1. The Political Economy of Migration in an Era of Globalization

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At the dawn of the twenty-first century all industrially developed nations in the world have become countries of immigration, whether or not they choose to recognize it. As a result, policies that govern the number, characteristics, and terms under which foreigners enter a country have become salient policy and political issues worldwide. Traditional immigrant-receiving nations (e.g., the United States, Canada, and Australia) have long histories of legislation to address issues surrounding immigration, settlement, and integration. Newer countries of immigration (e.g., Germany, Austria, and France) are still searching for appropriate legal, administrative, and political mechanisms to control and regulate mass immigration. The very newest nations of immigration (e.g., Italy, Spain, and Ireland) have been forced to build a body of law and civil procedure virtually from scratch. Certain newly industrialized countries (NICs) of East and Southeast Asia and the Middle East (e.g., Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Singapore) have avoided an “immigration policy” altogether, preferring rather to import foreigners strictly as workers and not recognizing any rights for them as residents or citizens.

Whatever a country’s specific history, it is clear that the formulation of policies to regulate the entry, residence, and departure of foreigners will loom large in this century. The need for enlightened, well-reasoned, and efficacious policies to govern immigration has never been greater. Since enlightened policy begins with an objective understanding of the social and economic forces responsible for the phenomenon under consideration, I begin this chapter by outlining a general theoretical explanation for contemporary immigration derived from a recent review of the world research literature. I then consider the role of the state in shaping immigrant flows and describe the sorts of policy actions that are likely to be attempted in the
coming decades. After outlining the likely consequences of these actions, I suggest a more efficacious approach to immigration policy that might be followed by liberal democratic regimes seeking to manage immigration humanely in an era of expanding trade and globalization. I conclude with an assessment of the research that is still needed to guide nations toward more effective and enlightened immigration policies.

WHY IMMIGRATION HAPPENS

Most policymakers and citizens in developed countries think they know why foreigners seek to enter their nations. Standards of living are low in developing countries and high in the developed world, and by migrating between the two poor migrants can expect to realize a net gain in their material well-being. In economic terms, migrants in the developing world are thought to make a cost-benefit calculation that weighs the projected costs of moving against the expected returns, both monetary and otherwise, from living and working in a developed country. Since this balance is large and positive for most inhabitants of the Third World, according to this reasoning they rationally choose to emigrate, thus accounting for high rates of population movement between developing and developed nations.

Unfortunately, reality is more complicated than this scenario suggests. A decade ago my colleagues and I (Massey et al. 1998) undertook a comprehensive review of theories purporting to account for international migration. We evaluated each theory against research conducted in the world’s various international migration systems to discern the degree of support for its propositions. Based on this review we proposed a synthetic theoretical explanation for the emergence and persistence of international migration in the contemporary world. We focused on six bodies of theory: neoclassical economics (Todaro 1976), the new economics of labor migration (Stark 1991), segmented labor market theory (Piore 1979), world systems theory (Sassen 1988), social capital theory (Massey, Goldring, and Durand 1994), and the theory of cumulative causation (Massey 1990). Based on the empirical review of the degree of support for propositions derived from each theory, we then developed a synthetic theoretical explanation for the emergence and persistence of international migration at the dawn of the twenty-first century.

We concluded that international migration originates in the social, economic, and political transformations that accompany the expansion of capitalist markets into nonmarket or premarket societies (as hypothesized under world systems theory). In the context of a globalizing economy, the
entry of markets and capital-intensive production methods into peripheral nonmarket or premarket economies disrupts existing social and economic arrangements and brings about the widespread displacement of people from customary livelihoods, creating a mobile population of wage laborers who actively search for new ways of achieving economic sustenance. Studies consistently show that international migrants do not come from poor, isolated places that are disconnected from world markets, but from regions and nations that are undergoing rapid change as a result of their incorporation into global trade, information, and production networks. In the short run, international migration does not stem from a lack of economic development, but from development itself.

One means by which people displaced from traditional livelihoods seek to assure their economic well-being is by selling their services on emerging national and international labor markets (neoclassical economics). Because wages are generally higher in urban than in rural areas, much of this process of labor commodification is expressed in the form of rural-to-urban migration. This movement occurs even when the probability of obtaining an urban job is low, because when multiplied by high urban wages, the low employment probabilities still yield expected incomes above those prevailing in rural areas, where wages and employment are both low. According to the neoclassical model, if the difference between incomes expected in urban and rural sectors exceeds the costs of movement between them, as is typical, people migrate to cities to reap higher lifetime earnings.

