to him. The man experienced great unhappiness subsequently—an autistic child, a divorce, bouts of mental illness, a history of heart problems. He died in 1996 at the age of fifty-five. At the news of his death I experienced some quiet remorse.

I came to regard Art Goldberg as abusive, though I was able to have some feeling of sympathy for him when he led a small minority of the FSM Steering Committee into the morass of the obscenity situation and thereby did so much to destroy the movement. Steve Weissman was the smartest of the activists, capable of some objectification of the political situation, but partly because he was so smart I did not trust him at all. Martin Roysher was a kind of courier of the Steering Committee who frequently brought messages, reports, and demands to me and felt me out on one issue or another; he had a demeanor that was so polite and ingratiating that I couldn’t trust him, either. For reasons revealed above, I regarded Jerry Rubin as thoroughly opportunistic and manipulative. As for the remainder of the activists with whom I came into contact, it was difficult to get to know, much less develop any kind of relationship.
with, any of them, because they were always in an official protesting posture, and, as representative of the chancellor’s office, I had assume a posture, too.

THE DAILY ROUND

It is difficult to characterize a “typical day” in my life during my months in the chancellor’s office, because each day brought unanticipated events, situations, or concerns that had to be dealt with by a phone call, a personal meeting, a letter, or a consultation with the chancellor or others on the campus. Those alone were usually enough to occupy all my time. In addition, I also had to lecture three times a week and meet students in office hours for my theory course; meet with individual graduate students whom I was supervising; dart off for a psychoanalytic hour four times a week; tend to the editorial duties of the American Sociological Review (mostly after hours); and pick up my children every Wednesday afternoon and every weekend. Needless to say, my ongoing scholarly research ground to a complete halt during these months. I was under great stress the whole time, but the pace of events was so rapid-fire that I didn’t have much time to indulge myself in responses to stress. Nevertheless, over the years I have paused and wondered occasionally not only why I took on this assignment but also how I was able to do it. I have no definitive answers for that final question either. What comes to mind, however, is Martin’s comment at the moment of his announced resignation in March 1965: “Whatever these last months have been, they have not been boring” (San Francisco Chronicle, March 11, 1965). I also know that those months were the most educational and exciting of my life.

REFERENCES