Wages are even higher, of course, in developed countries overseas, and the larger size of these international wage differentials inevitably prompts some people displaced in the course of economic development to offer their services on international labor markets by moving abroad for work. In developing countries, labor markets—both rural and urban—are volatile, characterized by wide oscillations and structural limitations that render them unable to absorb streams of workers being displaced from precapitalist or noncapitalist sectors. Since national insurance markets are rudimentary and government unemployment insurance programs are limited or nonexistent, households cannot adequately protect themselves from risks to well-being stemming from their under- or unemployment. Thus, the lack of access to unemployment insurance creates an incentive for families to self-insure by sending one or more members overseas for work. By allocating members to different labor markets in multiple geographic regions—rural, urban, and foreign—a household can diversify its labor portfolio and reduce risks to income, as long as conditions in the various labor markets are weakly or negatively correlated.
Household members who remain behind to participate in the ongoing structural transformation of agriculture, meanwhile, lack access to insurance markets for crops and futures. As households shift from subsistence to commercial farming, they are forced to adopt new production methods that make use of untested technologies, unfamiliar crops, and untried inputs. As they plunge into the unknown world of production for the market rather than self-consumption, the lack of insurance or futures markets leaves agrarian households vulnerable to economic disaster should these new methods fail, providing yet another incentive for them to self-insure against risk through international migration. Should crops fail or commodity prices fall precipitously, households with at least one worker employed overseas will not be left without a means of subsistence.

Developing countries also lack well-developed markets for capital and consumer credit. Families seeking to engage in new forms of agriculture or looking to establish new business enterprises need capital to purchase inputs and begin production. The shift to a market economy also creates new consumer demands for expensive items such as housing, automobiles, electronics, and appliances. The financing of both production and consumption requires rather large amounts of cash, but the weak and poorly developed banking industries characteristic of most developing nations cannot meet the demands for loans and credit, giving households one final motivation for international labor migration. By sending a family member temporarily abroad for work, a household can accumulate savings and overcome failures in capital and consumer credit markets by self-financing production or consumption.

Thus, whereas the rational actor posited by neoclassical economics takes advantage of a temporary geographic disequilibrium in labor markets to move abroad permanently to achieve higher lifetime earnings, the rational actor assumed by the new economics of labor migration seeks to cope with failures in insurance, futures, capital, and credit markets at home by moving abroad temporarily to repatriate earnings in the form of regular remittances or lump-sum transfers. In this way migrant-sending households control risk by diversifying sources of income, and they self-finance production or consumption by acquiring alternate sources of capital.

Direct empirical contrasts between neoclassical economics and the new economics of labor migration are scarce and confined largely to the North American literature, but wherever they have been done, propositions associated with the new economics have proven to be more powerful in explaining the migration behavior of individuals and households. Indeed, wage differentials often do not produce international movement (witness the
lack of movement between south and north within the European Union), and migration often ceases before wage differentials have disappeared (witness the case of Puerto Rico and the United States), outcomes that are difficult (though not impossible) to explain under neoclassical assumptions but which are readily accommodated under the new economics of labor migration. In addition, the massive flows of remittances cataloged around the world (and the uses to which they are put) are anomalous under neoclassical theory but specifically predicted by the new economics.

In sum, a preponderance of evidence from around the world suggests that wage differentials, the favored explanatory factor of neoclassical economics, account for some of the historical and temporal variation in international migration, but that failures in capital, credit, futures, and insurance markets—key factors hypothesized by the new economics of labor migration—create more powerful motivations for movement. In theoretical terms, wage differentials are neither necessary nor sufficient for international migration to occur. Even with equal wages across labor markets, people may have an incentive to migrate if other markets are inefficient or poorly developed. Large-scale international movement is rarely observed in the absence of a wage gap, but the existence of a wage differential still does not guarantee international movement, nor does its absence preclude it.

Whereas the theory of the new economics of labor migration seems to explain well why migrants move between certain countries and not between others, segmented labor market theory and world systems analysis seem to account better for why demand for immigrant labor arises in host societies. While the early phases of economic development in poor nations may create a mobile population seeking to earn more money, self-insure against risk, or self-finance production or consumption, postindustrial patterns of economic growth in wealthy nations yield a bifurcation of labor markets. Whereas jobs in the primary sector provide steady work and high pay for native workers, those in the secondary sector offer low pay, little stability, and few opportunities for advancement, repelling natives and generating a structural demand for immigrant workers (as theorized by segmented labor market theory). The process of labor market bifurcation is most acute in certain global cities, where a concentration of managerial, administrative, and technical expertise leads to a concentration of wealth and a strong ancillary demand for low-wage services (world systems theory). Unable to attract native workers, employers turn to immigrants and often initiate immigrant flows directly through formal recruitment (segmented labor market theory).
Although instrumental in initiating immigration, recruitment becomes less important over time: the same processes of economic globalization that create mobile populations in developing regions, and which generate a demand for their services in global cities, also create links of transportation, communication, as well as politics and culture, to make the international movement of people cheaper, quicker, and easier (world systems theory). Immigration is also promoted by foreign policies and military actions that core developed nations undertake to maintain international security, protect foreign investments, and guarantee access to raw materials, foreign entanglements that create links and obligations which generate ancillary flows of refugees, asylum seekers, and military dependents.

Eventually labor recruitment becomes superfluous, for once begun, immigration displays a strong tendency to continue through the growth and elaboration of migrant networks (social capital theory). The concentration of immigrants in certain destination areas creates a “family and friends” effect that channels immigrants to the same places and facilitates their arrival and incorporation. If enough migrants arrive under the right conditions, an enclave economy may form, which further augments the demand for immigrant workers (segmented labor market theory).

The spread of migratory behavior within sending communities sets off ancillary structural changes, shifting distributions of income and land and modifying local cultures in ways that promote additional international movement. Over time, the process of network expansion itself becomes self-perpetuating because each act of migration creates social infrastructure capable of promoting additional movement (the theory of cumulative causation). As receiving countries implement restrictive policies to counter rising tides of immigrants, they create a lucrative niche into which enterprising agents, contractors, and other middlemen move to create migration-supporting institutions that also serve to connect areas of labor supply and demand, providing migrants with another resource capable of supporting and sustaining international movement (social capital theory).

During the initial phases of emigration from any sending country, the effects of capitalist expansion, market failure, social networks, and cumulative causation dominate in explaining the flows, but as the level of out-migration reaches high levels and the costs and risks of international movement drop, movement is increasingly determined by international wage differentials (neoclassical economics) and labor demand (segmented labor market theory). As economic growth in sending regions occurs, international wage gaps gradually diminish and well-functioning markets for capital, credit, insurance, and futures come into existence, progres-
sively lowering the incentives for emigration. If these trends continue, the
country ultimately becomes integrated into the international economy as
a developed, capitalist society, whereupon it undergoes a migration transi-
tion: net out-migration progressively ceases and the nation itself becomes
a net importer of labor. Historically, this migratory transition took about
eight or nine decades in European nations (Hatton and Williamson 1998);
but recent evidence from East Asian nations such as Taiwan and Korea
suggests that it may now be compressed into as little as three or four
decades (Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002). What determines the length
of the transition is how long it takes a nation to build a capitalist economy
with well-functioning markets, not just for labor but for capital, credit, and
insurance as well as goods and services.

THE ROLE OF THE STATE

Although the foregoing theoretical account fits reasonably well when ap-
plied to explicate patterns and processes of international migration through-
out the world, considerable variation between nations stems from the fact
that governments attempt to intervene in transnational flows to influence
the numbers and characteristics of immigrants. Immigration policy is the
outcome of a political process through which competing interests interact
within bureaucratic, legislative, judicial, and public arenas to influence the
flow of immigrants. Shughart, Tollison, and Kimenyi (1986) identify three
key interest groups in the political competition to formulate immigration
policy: workers, capitalists, and landowners. Workers want high wages and
struggle politically to limit the supply of labor, pressuring politicians to
pass more restrictive laws and to more strictly enforce them. Capitalists
favor expanding the labor supply to reduce wages and keep labor markets
flexible. They pressure politicians to pass more expansive legislation and
relax the enforcement of restrictions. Capitalists are joined by landowners
in this effort, as the latter favor immigration as a means of increasing rents.
Foreman-Peck (1992) argues that labor must also be differentiated along
skill lines. Because immigrants take mostly unskilled jobs, it is unskilled
native workers who lose the most when immigration expands, whereas
owners of complementary factors of production (skills as well as capital and
land) can be expected to gain through immigration.

Building on these efforts, Timmer and Williamson (1998) developed
a comprehensive theoretical model of policy determination and tested it
using time series data on immigration policies in five countries between
1860 and 1929. Their analysis revealed that shifts in immigration policy
had little to do with the political environment, the relative number or quality of immigrants, or with most macroeconomic circumstances. Rather, the strongest and most consistent influence on immigration policy came from the relative wages of unskilled workers. As the earnings of unskilled workers declined relative to average income, countries tended to adopt more restrictive immigration policies. Less restriction was associated with periods of ideological commitment to free trade, although the effect was not as strong or consistent as that associated with relative wages.

Whereas Timmer and Williamson focused exclusively on national policies in the industrial era before 1930, Meyers (2002) analyzed U.S. policies in both the industrial and postindustrial periods. He hypothesized that the restrictiveness of immigration policies was determined by six basic factors. First was the economy, with downturns generating greater pressures for restriction. Second was the volume of immigration, with relatively high levels yielding greater pressures for restriction. Third was social conformity, which he measured by an index that coded limitations on freedom of expression. He argued that broader shifts toward social conformity were associated with a reaction against immigrants as aliens, and, hence, restrictive immigration policies. For his fourth factor, foreign relations, Meyers created a dummy variable to indicate years corresponding to the failure of anticommunist movements overseas and to peak years of the Cold War conflict. He hypothesized that Cold War tensions would be associated with relatively expansive immigration policies. Fifth, he argued that industrial unrest, measured by the frequency of strikes, would yield moves toward restriction. Finally, Meyers entertained the possibility that the political party in power might make a difference.

From 1890 through 1989, Meyers found that restrictiveness was unrelated to the frequency of strikes or to the party in power, but as strongly and positively related to the unemployment rate, the volume of immigration, and the degree of social conformity. It was also strongly and negatively related to Cold War tensions. When he divided the sample into industrial and postindustrial periods, moreover, he found very different patterns in the two epochs. Before 1945, immigration policy was tied principally to unemployment, the volume of immigration, and social conformity. Afterward unemployment fell substantially in significance and policy came to be dominated by foreign policy considerations, social conformity, and, again, the volume of immigration. The relative frequency of strikes had no effect on policymaking, nor did which party was in power (Democrats or Republicans).

After reviewing this and other evidence, I came to three basic conclu-
sions about the determinants of immigration policy in receiving societies (Massey 1999). First, even though doubt remains about precisely which economic conditions are most relevant, it is clear that a country’s macroeconomic health plays an important role in shaping its immigration policy. Periods of economic distress are associated with moves toward restriction, whereas economic booms are associated with expansive policies. Second, immigration policy is sensitive to the volume of international flows, with higher rates of immigration generally leading to restrictive policies, even though in the long run such shifts may be mitigated as a growing stock of immigrants exerts its influence within specific legislative districts (an effect obviously limited to representative democracies that enfranchise immigrants). Third, immigration policy is associated with broader ideological currents in society, tending toward restriction during periods of social conformity and toward expansion during periods of support for open trade and also during periods of intense geopolitical conflict along ideological lines, such as the Cold War.

These conclusions suggest that in the current century developed countries will increasingly move to restrict in-migration from the developing world. The past two decades have witnessed a rising volume of immigration, increasing inequality, and, outside of North America, persistent unemployment, precisely the conditions that prior work has shown to be associated with the implementation of harsher immigration restrictions. At the same time, the end of the Cold War has eliminated a major foreign relations motivation for developed countries to accept international migrants from poor countries. Only the continued hegemony of free trade ideology would seem to augur for more open immigration policies; but on balance recent economic and political trends suggest a more restrictive immigration policy regime in the next century. Although passport controls have been eliminated among states within the European Union, and while most OECD countries do not require visas for short term travel among themselves, since the late 1980s all have moved forcefully to impede the entry of migrants from developing countries.

THE EFFICACY OF RESTRICTION

The foregoing review suggests a postmodern paradox in the early twenty-first century: while the global economy unleashes powerful forces that produce larger and more diverse flows of migrants from developing to developed countries, it simultaneously creates conditions within developed countries that promote the implementation of restrictive immigration
policies by increasing the share of foreign-born residents, raising levels of inequality, and increasing economic insecurity. The central question for analysts seeking to understand the future of immigration is which set of forces will prevail: those promoting the restriction of international migration, or those promoting its expansion.

During the period from 1945 to 1975, immigration policies in receiving countries reflected the prevailing political and economic conditions and were relatively expansive. Rapid economic growth, falling inequality, and relatively low rates of international population movement kept immigration largely off the public agenda, and in most developed countries policy was formulated through a client politics of negotiation between bureaucrats and special interests. Immigration policy took the form of decisions made about temporary labor migration and the admission of political refugees. Since 1975, however, as the volume of immigration has risen, the presence of immigrants has become more permanent, economic growth has slowed, and wage inequality has increased, policymaking has progressively shifted from the bureaucratic to the public arena, and from client to electoral politics.

The politicization of immigration policy has created difficult dilemmas for political parties and politicians, because the interests favoring and opposing immigration do not fall neatly along party lines. On one side are special interests such as employers, ethnic lobbies, and humanitarian and libertarian groups that favor immigration; on the other side are nativist politicians, environmentalists, the general public, and unions who oppose it—both sides operating against a backdrop of globalization that encourages international movement. Given these alignments, Cornelius, Martin, and Hollifield (1994) noted the emergence of two common policy trends throughout the developed world: a convergence in the policy instruments chosen for immigration control and a widening gap between the goals served by these instruments and actual immigration outcomes.

In recent years, despite increasingly restrictive policies, virtually all developed countries have come to accept a large (though varying) number of “unwanted” immigrants (Joppke 1998). Even though most countries have enacted formal policies to prevent the entry and settlement of immigrants, liberal democratic states have found their abilities to enforce these restrictions constrained by several factors. First is the global economy itself, which lies beyond the reach of individual national governments but which generates structural transformations and unleashes socioeconomic forces that tend to promote large-scale international population movements (Sassen 1996, 1998). Second is the internal constitutional order of
liberal democracies, reinforced by the emergence of a universal human rights regime that protects the rights of immigrants and makes it difficult for political elites to address the racial or ethnic concerns of citizens (Hollifield 1992; Cornelius, Martin, and Hollifield 1994; Freeman 1992, 1994, 1995, 1998; Jacobson 1997).

Although rights-based policies have taken different forms in different countries, the net effect has been similar in liberal democracies: increased civil rights for immigrants, an outcome that significantly undermines the capacity of states to control immigration. As Cornelius, Martin, and Hollifield (1994: 10) note, “it is the confluence of markets and rights that explains much of the contemporary difficulty of immigration control in Europe and the United States” (emphasis in original). In many countries, universal human rights are reinforced by moral obligations that stem from specific histories of colonialism, guest worker recruitment, or Cold War politics (Joppke 1998).

A third constraint on the restriction of immigration is the existence in most representative democracies of an independent judiciary that is shielded from the political pressures to which elected politicians must respond. Immigrants and their advocates turn to the courts to combat restrictive policies implemented by the legislative and executive branches. According to Joppke (1998b), the rise of a liberal doctrine of human rights is not sufficient to protect the rights of immigrants and thwart governmental efforts at restriction. There must also be a means of guaranteeing those rights within a specific national polity, and this typically requires a written constitution and a strong, independent judiciary.

Faced with mounting public pressure to control immigration, but with the root causes of international migration lying largely beyond their reach in the forces of the global economy, and with formal policies of restriction under increasing moral and judicial challenge, politicians in many developed countries have turned increasingly to symbolic policy instruments to create an appearance of control (Calavita 1992; Cornelius, Martin, and Hollifield 1994; Andreas 1998a). Repressive policies such as vigorous border enforcement, the bureaucratic harassment of aliens, and the restriction of immigrants’ access to social services may or may not be effective, but they all serve an important political purpose: they are visible, concrete, and generally popular with citizen voters (Espenshade and Calhoun 1993; Espenshade and Hempstead 1996). Forceful restrictive actions enable otherwise encumbered public officials to appear decisive, tough, and engaged in combating the rising tide of immigration.

Little research has been done outside North America to evaluate the
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The Political Economy of Migration

The efficacy of such policies, although it is clear that, despite growing restrictions, undocumented migration is on the rise worldwide (see Massey et al. 1998). The efficacy of restriction, however, is likely to vary substantially from country to country depending on five basic factors: the relative power and autonomy of the state bureaucracy; the relative number of people seeking to immigrate; the degree to which political rights of citizens and noncitizens are constitutionally guaranteed; the relative independence of the judiciary; and the existence and strength of an indigenous tradition of immigration. The interplay of these five factors produces a continuum of state capacity to implement restrictive immigration policies, as illustrated in Table 1.1.

At one extreme are centralized authoritarian governments that lack an independent judiciary and a well-established regime of constitutional protections, and that have no tradition of immigration, as in the oil-exporting countries of the Persian Gulf. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, for example, are homogeneous Islamic societies led by hereditary monarchs who preside over centralized, nondemocratic states. Officials in the Gulf States are thus in a strong position to enforce restrictive immigration policies, and laws and regulations governing migration within the region are consequently much harsher than those prevailing in Europe or North America (Dib 1988; Sell 1988). None of the Gulf States recognizes the right to asylum, allows residence without a job, recognizes a right of family reunification, guarantees legal access to housing, social benefits, or medical care, or grants migrants any right of appeal with respect to decisions about their status; all permit deportation at any time by administrative decree (Dib 1988). Although migrants may be incorporated into the economic organization of the Gulf States, they are explicitly excluded from their social and political structures (Weiner 1982).

Next on the continuum of state capacity to restrict immigration are democratic states in Western Europe and East Asia with strong, centralized bureaucracies, but with moderate demand for entry and little native tradition of immigration. Political elites in these countries can expect to meet with some success in restricting immigration, but, as described above, immigrants nonetheless have important resources—moral, political, and legal—to forestall state actions and evade legal restrictions on entry and settlement. Next on the scale of state capacity are the nations of Southern Europe and South Asia, which likewise lack strong traditions of immigration but which also lack strong centralized bureaucracies capable of imposing their will efficiently throughout society. Immigrants to Spain, Italy, Greece, Thailand, or Malaysia thus have considerably more leeway to
overcome barriers, and the states have less capacity to enforce restrictive immigration policies and bureaucratic procedures.

Finally, at the opposite end of the spectrum from the Gulf States are countries that lack a highly centralized state and that have strong traditions of individual liberty and long-standing cultures of immigration. Such countries as Canada and Australia have well-developed social and political infrastructures to support immigrants, protect their rights, and advance their interests. The most extreme case in this category is obviously the United States, which faces an intense demand for immigrant entry and has a deeply ingrained commitment to individual rights, a long-standing history of resistance to central authority, a strong written constitution protecting individual rights, and an independent and powerful judiciary. In the United States immigration is not simply a historical fact, it is part of the national myth, and the very idea of a national personal identification system is anathema.

The imposition of restrictive policies in the United States does not appear to have been effective in limiting either documented or undocumented migration. Despite successive amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act intended to make it more difficult for migrants from developing countries to enter the United States legally, the volume of legal immigration has continued to grow, rising from an average of 330,000 per year during the 1960s, to 450,000 per year during the 1970s, 734,000 per year during the 1980s, and finally exceeding 1 million per year during the 1990s (U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service 1997).

Since 1986, the United States also has embarked increasingly on a repressive policy toward undocumented migrants, criminalizing the hiring of unauthorized workers, denying legal as well as illegal migrants access to selected social benefits, increasing inspections at work sites, and expanding the personnel and resources devoted to border enforcement (Heyman 1995; Dunn 1996). Yet a comprehensive analysis by Massey, Durand, and Malone (2002) indicates that these measures have not deterred undocumented migrants from leaving for the United States, discouraged former undocumented migrants from making return trips, prevented illegal migrants from crossing the border, encouraged settled migrants to return home, or prevented employers from hiring unauthorized workers.

A NEW APPROACH TO IMMIGRATION POLICY

Few of the causal processes underlying mass immigration are easily controllable using the policy levers normally available to public officials. Gov-
ernments can do little about the penetration of markets into developing regions of the world, or about the progressive incorporation of peripheral areas into global trade, information, and production networks anchored in world cities. Likewise, reducing a demand for unskilled labor that stems from the structural segmentation of the labor market would require a wholesale re-engineering of society that most political leaders find daunting, and state policies cannot prevent social networks and other transnational structures from arising to support international migration. Trade agreements such as NAFTA generally set in motion structural changes in sending regions that promote international movement while creating new links of transportation and communication and new social connections that make migration between trading nations easier.

To date, state efforts at immigration control have conceptualized international movement mainly as a cost-benefit decision. By patrolling the border, punishing employers who hire unauthorized workers, barring immigrants from social programs, and limiting the rights of the foreign born to housing, health care, schooling, and employment, officials seek to drive up the costs and lower the benefits of international migration, in hopes of reducing the incentives for entry. Such repressive policies, however, do not address the broader structural causes of international migration, and they focus on income maximization to the exclusion of other motives for international movement such as risk diversification and capital acquisition.

The failure of states to recognize the complex, multicausal nature of contemporary international migration yields the worst of all possible worlds: continuing immigration combined with lower wages, poorer working conditions, increased crime, more disease, and greater social marginalization. Repressive policies seeking to regulate immigration by influencing the costs and benefits of immigration are likely to fail. As long as the world’s powerful economies are incorporated within global networks, they will tend to receive international migrants. In both theoretical and practical terms it has proved difficult to lower barriers to the movement of capital, information, and goods while at the same time raising barriers to the movement of workers, as immigration is simply the labor component of globalizing factor markets.

Rather that trying to stop international migration through repressive means, a more enlightened approach might be to recognize immigration as a natural outgrowth of a developing country’s insertion into the global economy and then work to maximize its desirable features while working to minimize its negative consequences. While skilled and educated workers would be welcomed whatever their country of origin, repressive enforce-
ment actions against unskilled and undocumented immigrants would be reserved for those from nations otherwise unconnected to the receiving country by virtue of trade or investment relations. For immigrants coming from nations otherwise connected via well-established flows of capital, information, goods, and culture, policymakers would work to achieve outcomes that serve the interests of the receiving society rather than simply trying to suppress the flow. These would include policies to promote shorter stays, limit settlement, and encourage return migration; to protect internal wages and labor standards; and to encourage economic development in sending regions.

Rather than trying to suppress a natural flow and inviting counterproductive outcomes, an alternative is to accept immigration as inevitable and to design programs to enhance immigrants’ connections to the sending society and to maximize their propensity for return migration. These goals could be accomplished in a variety of ways. One is to make temporary work visas freely available, so that migrants can reasonably expect to migrate again should their economic circumstances warrant, thus lowering the incentives to stay on in the receiving country for fear of not being able to return. A portion of immigrants’ wages might be held back and only paid to a foreign bank account upon return to the sending country. Several Asian nations, notably South Korea and the Philippines, have successfully harnessed immigrant earnings in this fashion. Interest rates might be subsidized in foreign accounts to provide a return above the market, thus luring back migrants and their money. Finally, since migrants are often motivated by lack of access to insurance and capital, destination countries might enter into cooperative agreements with sending nations to establish public programs and private businesses to meet these needs.

With state resources freed up from unproductive attempts to suppress immigration, receiving countries could increase internal inspections of work sites in sectors that employing large concentrations of immigrants, not to round up and deport illegal aliens but to assure employers’ compliance with minimum wage laws, social insurance legislation, occupational safety and health regulations, tax codes, and mandated fair labor standards. This enforcement strategy has two advantages for the receiving society: it lowers the demand for immigrant workers by preventing employers from using them to avoid expensive labor regulations, and it prevents the formation of an underground, clandestine economy that puts downward pressure on the economic and social well-being of natives and immigrants alike.

Finally, since much international migration is brought about by the displacement of people from traditional livelihoods and an absence of well-
developed markets for insurance, capital, and consumer credit, an indispensable part of any enlightened immigration policy should be the creation of binational programs to enhance markets and promote economic growth and development in sending regions. Some of the initiatives already proposed to encourage return migration simultaneously achieve these goals: namely, the creation of social insurance programs and development banks accessible to former migrants. Funds for these enterprises might be raised through a special tax levied on migrant workers and their employers. Developed nations might also work more broadly to finance development programs and promote balanced economic growth within the nation as a whole.

FUTURE RESEARCH NEEDS

The globalization of capital and labor markets and the internationalization of production pose strong challenges to the very concept of the nation-state and the idea of national sovereignty itself, requiring people to move beyond nineteenth-century conceptions of territory and citizenship and to expand them to embrace the transnational spaces that are currently being formed around the world through massive immigration. These changes are especially daunting because they will occur at a time when the forces of globalization are also producing downward pressure on wages and incomes in developed nations. Because immigrants and immigration policies will necessarily be discussed in a very heated and politicized environment, social scientists have special responsibilities to policymakers and the public.

First, they must establish the basic facts about immigrants and immigration. Among the three fundamental fields of demography—fertility, mortality, and migration—the latter remains the least well-developed methodologically. Unlike birth or death, mobility is more of a social than a biological event. The definition of a move requires fixing a line and agreeing that it has been crossed; but where that line is drawn geographically and administratively is very much a social and political construction. Although international migration, by definition, involves crossing a national boundary, the simple act of boundary-crossing does not necessarily mean that immigration has occurred, for it depends on who is doing the crossing and what their intentions are.

Consider, for example, two men of the same age from the same town in Poland who cross the border into Germany. Both speak Polish exclusively and neither has ever before been abroad; yet if one person has a grandparent born in Germany, he will be classified by state authorities as a returning German while the other will be considered a foreigner and possibly an
immigrant. He is only “possibly” an immigrant, because it also depends on the purpose of the border-crossing. If it is to visit relatives for a short time and return, the state classifies him as a tourist. If his purpose is to reunite with a German bride and settle in Germany, he will be a legal immigrant. If he tells authorities he is just visiting but then violates his tourist visa by taking a construction job in Berlin, he will be considered by the state to be an undocumented, illegal, or unauthorized migrant. The conceptual problems multiply when one considers that intentions may change over time: the “returning” German may discover he dislikes Germany and goes home; the sincere tourist may encounter an unexpected job opportunity and decide to stay; or the undocumented migrant may marry a German woman and legalize to appear suddenly as an “immigrant.”

Obviously, where and how a state’s politicians and bureaucrats choose to draw geographic, political, and administrative boundaries determines the number of immigrants and their characteristics. Although demographers have developed objective criteria to define international migrants (see Zlotnik 1987), no country has adopted them and wide variations exist between countries in the way that migration statistics are tallied and reported. Under these circumstances, the responsibility of researchers is threefold: first, to pressure national statistical offices and census bureaus to adopt scientific standards for collecting and tabulating data on international migration; second, to disentangle the government statistics that are reported to reveal the objective numbers and characteristics of international migrants as well as their patterns and processes of assimilation; and third, to go beyond official statistics to develop independent and more detailed sources of data on international population movements.

In addition to establishing the facts about immigration, researchers should test the various theoretical explanations comparatively across nations and migratory systems to determine which theoretical explanations prevail under what circumstances and why. Although we concluded (in Massey et al. 1998) that alternative theoretical explanations were mostly complementary rather than competing, we were not able to state with any precision which theories were most important empirically in accounting for variations in the number, rate, and characteristics of immigrants over time and whether and why different theories may account more or less well for immigration patterns in different times and places. Relatively little research has been done to compare the strength of effects hypothesized under various theories, and what little has been done is confined to the North American system, and within that system, mainly to the case of Mexico-U.S. migration. More research needs to be done on immigration in
different countries and systems, and more of it needs to compare alternative hypotheses directly within the same statistical analysis.

Finally, researchers not only have an obligation to establish the fundamental facts of international migration and to explain them theoretically, they must also communicate their findings to state officials and the public in ways that are simple and nontechnical yet accurate and intuitively sensible. International migration and the interethnic relations it produces will be among the most important and potentially divisive topics of public debate in the next century, but all too often social scientists confine their writing to professional journals and their speaking to scholarly conferences. As a result, public discussions of immigrants and immigration policy have been dominated by myths, misinformation, and, at times, outright lies that are grounded in ideology rather than scientific understanding. It is the responsibility of social scientists not only to generate knowledge about immigration, but to make sure that it finds its way into the public arena where it can accurately inform debate, and hopefully, yield more enlightened and efficacious policies to regulate the entry and integration of immigrants.

The advent of worldwide international migration in the late twentieth century offers many formidable challenges to scholars and policymakers. Perhaps the most profound of all will be faced by citizens in migrant-receiving countries, who will have to move beyond the state of denial that so often has characterized their immigration policies to date. They must develop an approach that recognizes the inevitability of labor flows within a globalized economy characterized by well-established regional networks of trade, production, investment, and communications. Attempts to suppress population flows that are a natural consequence of a nation’s insertion into these economic networks will not be successful, but they will present grave threats to individual rights, civil liberties, and human dignity.

These are formidable challenges indeed, but they will have to be met, for international migration will surely continue. Barring an international catastrophe of unprecedented proportions, immigration will most likely expand and grow, for none of the causal forces responsible for immigration show any sign of moderating. The market economy is expanding to ever farther reaches of the globe, labor markets in developed countries are growing more segmented, transnational migration and trade networks are expanding, and the power of the nation state is faltering in the face of this transnational onslaught. The twenty-first century is shaping up to be one of globalism, and international migration undoubtedly will figure prominently within it.